Tuesday, 5 May 2015

Refugees and their right to Communcation - AR WACC publication



Refugees and their Right to Communicate -South Asian Perspectives


Content

1. Introduction                                          Page       2
            a. General Introduction 
            b. Introductory Speech by Lennart Kotsalainene, Chief of Mission, UNHCR, New                        Delhi.
            c. Dr Pradip Thomas
            d. Dr Michael Traber

2. State of Refugees in South Asia
            a. Mixed Flows and Massive Flows - Protection and Care Of the Victims of           Forced Migration in South Asia by Ranabir Samadhar
            b. Bhutanese Refugee Representative Repatriation Committee - Bhutanese             Refugee Repatriation and Present Situation Subha
            c. Refugees: The Experience in Bangladesh – Bhumitra Chakma


3. Law and Refugees
            a. International Provisions for Refugees – N Subramanya
            b. Model National  Law on Refugees - Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

4. Human Right Violations and Right to Inform
            a. Human Rights Violations and Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal: Right to     information and Communication - Jagat Mani Acharya
            b. Refugee Women and The Fundamental Inadequacies in Institutional Responses             in South Asia - Paula Banergee
            c. Refugees in their own land - Forced Migrant Women in Srilanka, A struggle       amidst Hope – Paul Newman

5. Media and Refugees          

        a. Bhutanese Refugee Representative Repatriation Committee: Media and Refugees -           Subba
         b.  Communication, Disintegration and The Tamil Refugees in London – by A W     Jebanesan

         c. News Barriers: Reporting on forced migration in times of globalisation by Max      

             Martin           


6. Conclusion
            a. Report on the Consultation
            b. Appendix- Resolution
            c. Names, addresses and e-mails of resource persons and the participants

Refugees and Their Right to Communicate

1. Introduction


Refugees and their Right to Communicate
 A Speech by Lennart, Kotsalainen, Chief of Mission, UNHCR, New Delhi.

            Refugee issue has become globalized and political context has changed (USSR gone and freedom struggle in Africa belongs to the past). All continents produce refugees and have become affected (developments in Europe, former USSR in particular). The refugees move from one continent to another as a result of changes in transportation and communication means. The admission of asylum-seekers and refugees is highly controversial political issue in particularly in Europe and Australia.  The refugee issue has increasingly been connected to migration debate in the developed countries, in particular irregular migration and failure in terms of integration (especially Europe). The security aspects of large refugee movements increasingly a concern (militarization of refugee camps (Zaire/ Tanzania), terrorism). The number of Internally Displaced Peoples (IDP) has grown and exceeds no of refugees world-wide; these issues increasingly linked (e.g. Balkan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka). The media play a major role in globalising the refugee issue


            The management of refugees and IDP movements is increasingly becoming a complex issue. While refugee issue is essentially related to social, humanitarian root causes whereas solutions are often linked to political negotiations (Western Sahara, Sri Lanka). DPA and DPKO are increasingly involved in complex emergencies (Kosovo, Timor, Afghanistan,) and refugee issues are even discussed in the United Nation’s Security Council. The co-ordination of humanitarian actors are difficult with expansion of NGOs and many UN agencies are involved and the response was the establishment of Office of Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) at the global level within the UN and Humanitarian Co-ordinators at country level. No single UN agency is with mandate to deal with IDPs which makes co-ordination necessary. There is an increased role of military (NATO intervention in the Balkans) and humanitarian intervention at International level. There is a gap between humanitarian and development actors, e.g. in post conflict situations.

            The role of UNHCR in India is to provide protection to the refugees and also individual refugee status determination under UNHCR’s mandate. It also enhances the promotion of refugee rights including the adoption of national refugee legislation and India’s accession to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. Finding durable solutions for Afghans refugees; helping voluntary repatriation due to changes in Afghanistan, guiding resettlement to the west, supporting naturalisation for those with Indians spouses and Indian origin Afghans are part of the job of UNHCR. There are attempts to find a durable solution for Sri Lankan Tamil refugees: If peace process successful in Sri Lanka the UNHCR is verifying voluntariness of return during large scale voluntary repatriation.

THE INFORMATION/COMMUNICATION RIGHTS OF REFUGEES IN SOUTH ASIA
Pradip Thomas


Most of you here are experts or at least have extensive knowledge of the situation of refugees and IDPs in South Asia.  So I do not plan to reiterate information that you already know related to the composition, numbers, politics, economics of refugees and IDPs in South Asia, or the geo-political ramifications of the refugee situation in South Asia.  Neither do I plan to deal with the manifold theoretical issues related to Diaspora and migration during this session.

Article 19

What I would like to focus on during this brief presentation is on issues related to the right to communicate as it affects refugees and IDPs.  Article 19, from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) is often used as the basis for derivative understandings of the right to information and communication.  It reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”.  Article 19 does of course apply to all human beings regardless of whether they are citizens of a country or are stateless.  This article has become the basis for a variety of initiatives – at global, regional, national and local levels aimed at ensuring guarantees related to the freedom of expression – a freedom that has been compromised by state censorship, the wilful silencing of persons and communities, corporate silencing, restrictions because of poverty, and by the continuing lack of access and participation of ordinary people in the cultural and communication environments that they inhabit.  In spite of this reality, many institutions, organisations, charters, policy initiatives and advocacy efforts including UNESCO’s controversial MacBride Commission that was instituted in the 1970s to look into the world’s communication problems, the calls for a New World Information Order, the UK-based NGOs Article 19 and Index on Censorship, a variety of right to information campaigns in many parts of the world including India and Thailand, and the People’s Communication Charter, among many other initiatives, have either tacitly or expressedly grounded their terms of reference within Article 19.

Other Limitations to Refugees and their Rights

There is however a major problem with Article 19, a problem that is often glossed over or bypassed.  Article 19 is a non-binding right along with all the other rights expressed in the UDHR.  the UDHR was a resolution of the UN General Assembly.  It did not have the status of a UN Convention of Covenant.  Article 19 essentially functions as a moral right, a statement of intent, a horizon that is worth working towards.  The few countries that have enacted domestic right to information legislations have been guided by the moral force of Article 19.  Article 19 has also been used as a guide within the UN to develop binding conventions such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1976, and its companion treaty, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights (CESCR), 1976 that contain more substantive Articles related to the right to information.  However, the potential import of these provisions have been curbed/limited by a number of caveats that allows states to suspend certain rights in the context of a national emergency, for reason of security, public health or morals.  Unfortunately, one of the rights in the ICCPR that can be suspended by member states is that related to the right to information contained in its Article 19.

A second problematic related to our topic is that neither key international refugee conventions, the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees nor its 1967 Protocol (neither of which, incidentally, have been ratified by governments in South Asia), contain any reference to the information rights of refugees.  I am aware that the Red Cross runs a tracing service that helps link displaced people with family.  Red Cross messages are a principle means of communication between family members separated by conflict.  The mandate of the UNHCR that is based on the 1951 Convention is limited to the provision of physical safety, non-discrimination and subsistence.  It does not cover the information rights of refugees.

Many critics of this convention have argued that it needs to be reformulated in the light of a very different refugee situation prevailing in our world today from that which existed in the immediate aftermath of the second-world war and during the Cold War.  These critics have pointed out that today’s refugee crisis’, unlike Cold War related dislocations that involved refugees usually a family unit, or individuals, involves mass, cross border movements and dislocations, and have also pointed out that the causes for displacement have increased – for instance IDPs who have been created by inter-ethnic, civil and communal conflicts, or are the by-products of mega and small developmental projects, and natural disasters.  Other critics have queried the other than moral validity of the Convention in the light of the fact that countries in South Asia, that are not party to the refugee convention, have nevertheless extended support to certain refugee groups – for instance Tibetans in India.  In other words they have pointed out, that countries like India by not signing the Convention, have been able to take a flexible line on refugees precisely because they have not signed the Convention and are therefore not bound by its statutes.  They also point out that many of the countries that have signed this Convention do not have an enviable track record on refugees.

A third problematic is the fact that governments in South Asia, like most governments in the South, have not enacted domestic legislations related to refugees and for that matter IDPs.  In South Asia, all marginalised citizens, at least nominally, have rights.  While in principle the Indian Constitution does give rights to all people resident in India, in practice these rights accrue to citizens and not to stateless people.  Other specific legislations such as the Protection of Civil Liberties Act, 1976 relate to the protection of specific communities, in this instance, Dalits.  Whether these are Dalits in India, or indigenous people, or women – they are heirs to constitutionally guaranteed rights or are covered by national and international laws.  These marginalised communities have the right to resist their subjugation and demand their basic rights from what is often a habitually recalcitrant state.  But the stateless person has minimal rights.  In fact, as it is clear from Article 2 of the 1951 Convention, every refugee has to abide by the laws and regulations of the country that he/she is a temporary resident of.  Even international human rights law such as the ICCPR in its Article 13 states that ‘aliens’ can be “expelled ...for compelling reasons of national security”.

This apparent unwillingness to enact domestic legislation related to refugees and IDPs is difficult to fathom, especially in the light of major populations of stateless people in every South Asia country, the victims of the frequent inter-country spats in South Asia – Sri Lanka-India, Pakistan-India, Pakistan-Bangladesh, Bangladesh-India, Pakistan-Bangladesh-India, Pakistan-Afghanistan, Nepal-Bhutan.  One of the problems is that stateless people are disadvantaged twice over.  The stateless person, living on no-man’s land, in border zones, in detention camps, as hidden, invisible workers in the formal and informal economy – these people by their circumstances and their hiddenness, are not an acknowledged part of any society, are not ‘legitimate’.  In the light of the war against terrorism and sweeping national security provisions such as that contained in the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 2001 in India, it would seem that stateless people will continue to pay the price for being vulnerable and marginalised.

A fourth problematic is the fact that governments in South Asia are yet to ensure the freedom of information for their citizens let alone for stateless people.  While the India parliament enacted the Freedom of Information Bill 2000, the Government of Pakistan introduced a Freedom of Information Ordinance in 2000 and the Law Commission in Sri Lanka prepared a draft Access to Official Information Act in November 1996, these efforts have been criticised for the many caveats and ‘reasons for suspension’ that have been included in each of these packages.  The Article 19 report Global Trends on the Right to Information: A Survey of South Asia, July 2001 (p.125) lists the following caveats in the Access to Official Information Act in Sri Lanka.  “Access to information may be refused if it pertains to, or adversely affects, one of the following: the economy, personal or commercial privacy; intra-departmental communications; law enforcement; personal safety, a financial institution; geological or geophysical information; privileged information; national defence; foreign policy; or international relations”.

Such broad exceptions make these exercises rather meaningless.  If, as in the case of the Tehelka disclosures in India, official lapses cannot be discussed, made public or the guilty brought to trial, but instead those who exposed the scam are relentlessly harassed and brought to trial, one can only surmise that it is not a serious piece of legislation.  Furthermore a slew of Official Secrecy and now anti-Terrorism legislations have compromised right to information legislations in South Asia.  In any case, the Freedom of Information Bill, 2000 explicitly states in the Prologue that it exists in order “to provide for freedom to every citizen to secure access to information”.  that precludes among others, the rights to information of non-citizens like Bangladeshi Muslims resident in India, Chakma and Hajong tribal refugees resident in Arunachal Pradesh, ad infinitum.  Such exclusions also affect in other national contexts, Bihari Muslims in Bangladesh, Bhutanese of Nepali origin in Nepal and the many categories of the internally displaced throughout South Asia.

The right to information is, as it is defined and legislated in South Asia, a rather restrictive right.  While it does make possible the disclosure of information from public bodies, state departments and the like, the process of getting this information is rather complicated and the onus is placed on the plaintiff.  It also does not include for disclosures from private entities – from the Monsantos, Enrons and their local counterparts in South Asia, thus exonerating a major employer in South Asia.  More worryingly, it explicitly exempts national security apparatuses from the purview of this right.  The move in this direction is a global trend.

The Right to Communicate

The right to communicate however, is a much broader right.  Michael Traber, formerly from WACC and now with the UTC has written extensively on the right to communicate – its philosophy, its liberative core.  While the right to communicate is yet to be recognised by the UN as a human right, for WACC and many other organisations, it remains a fundamental, non-negotiable right.  Why is it non-negotiable?  Because we recognise that communication expressed first and foremost through language is the very basis for our existence as relational human beings – we are what we are because we communicate.  Communication is the basis for relationship, for community, for the sharing of meaning.  Communication is in this sense, always inter-subjective.  The media, important and unique in their own right, are in a real sense technological extensions of the human capacity to communicate.  Every successive technology is in this sense an attempt by human beings to know the world and order it in our image.  One can argue that our right to communicate in a language of our choice is the basis for all rights – food, security, health and education.  The right to language is a fundamental basis of the right to communicate.

One can therefore argue that issues related to the right to language ought to become a priority issue for refugees and IDPs who have little or no access to resources in their own language, to an education in their own language, or to preserve their cultural heritage.  At a similar workshop that covered the same issues in South-East Asia, we were told that non-formal education in Karen dialects in the refugee camps situated on the Thai-Burma border were for the most part carried out by NGOs such as the Burma Border Consortium and Burma Issues.  That Karen refugees in the camps had better access to resources in their own language than Karen IDPs in Burma who have been forced to lead nomadic lives on account of the military.  And that one of the ways in which SLORC deals with the few groups not involved in negotiation is by denying them the use of their language.  There are other issues related to language.  For instance, the availability of regular information in the mother tongue of refugees and IDPS from family back at home, on the political and civil situation, on their status.  This type of information is absolutely critical to the cultural continuity of communities who have been displaced and have been forced by circumstances to live for long periods of time in unfamiliar environments.

The obverse of communication is silence.  Of course, silence has its own merits but he wilful silencing of people and communities goes against the fundamental principle of communication as a right – against the axiom that we, as individuals, are born to communicate.  The right to communication starts from the individual.  The freedom of expression is a minimum but important right in the plethora of claims under the right to communicate.  That freedom, best-expressed in Article 19 of the UDHR, holds that all human beings have the right to hold, impart and receive information.  But the right to communicate goes much further.  For it recognises that it would be a limitation to have the freedom to express but not have access to the channels of communication – that are the means by which one can tell one’s story to the world.  Access allows one to participate in the making of meaning, to contribute to and shape the cultural environments in which we all live.  This is near impossible for most of us today -–for whether you live in this part of Bangalore, in Colombo or Dhaka, our cultural environments are beyond our control.  Access is often denied by reasons of economics, politics and culture.  The vast majority of people in South Asia do not have access to the channels of communication because of their poverty.  Recent policy changes related to the media in South Asia – the lifting of restrictions to cross media ownership for example and the greater concentration of media ownership are bound to accentuate these divides.  Our cultural environments are suffused by a variety of communication channels that are owned, in most part, by rapidly shrinking coterie of cultural industrialists and industries.  We rarely have the means to tell our stories or to shape the cultural environments in which we live.

The Representation of Refugees

If this is a reality for people like us, it must be a nightmare for refugees and IDPs who often exist beyond the reach of civil society.  Refugee camps are often situated in remote or in between areas – making access impossible.  If these camps are close to towns or other habitations, the chances are that refugees will either be envied and hated by local people for the shelter and food security that they enjoy and other ‘legitimate’ citizens lack.  This, in turn, feeds into a cycle of resentment and from no representation to mis-representation.  If is often the case that refugees and IDPs are turned into scapegoats and are blamed for all sorts of social ills by the media – from thieving, for taking away jobs from the locals, to more serious crime.  They then are turned into the favourite whipping boys and girls for politicians who routinely blame them for all the ills in any given constituency.  I remember that refugees from Sri Lanka who were resettled in the Nilgiris, were often given a hard time by the media – the local press in particular.  While, in that case, there was the possibility that some among the people taking refuge were involved in ‘illegal’ activities, the majority were law-abiding and wanted to just get on with life.  When a truckful of illegal immigrants from China were found dead in Dover two years ago, there was scarcely any sympathy in the media over their plight.  This merely led to the reinforcement of the public perception of illegal immigrants as unwanted people who deserved what they got.  The same mentality is rife in Australia where the media have aided and abetted the incarceration of refugees in remote camps in the bush or in off-shore detention camps in the Pacific, and where a one-point electoral agenda on the threat posed by refugees was used by the conservative government of John Howard to get back into power earlier this year.

Another routine problem with the reporting of refugee situations in parts of Asia is that much of this reporting is second hand or is a re-hash of information handed out by official sources.  It is very rare for a reporter to go into the field and come back with first hand reports on refugee situations, their stories, their hopes, with enough background information that could make a difference to public opinion related to refugees.  I understand that there are a few NGOs – for instance the Kathmandu-based Centre for Protection of Minorities and Against Racism and Discrimination (CEMARD) who use a variety of media to create awareness of the plight of Bhutanese refugees – the Nepalese speaking Southern Bhutanese Lhotshampa, many of whom have been evicted from Nepal and live in six UNHCR-managed refugee camps in Easter Nepal. I have met a handful of journalists who have tried to make a difference – Steven Gan and Irene Fernandez, both from Malaysia, who got into major trouble for reporting detention deaths of Bangladeshi workers in Malayasian detention centres and Peter Mares from Australia who has consistently written on the government’s handling of the refugee crisis in that country, including the book Borderline: Australia’s Treatment of Refugees and Asylum Seekers.  Rather unfortunately, media reporting of refugees has, on the whole, been very negative.  In the context of Fortress Europe for instance, the media have had a field day amplifying the ‘threat’ from refugees, often through the use of highly emotive headlines that communicate invasion, the swamping of the country, the break down of social services, refugees and asylum seekers as welfare scroungers, a threat to national culture and national identity – all leading to moral panics that have merely led to the reinforcing of public opinion against all immigrants.  The tabloids have led and the broadcast media have, with some exceptions, followed suit.  This kind of reporting, has, in turn affected public policy on asylum seekers and refugees.  In fact all right of centre governments in Europe, including New Labour in the UK, have bent over backwards to take an anti-asylym line, ostensibly in order to stem the use of the race card by the extreme right.  In the post 9/11 situation, this climate has got even more out of hand, bordering on the paranoid.  There is also another reason for the non-reporting of refugee issues.  Media environments in South Asia, like everywhere else have become highly competitive and commercial.  In this world, there is little space for issue-based journalism.

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, I believe there is a lot that can and needs to be done.  Should the right to communication matter for people who, for the most part, are primarily concerned with basic rights – food, shelter, physical and mental security?  Is it a luxury that they can forego or should it count as a basic and irrevocable human right?  I believe that for uprooted and displaced people, the right to communication ought to become a prior, basic right, for on it depends the negotiation of all other fundamental rights.  Asylum seekers and refugees need to be granted the right to understand and to be understood the right to a language of their choice and the right to receive and impart communication.

So what ought this right to entail in the context of refugees who are frequently denied their right to reside in the country that they have chosen to seek asylum in?  And who is responsible for guaranteeing this right?  While I believe that governments do have a major responsibility for guaranteeing this right, in the absence of government support for pro-refugee policies in this part of the world, it would seem that NGOs, concerned journalists and faith communities involved in refugee work must take on some of the responsibilities for extending this right.  This is probably easier said than done, given other pressing claims.  However, I believe that support for and implementation of this right is necessary because the human dignity of refugees is closely tied to their freedom to communicate.  Survival has both economic and cultural dimensions.  To a certain extent, the cultural identity of a stateless person has already been negatively affected by the many factors that have contributed to his/her uprooting from a relatively stable environment.  A new, often hostile environment merely exacerbates that situation.  Add to that the loss of family, fear of constant violence from the military or the militia and the daily search for some form of food security and, life becomes precarious to say the least.  Surely then, apart from the real priorities of shelter, food and life securities, there also has to be support for the cultural survival of these communities through support for their communication rights.

The right to communication is inclusive of the following:

·          The right of refugee communities to use their own native language or alternatively a language of their choice to conduct their internal and external affairs.
·         The right of refugee communities to basic education and literacy in a language of their choice.
·         The right of refugee communities to practice a culture of their choice, and to have the freedom of religion.
·         The right of refugee communities to have access to information on their status under international and national law and to respond to and take part in on-going negotiations
·         The right of refugee groups to hold, impart and receive opinions through all media.
·         The right of refugees to petition the government in the country that they have sought refuge, for human rights in line with international declarations and conventions such as the UDHT and the Status of Refugees.
·         The right of refugee groups to counter the wilful misrepresentation of refugees in the national media through appropriate representations at press and media councils or other regulatory bodies
·         The right of refugee groups to have access to and control over their own media – for instance, newsletters, community radio, on-line services however this is possible.  The media can be used to keep and preserve tradition, connect to the diaspora community, be used for information, education and entertainment purposes, and for advocacy and networking.  Given decreasing costs and increasing bandwidth – there are more opportunities today for using a range of media than was the case a few years ago.
·         The right of refugees to skills training in communication.

Let me conclude with some examples of refugee right to communication projects – Radio Kwizera (Hope) in Tanzania. I am aware of the fact that the media scenario in South Asia is very different from that in Tanzania – but the example is illustrative of what can be done.  The radio station was part of a larger information project – the Refugee Information Network, carried out jointly by the UNHCR, the JRS and other NGOs, Radio Kwizera was established in 1995 in Ngara to help refugees – mainly from Rwanda and Burundi – establish a forum where they could voice their concerns.  It was also established to serve the needs of the local population.  The refugees had fled the genocide and many had memories of Radio Mille Collines, the radio station that had been used by nationalist Hutus to incite the genocide.  The refugees had felt isolated, abandoned, and many suffered from psychological trauma – self-denial, fear and anxiety.  In October 1997 Radio Kwizera launched a training programme in broadcasting skills that involved both locals and refugees.  Four trainee Kirundi refugee broadcasters were employed at Radio Kwizera.  Apart from these full timers, over a hundred refugees contribute in a variety of ways to Radio Kwizera.  Radio Kwizera has been used to provide a public forum for discussions on a number of pressing issues including repatriation, violence and reconciliation.  The station has introduced health and educational programmes and both locals and refugees now have a stake in Radio Kwizera.

Radio Kwizera has had its share of woes.  Its relationship with UNHCR suffered after Tanzanian soldiers took over the radio station in 1996 and used it to push forward the agenda of forced repatriation.  While this had been sorted out, the relationship between Radio Kwizera and the Tanzanian government has been difficult.  The Tanzanian Refugees Act allows the entry of non-refugees to refugee camps only after official permission has been granted.  This restriction has been used by the government to place refugee camps off limits to broadcasters.  The act also forbids speaking to more than five refugees.  There is also the implicit threat of repatriation for those refugees who divulge information that is perceived to be sensitive.  These on-going problems have been exacerbated by the World Food Programmes recent decision to cut the food ration to the camps by about forty per cent.  Still, the example of Radio Kwizera illustrates the highs and lows of the right to information of refugees.

There are other examples.  I understand that Radio Angola has just launched a sort of ‘Reality Television’ programme directed towards enabling the reconciliation of families who had been victims of forced separation.  The national Roll Back Xenophobia campaign that was launched in South Africa was aimed at placing refugee issues on the agenda of the national media, creating national awareness and favourable attitudes towards refugees.  The worsening economic climate in Southern Africa had led to a huge influx of refugees from Zimbabwe and other countries.  Violence against refugees had increased and a consortium consisting of the South African Human Rights Commission, the National Commission for Human Rights Affairs and the UNHCR launched this multi-media campaign in 1999 using radio, art and photo exhibitions, documentaries, workshops on refugees for journalists organised by the Institute for the Advancement of Journalism.  Refugees were themselves involved in producing 5 minute documentaries and there was a series of 10 radio programmes on former South African exiles now in government positions.  I am also aware of a series of radio programmes Right to Refuge produced by the BBC World Service Education in partnership with the BBC World Service Trust.  This was a series of radio programmes linked to creating refugee awareness in nine languages that was broadcast in conjunction with the 50th anniversary of the UN Convention in 2001.

These examples point to the kind of practical programmes that can be established to help strengthen the information/communication rights of refugees, and the channels of communication that can be used to create positive awareness of refugees.  I trust that during the next two days, we will work towards a practical agenda related to enabling the right to information/communication of refugees and IDPs in South Asia.

Pradip N. Thomas, WACC
References

Article 19 (2001), Global Trends on the Right to Information: A Survey of South Asia,
            July.

Mares, P. (2001), borderline: Australia’s Treatment of Refugees and Asylum Seekers,
            UNSW Press, Sydney

Thomas, P.N. (ed.) Refugees and their Right to Communicate: Perspectives from South
            East Asia, WACC/CCA. 2001.

Media Development 3/1998, Migrants, Refugees and the Rights to Communicate
            (available at www.wacc.org.uk)

Mjanga, C.M. (2001) ‘Presentation of JRS-Radio Kwizera’, at the WACC-AR/WACC
            Refugees, Displaced Persons and the Right to Communicate in the Horn of Africa
Workshop, 11-15 June 2001, Nairobi, pp.1-5.

2. State of Refugees in South Asia


A. Mixed Flows and Massive Flows: Protection and Care Of the Victims of Forced Migration in South Asia
                                                                                                Ranabir Samaddar

(South Asia Forum for Human Rights and Calcutta Research Group)




1. Mixed patterns of forced migration and their consequences for a protection policy and the broad humanitarian network

1.1 The reason why we should pay attention to the issue of mixed patterns of forced migration in the region of South Asia is that the phenomenon of mixed flows of forced migration raises significant issues for "humanitarian politics" - a name under which the international work on protection and care of the escapees and victims of violence, discrimination, environmental degradation and disaster, famine, economic deprivation, brutal and indiscriminate structural adjustment policies accompanied by pronounced structural violence goes on. The new mix of forced and unwanted population flows and the inadequate appreciation of the new phenomenon in refugee protection policies particularly in a region like South Asia raise the problem of method from several angles. It is important to note the following in this context:

First, studies of forced population movements particularly in South Asia have been hitherto pursued from economic and demographic angles. The link between over all politics of the state and population flow cannot be seen through rose-tinted glasses.
Second, the notion of forced is so narrowly defined, that the structural violence permeating these societies escapes our attention, though violence and coercion are considered as benchmarks in determination of refugees. Therefore though we are aware of the complications and controversies around the issue of determination, we are not ready to probe the entire political ethic of determination involving state primacy in determination, repatriation, issues of collective exodus, and regional grouping in constructing standards of denial of refuge under an essentially international humanitarian regime.
Third, population flow under various conditions of coercion has been through ages, epochs, and centuries. Yet conditions of modernity guide us to a state of oblivion, where there is only the present of the conflict to envelop our minds; and the history of enmeshing of peoples recedes into some hoary past in which contemporary scholars engaged in fixing problems and finding solutions have little interest.
Fourth, the politics of humanitarian regime subsumes the ethic and sentiment of care, protection and hospitality that are supposed to be the core of humanitarianism guiding international work on victims of forced migration, which still remains a half way house. This politics neither adequately guarantees the ethic and sentiment, nor it allows expansion of the institutional framework adequately to ensure full justification of the notion of humanitarianism. There is now a great urgency to address these questions in the context of our region, and take general note of the inadequacy of the frameworks, practices, and the received notions. The definitions and concepts produced from within the discourse of refugee care and protection have acted on institutions and practices, while certainly the practices of refugee protection, care, rehabilitation, also the politicization and confinement of the issue of refugees have reflected on the discursive legacy as well.

1.2 In the perspective of new kinds of flow in this region, in framing protection policies for the victims of forced migration we have in the first place the problem posed by the connection between (a) grant of refugee status to a person declared an outlaw by a state, (b) the need for his immunity from the draconian law of that state, and (c) the viability of a peace process. Second, we face here the problem posed by the location of the power to define, determine, and exclude a person from the status of the refugee. Third, we are required to take into account the problematic of the political ethic of reconciliation in determining the humanitarian nature of an international arrangement. In short, protection policies in this region have to take into account the imperatives of peace and reconciliation in this region – imperatives, which supposedly were not concerns of a protection regime. Given the significance accorded to the question of "well grounded fear of persecution" in determining the status of refugee, exclusion clause is meant to be an extreme measure, and even then the person can be protected against forcible return (refoulement), for among other things Article 3 (1) of the Convention against Torture (1984) covered excluded persons and aliens. Article 1F (b) of the 1951 Convention also specifically mentions that crimes to be considered under the exclusion provision have to be "non-political". Yet, we must remember that the system grew in the wake of cold war and great power competition, and possesses no capacity to respond to the imperatives of justice and reconciliation.[i]

2. Gender specificity of the current protection regime

2.1 We have to take note also of the non-gender specific nature of humanitarian practices and law here. Nowhere it is more apparent, as several reports on refugee care and care of the internally displaced people in South Asia bear out, than in the way women feature as refugee-subjects in refugee management. Citizenship as a status marked by universality and equality flows above all from the structure of the liberal-humanitarian regime, which is characteristically patriarchal. This implies that the humanitarian system by itself dominates women, or is constituted by forms of rule in which men will systemically dominate women. The humanitarian law is almost a male agency. The way a refugee is defined, or the way in which the Geneva Conventions define humanitarian protection in war, shows that such laws see and treat women the way condescending men see and treat women. It is the male gaze that frames the humanitarian. The non-gender specific nature of fear, persecution and threat as outlined in The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria on Determining Refugee Status does not therefore think deeply on the fear, the fear of violence, fear of state, of law, assault, and breakdown of security and life around, faced by more than half of the refugees on earth. The gender-blind concept and application of humanitarian law can go to harsh extent, as evident from the experiences of Sri Lanka today.

2.2 The non-gender orientation of the protection ethic and arrangement is a classic case of what we may call as "procedural neutrality". It recognizes that there may be a specific nature of abuse suffered by a "social group" (it is primarily this route by which vast number of abuses are identified), but upholds general principles as the basis of adjudication of claims. Hence the humanitarian law is procedurally neutral, as law under patriarchy is often so; but this procedural neutrality on which the humanitarian law is founded bases itself on a prior construction of a liberal-humanitarian regime where male power is entrenched. Thus rape, violence, localized mass murder, eviction, girl-sale, illegal underpaid female labour, sex-slavery – all these flourish, as they do in our region, because the humanitarian aims at protecting the population facing abuse, but only under certain rigorous conditions, turning the victims into petitioners whose appeals (in law claims) have to be adjudicated, while the very gender-structure of abuse continues. And this, as I had argued in my work, The Marginal Nation – Transborder Migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal (Sage, 1999), is one of the characteristics of the current forced population flow in South Asia.

2.3 We can speak here of three implications of this situation. First, taken collectively the cases of women's dislocations reflect on the fact that the overwhelming presence of women among the forced migrants in this region is not an accident of history. It is a way by which states have made women political non-subjects in the vast panorama of conflicts. Second, it should be recognized that even in their marginality displaced women are never merely victims, they exert agency even in situations of marginality. Dislocation is a debilitating experience no doubt, but women have many times transformed it into an empowering one. Third, and this seems to me most significant in the context of this discussion, a system-centric narrative on the situation of refugee women leads to their trivialization as mere victims. It shifts attention from the argument that policies have been by themselves gender-specific to the extent that such humanitarian policy would consider death or a serious threat to liberty a reason for asylum but not rape or vulnerability to human trafficking. Such value judgment not only makes it more difficult for women to seek asylum, it acts as a way of marginalizing crimes against women in order to marginalize the woman into political non-subjects.[ii]

3. The non-entree regime in South Asia

3.1 The massive refugee flow, forced repatriation, the decline of liberal asylum practices, the creation of virtual non-entrée regime in this region following European examples indicates that, the “fortress Europe” mentality is engulfing this region also, thus making the refugee care arrangement in this region, and the vision of 1951 inadequate for negotiating the population flow today. In any case the Convention of 1951 was intended for Europe, and did not consider the millions fleeing homes in the wake of de-colonization, partition, and the emergence of new states in South Asia. No UNHCR was there to take care of the refugees in this region that was being de-colonized. A report in the Human Rights Tribune describes in details the charade of the Dublin Convention, the Amsterdam Treaty and the new Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union that do not take into account the rights of the non-European citizens – and this despite the passage of immigration and asylum matters to the first pillar under the Amsterdam Treaty. In this region also, each state is free to devise guidelines for the conduct of its security forces. Besides not being exercised with the abuse around prevention of entry of shelter-seekers, the country-specific protection regimes in South Asia, as elsewhere, are still unable to administer quick and proper care of the thousands fleeing from violence, terror, environmental devastation and insecurities. The situation aggravates because states by way of prioritizing refugee issues decide to ignore some cases while taking up godfather's role in others in a completely disproportionate manner, or administer care to a victim group quickly some time while ignoring the same group at other times in tune with diplomatic and security considerations. In face of the structural adjustment policies that produce what the historian of indentured labour from South Asia Hugh Tinker called “new slavery”, and with the entire sub-continent being populated today by aliens leading a submerged existence - whom following Eric Wolf we may call "people without history", it is meaningless to stick to current citizenship policies. The current controversy over citizenship in Nepal, India (particularly the Northeast), Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (in each of these cases vast number of people remain disenfranchised or inferior even in legal equality) reinforces the need to study the mixed phenomenon of forced migrants, unwanted migrants and migrants of the submerged world within the country and across the country – all that have made the relevance of the current institutionalized care and protection suspect.

3.2 Also, as Judge Geoffrey Care of the International Association of Refugee Law Judges has demonstrated, the peculiar nature of the Convention leaves a tremendous burden on jurisprudence and enormous freedom to the state. Referring to one particular case (R v. SSSS ex p JCWI: R v. SOE ex p B [1996] 4 All ER 385), he has commented that increasingly the courts and tribunals have given interpretation of the states' obligations under the Convention, which are not always in conformity with the views of the executive of the state itself. The manner in which the Convention is applied has also frequently been with the reality for the individual himself or herself very much in mind. In his words, "to put it another way, the courts have distanced themselves from the litigant parties, as courts do... I have in mind... two decisions of the Court of Appeal (in UK). The Courts were faced with refugees who, under the interpretation of the regulations, which the state would have followed, would put the refugees on the street. The courts interpreted the regulations to prevent this saying that 'parliament could not have intended such an inhumane result'. Parliament did however, because the regulations were promptly amended." Refugee determination procedure on individual basis and the unequal sharing of burden of care have now produced confused, traumatized, and nervous shelter-seekers who travel rarely with supportive documents, false or no papers, and land in alien systems which are in Judge Geoffrey Care's words "frequently hostile or incredulous" hosts. The more fundamental question is, how much can decisions of determination of refugee status on individual basis but taken on broad collective political, economic and cultural considerations be able to set up an international ethic and framework of care, hospitality, and kindness? Also, how would law in such cases settle on proofs? Judge Care has reminded us again while referring to another case of similar nature involving a Sri Lanka Tamil who had fled persecution allegedly at the hands of the LTTE (R. SSHD ex parte Karunakaran 25 January 2000, unreported) that, the civil standard of proof, which treats anything, which probably happened, is part of a pragmatic legal fiction. It has no logical bearing on the assessment of the likelihood of future events or (by parity of reasoning) the quality of past ones... The method of evaluation is itself not one of hard facts. But it requires knowledge not only of applicant's own tale, and what is accepted of it, but a whole range of other factual matters. Therefore, it is not merely the issue of narrowness of determination-principle as indicated in the Convention, but a more fundamental structural issue is here at stake. The refugee flees in fear from the induced violence of the state, private armies, systemic discriminatory institutions, environment disaster, and developmental catastrophe - but s/he flees from a state where s/he is a citizen, and lands in another state no matter where it is, and here is a system that tries to frame rules of the game - escape and refuge, how you are to escape and how you are to get refuge. How can an ethic of care and kindness and a framework of responsibility grow from that? If at all it can, it will develop very incrementally. It is this bizarre scenario of hosting the distressed and displaced through the state by the international that has produced the alien. The geography and politics of fear is thus perched on power that influences in a substantive manner the ways in which discourses of fear are manufactured through institutionalized politics with the effect that fear reinforces the exercise of power. It is significant therefore to look into how fear is defined and utilized within hegemonic discourses, the ways in which fear is constructed around certain social identities, how it is reflected in experiences of public spaces, territories and environments, how fear surfaces in relation to racism, homophobia, sexism, ethno-sectarianism and contemporary patterns of political, legal, and social exclusion. All these indicate the need to re-conceptualize the theme of refuge, one of the most important aspects of humanitarian politics in today's world. It means above all the imperative to investigate the political practices of giving refuge, practices that are supposed to be guided by the ethic of care and reconciliation. It also means that if we do not broaden the framework of protection and care in the present perspective, even direct victims of violence will not get due shelter and care. Thirdly, it means that this broadening implies the notion of responsibility.

3.3 People displaced by agencies/other people are, prima facie, wronged. How shall we judge the moral obligation of others, in this case other states, towards the wronged, the actual and potential victims of this region? We have here not only the relevance of the ethic of care, kindness, and hospitality, but an added ethic, that of responsibility. Responsibility has two implications – responsibility of the state and of the international community. The word, responsibility carries two senses also - responsibility of the host and that of the expelling state, or state that allows the "nice exit". Ethically then the issues, they must confront, but unfortunately fail to do so, are – what is morally owed to the victims of displacement? How do we place and apportion responsibility for man made disasters, say from a developmental process (a dam, a highway, a famine, a flood)? What is the politics of reparation in these cases? And what will be the norm of responsibility in the more complex cases of indirect displacement and repeated displacements? What will be the method? How shall we settle for what is known as minimal justice? These are questions of ethics staring before those who have held that those issues of care, kindness and hospitality are matters of system and a humanitarian doctrine. While there may be substantial agreement about preferred values, there is clearly deficit in agreements over strategies to meet the emerging situation marked by three conditions.[iii]

3.4 Broadly, these three conditions are –
First, refugees are today a phenomenon of mass flight, mass movement, and massive displacement, but individual determination of the status of the shelter seeker that comes as a shadow of the principle of no forcible return overwhelms the principle of care of the victims of forced migration.
Second, the movement of the displaced is so mixed that, while states today do not claim any more an absolute right to return the displaced to persecution and peril, there is a greater freedom of action made available to the states by this new phenomenon with the result that the terminology of refugee protection is obsolete with the rise of new words such as, displaced persons, illegal immigrants, economic migrants, aliens, stowaways, interdiction, safe third country, visa requirements, carrier sanctions, and finally the internally guaranteed security zones.
Third, hospitality is now subject to rules, procedures, laws, and practices that must be thought anew in terms of the imperatives of the ethic of hospitality.

Raising these questions means taking into account emerging policies and perspectives relating to conflicts, collective actions, and human rights perspectives. We cannot rest content with traces of group care (care of groups and care by groups) as the basic pattern of protection of refugees in his region, and not interrogate the way in which states in South Asia respond to inflows of refugees and other kinds of forced migrants. Thus while admittedly there is a difference between what is termed as "Northern approach" and "Southern approach". By northern approach we imply individual determination, emphasis on law and procedure, host of administrative and quasi-judicial mechanisms, and attempts to adhere to 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. By southern approach we indicate the prevalence of heavy reliance on bilateral method to resolve refugee crisis (India-Sri Lanka Accord being one such example), group determination, community care and protection, placing responsibility at the essential level of a community norm, and an almost deliberate reluctance to legally stabilize a related situation.[iv] While acknowledging the truth of the difference in the two sets of practices, human rights perspective would demand that the emerging reality of mixed flows of forced migration, the increasing rigidity of states to offer shelter to the victims, and the woefully inadequate institutionalization of practices of care and protection be recognized, and steps be suggested towards a broader and coordinated approach. Such a perspective, instead of being vexed with the question, would rather encourage new insights, that question being, "Who are they - refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, students or nomads? Should they be classified in this way or should all the reasons that have driven them to leave their countries of origin be taken into account? And would not a humanitarian policy of the state demand that besides allowing entry attention be paid to economic, demographic, social and health issues?" Further it would encourage the policy planners to face the reality that a refugee cannot be defined by a single event that has supposedly produced the shelter-seeker. The partition of 1947 has produced refugees long after the states had thought that the event was dead in terms of producing refugees. Yet, researches including mine on the linkages between various phases of forced migration in the sub-continent show how long after the states stopped concerning themselves with that bygone event, it continued to produce escapees of fear and insecurity. This realization should have political and legal implications.[v]

4. A South Asian forced migration observatory

4.1 All these show that there is in the first place the need to take account of the various streams of forced migration, their dimensions, and their mixed nature in order to grasp the complexity of the challenges to humanitarian tasks. One way of gaining such an account may be to set up a South Asian migratory observatory and to conduct a feasibility study for such a step along the lines of discussion for such an observatory for Europe. Such a feasibility study will not only establish and connect various research institutions and organizations active in the field of forced migration thus producing a wealth of information on migration within the region and outside, it will also facilitate the analysis of the information systems used by policy makers and others, and identify the relative importance of specific information sources and networks. It will show that for policy makers particularly, their main problems are inherent in the sheer volume and diversity of information on migration. Sources are frequently unknown or inaccessible to them, or there is a lack of resources to digest and evaluate what is available.

4.2 There may be several gaps in the information on forced migration information, available to users. The first may be related to access to and co-ordination of existing information. Second can be lack of a comprehensive and up-to-date source on national policy, legislation, case laws, and administrative and quasi-judicial orders relating to forced migration. A South Asian forced migration observatory can easily fill these gaps. The third gap relates to the need, especially of policymakers, for more timely, reliable and harmonized statistics. A migration observatory would be unlikely to produce many more up-to-date statistics, but it could enable other improvements, notably by serving as a catalyst for data harmonization, and by overseeing the provision of comprehensive meta-data. The fourth gap may be in the provision of analyses of trends and patterns of migration. An observatory would be able to perform a series of analytical roles, as well as develop ways of enhancing statistical databases that would improve the depth and quality of its analyses. The shortage and inadequacy of country reports, which can support the development of an early warning system constitutes a fifth gap. The proposed observatory would ameliorate this problem by compiling its own reports, by sign-posting existing country-based information, and by synthesising reports already in existence. Another gap can be the lack of a comprehensive source of information on what research is currently being done or planned, and the identification of gaps in the current research effort which may necessitate reorientation of funding. The mandate for such an observatory should be to make more accessible the information that already exists. It should primarily serve the needs of policy makers, analysts, human rights groups, and multilateral humanitarian agencies for information on all aspects of forced migration in the region, and for all these it has to be an open institution. Based on the up-to-date information technology, it should be network-based and have a clearly defined set of analytical tasks. It should have a major role in information co-ordination with limited research assignments. It should develop a database on national policies and legislations in the region with respect to all aspects of forced migration. It should not be expected to gather statistics, or to compile large statistical or other databases that replicate those, available elsewhere. It should not only respond to current identified needs, but should also anticipate and be able to respond to new information requirements. A forced migration observatory with such mandate will go a long way in facilitating not only information needs for humanitarian tasks, but also help in indicating the trend of current legislation, court pronouncements, and administrative practices, and the trend of proper direction of all these. An annotated directory of services and persons involved can be the first step towards such an observatory.

5. Innovative and democratic border-management by easing labour inflow

5.1 This is the second suggestion offered in this paper. It relates to democratic border management by easing labour inflow between countries marked by trans-border movement of illegal immigrants, primarily of working population driven by insecurities of various kinds. As an example, we can refer to the situation obtaining between India and Bangladesh. Both India and Bangladesh have proved woefully inadequate in dealing with the reality of the border between the two countries. It is ironic that the border which was drawn by the British in 1947 to rationally reorganize the political space in the region, has eventually not only generated its own irrationality, but has also created many new problems for the region. The border, with its long history of movements between people, cultures, beliefs, ideas and customs was completely unreal from the beginning. Land on both sides of the border was mostly cultivable and was locked and there were farms that were within forty yards of zero point on either side. Perhaps the most important characteristic of the border was that in many cases it was not contiguous. There are 53 rivers in the region that make functioning of the border more complicated. Almost all of India's disputes with East Pakistan related to this border, mostly involving rivers. Even more problematic was that each country had its enclaves within the boundary of the other, meaning that the border was rife with potential for problem. After the liberation of Bangladesh it was hoped that the border would lose much of its potential for creating disputes and enmity with the improvement of bilateral relations.  Sadly, even after more than twenty-five years of the birth of Bangladesh, almost all the outstanding issues between India and Bangladesh continue to be related to the common border. These include sharing of water-resources of common rivers, CHT, demarcation of maritime boundaries and the ownership of South Moore/Talpatty Island, illegal cross-border activities, illegal migration, Berubari corridor and the granting of entry/exit facilities. Convictions about the sanctity of the border are weaker in this region than elsewhere in India. Out of a combination of despair and political pressure, the Government of India has built barbed wire fencing on parts of both Assam and the West Bengal sides of the border. In South Bengal sector alone 358 km s and in Assam 159 km s of fencing programme has been sanctioned.  Other measures such as regular patrolling and check posts continue. But these have not stemmed the flow of either people or goods; indeed, it is no secret that border guards on either side accept and demand bribes from those seeking to cross illegally. As a result of the influx, the size of which is difficult to estimate, a constant state of tension exists, in Assam in particular and other states of the Northeast as well as between migrants, perceived migrants and the host communities. If one is to accept that migration is a natural human phenomenon that occurs in varying degrees world wide, one must also accept the fact that few countries in the world have successfully contained it, be it a Super Power like the United States or a medium power country like Germany. Again, if one is to go by the premise that immigration, especially illegal immigration cannot be stopped, one must go a step further and say that it can only be contained or regulated. Or rather, it can be negotiated through a process of meaningful economic activities, exchanges, regulatory mechanisms, and above all through dialogue. The problem of cross-border migration is sometimes complicated by religious factor. Either the minorities look to the option of taking shelter in the neighbouring country exasperated with majoritarian insensitivities, or remain potential refugees or illegal migrants. During 1972-1993, a total number of 41,25,576 people arrived in India from Bangladesh. Out of that a total of 8,36,524 overstayed (difference between the immigration and emigration figures). Of them 5,38,501 were Hindus.

5.2 One can think of certain policy suggestions, such as (a) a system of identity cards acceptable to local population, particularly those living on the border in the eastern and the North Eastern region has to be ensured; (b) wile the system of visas for nationals of either country will continue, for those who cannot or do not want to use the visa system for economic and quasi-economic reasons, a specific, time-bound legal system sanctioning their presence in the host area for mutual economic benefit of both sides, legal and acknowledged, has to be devised. We can take the specific case of the several Indian border districts that share river or land border with Bangladesh. The process of acquiring a passport (for which one has to travel long often in an opposite direction, to the capital city of Calcutta or Guwahati) and a visa (for which one has to travel again to Calcutta) are both cumbersome and time-consuming; (c) this will involve the development of a scheme to allow migrants to come legally into the region on the basis of work permits issued by a Central Work Permit Authority with the backing of the relevant state set up by an Act of the Parliament, with specific clauses involving the officials of the local state and village-level administrators who will act as checks and balances to each other ensuring that no one group becomes too powerful so as to be able to bend the system. This may be worked out in association with the Home Ministry as well as Ministry for Law and Company Affairs. A retired Supreme Court/High Court judge may head such a panel and a member of the NHRC may be associated with it.

5.3 Since the permits are intended to discourage illegal migration, and promote healthy economic cooperation at sub regional and local level of both sides, the preliminary step may be that the permits be issued to groups (of say, 20 or so) rather than to individuals. It should be allowed in the following fields: agricultural operations at harvest time; construction; boat-building; fishing and allied activities. In doing so, the following procedure might be followed: - the work permits could be issued at the border at posts set up for this purpose by cells that would include at its top a representative of the District Magistrate with members: one senior member of the local panchayat (village council system), a police officer, a member of an NGO or some other public organization, a representative of the labour board, and a person representing labour organizations - with at least two of these five being women. Since the border is long, a system of such posts needs to be worked out either situating them at existing check posts or beside them.

5.4 The permits will be issued on spot after verification of the following documents: (a) the identity of the applicant(s) as proof of nationality/residency; (b) a clear statement on the place he/she will be residing for a maximum of next one year (work permits will be given for a maximum of one year to begin with) and the name of the employer who or whose representative must be present for the issue of the permit with supporting documents from his side; (c) a document of undertaking signed by the employer stating the employer's responsibility for the immigrant group/individual and his/her duty to report to the local authority (preferably local labour board) three times in a year; one, at the time of arrival to register; two, after six months to reconfirm their presence; three, at the time of departure at the end of the year. If the permit is to be extended, it can be done by the DC or the Labour Commissioner of the relevant district, for a period not beyond another two years; (d) the work permit will carry the photograph of the permit holder and will be laminated with his thumb impression/signature on the document to prevent misuse of the same; (e) the permit holders will have no voting or political rights but will have access to courts of the host country if their civil rights are injured in any way and will be permitted to receive payment for services at the same level as local workers and repatriate their savings to their home country; (f) the entire arrangement will also give due consideration to the rights of local citizens while making use of a dynamic human resource.

5.5 For the Indo-Bangladesh border, an autonomous bi-national commission can be formed to act as a flexible instrument for formulating strategies of cooperation. Such a commission will form temporary working groups of local parallels as existing between West Bengal/Assam/Meghalaya/India and Bangladesh on matters of land-holdings, employment, social and economic resources and formulate policies based on commonalities and the market. Border demography, settlement problems in border areas, ethnic divisions within the region, viability of developing environmental provisions to convert the area into a self-sustaining unit with linkages to both countries will be ascertained by groups set up by the commission, the ultimate goal being to hand over local administration to largely de-centralized administrative units which can work with greater competence and stability in comparison to the vested interest groups and consequently the promotion of an atmosphere of greater understanding between two countries and also in the sub-region.

5.6 In brief, the example of such a proposal (worked out in details by four researchers in Economic and Political Weekly, 4 September 1999) shows that care and protection policy for victims of forced migration can be innovatively widened in its conceptual horizon if the attending factors such as labour market linkages, work-permits, local cooperation, decentralization of border-management and control, are considered, and national and military security is not held up as the cornerstone of state policy towards illegal immigrants who are mostly deprived of livelihood and remain victims of insecurities of all kinds.


6. Mixed situation, need for mixed response and mixed policies
6.1 The above analysis and the examples of innovative measures suggest that the mixed situation in forced migration calls for new outlook on the overall protection framework in the region in a situation of mass influx, policies on prima facie determination on group basis, temporary protection, need for combining the rules of protection with the need for reconciliation, operational measures to enhance security of the victims of forced migration, sharing of responsibility, combining issues of internal displacement with issues emanating from exodus outside in a general perspective on forced migration, and planning for durable solutions based on gender equity.[vi] Human rights based approach in place of state security centric approach will call for deep reflection on all these, because only human rights based approach can fashion appropriate response in the wake of mass influx, and call for new policies, measures, information-coordination for protection of the victims. Clearly South Asia has to go beyond other regional standards, and seek its own model while learning from these in terms of coping with mass displacement and influx. The civilian character of protection will be enhanced when the human rights based approach will be given priority, justice to the victims will become the prime value, and roles and responsibilities will be democratized. The refugee will not be an object of protection administration only, but the subject of a humanitarian framework.

6.2 Mass influx in South Asia will continue to affect not only host states, but also the entire regional community. Besides adopting international tools there is therefore a current need to further develop them particularly in order to cope with the task of determining the prima facie status for groups of victims of forced migration, making available for them temporary protection through better harmonization of approaches with acceptable standards, and attaining a degree of flexibility in protection-based response to mass influx in the region. This will need both national mechanisms and regional cooperation in tune with international standards to share responsibilities and burdens in mass influx situations, and to frame policies for democratizing citizenship issues, resettlement of the victims, humanitarian transfers, and other appropriate procedural mechanisms. It is important in all these cases that we proceed not from international resolutions mainly, but from local best practices and local experiences and burdens. It is only then that we shall be able to go some way towards sharing responsibilities more equitably (first country of asylum, safe third country option, undocumented shelter-seekers, broadening appeal procedures, protection of illegal immigrant workers, etc.), and coordinating refugee protection mechanisms with other protection policies such as the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and members of Their Families. That is where an immigration policy based on human rights begins. From a simple protection framework for refugees who are mostly individually and sometimes group-wise determined, it becomes a framework against racism, oppression of migrants, trafficking of women and children, various discriminations – a framework for tolerance and greater enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. Broadening the horizon is essential for broadening the framework.

6.3 In short, in dealing with mixed and massive flows forced migration based on a fundamental concern for the victims, the choice is between human rights and care oriented approach and state security oriented approach. There is no way that with a fundamentally state security oriented approach in the context of massive flows, conflicts can be contained, mitigated, and tackled on a cooperative basis. Responsibility-sharing and care, protection, hospitality, settlement, re-settlement, and wherever possible eventual and voluntary return, being the only route to protect the victims of forced migration, a justice and human rights-based approach is the only option. It will not only help humanitarianism to cope with the paradoxes of humanitarian politics, but will help the political societies of the region to realize also, that conflicts occur not to due to demography or population flow, but because of a nation-state security centric attitude, which forecloses all possibilities of cooperation, co-existence, and the imagination of new avenues of accommodation.


7. Lessons of the fifty-five year’s history of refugee care

7.1 In terms of a policy on refugee protection by the State and a study of such policy, our fifty years’ experiences suggest attending to the: (a) definition of the term “refugee” and its scope; (b) the concept of “non-refoulement and its scope; (c) and, the administrative-judicial machinery to determine the status of a shelter-seeker as a refugee and once determined, the quantum of assistance the shelter-seeker needs.[vii] It also means trying to understand, where does the refugee feature in such policy formulation? We shall see, ease of physical accessibility, cultural and economic networks, and political support of host government and communities are among the significant elements that make the refugee a critical component in the determination of a policy on the refugees – these are elements that impel care but also add to the power of the state to decide towards whom to extend hospitality, and whom to deny.

 7.2 If we go through the detailed narratives of how shelter-seekers were saved, cared, rehabilitated, and many were left out, refused, and neglected in the same period, how hospitality always went on with calculation, best described now in that well-known phrase in the literature of refugee studies, “calculated kindness”,[viii] we shall appreciate the need for a many-sided interrogation of the logical structure behind what we call the political ethic and duty of hospitality. Refugee studies in this country had been waiting for such an interrogation of the contradictory nature of our attitude towards the shelter-seeker, and the policy of strategic ambiguity of our rulers. Neither the security explanation, nor the kindness explanation, nor even the international law and international regime explanation, will be adequate in making us understand the mysteries behind one of the most-observed and least comprehended political conduct of our time, namely the asylum and refugee care policy of the a post-colonial state. We have in this history a contention between two notions – that of charity and right. On one hand there is the responsibility of the State to care for the public, on the other hand the demands of the shelter seeker to receive such care. Indeed two visions of rights inform the situation – one emerging from the concept of nationhood and citizenship, and the other emerging from the affected population’s daily negotiations with governmental authority over every tiny bit of subsistence-means and the consequential expansion of the moral universe of claims. One results in an expansion of citizenship, and the other results in expansion of social security beyond strictly legal confines, that, as several judicial decisions show, ultimately get accepted by the judicial authority and the juridical discourse. The birth of social security is made possible by detailed governmental policies and techniques for sheltering the refugee population, the expanding universe of nation, and the daily contest between the state that appears as the government and the refugee population that becomes another segment of the population being governed.

7.3 A regime of rights, as often found, calls for its effectiveness centralization of power, power to be concentrated at one point to make rights effective, and rarely at multiple points. Yet, as we know, hospitality is provided often by local communities, to whom the shelter-seekers are neighbours from near abroad, also when this hospitality is denied by them The effectiveness of a rights regime, informal or formal, depend much on this response; it is conditioned by prevailing sentiments of tolerance, democracy, and nationalism. One of the challenges before cosmopolitanism is how to make such sentiments relevant for the host communities in response to arrival of guests from near abroad – for cosmopolitanism depends on how you behave to your neighbours, and not to whom you had never seen. In Europe and elsewhere we have today the call to create “cities of refuge” that invokes the tradition of past several centuries. That tradition has been present in the East also – all the more therefore the need to re-emphasize the significance of empowering the host communities, and not so much a single institution called the state or one of its organs, in deciding issues of providing shelter, relief, and hospitality. The vigilance that human rights institutions and public platforms have shown, for instance, in case of the Sri Lankan refugees in Tamil Nadu, proves the point that the politics of democracy and justice sits at the heart of the issue of hospitality. The call for a democratisation of the rights regime from top to bottom - the international, the nation-state and the local power structure - will therefore inevitably arise in any discussion on the history of hospitality in India in the last fifty years. For, after all the politics of hospitality is a constant negotiation between the unconditional and the conditional, the absolute and the relative, cosmopolitan and the particular – between the “unconditional purity” or the “infinite responsibility” that humanity’s own ethics constantly evokes by creating its own history, also the history of the quotidian - the legal, political, and the social. Can we reconcile these? It seems that this will remain an eternal task, as much for countries and societies that have signed the 1951 Convention and those that have not, or as much for countries that have national refugee laws and those that have not.

7.4 Guests, as the Tibetan refugees in India have shown, can be creative and productive, they can add to the wealth and colours of life, in as much as refugees as guests can become murderers as the Taleban experience in Pakistan and Afghanistan suggests. Therefore beyond law remains ethic, though one can reasonably inquire as Derrida does in a recent lecture, can one “cultivate an ethic of hospitality? Hospitality is culture itself and not simply one ethic among others.”[ix] Granting the suggestion of the impossibility in this task, the issue still remains, and what Derrida himself could not ignore, what is the Great Law of Hospitality? The law that will combine the absolute virtue with the conditional, the ethic with plural and restrictive laws of asylum, shelter, and sanctuaries, supervision with visitation, stay with creativity, and finally protection with reconciliation? These are no doubt obscure questions, but I believe, it is time that we draw certain references from the Indian experience narrated in these eleven essays. For, once we have drawn these broad references, we shall be in a better position to understand the paradoxes of hospitality, and shall be therefore more sensitive to the limits of law and the confines of legal practices, and thus appreciative of the imperative to push the frontier of the ethics of care. We shall acquire a greater capacity to transform and improve the law within the available historical space to approximate the moral law of an unconditional hospitality by expanding the conditional law of a right to hospitality.

8. Inferences from India’s fifty-five years’ history of refugee care

8.1 These broad inferences from India’s fifty-five years’ history of refugee care are:
·         The first refugees to arrive in independent India were not the aliens who had to be given shelter; they were part of the nation.
·         The first practices of refugee care and administration built up through not so much law as practices – practices of care, rehabilitation, and social security.
·         Institutions became the concrete results of these practices and the few laws, resulting in a durable tradition of hospitality that the State cannot fully endorse and embrace, nor can reject.
·         “Partition refugees” thus leave deep mark on the subsequent pattern in which the state is to combine care with power; this is the mark of ambiguity.
·         The contest between the notions of charity and rights that began as soon as refugees first started pouring in has influenced the subsequent discourse of “hospitality”, a term that is supposed to overcome the contradiction. The current discourse of human rights on refugee protection in India takes off from this old contest between the two notions.
·         The foundations of the legal discourse on the aliens as developed in the colonial time provided the beginnings of strategic ambiguity in this respect. Who becomes alien, when, declared by whom – became a deeply circumstantial matter, never to be finally defined by law.
·         Alien-hood thereby became the other part of a democratic state, which had needed and created at the same time the citizens as its political foundation. Thus India got citizens who through several succeeding years chose to opt out of citizenship and move to other countries as aliens, or the country found it faced with aliens who had opted for India and now wanted her citizenship. Similarly, some communities became part-citizens, part-aliens, and some who had been all through citizens, became in changed circumstances the “stranded minorities”. In all these metamorphoses, the foundations laid by colonial law and practices held ground.
·         Because offering shelter and protection became deeply circumstantial, including the issue of near-permanent residence much beyond temporary visitation, local communities developed their response of charity and fatigue, benign care and ill feeling and animosity – a response that characterized the conduct of the State also. Local response and responsibility have turned out to be as important if not more in influencing the fate of the refugees, also the language in which the task of protecting the rights of the refugees goes on.
·         Keeping the shelter-seekers in ghetto, proscribing there movement, creating ever new penal colonies, thus underwriting the nature of charity that the State has been providing to shelter-seekers, become in time a feature of the asylum and care practices of the State, though with some exceptions. What began in the Andaman Islands and Dandakaranya, continues – protecting and penalizing have become inter-linked responsibilities. The policy of having prison-like refugee camps bears as in many other cases in this context such practices in the West, for example in Sungatte in France, where non-documented would-be refugees, actually non-identities, are detained and from where the detainees try to escape to Great Britain.
·         Refugee flows in India in time became massive and mixed flows (it had been indeed often massive, and now became mixed), and to a large extent, the foundational history of care in the early years of independent India saved many shelter-seekers, who formed part of the mixed and massive flows. Now, the two discourses have become linked – the issue of illegal immigrants and that of refugees. One influences, predicates, and prejudices the other.
·         Finally, what the Convention of 1951 was powerless about is that, the states-system would finally decide the relation between visitation and residence. Thus, refugees who thought on arrival in India in 1947 that they would go back, did not, and were in all seriousness never told by the State also to go back; similarly, the Tibetan refugees have not been told to go back, or repatriated; on the other hand, hundreds and thousands of refugees from East Pakistan went back as soon as the war of 1971 was over. Part of the Chakma refugees flowing in this country in successive phases stayed back, part went back, and part had to be induced to go back. In some cases, the State allowed the refugees to come in, and then inexplicably, it shut the door on them. Without a deliberate effort, the behaviour of the State in this respect has been exactly according to the spirit of the cold war that largely influenced the drafting of the 1951 Convention regarding visitation and residence. The enigma, if there is any, is therefore not so much in India’s non-accession to the Convention, but on the way it defines and configures its responsibility. Responsibility is other great history, which runs parallel to that of rights and care, still largely unwritten, but this history has no doubt has defined the relation between care and power.

8.2 These inferences indicate features of the social economy of care and hospitality exhibited by communities, gentry, and the state. They show the circumstances when the State felt the need for policy initiatives to encourage citizens to give alms and show hospitality to the outsiders seeking refuge, at times insisting on compliance by the subject population of its directives, and at times setting up massive arrangements and campaigns for general hospitality. They also show the circumstances when the State has felt the need no more than to leave it to local population and local governments. Yet, as a result of the episodic general campaigns launched by the State for hospitality and care, organizations spring up, which taking the mandate seriously want to carry on with the work – their hospitality then becomes a point of disturbance for the State policy of withdrawing from a general campaign for hospitality. Notwithstanding the dramatic forms of generosity of the State, therefore, it is an overall picture of graded care, fundamentally weak welfare system, a hierarchy of priorities of the State in giving help, shelter, and care, and a differentiated notion of charity in public welfare provision for the strangers. To be true, possibly there was never an undifferentiated notion of charity, though at times the rich and the poor were equally moved to take the work of care and charity seriously. As we know, to remove the uncertainties in responding to the needs for care, countries gradually move into a legal obligation regarding the principle of compulsory welfare of the shelter-seeker. The price to be paid for, it seems to me, is in the form of accepting discretion of the legal authority to define the terms of entitlement. Public welfare provisions have become thus in this case, as in every other field, a matter of “calculation, discrimination, and discretion”.[x]


2. Bhutanese Refugee Repatriation and Present Situation.
BHUTANESE  REFUGEE  REPRESENTATIVE  REPATRIATION  COMMITTEE

S.B.Subba
Chairman
  1. Introduction
Bhutan is a tiny Himalayan Kingdom, situated in eastern Himalayas, bordered to the north by Tibetan Autonomous Region of China and to the east, west and south by India. According to a publication of the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB), entitled BHUTAN: Himalayan Kingdom, 1979, pp.14; "Bhutan's people fall into three broad ethnic groups. The first, the Sarchops (37% of the total population), are believed to have been the earliest inhabitants of the country. Apparently Indo-Mongoloid in origin, the question of where they came from, or exactly when they reached Bhutan, remained unresolved. Today the Sarchops live largely in eastern regions. The second group, known as the Ngalongs (20%) is the descendants of Tibetan Immigrants, who came to Bhutan from about the 9th century onwards, settling primarily in the west. The third section of the population is the (ethnic) Nepalese called Lhotsampas (43%) who began to settle in the south towards the end of last century".
Until early 17th century Bhutan existed as a conglomeration of numerous discordant petty principalities. In 1616 AD Shabdrung Nawang Namgyel, an incarnate Lama belonging to the House of Rgya of Druk at Ralung in Tibet came to Bhutan, united the country, established theocracy and became its supreme head. In 1651 AD he established a dual form of government called Chhoesid, with a division of authority between the political head, the Desi and the spiritual head the Je Khempo. After almost three and a half century of existence, Chhoesid system was abolished and the present hereditary monarchy was established in 1907 by Tongsa Penlop(Governor) Ugyen Wangchuk.
In 1953 the third King Jigme Dorji Wangchuk established Tshongdu (National Assembly). He declared Bhutan as a constitutional Monarchy through resolution 12 of the 30th Session of National Assembly held in 1969, wherein after a system of vote of confidence on the King was introduced. Bhutan became the member of United Nations on September 21, 1971. Following the demise of his father in 1972, 17 years old Crown Prince Jigme Singye Wangchuk ascended the golden throne. Thereinafter all democratic reforms brought about by the third Monarch were reverted establishing Royal Absolutism.

  1. Genesis of the problem
The creation of more than 100,000 Bhutanese refugees is not an overnight act of RGOB. It is a carefully thought policy and maneuvering plan to depopulate the Lhotsampa(Nepali speaking) through the mechanism of census exercise.  The RGOB enacted 1985 Citizenship Act after revoking the earlier Citizenship Acts of 1958 and 1977 ostensibly to disenfranchise as many Lhotsampas as possible which otherwise there was no need of enacting such acts frequently.  In early 1988 the RGOB began implementing the 1985 citizenship act and conducted census in the 6 districts of southern Bhutan. The officials consisting only from the north and east demanded the documents of proof of only 1958 and unable to produce were declared non-Bhutanese and ordered to leave the country. The officials never considered the then existing system of non-issuing of tax receipts and were mostly paid in kinds. The exercise was aimed not only to detect illegal immigrants per se but also find fault and declare Lhotsampas as illegal immigrants though living there for generations. The government has empowered the census officials to confiscate all the citizenship cards issued in 1982 and other documents in possession of the people. Besides the census, several other methods were used to force the people leave the country. In 1989 cultural pluralism was banned. Against this backdrop, Bhutan witnessed a Human Rights Movement in 1990. Instead of addressing the people's genuine grievances the RGOB let loose a reign of terror and the consequences were appalling. Thousands were arrested, tortured, raped and killed by the Security Forces and many began to flee the country for safety. On top of this, the RGOB from 1991 started a systematic process of coercing tens of thousands of Bhutanese citizens to fill and sign the "Voluntary Migration Forms" and forcibly evicted them, heightening the refugee crisis. Unable to obtain safety, security and relief from the Government of India though immediate neighbor and supposed to be the first country of asylum the Bhutanese refugees were compelled to come to third country-Nepal to seek asylum.
The crux of the issue is the question of fundamental rights to nationality and citizenship to Lhotsampas. Bhutan was an example of a nation with peace and tranquility where Lhotsampas lived together with other ethnics harmoniously and contributed for the development of the nation without any doubt and fear of such unprecedented misfortune. It becomes hard to believe that a human calamity would erupt from a small and peaceful Himalayan Kingdom. Every one thought in the serene heart of "Sangrila" a bastion of Mahayana Buddhism, which teaches tolerance, brotherhood and compassion the people were happy and living in peace. Today the country which is proud of holding high the principles of Buddhism has created miseries and suffering to about 130,000 its own citizens. The regime has shown the seed of hatred to a section of its subject and has arbitrarily and systematically uprooted them from the country.

  1. Refugees in Nepal
A trickle of 234 Bhutanese refugees crossed over India and first arrived in Nepal in 1991. The refugees pitched up their shanty huts barely enough to protect them from the sandy wind of the bank of Maidhar River. They eked out their livelihood from the alms given by the local Samaritans. However, as the RGOB intensified its eviction program with the help of the security forces, the arrival of the refugees started swelling up in Nepal as Bhutan's immediate neighbor, India could not provide asylum. When the number became tangible to 7000 and their situation became harrowing with more and more Bhutanese refugees flowing in creating unmanageable situation, His Majesty's Government of Nepal (HMG-Nepal) requested UNHCR to provide relief assistance. Now there are more than 100000 Bhutanese refugees living in 7 camps in 2 districts of eastern Nepal.

  1. Role of HMG-Nepal
Apprehensive of the large exodus of Bhutanese refugees, HMG-Nepal has initiated dialogue with the RGOB during the SAARC summit in Dhaka in 1993. The King of Bhutan waive the matter just by requesting the HMG-Nepal to close the gate for asylum which would attract more arrivals. But the King of Bhutan never assured that there would be no further eviction. The refugees arrival increased in multiple which now numbers more than 100,000 in the seven camps managed by UNHCR and its implementing partners. HMG-Nepal provides shelter and security to the Bhutanese refugees. It is an extra burden to shoulder the 100,000 plus refugees with its poor economic situation coupled with sukumbasi(landless) problem.

  1. Bilateral Talks and outcome
It is almost twelve years that Bhutanese refugees have been languishing in the seven camps in the districts of Jhapa and Morang in eastern Nepal with a very uncertain future. UNHCR and its implementing partners manage the camps. Gradually the facilities are reducing because of the fatigue compassion of the donor agencies.
In an endeavor to find an amicable solution, HMG-Nepal has initiated bilateral talk with the RGOB since 1993. So far eleven rounds of bilateral talks had taken place. On 10th round of bilateral talk and after tremendous pressure from International community the RGOB agreed for verification of the refugees in the camps. As agreed the Joint Verification Team (JVT) started the verification of refugees in Khudunabari camp one of the 7 camps on 26th March 2001 and completed on 14th December 2001 verifying 12804 individuals and 1933 families. But the result of the verification which was expected immediately is not yet out even after the lapse of 14 months. The delay of declaration of the result of verification and non-continuation of verification in the remaining 6 camps is frustrating and disillusioned the refugees for early, amicable and permanent solution. This is solely because of the intransigent position of the RGOB. It has always been delaying the resolution of the issue with a view to frustrate the refugees to the maximum extent that would automatically lead them to opt for local assimilation or settle elsewhere. However, in the recently concluded 12th round of talk on 5th- 6th February 2003 the two governments of Bhutan and Nepal have agreed to declare the result of the verified refugees on basis of 4 categories and start repatriation. Though the process would start but is going to take indefinite time to completely resolve the problem or never as Bhutan is reluctant to take all the Bhutanese back.
Although there has been all party consensus on resolution of Bhutanese refugee problem, there had not been much concerted effort. This was opined mainly due to the unstable Government and the lack of serious homework on the part of HMG-Nepal. It is also observed that two Ministries-Home and Foreign of HMG-Nepal which are responsible for the Bhutanese refugees and resolution of the problem lack close coordination on the issue. The refugees are apprehensive that unless the two Ministries work very closely if possible with the refugees too it is impossible to deal with the RGOB effectively. On the other hand, RGOB has been all the time prepared and successfully maneuvering HMG-Nepal with its clever ploy. The HMG-Nepal has made mistake by accepting the proposal of the RGOB to categorize the refugees in four categories:
  1. Bonafide Bhutanese if evicted forcefully
  2. Bhutanese who emigrated
  3. Non-Bhutanese and
  4. Bhutanese who have committed criminal acts.
Now this has became an irksome condition for HMG-Nepal to salvage. This has given an opportunity to RGOB to beat around the bush and procrastinate the progress in the talk and declaring the result of the verification. To show to the world that the RGOB is very much concern for the resolution of the Bhutanese refugee problem ahead of HMG-Nepal, it even invited the individuals and opposition leaders from Nepal to give inputs as how to find the solution. But refugees never felt the impact of the visits instead Bhutan seems to have won their heart. On the other hand, HMG-Nepal holds no any responsibilities of providing permanent settlements other than asylum on humanitarian ground. So there is fear of creating statelessness by the imbroglio and decision to declare the result on the basis of 4 categories and Bhutan which has been always refusing to accept the people in the category 2. We are also not interested to take non-Bhutanese or force any Bhutanese who would like to settle elsewhere.

  1. Role of the Government of India (GOI)
Bhutanese refugees have approached the GOI for help to resolve the problem amicably besides requesting for shelter. Many appeals have been made to the GOI to help resolve the problem as being immediate neighbor and also the Foreign policies and Security of Bhutan are guided by India as per the 1949 Indo-Bhutan treaty. So far there has not been any response. It is also learnt that informally, the HMG-Nepal also had requested the GOI to help resolve the Bhutanese refugee issue.
On the other hand the GOI has so far maintained the neutral stand and has waived the issue to be solved bilaterally. But every one is of the opinion that the Bhutanese refugee problem cannot be solved without the involvement of the GOI in view of the following facts:
  1. India is the immediate neighbor of Bhutan and Nepal and would have been the first country of asylum.
  2. There are Bhutanese refugees taking shelter in India.
  3. The RGOB has been alleging that there are Indians in the refugee camps in Nepal.
  4. The Bhutanese refugees crossed over to Nepal through Indian soil.
  5. The Bhutanese refugees have to pass through India in the event of repatriation.
Therefore, the GOI's involvement is felt necessary to resolve the Bhutanese refugee problem amicably and permanently.


  1. International Community
In the initial stage of the refugee arrival, the international communities were very active and supportive to the Bhutanese refugee issue. There has been wide campaign and advocacy on the flagrant human rights violation and arbitrary deprivation of basic human rights to a section of the Bhutanese citizens on ethnic ground.
The American Senator's letter to the King of Bhutan, two visits of the Assistant Secretary of State from US, the State Department reports on Bhutan, the visit of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, visit of High Commissioner UNHCR, the discussion of the Bhutanese refugee issue in the UN Commission and two chairman's statement in the Sub-Commission, adoption of two resolutions by the European Parliament, discussion of the Bhutanese refugee issue in the British Parliament, frequent diplomatic missions visits to the refugee camps etc created pressures on the RGOB which compelled to open dialogue with His Majesty's Government of Nepal(HMG-Nepal) in 1993 and agree for verification in 2000. However, despite the tremendous pressure and urge from International community Bhutan still is not sincere and have political will to resolve the problem peacefully and permanently which is obvious from the delay of the verification result of the Khudunabari camp. Therefore unless the International community takes up some assertive steps rather than cajoling, Bhutan is not easily going to accept all the Bhutanese back. On the other hand because of lack of progress in the resolution of the protracted refugee problem, the International community has started showing fatigue compassion which is adversely affecting in all the areas of refugee concern.

  1. Role of donor agencies to Bhutan
Bhutan is being highly appreciated for its performance and efficiency in the aid management and keeping intact its cultural and traditional values. On the other hand, they have ignored that in the pretext of protecting the culture and tradition a section of ethnic community are being arbitrarily deprived of their fundamental rights and indiscriminately thrown out of the country. The diplomacy of the donor agencies to keep Bhutan happy has been a clean chit to Bhutan which has encouraged further to implement various discriminatory policies to coerce the southern Bhutanese to leave the country. There is no any aid reduction inspite of 1/6 of population being thrown out in exile and spending a harrowing lives in the refugee camps. They are very skeptic and careful not to offend with pernicious refugee issue to Bhutan. The Bhutanese refugees are the victim of systematic ethnic cleansing and blatant human rights violation. We appreciate the stand taken by the Government of Denmark in the Round Table Meeting (RTM) in Thimphu in 2000 and subsequent decision to close its Aid Monitoring Office in Bhutan from July this year. However we are dismay over again renewing the policy and reopening it from January 2003 which should not have been until the refugee problem is resolved. The 8th Round Table meeting (RTM) of donor countries to Bhutan was held in Geneva from 18th- 19th February 2003 and reportedly the countries this time were more firmed in their position on resolution of the refugee problem and Bhutan was pressurized to agree for repatriation of Bhutanese who would like to return.

9. Role of INGOs
Most of the INGOs are actively involved and continuing their support to the plight of the Bhutanese refugees. Besides their role in advocacy and campaign through publications and their participation in the international forum, many of them have been supporting some of the Bhutanese groups financially for their activities. Organizations like the Amnesty International, ICRC are closely monitoring the human rights situation and the prison conditions in Bhutan even though they are not permitted free access of places of choice and the prisons. However, this has enhanced to highlight the human rights situation in Bhutan and improvement in the prisons and prisoners' conditions to some extent. This has also pressurized the RGOB to release prisoners detained arbitrarily and without fair trial. However, political prisoners like Gomchhen Thinley Weizer and others still continue to languish in the prisons in Bhutan.


  1. Role of NGOs in Nepal
Most of the NGOs in Nepal are actively supporting the Bhutanese movement and help resolve the refugee issue. They have been raising the issue in various forums besides organizing workshops, seminars and interaction programs for the refugees. Nonetheless, some isolated support and tie up programs with some individual Bhutanese organizations have not yielded desired end results in terms of bringing closeness and harmony among the Bhutanese refugee groups. In an effort to give impetus to the effort of HMG-Nepal, Bhutanese Refugee Repatriation Support Group (BRRSG) was formed on 18th August 2002 by the senior citizens consisting of Ex-Ministers, Ex-Ambassadors and Ex-Foreign Experts of Nepal coordinated by Shailendra Kumar Upadhya, Ex-Foreign Minister. They have been extensively campaigning for repatriation of the refugees and possibly trying to mediate dialogue with the Bhutan government and the refugee representatives.

  1. Role of NGOs in India
The first NGO to take up the Bhutanese refugee issue is the South Asian Human Rights Documentation Center (SAHRDC). The Executive Director personally visited the affected border districts of Bhutan in 1991 for first hand information and helped in disseminating classified cases to the Amnesty International and other International agencies. The center is continuing its support through its publications and raising the issue in international forums. Other groups like Bhutan Solidarity India (BSI) and Indo-Bhutan Friendship Society (IBFS) are also actively involved in campaign and advocacy of Bhutanese refugee issue with the GOI. They also organize meetings and conferences.



  1. Situation inside Bhutan
The Lhotsampas continue to live in a state of fear and persecution. There is no freedom of movement and freedom of speech. On every check point the southern Bhutanese have to show identity card and register their names with the police for traveling to interior Bhutan. They are being deprived of most of the government facilities. Education to the children, health facilities and other public services are not accessible to them easily. Production of No Objection Certificate (NOC) is mandatory for availing these facilities. Even for private employment the southern Bhutanese have to produce NOC.
Over 3000 Lhotsampas civil servants are expelled from government jobs after the refugee problem began. According to the decision of the 75th National Assembly session of Bhutan, 219 relatives of the people living in the refuge camps were compulsorily retired from the government service in the beginning of 1999. The situation is becoming all the more worst as the recently concluded 80th National Assembly Session has further urged the RGOB not to allow to return the refugees in case of which might create insecurity for the country. But the same assembly members expressed their grave concern of apprehension of the threat posed by the presence of United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and Kamtapuri Liberation Organization (KLO), in Bhutan, insurgents from Assam and West Bengal. The insurgents were given safe haven by the RGOB in order to prevent them from conniving with the refugees.
The King has taken the full responsibility of resolving the problem of militants from India but has ignored the refugee problem as if solved which once was also the responsibility taken by the King in 1993 and even threatened to abdicate the throne within 3 years if could not resolve the southern Bhutanese problem. To further complicate the issue, the government is continuously distributing the lands owned by the Bhutanese refugees now living in the camps in Nepal. About 8000 families from the north and eastern Bhutan have been resettled on the lands belonging to the refugees in various districts. This is going to create serious conflict in the event of repatriation. The RGOB is determined to erase the existence of the Lhotsampas from Bhutan and has even gone to the extent of changing the names of the districts and villages and also the land registration numbers that are being held by the people now living in the camps.

13. Changing policies of RGOB
The King of Bhutan to everyone's surprise dissolved the age-old cabinet in the 76th National Assembly in 1999 and appointed well-qualified ministers and entrusted them with the responsibility of running the government. He also appointed the Chairman synonym to Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers on a rotation basis of one year tenure. He also further declared that he would remain only as the Head of the State and not as the Government. Further in November 2001 the King has appointed 39 members headed by the Chief Justice of High Court to draft the constitution of the country. The process of changes that suppose to benefit all the Bhutanese however is aimed to bring changes despising the refugees in exile. The southern Bhutanese are given very insignificant role in the government administration and more and more northern Bhutanese are inducted to gradually replace the southern Bhutanese.
The government has started decentralization of developmental activities. It is encouraging more participation of the grass roots and take responsibility of the developmental activities in the respective village, block and district. The government has established Gewog Yargay Tshogchung-GYT(Block Development Committee) and Dzongkhag Yargay Tshogchung-DYT(District Development Committee). They are also entrusted with the responsibility to plan and implement the development activities. All these changes are to keep the people happy and not support the repatriation of the refugees with whom have to share the benefits. Also this is to show to the International community that democratic changes are favored and process is taking place.

      14. Refugee situation in the camps
The Bhutanese refugee problem is a protracted problem with no complete solution insight despite the bilateral talks between 2 governments of HMG Nepal and RGOB and completion of verification of refugees in Khudunabari one of the 7 camps. However, the refugees are still living on hope to go back to Bhutan. There are no any single Bhutanese who would not like to go to Bhutan. On the other hand there is frustration and expression of hopelessness yet no body is openly able to express what exactly should be the suitable solution and arrangement that to be made. The recent decision of the two governments to verify the people in 4 categories and start repatriation whoever are accepted is a little solace but not a complete solution. The two governments have decided to work on the categories from 24th February 2003 and on 24th March 2003 the Joint Ministerial Level Committee (JMLC) meeting will be held and repatriation would start. Nevertheless there are still 6 camps almost with 90000 people are to be verified and repatriated.

      15. Role of Bhutanese Refugees and formation of BRRRC
There are more than 60 Bhutanese organizations and political parties altogether. All are formed in exile to take up the Bhutanese refugee issue and to establish human rights and democracy in Bhutan. Seeing no any concrete progress achieved by any of the organization and political party, the people in the camps have decided to form a single consolidated body to give proper direction to achieve the goal of repatriation. Therefore, they have decided to elect their leaders from the respected districts, camps and human rights organizations and formed a body known as the Bhutanese Refugee Representative Repatriation Committee (BRRRC). The objective of BRRRC is" Early Repatriation of all the Bhutanese refugees to their original homesteads with safety, dignity and honor". It is the only peoples' mandated and legitimate body to speak on behalf of the Bhutanese refugees. After its formation on 16th January 1999, it has taken up many activities to achieve its aims and objectives. It is endeavoring to garner support and solidarity and build international opinions to pressurize RGOB to help solve the refugee problem peacefully and permanently as early as possible and enable the Bhutanese refugees' repatriation with safety, dignity and honor.

3. REFUGEES[1]: THE EXPERIENCE IN BANGLADESH

Dr. Bhumitra Chakma
Associate Professor
Department of International Relations
Dhaka University
Dhaka


Section I: INTRODUCTION

            The movement of people although has been a constant phenomenon in Human history, but the ‘forcing of people’ from their established and known habitats emerged with the birth of a territorial nation-state.[2]  The nation-state system emerged in Europe in late eighteenth century and the post-revolutionary France is considered as the first such political entity.  The structural elements of the nation-state created political, social, economic and environmental conditions during the nation-building process, which led to a widespread displacement of people from their usual habitats.  The problem intensified with the world-wide spread of the nation-state system gradually assuming religious, racial and/or ideological character.  Although remained dormant under the structure of superpower politics and rivalry during the Cold War years, the refugee phenomenon became an issue of serious concern in global politics with the phenomenal rise of involuntary or forced movement of people across national boundaries as a undeniable reference point in the study of international security in the post-Cold War era.  The upsurge in refugee flow in the post-Cold War era, it is noteworthy, was primarily caused by nation-state induced factors, such as the state repression for political or ethnic reasons or failure of the state to provide economic, social or environmental sense of security to the people.  Not surprisingly, this refugee phenomenon is more evident in the developing regions of the world.  With the ethnic, socio-political, economic and environmental turmoil being on the rise at the global level, more visibly in the South Asia region, the refugee problem will remain a matter of serious concern for humankind.

            The refugee phenomenon has been an integral part of Bangladesh’s state formation process.  It is a refugee-generating as well as a refugee-receiving state.  During the war of independence, Bangladesh produced about ten million refugees, who took refuge in neighbouring India.  Upon independence, about three hundred thousand Biharis became refugees who proclaimed themselves as ‘Stranded Pakistanis’ in the aftermath of the war and opted for repatriation to Pakistan.  An agreement in 1974 facilitated repatriation of 170,000 Bihari refugees.  But Pakistan’s domestic politics and its general disinterest in receiving the Biharis have prevented a permanent settlement of the problem till date.

            Furthermore, in the post-independence era Bangladesh generated as well as hosted refugees.  It produced over 50,000 ethnic conflict-induced Pahari refugees, who crossed international broder to take refuge in the neighbouring Indian state of Tripura.  A substantial number of Hindus have also allegedly migrated to India since independence.  Insecurity and discrimination against this religious minority community as well as the factor or religious affinity with the majority population of India have precipitated their movement.  In addition, development activities and environmental degradation in the process of nation-building and natural calamities have displaced a large number of people in Bangladesh, some of whom have crossed international borders and settled in various Indian states, i.e., Tripura, Assam, Meghalaya etc.  Bangladesh also hosted about half a million Rohingya refugees from Myanmar twice in its short history as an independent state.

            Given the above background, this paper explores how states in order to protect their narrowly defined national interest have ended up in producing refugees and violated the human rights of these displaced people keeping the context of Bangladesh into perspective.  For a closer exposition, three particular cases – the Bihari refugees, the Pahari refugees, and the Rohingya refugees – are examined in greater details.  The next section presents each of the three selected cases with particular emphasis on the sources and reasons of their displacements, which tell the story of their miseries.  The final section will sum up the main points discussed in the previous section.

SECTION II: CASES
Case I:  The Bihari Refugees

            The history of the Bihari refugees goes back to the partition of India in 1947.  Their displacement occurred in the wake of communal violence during and in the aftermath of the partition (for example, 30,000 Muslims were killed in the ‘Great Bihar Killing’ in October-November 1947).  About a million of them migrated into the eastern wing of Pakistan (East Pakistan),[3] mostly from the eastern Indian states of Bihar, West Bengal, Assam, Orissa, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura and Sikkim.[4]  During the period of united Pakistan (1947-1971), the Urdu-speaking Biharis were not assimilated with the society of East Pakistan and remained as a distinct cultural-linguistic group.  They generally associated and identified themselves with the West Pakistani society primarily based on a shared linguistic heritage and supported the West Pakistani governing elite in the process of capturing the economic and political power in East Pakistan.  The Biharis, consequently, enjoyed preferential treatment in various sectors of the East Pakistan economy and a relatively privileged position in terms of official patronage during the period of united Pakistan.  Indeed, initially the arrival of Biharis and the positive discrimination of the Pakistan Government in terms of refugee rehabilitation were not resented by the Bengalis.  However, the euphoria of the formation of Pakistan and the positive attitude of the Bengalis towards the Biharis was short-lived.   It was over as early as March 1948 when Mohammad Ali Jinnah announced in Dhaka that “Urdu and Urdu alone shall be the State language of Pakistan.”  During the language movement, the Biharis instead of supporting the Bengalis sided with the West Pakistani ruling elite.   Furthermore, in the 1954 provincial election and in the 1970 general election, they extended their supportto the Muslim League, which symbolised and championed the domination of the West Pakistanais over the Bengalis.  They also supported the West Pakistani ruling elite and many of them actively participated in the military actions against the Bengalis in the 1971 Bangladesh independence War.  The exclusive attitude of the Biharis and their pro-West Pakistani political activities resulted in the formation of an anti-Bihari sentiment among the Bengalis. 

            Against the above backdrop and more importantly, because of their active anti-independence role (for example, their participation in the East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces, i.e., Razakars and Al-Shams, raised by the Pakistani authorities), the Biharis became subject to widespread  political persecution preceding and during the Independence War, and in the aftermath of liberation.[5]  Following independence, the Bihari political persecution continued and their properties and houses were taken over by the Bengalis.  Several Government initiatives [for example, the Acting President Order I of 1972, the Bangladesh Abandoned Property (Control, Management and Disposal) Order 1972, President’s Order 16 etc.] were also responsible for the dispossession of Bihari properties.  As a result, by the middle of 1972, a total of 1,008,680 Biharis were domiciled in various shanty camps spreading all over Bangladesh.[6]

            The Biharis were offered Bangladeshi citizenship in 1972 under the Presidential Order – 149.  According to Bangladesh Government sources, 600,000 Biharis accepted the offer,[7] while 529,669 registered with the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) opting to return to their ‘country of nationality’ – Pakistan.  Islamabad, however, was less interested and showed a lax attitude about the repatriation of the Biharis except those who joined the East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces and surrendered with the Pakistan Army.  As a Pakistani Foreign Ministry official said: “What are we supposed to do with them (the Biharis)?  We have enough problems already.  Besides, you must remember that they are really Indian refugees.”[8]  Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the post-1971 first civilian president of Pakistan, was even unwilling to admit any sizeable number of Bihari refugees to be repatriated to Pakistan.[9]  Hence, Pakistan adopted such a policy and legislated categories of Biharis to be able to qualify to return in such a way which effectively stymied the repatriation process and denationalised the Biharis in Bangladesh.

            On the other hand, Bangladesh’s diplomacy with Pakistan began with the position that it would not establish and normalise relations with Islamabad unless the former agreed to, and expedite the repatriation of the non-Bengalis including the Biharis.  This forced the Pakistan Government to agree to take back a large number of Biharis in the 1973 New Delhi Agreement as well as in the Tripartite Agreement of 1974 in exchange for the return of the Bengalis in Pakistan.[10]  Followisng the conclusion of these agreements, the ICRC registered 539,639 Biharis who intended to return to Pakistan.  The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) facilitated the return of 108,750 Bihari refugees by June 1974.[11]  After that it had to suspend the repatriation process due to exhaustion of funds.  The Bangladesh Government complained to Islamabad about the slow repatriation of the Biharis and raised the issue during the 1974 Mujib-Bhutto summit.  The Pakistani side, as it was earlier, showed little interest in it.  Bangladesh raised the issue at the Commonwealth Leader’s Conference in Jamaica in May 1974 and in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly in December of the same year.  Despite vigorous diplomatic initiatives and in international campaign to create pressure on Islamabad, no more Bihari refugees were repatriated to Pakistan during the remaining period of the Mujib rule (till August 1975).

            Following the fall of the Mujib Government in 1975, Dhaka initiated new diplomatic initiatives to persuade Islamabad to resume the repatriation process.  Saudi Arabia offered a C-130 transport plane, and Qatar and Kuwait contributed $500,000 and $50,000 respectively to restart the repatriation of the Bihari refugees.  During a visit to Bangladesh in August 1977, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary agreed to take 25,000 hardship cases through international agencies.  But these were from the 1974 ICRC registered list and no new hardship cases were in fact included.  Islamabad was even reluctant to receive the above-noted promised number of refugees and during the visit of Bangladesh Foreing Secretary to Pakistan in July 1978, the Pakistani Government “brought down the figure from 25,000 to 16,000”.[12]

            The Bangladesh Government raised the issue at the Saana Islamic Countries’ Foreign Ministers sConference in January 1985 and urged the Muslim countries to exert pressure on Islamabad to take back the Bihari refugees.[13]  The move was the direct result of Islamabad’s recent position that it was “the problem of Bangladesh.”[14]  These indeed indicated a deadlock on the matter.

            Despite the above, Pakistan’s President Zia-ul Haq, however, desired a solution to the problem on humanitarian grounds and asserted that Pakistan was ready to accept the Bihari refugees if sufficient financial resources were raised for their transfer and rehabilitation.  During a visit to Bangladeh in December 1985, he stated that Pakistan was ‘not legally bound’ to take ‘non-locals,’ “but on humanitarian and moral grounds we have agreed to look into the matter.”  Zia also met a delegation of the Bihari refugees during the visit and assured them that they would be repatriated as soon as necessary arrangements were made.”[15]  On 27 November 1986, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shahibjada Yakub Khan stated in Pakistan’s National Assembly that his country was ‘morally committed’ to the repatriation of the rest of the non-Bengalis from Bangladesh for which a sum of Rs.490 million was required.[16]  Pakistan and Rabita Al-Alam Al-Islami (an Islamic charity organisation, hereafter Rabita) signed a trust agreement in 1988,[17] wherein the former agreed to resettle the Bihari refugees on humanitarian grounds.  A repatriation and resettlement plan was drawn up which included the construction of 36,000 houses spread over 80 sites costing about $278 million and with approximately $30 million for community services and $10 million for the transportation of the refugees.  Despite alaborate preparations, the repatriation process could not get oof the ground and the first scheduled flight was cancelled due to violent protest and demonstration in Sindh.

            Benazir Bhutto was traditionally opposed to the idea of transferring the Biharis to Pakistan and followed the party politics (Pakistan Peoples Party to PPP) and the state policy of her father (Zulfikar Ali Buttto) after she came to power in 1988.  Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, it is noteworthy, introduced the restrictive entry regulations for the Bihari refugees in the early 1970s.  during her tenure as Prime Minister, Benazir did not grant the citizenship rights either to the refugees in Bangladesh or to the 100,000 Biharis who have moved to Pakistan illegally since 1977.  Terming “the issue of stranded Biharis is a complicated one,” and “politically potent,” she even proposed to Dhaka that they should be permanently settled in Bangladesh.  During her visit to Bangladesh in October 1989, Benazir proposed the Ershad Government that the Biharis be permanently settled in Bangladesh and Pakistan would help to raise funds from the Muslim world for their settlement.[18]  Benazir in fact feared that the Biharis would end up in Karachi, which would exacerbate the existing ethnic tension between Mujahirs and the Sindhi community.  Therefore, playing the Sindh card, Benazir Bhutto indefinitely put off the repatriation of the Biharis to Pakistan.

            Newaz Shariff, Benazir Bhutto’s political opponent, was generally supportive to the repatriation of the Bihari refugees from Bangladesh.  After becoming Prime Minister, he took substantive initiatives for the repatriation of the Biharis from Bangladesh.  In an interview with the Daily Star in 1992, he hoped to resume the repatriation process in due course and linked the problem in general to resource constraints.[19]  He was ready to rehabilitate the Biharis in his home state of Punjab and officially domiciled them there with the issuance of identity cards.  Following it, the Pakistan High Commission in Dhaka registered more than 200,000 Bihari refugees and provided them with identity cards in order to resume the repatriation process.  Initially 3,000 families comprisiing 20,000 refugees were readied for return.  Although Islamabad indicated some ‘logistical and practical’ problems for the delaying of the repatriation,[20] however, symbolically the process began with the return of 235 Bihari refugees on 10 January 1993.  The repatriation process could not proceed further as Newaz Shariff was removed from office in April 1993 and Benazir Bhutto was reinstated as the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

            Benazir in her second term as Prime Minister initially indicated that the previous government’s commitments for the repatriation of the Biharis would be honoured.[21]  However, subsequently her government failed to materialise the commitment.  It adopted a ‘go-slow’ policy and refrained from announcing a definite timetable for repatriation.[22]  This manifested a distinterest on the part of the Benazir Government to resume the repatriation process.  Indeed, during Benazir’s second term the repatriation of the Biharis did not restart.  Since then, the issue has taken a backseat in Bangladesh_Pakistan relations due to latter’s lax attitude and despite formers’ strong interest in it.

            Despite the fact that a substantial number of Biharis have returned to Pakistan in the last three decades, a large number still remain in the refugee camps of Bangladesh.  They are still determined to go to Pakistan.  In the past, domestic political factors in Pakistan, i.e., disinterest of some political prties, inter-ethnic conflict, inter-sectarian violence etc., have prevented a smooth repatriation of the Biharis.  It is indeed a political question rather than an economic one.  Given the above, it will not be unrealistic to conjecture that the factors that prevented a permanent settlement of the problem in the past will influence the course of the matter in the same way in the future.  This means that the misery of the Biharis will continue in the days to come.

Case II: The Pahari Refugees

            The influx of Pahari refugees from bangladesh to India in the later 1970s and throughout the 1980s had been the direct result of government’s repressive measures carried out in order to contain an ethnic resistance movement that developed in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) from the failure of nation-building in the post-independent Bangladesh ‘nation-state.’[23]  The state and nation-building process in the state of Pakistan and later Bangladesh precipitated political, ethnic and religious conflicts as well as created economic and developmental conditions, which forced many people to migrate within and outside its territorial boundaries.  Indeed the creation of a majoritarian and domineering state where the nation was conceived in terms of the culture and identity of the dominant and governing social group inflicted discrimination, deprivation, marginalisation and alienation of the minority communities resulting in ethnic and other types of conflict and the dispslacement of people as refugees.  As argued elsewhere, it has been the ‘politics of nation-building’ or in other words, the failure to accommodate the identity of the Hill People in the post-independent Bangladesh state precipitated gradual alienation of the Paharis from the national mainstream that eventually turned into a full-blown armed ethnic resistance movement.[24]  The Paharis organised themselves under the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS) and its armed wing Shanti Bahini, who carried out the armed struggle, what they termed as an ‘authonomy movement’, to establish their ‘identity’.  The Bangladesh central government responded to this development by adopting a two-pronged counter-insurgency policy.  One, it launched a settlement programme of Bengalis in the CHT from the plains of Bangladesh in order to outnumber the Paharis in the district.  The settlement programme inevitably fuelled conflict over land between the settlers and the Paharis as there was hardly any extra cultivable land left to accommodate new settlement.[25]  It resulted in the viction of the Paharis from their land as the administration and the law-enforcing agencies directly or indirectly promoted the cause of the new settlers.  It was in such a context that the settlers joined in organised massacres with the military in order to create instability and to evict the Paharis to grab their land.[26]

            Two, the government increased its military presence in the CHT and the military carried out series of military operations with the aim of containing the Pahari resistance movement.  While doing this, the military resorted to various repressive measures and mental and physical violence on the Paharis.  The repressive measures included inter alia deliberate harassment, restriction on movement, rape, extrajudicial killing and organised massacres.[27]  To avoid such repressive measures, thousands of Paharis crossed international borders and too refuge in the Indian states of Tripura and Mizoram.  Each counter-insurgency operation carried out by the Bangladesh military created a fresh wave of refugee flows to India, such as seen in 1979, 1981, 1984 and 1986.[28]  M.Q. Zaman also pointed out: “The waves of refugees are directly related to the waves of violence against the tribal people in the Hill Tracts.”[29]

           
            A total of 54,000 Pahari refugees took refuge in the Indian state of T[30]ripura.[31]  It constituted more than ten percent of the Pahari population in the CHT.  The Bangladesh government preferred and adopted a bilateral negotiating posture with India to resolve the issue.  During Prime Minister Khaleda Zia’s visit to India in May 1992 the two governments reached an agreement to repatriate the refugees and the Bangladesh government committed itself to creating an atmosphere congenial to their return.  Dhaka also agreed to send a government delegation to India to make final arrangement for repatriation and encourage the refugees to return.  Although apparently it seems that India emphasised the ‘voluntary’ repatriation of the Pahari refugees, however, actually it resorted to ‘non-violent pressure’ to make the refugees agree to repatriation by drastically reducing food rations, excepting rice and salt, which resulted in near starvation and malnutrition of the refugees.[32]   It was even announced by the Tripura state government that no rations would be supplied after July 1992 following a directive from the central government to force the refugees for repatriation by that date.  The refugees initially resisted the pressure and refused to return in view of the security situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.  However, finally they could not resist it and agreed to the first ‘experimental’ batch of repatriation of 2,000 refugees on 15 February 1994.  Prior to that, a 20-point economic and rehabilitation package agreement was signed in Agartala (the capital of the Tripura state) between the Bangladesh government and the leaders of the Jumma Refugees’ Welfare Association on 9 March 1997.  It projected an estimated repatriation of 63,861 Pahari refugees.[33]  But the smooth implementation of the accord was hampered by bureaucratic delays and uncertain political and security situation in the CHT.  The repatriation process was only salvaged following the conclusion of a Peace Accord between the Bangladesh government and the PCJSS to end the armed ethnic resistance movement in the CHT in December 1997.  The agreement paved the way for the repatriation of 43,000 remaining Pahari refugees from India.  Repatriation recommenced in November 1997 and was completed by 27 February 1998.  One remarkable feature in the whole affair was that neither Bangladesh nor India preferred or wanted involvement of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the repatriation process.

            Over the years, the Pahari refugee problem became a dominant issue in Bangladesh-India relations.  For example, Bangladesh Foreign Minister in 1989 opined Bangladesh-India relations to be not in a ‘good condition’ and identified three major issues that must be resolved to develop an ‘excellent neighbourly’ relations – water sharing, Tin Bigha and Chakma refugees.[34]  The importance of the Pahari refugee issue therefore was that it was conceived in the same way as the Ganges Water dispute in Bangladesh-India bilateral relations.  India also attempted to use the Pahari refugee issue as a bargaining tool vis-à-vis Bangladesh to realise diplomatic objectives in other areas.  For example, New Delhi wanted communication facilities through Bangladesh as a quid pro quo for resolving the refugee problem.  Bangladesh’s Communication Minister Colonel (Rtd.) Oli Ahmed claimed that Indians wanted rail passage and port facilities from Bangladesh in exchange for the repatriation of the Chakmas.[35]  Bangladesh’s co-operative hand on these issues, it is noteworthy, is important for India for containing insurgency and for ensuring economic development in its north-eastern region.[36]  Bangladesh for geographic reason is a very important channel for various insurgent groups operating in the North-eastern region to establish link with the outside world.  For the same locational reason, Bangladesh can play a significant role for the economic development of the North-eastern India.

            Following the influx of the Pahari refugees, the Indian government demanded and pressed for an amicable political solution of the CHT problem so that the refugees could come back to their homes safely and as quickly as possible.  The implication of this was that the production of the Pahari refugees turned the CHT problem into an Indo-Bangladesh matter and India was given an opportunity to have a hand in resolving an internal rpoblem.  Furthermore, it should also be noted that India provided political and material assistance to the Shanti Bahini since the 1970s.  India provided such assistance not out of humanitarian gesture, rather on the basis of its own strategic assessment.  For example, it was a move to counterbalance alleged use of Bangladesh as conduit for channeling China and Pakistan’s assistance to the insurgent groups of Northeast India and to contain Mizo insurgency.  Therefore, it is very evident that both India and Bangladesh in this context were acting on the basis of their own national interests which severely hampered the human rights of the Pahari refugees.  The Pahari refugees were nothing more than political pawns in the strategic chess game of India and Bangladesh.

Case III:  The Rohingya Refugees

            Like the case of the Pahari refugees, the Rohingya refugee problem can also be understood and explained in the contet of ‘nation-building’ in a new state aimed and determined at imitating the Western model of ‘nation-state.’[37]  Following independence, the ruling elite attempted to bring national integration and adopted nation-building strategies in multi-ethnic Myanmar imitating the Western wisdom of nation-state system.  The consequences of such a venture in Myanmar, as can be observed, were gradual alienation of the minority communities, heightening of inter-ethnic tension and growth of resistance movements in various parts of the country.  The Myanmar ruling elite systematically used the ‘race and religion card’ while pursuing the ‘mahoritarian’ and ‘authoritarian’ politics in multi-ethnic Myanmar ruling elite claimed that the Muslim Rohingyas were the illegal migrants from Bangladesh and they were the cause of social instability and deteriorating law and order situation in Arakan.  Therefore, they should be pushed back from where they originated.

            From the beginning of independance, the Muslim Rohingyas were excluded from the nation-building process.  They were not invited during the drafting of the constitution.  Subsequently, successive military governments undertook various repressive measures in order to drive the Rohingyas out of Myanmar.  Rohingyas were employed in forced community labour and made subject to arbitrary taxation and extortion.  The military ruling elite also imposed heavy restrictions on the movements of the Rohingyas and undertook measures to deny them citizenship rights.  Under the 1974 Emergency Immigration Act, Rohingyas were provided with Foreign Registration Cards codifying their non-citizen status, which was formalised by the 1982 Citizenship Act thus making them stateless.  In 1977, the Myanmar government launched ‘Operation Nagamin’ (Dragon King) to “scrutinise each individual living in the State (of Arakan), designating citizens and foreigners in accordance with the law and taking actions against foreigners who have filtered into the country illegally.”[38]  Gross Human rights villations occurred during this operation.  The end result of all these repressive measures – system of forced labour, denial of citizenship rights, arbitrary taxation and extorition, system of model villages, forced relocation, restriction on freedom of movements and arbitrary deterioration of economic and food security in Arakan etc. – was the exodus of over 150,000 Rohingyas into Bangladesh in early 1978.

            Besides, there was also an immediate cause behind the 1978 Rohingya influx.  It was alleged that Rohingyas (both Muslims and Buddhists) were involved in a failed coup of February 1976 and Bangladesh Military Attaché at Rangoon had a hand in it.[39]  Against such a backdrop, Rangoon felt the need to adopt counter-insurgency measures to curb any possible insurrection in Arakan.  ‘Operation Nagamin,’ as cited above, was carried out in such a context.  The Muslim Rohingyas caught the maximum suspicion of the military government because religiously they constituted a ‘different category,’ they lived in border areas, and they were more likely to resort to armed rebellion with assistance from fellow Muslims just across the border in Bangladesh.  Rangoon'’ suspicion also arose from the incident that in 1947 a section of the Rohingya leadership approached Muslim League President Mohammad Ali Jinnah to incorporate northern Arakan into East Pakistan.  Therefore, the Myanmar ruling elite since independence has always kept a suspicious eye on the Muslim Rohingyas of Arakan.

            By June 1978, a total of 167,000 Rohingya refugees arrived in Bangladesh thus making it a refugee-receiving nation for the first time in its short history as an independent state.  Strangely enough, it occurred at a time when it seemed that Bangladesh-Myanmar bilateral relation was on a sound track, particularly following the visit of President Ziaur Rahman to Myanmer in July 1977.  Immediately after the beginning of the influx, Bangladesh in a protest note warned that “the treatment meted out to the refugees constituted not only a grave violation of Human Rights enshrined in the UN Charter, but also posed a serious threat to the peace on the border and stability in the region.”[40]  However, Bangladesh, for the sake of maintaining the continuity of the steady growth of good neighbourly relations, still adopted a bilateral negotiating approach to resolve the problem without internationalising it.  Dhaka considered the refugee influx as a short-term problem and hence sought a ‘quick and safe return’ of the refugees to Myanmar.[41]  Bangladesh’s bilateral negotiating approach soon floundered as its diplomatic initiatives failed to resolve the problem and the refugee influx continued unabated.  Against this backdrop, President Zia in a strongly worded statement on 7 May 1978 accused the Myanmar government of “inhuman evictions of Muslims” and demanded immediate repatriation of all refugees.[42]

            Bangladesh thereafter decided to internationalise the issue to supplement the bilateral approach.  Two factors prompted Dhaka to advance such a posture.  First, the Myanmar government was deliberately pursuing a policy of procrastination to resolve the matter.  Dhaka alone failed to create adequate pressure on Rangoon to impose a solution to the problem.  Therefore, it was thought that internationalisation of the matter would help Bangladesh’s cause.  Second, longer stay of the Rohingya refugees was proving to be economically unbearable for Bangladesh.  Hence, Bangladesh decided to seek international assistance to feed the refugees.

            Eventually, Rangoon sent an eleven-member delegation to Dhaka in July 1978 led by Deputy Foreign Minister U Tin Ohn to find out a solution to the refugee problem.  After intense negotiations, an agreement was reached on 9 July 1978, which facilitated the repatriation of ‘all’ Rohingya refugees.[43]  The repatriation began on 1 August 1978 and ended by the end of the year with a total repatraition of 187,500 Rohingyas.

            Although all the Rohingya refugees went back within a relatively short period of time, neither side actually paid any attention to remove the fundamental causes of the Rohingya refugee phenomenon.  Hence it was not surprising that a second Rohingya refugee influx in a bigger magnitude occurred in the early 1990s.  The structural and causal factors that led to the second influx were not very different from the first one.  Additionally, this push was specifically executed by the military junta in the context of its growing isolation and desperate effort to hang on to power against a massive anti-military popular democratic movement in Myanmar.  The military was severely discredited due to its failure to hand over power to the elected representatives in September 1990.  Therefore, forcing the Rohingyas out of the country was a calculated application of ‘race and religion card’ and an attempt to diver the attention of the people from the democratic movement.

            By October 1992, about 265,000 Rohingyas took refuge in Bangladesh.[44]  As can be observed, this figure is about 100,000 higher than the 1978 influx.  During the initial stage of influx, Bangladesh and Myanmar troops became involved in border skirmishes,[45] which possibly occurred from the former’s unwillingness to accept the Rohingya refugees and forcible resistance to their entry.  This development set the stage for a serious deterioration of Bangladesh-Myanmar bilateral relations.
            Immediately following the initiation of the second influx, Bangladesh took the matter at diplomatic level with the Myanmar authorities.  Protracted bilateral diplomatic negotiations resulted in the conclusion of a memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Bangladesh government and the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) of Myanmar on 28 April 1992.  Under the MOU, Rangoon agreed to take back those refugees who could establish their bona fide residency prior to their departure.  Despite its commitment, Myanmar adopted a policy of procrastination in implementing the accord.  Bangladesh government hence in mid 1992 appealed to the international community to render help to the refugees.
           
Dhaka was quite aware about the economic, social, environmental, security and diplomatic fallouts of the prolonged stay of the Rohingya refugees on its soil.  Therefore, its policy from the early stage of the influx was to arrange repatriation of the refugees as expeditiously as possible and by an means, even by ‘use of force’.  For example, the first repatriation on 22 September 1992 following the conclusion of the MOU was allegedly “accompanied by considerable pressure from the Bangladesh authorities”.  Dhaka argued that Bangladesh could not feed and shelter the refugees for an indefinite period and it wanted “to set a policy in this connection, emphasising that the Rohingyas are refugees and they must go back to their country of origin.”[46]  Another reason for Bangladesh’s ‘use of force’ for repatriation was that according to the MOU signed with Myanmar, the repatriation would have to be completed by 15 August 1997.  Therefore, Bangladesh wanted an expeditious repatriation of the refugees.  The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other human rights organisations protested the coercive and forcible repatriation of the refugees.  Bangladesh government thereafter restricted the access of UNHCR to the refugee camps.  This was in breach of an earlier agreement signed between the Bangladesh government and the UNHCR on 8 October 1992, which allowed the latter to verify the voluntary nature of repatriation.  UNHCR, as a result, withdrew from the repatriation process on 22 December 1992.

            This development triggered an international outcry against Bangladesh government.  Protest from the UNHCR, other international organisations and the Western countries forced Bangladesh to change the repatriation procedure and to make it more transparent.[47]  After intense negotiations, Bangladesh government signed another MOU with the UNHCR in May 1993, which allowed “free access to officials of the UNHCR to independent interview of refugees in transit camps.”  The MOU further committed the Bangladesh government that “no refugees will be coerced into leaving against his/her will.”  This episode signified that the refugee phenomenon curtailed Bangladesh’s autonomy in policy making and its ability to define national interest in its own term.

            The UNHCR also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Myanmar government in November 1993.  Under the terms of the MOU, Rangoon assured that the returnee refugees would be allowed to go back to their respective places of origins.  Following this, about fifteen to eighteen thousand refugees returned per month.  By April 1997, a total of 238,000 refugees went back to Myanmar leaving 21,117 Rohingyas in two refugee camps.

            Although initially there was no sign of discontent amongst the local people with regard to the hosting of the Rohingya refugees, at a later stage the ‘compassion fatigue’ surfaced as growing number of refugees took job outside the refugee camps, which disturbed the local labour market.  It was also viewed as the main reason for lowering down the wages.  Local negative attitude was also formed due to the report that the refugees were causing massive deforestation in the region.  For example, the Forest Department of Bangladesh claimed in 1993 that the Rohingya refugees had destroyed forest resources worth Take 740 million by September 1992.[48]  Moreover, it was observed that criminal activities were on the rise in the region.  As of 31 December 1998, there were 213 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh jails on charges of rioting, unlawful assembly, illegal entry, possession of arms, rape or smuggling.[49]  Therefore, the initial humanitarian gesture that was accorded to the refugees gradually evaporated with the passage of time.

            Furthermore, the Bangladesh authority also confronted formidable challenge from the armed Rohingya refugee groups operating within the Nayapara and Kutupalong refugee camps.  They tried to block the repatriation process by resorting to riots.[50]  These armed groups resorted to rioting against what they termed as ‘forced repatriation’.  But it is alleged that they had links with the right wing religious political forces i.e., the Jamat-I-Islami, in Bangladesh and their resorting to rioting and refusal of access of any Bangladesh officials in the camps were orchestrated in order to crerate instability and to show that law and order situation had seriously deteriorated.  There were also ominous sign of increased militancy amongst the frustrated Rohingyas and rising phenomenon of drug-trafficking and arms smuggling in the border regions of Bangladesh and Myanmar.[51]  These ramifications of the Rohingya refugee problem are quite challenging.

            Most of the refugees had gone back (about 22,000 still remains in Bangladesh) and the problem had almost been ‘resolved’.  But the Rohgingyas still remained ‘stateless’ and the structural and the causal factors that made them refugees did still exist.  Against such a backdrop, fresh influx of Rohingya refugees, although on a smaller scale, was reported.[52]  The Bangladesh authority did not recognise the ‘new arrivals’ as refugees; hence they were deprived of any camp facilities.  Bangladesh’s refusal to accord them refugee status was indicative of aid and compassion fatigue as well as due to absence of a standard national law in Bangladesh to determine the refugee status.


Section III: Conclusion

            The point is that refugees are the political pawns of the nation-states.  Nation-states are generally concerned about their own national interests, they are not at all attentive to the rights of the displaced people.  In other words, nation-states pay almost no attention to the human rights of the refugees.

            The three cases that have been explored in this paper indicate that Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Myanmar have only been attentive to their own interests at the expense of the rights of the refugees.  The Bihari refugee problem is truly a humanitarian issue.  The biharis have been in the refugee camps in a very miserable condition for last thirty years or more.  Still the concerned states have not acted based on humanitarian grounds.  Rather, they have played political game with the Biharis which severely hampered the rights of these unfortunate people.  The story of the Paharis and the Rohingyas is similar.  In fact, it can be concluded that the nation-states have severely failed to protect the human rights of the refugees.  In this context, it is alarming that all South Asian states have bypassed the international refugee conventions and have not adopted national refugee laws.  Therefore, the ground for violating human rights of the refugees is quite open in South Asia.

INTERNATIONAL PROVISIONS FOR REFUGEES


Dr.N.Subramanya

National Law School of India University, Bangalore

The REFUGEES perhaps are the most talked about group in the recent times. People are being uprooted from their homes and face hardships and lead miserable lives fearing for the life and liberty of themselves and their loved ones. The refugee issue with its sheer numbers and intensity merits serious concern and attention of the international community. It is inextricably intertwined with HUMAN RIGHTS violation of which causes the painful plight of the refugees in the form of exodus from their usual habitats often under grueling conditions exposing themselves to the perils- natural and man made all the way.

Twentieth century was one of the most turbulent periods in the history of mankind –with two world wars and scores of localized equally ferocious battles, civil wars, internecine conflicts, ‘ cleansing ‘ of ‘ unwanted’ populations on the basis of ethnicity, tribe, religion, language and all such divisive considerations which resulted in unleashing of unprecedented animosities by man on his fellow human beings. It was an era of de-colonization in most parts of the world and the redefining of transnational borders and demarcation of territorial boundaries destabilized the delicate balance, which held them together under an alien rule. The delicate demographic complexion changed the equations unleashing fresh waves of struggle for power, prosperity and domination over one another. Considerable number of new post colonial rulers resorted to human rights violations on their own people on a scale which even the colonial ‘masters’ hadn’t done. While many countries adopted democracy type of governance most others landed up with an arbitrary, totalitarian regimes. All these developments were parallely matched by the COLD WAR between the two super powers USA and USSR which resorted to proxy wars in many parts of the world creating a large number of refugees. Even much after these wars ended the residuary issues triggered off large scale forced migrations of people leading to escalation of the refugee problem and human rights violations.

This state of affairs in which the sociopolitical and economic fabric within the nation as well as on the global scene prompted the international community to present and subscribe to many instruments for protection of these vulnerable sections of the populations which resulted in colossal relief and rehabilitation measures as well as efforts at finding out durable solutions to the issues which caused the generation of refugee movements and human rights violations. The real causes lay else where for which negotiated political settlements are the only logical and ideal solutions.

Against this background we shall look into the various international instruments which have direct or indirect applicability for the refugees. First and foremost it is necessary to explain the term refugee. In the layman’s parlance the world refugee is used to indicate any displaced person. The words displaced persons and forced migrants are also frequently used.

The most commonly employed definition of a REFUGEE is in Article 1 Paragraph 2 of the 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES[53] which reads as follows.

“ As a result of events occurring before 1st January 1951 and owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country: or who not having a nationality and being outside the country of his formal habitual residence as a result of such events is unable or owing to such fear is unwilling to return to it”. 


This definition was formulated in the aftermath of the II World War and was specific to that fact. However the 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES[54] removed the cut off date requirement and broad based the definition so as to be universally applicable. It took note of the fact that “new refugee situations have arisen since the convention was adopted and that the refugees concerned may therefore not fall with in the scope of the convention”. Te protocol omitted the words “As a result of events occurring before 1st January1951 and ..” and the words “ as a result of such events “. Paragraph 3 clearly said,  “ The present protocol shall be applied by the States parties hereto without any geographical limitation….”

While this description of a refugee definition seemed to cover the refugee issue the developments in many parts of the world necessitated the broadening of the scope of the definition and regional instruments came into force. The most notable among them are the 1969 OAU [55] CONVENTION GOVERNING THE SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF REFUGEES PROBLEMS ON AFRICA, and the 1984 CARTAGENA DECLARATION ON REFUGEES [56]. We will just read the definitions to have a broad overview of Refugee status. Article 1 of the OAU convention adopts the same definition as the 1951 convention read with the 1967 protocol. Paragraph 2 broad bases the applicability of the definition as follows.

“ The term “refugee’ shall also apply to every person who owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part of whole of his country of origin or nationality is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.”[57].

The definition of the Refugee as can be read in Part III Paragraph 3 of the Cartage declaration[58] is as follows.

“ …in addition to containing the elements of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, includes among refugees persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order”.

Any discussion on the issue of refugees issue inevitably adopts a human rights discourse approach. Refugees are as much citizens of this globe as one of us are, except that they are place in a patently disadvantageous position.

The UN  Charter of 1945 can be said as the first instrument towards ensuring Human Rights and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights[59] is the most important document. These have provided for many basic rights to the refugees.

The preamble to the charter mentions about the “ ..  dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”. It aims to “…reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights”. This set the tone for all the subsequent international instruments for the protection of refugees. One of the purposes of the United Nations is  “  in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;…”


The UDHR[60] in the preamble recognizes the “inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family “ recognizing that it is the “ foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”.  Further it states “…disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of the mankind ….”.

Article 14 of the UDHR is specific to the refugee context. Clause (1) provides “ Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries freedom from persecution”. [ (2) However this right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.]


In addition to these instruments for the protection of refugees a number of other instruments have also been formulated[61] and come into effect[62]. The most notable among these which have a direct relation to our theme namely INTERNATIONAL PROVISIONS FOR REFUGEES merit a mention here.

·         EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1950
INTERNATIONAL CONVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 1966 and its optional Protocol.[63] ( ICCPR)
Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N.Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302, entered into force March 23, 1976.
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, G.A. res. 44/128, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 207, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force July 11, 1991.

·         INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS[64] 1966.
·         AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1978
·         AFRICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1981
·         COVENANT AGAISNT TORTURE AND OTHERCRUEL,INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OF PUNISHMENT[65] 1984.
·         COVENANT ON RIGHTS OF THE CHILD[66] 1989
·         CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAISNT WOMEN 1981[67]( CEDAW).[68]


The covenant against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment contains in Article 3 the protection against defilement which reads “ No state party shall expel, return (“refuter”) or extradite a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”. Article 2 lays down the parameters for determination of grounds based on the ‘existence’ in the state of ‘consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights”.

The rights of the vulnerable sections of the world and more specifically in this context the refugee children and women needs a mention here.

Convention on Rights of the Child 1989 (CRC) is not a refugee treaty but covers the refugee children as provided in Article 1 that all CRC rights are to be granted to all persons under 18 years of age without discrimination of any kind ( Article 2). “The CRC is important to refugee children because it sets comprehensive standards. Virtually every aspect of a child’s life is covered from health and education to social and political rights. Some of the standards are specific for example the articles on juvenile justice ( Articles 37 and 40 ), right to health (Article 24), right to education ( Article 28) and so on. The CRC has gained importance for refugee children due to the near universal ratification of the treaty ( more than 155 state parties ).  The CRC tools can be used as powerful tools of advocacy for ensuring human rights of refugee children.

Women are a vulnerable section of refugees whose human rights are often violated in the most humiliating way by almost all parties whether state or non state. They are not safe from abuse in the country of origin, their transit path and even in the refugee camps by other refugees or persons under whose charge they are placed for protection.

While the human rights of refugees needs to be protected at all stages and at all times there are stages in which they need utmost protection.
·         Protection of human rights in the country of origin i.e. his own country so that there is no need for him to leave his home and become homeless exposing himself and his family members to hardships and uncertainty of the life of a refugee in other words prevention of the genesis of the refugee problem by ensuring basic human rights in the country of origin.
·         Protection of his human rights while in transit and this means that his life, liberty and dignity are ensured and he is given protection from harassment and worse from the state and non state actors in the areas through which he /she passes.
·         Protection of his human rights in the country where he is seeking asylum because necessary steps have to be initiated to ensure that those who flee human rights violations are allowed to reach a place of safety and remain there. It is here that the principle of NON REFOULEMENT is applied. That no person should be sent back to his own country or from where he came if there are grounds to believe that the human rights of the asylum seeker will be jeopardized. This principle is contained in article 33 of the United Nations refugee convention in addition to others which we have already examined.

There are many obstacles in the path of the asylum seeker in obtaining asylum and refugee status. The western nations are increasingly resorting to procedures like Non Entrée and Defilement since they tend to look at the asylum seekers as economic migrants in disguise and there may be such instances too but by and large the genuine refugees are being turned away from these countries which even resort to imposing heavy penalties on the air lines or shipping companies who bring people to their country without valid visa and other travel documents which obviously no refugee will be in possession of. We notice a kind of IMMIGRATION based approach. This is true of many countries who are been signatories to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 protocol. This is apparently due to their interpretation of the term “refugee” as different from the “asylum seeker” who has not yet entered their territory, in the literal sense. There are instances of US Coast guard who have chased away the asylum seekers from Haiti from the high seas in international waters.


REFUGEES – SITUATION IN SOUTH ASIA

None of the South Asian nations have signed or ratified the 1951 convention or the 1967 protocol. Neither do they have any refugee specific legal framework but they have been commendably hosting millions of refugees much more than all the other signatories or ratifies to the convention have done. There are many reasons for not signing some of which are that it is an euro-centric instrument and does not contain many provisions which are so relevant in view of the ground realities prevailing in South Asia.
The other reason is that signing of the convention involves financial burden which they can ill afford. Some eminent scholars have put forth views : like Dr.B.S.Chimni who says that “ the Convention is being dismantled by the very states which framed the Convention” and that “ any talk of accession should be linked to the withdrawal of measures that constitute non entree and temporary protection regimes…”[69] The issue of ratifying the convention has engaged the attention of the Government of India, more so just before India became a member of the Executive Committee of UNHCR. The Ministry of External Affairs considers the Convention and Protocol as “ a partial regime for refugee protection drafted in an Euro-centric context” and that “ …they don’t address adequately situations faced by developing countries as it is designed primarily to deal with individual cases and not with situations of mass influx, they also don’t deal adequately with situations of mixed flows that is they don’t distinguish between political refugees and economic migrants…the convention does not provide for a proper balance between the rights and obligations of receiving and source states. The concept of international burden sharing has not been developed adequately in the convention”.

Before the countries of South Asia arrive at a consensus on the Regional Convention on refugees , it may be ideal to enact national legislations and to this end the model refugee law will be an ideal instrument not only for spelling out the rights of refugees but also safeguard the territorial integrity and security of the state..

There have been some serious initiatives taken in South Asia in the form of organizing seminars and workshops[70] in collaboration with Universities and organizations like the SAARCLAW , Indian Centre for Humanitarian Law and Research ( ICHLR) and the Regional Consultation of Refugee and Migratory Movements in South Asia. “ The…….latter….  was initiated by the UNHCR in Geneva in November 1994, In a meeting held at Geneva at which five eminent persons were present one each from Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka various human rights and humanitarian issues were discussed. An outcome of this meeting was the shared view that there were possibilities of developing common approaches to many of the South Asia’s migratory and refugee issues. An informal grouping of renowned and interested persons was then established in each of the five countries by the eminent person concerned.”.[71] These groups have been meeting annually[72] in the region to “consult on common approaches to refugee and migration issues and to develop strategies with a view to promote better protection regimes for refugees in the region”. [73]

The fifth meeting held at Katmandu in 1998 reviewed promotion al activities undertaken during the past year by the respective eminent persons groups and discussed the future programmed of the eminent persons, which focussed substantially on strategies to promote the Model law with Governments and the adoption of national refugee legislation.


The UNHCR in collaboration with the Indian Chapter of SAARCLAW hosted a Roundtable workshop titled “ National Legislation on Refugees” on 30th April 1999.  A group of eminent persons under the guidance for former Chief Justice of India of Justice P.N.Bhagwati drafted the Model National Law on refugees in November 1996 ( under the umbrella of the Informal Regional Consultations on Refugees and Migratory movements in South Asia)  , and this draft was presented at a SAARLAW seminar in New Delhi in May 1997. The next consultations unanimously decided that the Model Law should be harmonized with country specific legislative and judicial requirements with a view to formally proposing it to the respective governments of he region.  Following the placing of the model law at the SAARCLAW-UNHCR workshop for discussion[74], a number of recommendations specific to India have emerged.[75]

WHEREEAS India is not a signatory to the convention or protocol but has an admirable records of protecting the human rights of asylum seekers and refugees . The Indian law also does not have any specific refugee laws . But the judiciary in India has taken a humanitarian stand and by relying upon Article 21 of the constitution have helped several refugees. The National Human Rights Commission also has initiated positive measures for protecting the human rights of refugees.

India has a tradition of helping people in distress who seek assistance and consequently the sheer volume of such help to refugees extended by India has created an appreciable track record which is recognized internationally. But there is no legal frame work as such for protection of refugees. While the Executive branch of the Government of India does not recognize refugees as such the judiciary has taken a humanitarian stand and so also the National Human Rights Commission. 


 REFUGEES, INDIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS

India has a history of hospitality and a glorious tradition of even sacrificing ones own life to protect those who have been given refuge and protection. Though India does not have a legal frame work specific for the protection and treatment of refugees, the Judiciary has adopted a humanitarian attitude and approach towards them relying upon and applying various provisions in our Constitution.

Since there is no refugee law in India they are treated as aliens. They are covered under the

·         Registration of Foreigners Act 1939 ( Central Act 16 of 1939) which is applicable to all foreigners.
·         The Foreigners Act 1946 which empowers the state to regulate the entry, presence and departure of aliens in India.
·         The Passport ( Entry into India) Act 1920
·         The Passport Act 1967


In the absence of refugee specific laws in India the Indian Judiciary has played a constructive role in protecting the interests of the refugees. In the famous case of NHRC vs. State of Raunchily Prudish (1996) the supreme court held that “ the state is bound to protect the life and liberty of every human being , be he a citizen or otherwise” “There are a few articles in the Indian Constitution which are equally applicable to refugees who are on the Indian soil in the same way as they are applicable to the Indian citizens”.[76] The Supreme Court of India has consistently held that the fundamental rights enshrined under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution regarding the ‘right to life and personal liberty’ applies to all people irrespective of the fact whether they are citizens of India or aliens. While the protection of Article 21 can be availed by the refugees and it is the duty of the state to act in consonance with Article 21 the Supreme Court in earlier cases of Khudiram Chakma  as well as Louis De Raedt also held that the refugees are not entitled to the protection of Articles 19(1)(d) and (e) of the constitution. It was said that Article 21 is confined to life and liberty and “does not include the right to reside and settle in this country” and as Article 19(1)(e) is applicable only to the citizens of this country and that “ the machinery of Article 14 can not be invoked to obtain that fundamental right”. In the same judgement Supreme Court approvingly referred to the Universal declaration of human rights in the context of the refugee thus.

“ Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which speaks of the right to enjoy asylum has to be interpreted in the light of the instrument as a whole and must be taken to mean something.  It implies that although an asylum seeker has no right to be granted to admission to a foreign state, equally a State which has granted asylum must not later return him to the country whence he came. Moreover the Article carries considerable moral authority and embodies the legal prerequisite of regional declaration and instruments”

Many High Courts have also granted relief to refugees. In exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Article 21 the Guwahati High Court in the case of u.Myat Kaeew and another v State of Manipur allowed the petitioners who had entered India without valid travel documents and who were lodged in Manipur central jail to be released on interim bail on personal bond to enable them to approach UNHCR, New Delhi to seek refugee status.  The courts did not insist on local sureties as they were foreigners and local sureties would not easily be available.  Similar orders were passed  by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana also. The courts in India have recognized UNHCR as playing an important role in the protection of refugees. The High Courts in various states[77] have recognized the refugee issue and permitted them to approach the UNHCR for determination of refugee status while staying the deportation orders issued by the district courts or the administration. 

In the matter of Gurunathan and others vs Government of India and in the matter of A.C.Mohd Siddique vs Government of India and others the High Court of Madras expressed its unwillingness to allow any Sri Lankan refugee to be forced to return to Sri Lanka against their will. The Court acknowledged the ‘competence and impartiality’ of the UNHCR. The Bombay High Court in the matter of Syed Ata Mohammadi vs Union of India was pleased to direct that “ there is no question of deporting the Iranian refugee to Iran since he has been recognized as a refugee by the UNHCR”. The refugee was permitted to travel to which ever country he desired. All these are in line with the accepted and recognized principle of Non Defilement of the refugees to the country of their origin.

Supreme Court of India has stayed the deportation of refugees in a number of cases like the Maiwand’s Trust of Afghan Human Freedom vs. State of Punjab and N.D.Pancholi vs. State of Punjab and others. In the matter of Malvika Karlekar vs Union of India[78] then Supreme Court directed the stay of the Andaman Island Burmese refugees since “their claim for refugee status was pending determination and a prima facie case is made out for grant of refugee status”. The judgment of the Hon’ble Court in the Chakma refugees’ case clearly declared that no one shall be deprived of his or her life or liberty without the due process of law. The earlier judgments of the Supreme Court in Luis De Raedt vs Union of India and also State of Raunchily Pradesh vs. Khudiram Chakma also stressed this point.


Articles 22(1), 22(2) and 25(1) of the Indian Constitution reflect that the rules of natural justice in common law systems are equally applicable in India even to refugees. The Constitution of India expressly incorporates the common law percept and the Courts have gone further to raise it to the status of one of the basic features of the Constitution which can not be amended.

The question of applicability of an international treaties, Covenants ,and Conventions merits a mention here. International Covenants can be enforced in Indian courts even in the absence of a statute being enacted to give effect it. A discussion is found in the case Maganbhai Ishwarlal Patel v Union of India (1969) in which it was held that “ Making of law….is necessary when [international] treaty or agreement operates to restrict the rights of citizens or others or modifies the laws of the State. If the rights of the citizens or others which are justifiable are not affecting, no legislative measure is needed to give effect to the agreement of treaty”.[79] “ The position therefore is that even if a treaty or convention or resolution is not ratified or agreed to by India courts are still at liberty provided there exists no Indian law to the contrary, to incorporate these conventions, treaties and resolutions into India law and thereby enforce them. In Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India the Supreme Court held “ The provisions of the Covenant which elucidate and go to effectuate the fundamental rights guaranteed by our Constitution can certainly be relied upon by the courts as facets of those fundamental rights and hence enforceable as such”.[80] Thus Courts may apply international law only when there is no conflict between international law and domestic law and also if the provisions of the international law sought to be applied are not in contravention of the spirit of the Constitution and national legislation, thereby enabling a harmonious construction of the laws. It has been held that in case of any conflict the domestic laws shall prevail.


In case of any person trying to enter or leave India the Immigration officials border police or the local police come into the picture and the person after investigation is charged for violations of various Indian Laws like the Passport Act, and Passport Act etc.

The following two cases illustrate the position of law and the procedure that is being followed in India.  Mahmud Ghazleh an Iranian refugee registered with UNHCR was detained while illegally exiting India for Nepal via Uttar Pradesh. He was travelling on forged  and fabricated travel documents. He as detained by the border authorities who prima facie discovered the fact. They handed over the person to the local police for investigation. A FIR was drawn under Sections 419,420,468 and 471 of IPC read with Sections 3 and 6 of the Passport Act and Section 14 of the Foreigners’ Act. He was subsequently interned at the Gorakhpur sub-jail. In another instance two Afghan refugees Shah Ghazai and his minor son Assadullah were apprehended by the authorities at the Attari border in Amritsar while they were  attempting to illegally exit India for Afghanistan via Pakistan. They were handed over to the local police and subsequently interned at the Amritsar Central Jail.

It may sometimes happen that a person or groups of persons who try to enter India are apprehended and simply sent back by the border authorities as they don’t carry valid travel documents. This legally amounts to Refoulement. But it does happen that way too. There are instances of persons entering India with valid travel documents but don’t get the permits renewed for some reason or the other. Or they may have entered India with forged documents which are discovered subsequently. In all such cases the police usually don’t consider any pleas for claim of refugee status, persecution in the country of origin etc. Further the administrative authorities vide Section 3 of the Foreigners Act 1946 may issue Leave India notice to refugees who have failed to obtain extension of their travel documents from the Foreigners Regional Registration Office. The High Courts in India have granted an interim stay on such leave India notices as the Punjab and Haryana High court at Chandigarh did in the case of two Sikhs from Afghanistan in the case Gurinder Singh and Karmajit Singh.

Barring such instances of clear violations of the Indian Law related to the entry and stay of foreigners in India or the usage of forged documents or trying to enter or exit Indian borders or entry points illegally , once the person is in Indian soil the law gives him some protection as per the provisions as mentioned before.

Indian Government has accepted refugees without discriminating in any way based on their country of origin or their religion or political background in the true spirit of the numerous instruments though it is not a signatory. There are no known instances of any person being handed back to their country of origin too thus upholding the principles of non refoulement.

During their stay in India there are of course some reasonable restrictions imposed on the refugees. There is no concept of work permits in India. Those who get the residential certificate as refugees do find employment in the informal sector. Some refugee groups like the Tibetans are getting loans from the Indian Banks and are enjoying subsidies and other facilities as much as their Indian counterparts.

The refugees can freely practice their religion. While persons or groups who have complied with or initiated the procedures towards obtaining the refugee status are given more lenient treatment by the administration those who have been known to have illegally attempt entry or exit into or from India or have tried to use some fabricated document face more restrictions.

Another land mark judgement in the case of Chairman , Railway Board vs. Chandrimadas and others[81] needs a mention here. Chandrima das a practicing lady advocate of Calcutta High Court filed a writ petition before the High Court claiming compensation for  one Hanuffa Khatoon , a Bangladeshi girl who was raped at the Rail Yatri Niwas of Howrah Railway Station with the argument that since the offence was committed in a place belonging to the Railways, they had to pay the compensation claimed. The High Court awarded a compensation of Rs 10 Lakhs against which judgment was challenged on various grounds including the question of locus standi as well as the right of compensation not being enforceable under Article 226 of the Constitution. These contentions were rejected by the Supreme Court referring to various judgements  and also to Article 21. The Supreme court relied upon an earlier judgment in Bodhisattwa Gautam where it was held that rape is a crime against the entire society, it is a crime against the basic human rights and is violative of Article 21 : Right to life which includes right to live with human dignity. The arguments of the State – in this case the Railways claimed that since the victim was a foreign national and therefore not entitled to any relief under the public law domain for the violation of fundamental rights which are available only to the citizens of this country. The Supreme Court rejected this contention on two grounds. Firstly on the ground of human rights jurisprudence founded on the UDHR, provisions form Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women ( CEDAW) and then observed that “ our
Constitution guarantees all the basic and fundamental human rights set out in the UDHR to its citizens and other persons.  The Chapter dealing with the fundamental rights is contained in Part III of the Constitution.[82] It was held that wherever in Chapter III of the Constitution the term “person” is mentioned  (like in Articles 21 and 14) it would apply to all persons including citizens and non-citizens. Similarly Articles 20 and 22[83] are also available to non-citizens. The court upheld the decision of the Calcutta High Court compensating the victim for violation of Article 21. This case may be called as a landmark in taking the jurisprudence of human rights on the highest level placing its decision on protection of human dignity. Another important feature of this judgement is that it opened the doors for Public Interest Litigations in case of a foreign national.

International provisions for the protection of the life and liberty have helped to a large extent in extending relief , repatriation and rehabilitation of millions of refugees. But a considerable gap still exists between the legal provisions and their effective implementation due to many reasons including lack of supportive domestic laws and absence of an efficient and humane  executive and enforcement machinery. The refugee issue is multidimensional and complex, which demands a careful and in-depth study of all perspectives.

Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees


MODEL NATIONAL LAW ON REFUGEES



Preamble:

Acknowledging the fact that India has a long tradition and experience in accommodating inflows of regugees, and demonstrating its faith in the principle of non-refoulement;

Affirming its commitment to uphold international human rights principles through accession to all major human rights treaties, and adoption of appropriate legislative steps to implement them;

Considering the pronouncements of the Supreme Court and High Courts extending the protection of fundamental rights to refugees and asylum seekers;

Reaffirming the initiatives taken by Parliament under Article 37 and 253 of the Constitution of India to provide an administrative system free from arbitrariness and guarantee equality, fairness and due process of law;

Recognising the need for an appropriate legal framework to process matters relating to forced migration in respect of determination of refugee status, protection from refoulement and treatment during stay;

The following Act is enacted to consolidate, streamline, and harmonise the norms and standards applicable to refugees and asylum seekers in India; to establish a procedure and the requisite machinery for granting refugee status; to guarantee them fair treatment, provide for their rights and obligations and regulate matters connected therewith.  For the purposes of this Act, the grant of refugee status shall be considered a peaceful and humanitarian act and does not imply any judgement on the country of origin of the refugee.

1.  Short title, Extent and Commencement

a.  This Act may be called the Refugees and Asylym Seekers Protection Act, 2000.

b. It extends to the whole of India.

c.  It shall come into force on the day specified by the Union Government by notification in the Gazette of India.

2.  Terminology

In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:

a.  ‘Asylum seeker’ means a person who seeks recognition and protectyion as a refugee.

b.  ‘Refugee’ means a ‘refugee’ defined in Article 3 and includes dependants of persons determined to be refugees.

c.  ‘Country of origin’ means the refugee’s country of nationality.  Or if he or she has no nationality, his or her country of former habitual residence.

d.  ‘Commissioner’ means the ‘Commissioner of refugees’, defined under the provisions of Articles 7 and 8 of this Act.

e.  ‘Refugee Committee’ means the ‘Committee’ established as an Appellate Board by the Government under Articles 7 and 8 of this Act.

f.  ‘Refugee Children’ means children below the age of 18 years who are seeking refuge or where protection is extended by the state to children under Article 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989.

g.  “Serious non-political offence” refers to any offence determined in accordance with Article 17 of this Act, and listed in schedule A of the Act.

h.  “Government” shall mean Union Government.

3.  Definition of a Refugee

A Refugee is defined as:

a.  Any person who is outside his or her country of origin, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country because of a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, sex, nationality, ethnic identity, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, or,

b.  any person who owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, serious violation of human rights or other events seriously disrupting public order in either part or whole of his or her country of origin, is compelled to leave his or her place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his or her country of origin.

4.  Persons who shall be excluded from refugee status

A person shall be excluded from refugee status for the purpose of this Act if:

a.  He or she is convicted for a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity, in accordance with the applicable principles and rules of International Law/Conventions including the SAARC Regional Convention On Suppression of Terrorism, 1987;

b.  He or she has committed a serious non-political crime as specified in the Schedule A, outside India prior to his or her admission into India as a refugee.

5. Principle of Non-Refoulement

a.  No refugee or asylum seeker shall be expelled or returned in any manner whatsoever to a place where there are reasons to believe his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of any of the reasons set out in sub-sections (a) or (b) of Article 3;

b.  Where an asylum seeker or refugee has been convicted by a final judgement of a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity and constitutes a danger to the community, or where a Minister has certified that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an asylum seeker or refugee is a threat to the sovereignty and integrity of India, such an asylum seeker or refugee may be asked to leave India.  However, such asn asylum seeker or refugee shall not be returned to a situation or to any country in which his or her life or liberty is threatened for reasons of race, religion, sex, nationality, ethnic identity, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

6.  Application

a.  Where an application is made by, on behalf of, or in relation to an asylum seeker, for the recognition of the said asylum seeker as a refugee, either at the point of entry or subsequently, the applicant shall, in accordance with the principle laid down in Article 5 be directed and assisted to apply to the Commissioner of Refugees;

b.  Where an application is made by, on behalf of, or in relation to an asylum seeker, for the determination of refugee status, pending determination of such status, no restrictions shall be imposed on the asylum seeker save and except those that are necessary in the interests of sovereignty and integrity or public order of India.  Such application may be made within such reasonable time as may be prescribed in accordance with Article 17 of this Act;

c.  Where an application for refugees status is made by, on behalf of, or in relation to a child, accompanied or unaccompanied; or where a refugee child is found within the territory of India; he or she shall receive immediate and appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in accordance with the existing policy and legal framework of the state.  The requirement of filing an application form on their behalf may be entrusted to a local Legal Service Authority or their representatives or any other recognised NGO involved in the welfare of children in general.


7.  Constitution of the Authorities

In order to implement the provision of this Act:

a.  The President shall appoint the Commissioner of Refugees, and Deputy Commissioners of Refugees as may be necessary on the basis of the eligibility requirements and procedure laid down in Articles 7 and 8 of this Act;

b.  Other officers as may be necessary shall be appointed after consultation with the Commissioner of Refugees;

c.  The President shall appoint the Chairperson and Members of the Refugee Committee

d.  The Chairperson of the Refugee Committee shall appoint the staff of the Committee.

8.  Appointment and Functions

a.  The Commissioner of Refugees shall be a sitting or retired High Court Judge, and shall be appointed after consultation with the Chief Justice of India.

b.  The Deputy Commissioner should be qualified to be appointed as a High Court Judge; and shall be appointed after consultation with the Chief Justice of India.

c.  The Chairperson of the Refugee Committee shall be a retired Supreme Court Judge.

d.  The Refugee Committee shall consist of the following three members: a sitting or retired High Court Judge, appointed by the President in consultation with the Chief Justice of India, and two independent members with knowledge and experience of refugee issues and refugee law.

e.  The Commissioner of Refugees may assign such of his functions as may be necessary to the Deputy Commissioner of Refugees appointed under this Act.

f.  The decision of the Commissioner of Refugees shall be final.  Any appeal against such decision shall lie only with the Refugee Committee, as the Appellate Board for reconsideration of the decision.

9.  Determination of Refugee Status

a.  An asylum seeker who wishes to claim refugee status under the terms of this Act shall be heard by a Commissioner of refugees before the determination of his or her sstatus;

b.  During the refugee determination interview, the asylum seeker shall be provided necessary facilities including the services of a competent interpreter where required, and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence in support of his or her case;

c.  The asylum seeker, if he or she wishes, shall be given an opportunity, of which he or she should be duly informed, to contact a representative of UNHCR;

d.  The asylum seeker, if her or she wishes, shall be entitled to be assisted in the determination of the status by a person of his or her choice including a legal practitioner.  A list of competent practitioners, who are conversant with refugee law, shall be provided by the Government to the asylum seeker;

e.  If the asylum seeker is not recognised as a refugee, he or she could be given a reasonable time as provided in the rules, to appeal to the Refugee Committee;

f.  Where an application by the asylum seeker is rejected, the Commissioner of refugees shall give reasons for the order in writing and furnish a copy of it to the asylum seeker;

g.  If the asylum seeker is recognised as a refugee, he or she shall be informed accordingly and issued with documentation certifying his or her refugee status.

10.  Publication of Findings and Decisions

a.  the findings, as well as the orders of the Commissioner of Refugees, the Refugee Committee and other authorities established under this Act shall be published by them periodically.

b.  The Commissioner of Refugees and the Refugee Committee shall publish an annual report.  The annual report and any other periodic or special reports related to their work shall be made public.

11.  Appellate Procedure

The Refugee Committee shall receive and consider appeals made by asylum seekers against the decision of the Commissioner of Refugees.  The Committee may also consider applications for refugee status suo moto.

12.  Persons who shall cease to be refugees

A person shall cease to be a refugee for the purpose of this Act if:

a.  he or she voluntarily re-avails himself or herself of the protection of the country of his or her origin; or

b.  he or she has become a citizen of India; or

c.  he or she has acquired the nationality of some other country and enjoys the protection of that country; or

d.  he or she has voluntarily re-established himself or herself in the country which he or she left, or outside which he or she remained owing to fear of persecution; or

e.  he or she can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he or she was recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself or herself of the protection of the country of his or her nationality.

13.  Rights and Duties of Refugees

a.  Every refugee so long as he or she remains within India, shall have the right to:

1.  fair and due treatment, without discrimination on grounds of race, religion, sex, nationality, ethnic identity, membership of a particular social group or political opinion;

2.  receive the same treatment as is generally accorded under the Constitution or any other laws and privileges as may be granted;

3.  be provided a means to seek a livelihood for himself or herself, and for those dependent on them;

4.  be given special consideration to ensure their protection and material well being in the case of refugee women and children;

5.  choose his or her place of residence and move freely within the territory of India, subject to any regulations applicable to refugees generally in the same circumstances;

6.  be issued identity documents;

7.  be issued travel documents for the purpose of travel outside and back to the territory of India unless compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require;

8.  be given the right to access to education, health and other related services.

b.  Every refugee shall be bound by the laws and regulations of India.

14.  Situations of Mass Influx

a.  the Government may, in appropriate cases where there is large-scale influx of asylum seekers, issue an order permitting them to reside in India without requiring their individual status to be determined under Section 11 of this Act, until such time as the reasons for departure from the country of origin have ceased to exist, or the Government decides that their status should be determined on an individual basis under this Act;

b.  Asylum seekers who have been permitted to reside in India under this provision, may be subject to reasonable restrictions with respect to their location and movement but will otherwise be granted normally the same rights as refugees under this Act;

c.  Women and children asylum seekers in mass influx shall have the right to be given special consideration as to their protection and material well being.

15.  Refugees Unlawfully in India

The government shall not impose penalties on refugees on account of their illegal entry, or presence who, coming directly from a place where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense provided in Article 3, enter or are present in India without authorisation.  Provided they present themselves with immediate effect to the authorities and are able to show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.

16.  Voluntary Repatriation

The repatriation of refugees shall take place at their free volition expressed in writing or other appropriate means, before the Commissioner of Refugees.  The voluntary and individual character of repatriation of refugees and the need for it to be carried out under conditions of transparency and safety to the country of origin shall be respected.

17.  Rules and regulations

The Government may propose to Parliament, from time to time, rules and regulations, to give effect to the provisions of this Act.

18.  Non-Obstante Clause

The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding the provisions of any other law.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION AND BHUTANESE REFUGEES IN NEPAL:
RIGHT TO INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION


Jagat Mani Acharya



I. Background

Introduction:

Bhutan is a tiny Himalayan nation situated in the eastern Himalaya sandwiched between two Asian giants, India and China.  It has a geographical area of 48,000 sq.km and a population of little over 6000,000.  Like most modern nations Bhutan is truly a multi-racial, multicultural, multilingual and multi-religious Himalay country which consists of three major ethnic groups.  The western valley consists people of Tibetan origin who are called Ngalongs, in the east are the Sharchops and the southern foothills are inhabited by the Lhotshampas.  The country has as many as fourteen different ethnic groups.

Politics: past and the present

Until the mid – 7th century, Bhutan was under the political jurisdiction of India.  However the Indian rule ended with the invasion of Bhutan by a band of Tibetan soldiers.  Until the first quarter of the 17th century, Bhutan existed as an agglomeration of numerous independent, petty kingdoms.  In 1616 A.D. Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal, a famous Tibetan monk of Drukralung in Tibet, entered Bhutan and unified the country.  He established a theocracy and became its supreme head.  However, on December 17, 1907, Governor Ugyen Wangchuck of Tongsa province effaced the Shabdrung’s institution and established Absolute Hereditary Monarchy in Bhutan.  The present king is the fourth hereditary monarch of the Wangchuck dynasty.  The current incarnation of the Shabdrung lives in exile in Manali, Himarchal Pradesh, northern India.

Influenced by the Indian freedom movement, Mr. D.B. Gurung in 1950 led the southern Bhutanese in a democratic movement, under the banner of the country’s first political party, the Bhutan State Congress.  The present king’s father, King Jugme Dorji Wangchuck, brutally suppressed the uprising by killing many activists in cold blood.  The leaders were incarcerated.  However, realising the sentiments of the Bhutanese people for political change, the king gradually introduced some democratic reforms in Bhutan.  In 1953, he established the National Assembly.  Sixteen years later, he introduced a system of electing Ministers every five years; this allowed the system to be described as Constitutional monarchy.  Towards the end of 1960s, the king himself began to guide the Bhutanese people towards greater freedom and democracy.

With the demise of the King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck in 1972, Prince Jugme Singye Wangchuck the present king ascende the throne at the tender age of 18.  Soon the vested interests of the palace coterie began reverting the reforms, thrusting Bhutan into political regression.  On October 10, 1973, during the 39th Assembly session, the Royal government passed a resolution to abolish the system of “vote of confidence on the King” introduced by the late king.  Thus came the demise of Bhutan’s short-lived constitutional monarchy.  In 1978, during the 49th National Assembly session, another resolution was adopted abolishing the system of election of Ministers and from 1980 onwards, the Royal government also did away with the ballot boxes which elected people’s representatives and instead began nominating them.  The result of all theses reversions has been to re-establish Royal Absolutism in Bhutan.

The Kingdom of Bhutan has an obsolete monarchical system of government dominated by the ethnic Ngalongs since its establishment in 1907.  It has not written constitution or Bill of Rights.  Its national Assembly serves as a rubber-stamp Assembly and the Judiciary is subjected to absolute control of the Assembly.  Bhutan is all set to declare itself a Constitutional Monarchy on November 11 or December 17 2002 when a written Constitution will be adopted by a Royal Proclamation.  Bhutan is now drafting the constitution.  While this constitution does not represent the voice of the people in exile.

Bhutanese Refugee: Short Story

Bhutanese fleeing Bhutan in early 1991 first arrived in Assam and West Bengal in India.  They set up makeshift camps and hoped for the situation to normalise.  Instead, as the situation in Bhutan worsened and the refugees were not permitted to set up permanent camps in India, a small group of refugees crossed in Nepal and established the first camp by the banks of Mai river in July 1991 which housed only 235 refugees.  From August 1991, the influx of refugees increased at the rate of 1,000 per month.  The flow of refugees leaped in Februrary 1992 to a massive 10,000 per month.  The period from February to March 1992 saw the refugee population rise to 48,000.  Conditions at Maidhar in late 1991 were grim, but the refugee leaders quickly organised themselves and sought help from the local community.  Local Nepalese responded with donations of rice, bamboo, money and wood.  However, with thousands to feed and shelter it was becoming impossible to manage.  Many died and hundreds suffered from malnutrition and diseases.

Bhutan creating statelessness:

II. Bhutan and the Bhutanese Media: Consequences

The isolation of the country, absence of media, political institution, NGOs and INGO, gave enough space to the rulers to design and implement national policies in their own interest rather the interest of the common people of Bhutan.  These resulted in the eviction of more than 17% of the total population of the country.  Bhutan is the largest refugee producing country of the world, where 100,000 people reside inside the Bhutanese refugee camps in the eastern part of Nepal and another 20,000 outside the camps in Nepal and India.  Another 100,000 people are in exile today on account of non-violent expression of their political and religious belief.

Major Government policies and the role of the media

The major policies used by the government of Bhutan to evict its own citizens are: I. Census policy of 1988  II. One nation one people policy    III. No-objection Certificate    IV. Voluntary Migration Forms    V. Religion etc.  In the basence of independent media, e-mail, internet facilities the government could very well plan the process of eviction and implement very easily in the beginning but in the later years when the Bhutanese refugee issues was highlighted and the media personnel became active to highlight the issues the Bhutanese government changed its policy of eviction.  In the later stage the government introduced the Voluntary Migrations Forms (VMF), where the Bhutanese people were made to sign the form at gun point and asked to leave the country.  All the papers which would prove one’s identity as a Bhutanese citizens were taken away before one was asked to leave the country after signing the VMF.

After 1988 when the government implemented the above mentioned policies large number of people were evicted and were residing in India. At that time media and NGOs could not take up these issues very strongly as the Bhutanese government was very active to suppress this issue through their own channel.  At the later state when the Bhutanese refugees came to Nepal via India in 1991, the media, NGOs and INGOs and the refugee groups took up the Bhutanese refugee issue very strongly.  As a result of lobbying and mass media coverage UNHCR was invited by the government of Nepal to help the refugees.  If the media and the NGOs would not have given due importance to these issue then Bhutanese government would have been very successful in their objective of producing more refugees and stateless people.

Bhutan government is misinforming the people saying that most of refugees in the camps are not Bhutanese citizens, while the survey of the Bhutanese refugees by Ministry of Home Affairs, Nepal shows that 97% of the refugees have documents to prove their Bhutanese identity, rest 3% say that they have either lost or have been seized by the government authorities.  During the recent verification process 98.8% showed valid documents to prove their Bhutanese identity.

The Citizenship Act 1985:    

The Citizenship act passed in 1985 and implemented in the year 1988 was discriminatory against the Lhotshampas.  Census operation was carried out in Southern district and people who had been recognised as Bhutanese until then were arbitrarily declared as illegal immigrants and it revoked the citizenship of tens of thousands of southern Bhutanese who were otherwise bonafide Bhutanese under the 1958 nationality law and 1977 Citizenship Act of Bhutan.  On the basis of the 1985 Citizenship Act the census team demanded the land tax receipt of 1958 in the year 1988 (after 30 years) to prove their residence in Bhutan on or before 1958.  Based on it the census team categorised the southern Bhutanese under seven groups: viz., F1 – Genuine Bhutanese; F2 – Returned Migrants (those who had left the country but returned); F3 – Drop-outs (those not available during the census); F4 – A non national women married to a Bhutanese man; F5 – A non-national man married to a Bhutanese woman; F6 – Adoption cases (children legally adopted); and F7 – Non-national (migrants and illegal settlers).  Those who were able to produce the land tax receipt of 1958 were considered as genuine Bhutanese and those who could not produce were declared as non-nationals.

“There has been concerns about the Royal Government of Bhutan’s (RgoB) human rights practices including implementation of the 1985 Citizenship Act and the failure to prosecute security force members who committed rape, torture and other abuses in the name of enforcing the Citizenship Act”.  United States of America in its State
Department;s report on Human Rights practices in Bhutan, 1994.

Driglam Namza:     Driglam Namza an ancient code of social etiquette of western Bhutanese was made obligatory for all ethnic communities.  Dzongkha language, the mother tongue of the Ngalong community was made sole national language.  Nepali, the language of the southern Bhutanese was dropped from the school curriculum.  The children from southern Bhutan lost their right to be informed in their own language.

One Nation One People Policy:     One nation one people policy sought to impose a uniform Ngalongs culture on a multicultural, multiethnic society.  Bhutan being the land of 14 different ethnic groups the government implemented the One Nation One People Policy denying other ethnic groups in Bhutan to enjoy their own culture, wear their ethnic dress and use their own language.

Marriage Act of 1998:i     Marriage Act of 1998 was forcefully implemented in 1988 that targeted the Lhotshampas who were married to non-national.  government denied promotion in government services, training and fellowships abroad.

No Objection Ceritificate:     In 1990, the government introduced a new rule requiring a ‘No Objection Certificate’, (NOC) from the police and the local administration in southern Bhutan.  It was considered as a pre-requisite for access to health facilities, education, civil service jobs and for sale of cash crops.  Even for children for admission in the school need NOC.

Voluntary Migration Forms (VMF):     Eviction was legitimised with the introduction of the so called VMF.  The 70th session of the national Assembly in 1991 resolved to evict anyone involved in the peaceful demonstration or being suspected as the supporter of the human rights movement.  Sixty percent of the refugees residing in therefugee camps were forced into signing these VMFs voluntarily renouncing their Bhutanese citizenship.  These forms were printed in Dzongkha language.  As the Lhotshampas couldn’t read these forms they did not understand the content of the forms most of them did not even know that they were voluntarily renouncing their citizenship of Bhutan.  Those who lsigned the VMF form never knew about the content of it neither the authorities informed about it.

“Many refugees were coerced (under threat of arrest and torture) to sign papers renouncing their land and citizenship, stating they were leaving voluntarily.  The concept of voluntary emigrant is in no way compatible with the reports of violence, summery arrest, vandalism of property and general intimidation” LWF, Refugees of the Peaceful Dragon, December 1995.

Religion:     The royal government of Bhutan has used religion as tool to harassment and eviction of the nationals from the country.  In the year 1992 Mr. Dal Jit Rai and his neighbours were celebrating Christmas.  They were arrested, imprisoned and evicted from the country for practising Christianity.  Likewise the harassment for the Hindus continue.  They cannot practice their religion on their will.  They have no right to religion in Bhutan.

The religious atrocities were met to the followers of Nyingmapa sect of Buddhism in eastern Bhutan.  During the peace protest by the eastern Bhutanese in October 1997, 13 Shedras (monastries) have been closed and more than 600 monks and students were sent to their respective villages by civil administrators, police, army and security forces.  Around 200 people including monks and ordinary people were arrested and one monk was killed alleging them as anti-national.

Resettlement Programme in Bhutan:

The resettlement of Bhutanese people from north and eastern zone in Southern Bhutan on the land belonging to the refugees started in 1993.  The first settlement programme was carried out in Samdrupjongkhar district with 58 ex-Royal Bbutan Army families.  From 1998 the Royal Government of Bhutan has undertaken a massive land resettlement programme in six southern districts.  The names of the districts, blocks and villages have been changed particularly in the south to make them sound more like names in northern Bhutan.  The Royal government of Bhutan, in the guise of rehabilitating landless people, has been closing the possibility of the return of the evicted citizens by distributing land belonging to them.  It is reported that the northern Bhutanese persons have often been coerced into settling on land belonging to the evicted Lhotshampas.



Role of the Bhutanese media in the re-settlement programme:

Kuensel, March 20, 1999.

Dzongkhag Administration
Tsirang

Announcement
DAT/ADM-/98-99-

Landless people from other Dzongkhag who got land allotment in TsirangT Dzongkhag under resettlement programme have failed to report despite repeated requests of Dzongkhag.  therefore, Tsirang Dzongkhag administration once again requests them to report immediately as the cultivation season is already set in.  Non-compliance shall be viewed very seriously and Dzongkhag administration shall not be held responsible if any complication arises in future on the matter.
TOld name of Tsirang was Chirang
Dzongkhag



Kuensel:  March 27, 1999

Sarpand Dzongkhag

Announcement

All the Shi-Sarps (Re-settlers) of phase one and two from different Dzongkhags should report to their respective areas under SarpangT Dzongkhag within April 1999.  Failure to report within the above dateline, this Dzongkhag Administration would consider the lands to have surrendered by the Shi-sarps (Re-settlers) to the Government.  The concern Dzongkhags are also requested to kindly inform their respective Shi-sarps (Re-settlers), to report within the above dateline.  For convenience of the Dzongkhags the list of Shi-sarps will be faxed to the individual Dzongkhag within the week.
TOld name of Sarpand was Sarbhang
Dzongdag


During the 76th National Assembly session held in August 1998 the Bhutanese government announced that around 1027 households from north and east of Bhutan had been rehabilitated in southern Bhutan.  The ‘people’s representatives’ asked the government to speed up the resettlement scheme and also to expand it to other southern districts.  Today several hundred acres of land and housing properties to over 100,000 refugees are being distributed to northern Bhutanese families sunder the resettlement scheme of the Royal Government of Bhutan.  It may be noted that this scheme of resettlement in the south is of recent origin and that it was not in practice before forcible eviction of the Lhotshampas.

On the one hand, the Bhutanese government is trying to convince the world community that it is negotiating for the return of refugees with the Nepalese government, but at the same time it is distributing the landed property of the refugees to the people from northern Bhutan.

The northern families now resettled in the south had very little option but to accept what was forced upon them by the district authorities.  When those northern Bhutanese learned that the land and houses being allocated to them actually belonged to the Lhotshampas and that one day those people might return and claim their land, the northerners did not want to take it.  However, they were forced to resettle on these lands by the Royal Government of Bhutan.
Most of the Bhutanese refugees in the camps don’t know as to what has happened to their land.  All the refugees want to go back to their land from where they were evicted.  The refugees from Khudanabari camp are unhappy to know that the verification team left out details on their land and housing property.

The U.S. State Department report has clearly mentioned that “the Bhutanese government’s restrictions on its citizens’ right to privacy, freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion”.  U.S. State Department Report on Human Rights Practices – 2001.

III. State of Media: Bhutan

Press Freedom:   Bhutan is one country where there is no right to information, media is completely owned and controlled by the government.  Anyone who speaks against the king, country and the people is considered criminal in Bhutan.  There are thousands of refugees in Nepal who have been the victims of the royal Government of Bhutan for speaking against the atrocities of the government authorities.  The freedom of press is non-existent in Bhutan.  Private media is not allowed.  Bhutan’s only government-owned weekly news paper Kuensel, television and radito Bhutan Broadcasting Corporation publish and broadcast what the government wants the people to read and know.  Presence of a independent media could have contributed to safeguarding the rights of the Bhutanese people  However, today there are over 100,000 refugees in Nepal.

Tek Nath Rizal the father of human rights movement in Bhutan and Amnesty International prisoner of conscience was first arrested in Bhutan in mid-1088 after campaigning against unfair practices adopted during the 1988 census.  He was released after three days and soon after left for Nepal, where he continued to campaign against unfair practices adopted during the census and the Bhutanese government’s policy requiring ethnic Nepalese people to adopt northern Bhutanese traditions and culture.

The following year he was arrested in Nepal and handed over to the Burmese authorities.  After four years in prison he was finally tried and, in November 1993, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for “treasonable acts”.  He was granted a pardon by King Jigme Singye Wangchuck three days after sentence was passed.  Tak Nath Rizal was released in November 1999 after King Jigme Singye Wangchuck granted him unconditional release in an amnesty.

Mr. T.N. Rizal and other political activist were arrested for no fault of their own, but expressing against the atrocities of the government.  Being the leader leading the human rights movement, he could never express his thoughts, ideas and feelings with the government, citizens of Bhutan, refugees in Nepal and outsiders.  The fact as to why he was arrested is still unknown to the people inside Bhutan.  This implies to all the political prisoners in Bhutan.

Television:   The state-run Bhutan Broadcasting Service 9BBS) launched the first TV service as part of celebrations surrounding King Jigme Singye Wangchuk’s silver jubilee.  The launch marked the end of a general ban on television.  Television was introduced only in 1999, because for years Bhutan had a deliberate policy of isolation, fearing that outside influences would undermine its absolute monarchy, freedom and culture.  While Bhutan has been cited in the news media for being the last place in the world to legalise television.  It is just few years that the Bhutanese people are allowed to view television.  Before that no one in Bhutan except the foreigners were allowed to watch television.  Bhutan today runs the television programme for about four hours per day and it is controlled by the government.

Kuensel:   Bhutan’s one and only government-owned print newspaper, Kuensel also has a Web site that features news, links and information about the country.  Kuensel is the only weekly paper or the print media communication of the royal government of Bhutan.  This is one of the tools at the hands of the government to publish what they want the people to read and know.

“The Kuensel in recent months have become pages of blatant lies.  It has no conscience or intelligence of its own; journalism is meant to be an intelligent portrayal of a nation’s life.  Here is a paper that tells lies and lies alone when it covers the national news.  The Kuensel news are meant to deceive and confuse the people journalistic ethic is a stranger to it.  A paper that says “yes” to every stupidity”  Bhutan we want justice, PFHR, 1989.

Bhutanese authority never tried to present the fact of the creation of refugees or the refugee situation in Nepal and India.  But the known fact is that they have always published news that defames its own citizens in exile.  Bhutanese authorities are very sensitive to media, this is clear from the visit of the Bhutanese officials for bilateral negotiations where they have always tried to avoid media.  Bhutan has one dimensional polciy today and whatever appears on Bhutan in the Nepali or the international press is immediately transmitted through various sources employed by the government.  They then try to react or diplomatically solve the problem.  In an attempt to lobby and react to Bhutanese refugee issues at international level the Government of Bhutan have set up two diplomatic missions, one in New York and another at Geneva after the refugee problem started.  The government has also brought a few publications in an attempt to sideline the refugee issue.

Bhutanese people do not enjoy human rights as their rights by Bhutan’s constitution and law.  This is as true as it was prior to 1990.  Specifically, Bhutanese people have, as a matter of law:

·         No right to Speech and Expression
·         No right to dissent or express dissent
·         No right to form association or organisation
·         No civil and political rights
·         No right to equality and freedom from discrimination
·         No cultural rights
·         No economic and social rights
Eris Sottas, the Director of SOS/Torture, Development and Human Rights.
Amnesty International believes that many people in the camps in Nepal have been forced out of Bhutan as a result of measures taken by the Bhutanese authority.  Amnesty International opposes the practice of forcible exile when it is imposed as a measure on account of people’s non-violent expression of their political, religious or conscientiously held beliefs or by reason of their ethnic origin, sex, colour or language.  It believes that many of those in the camps have been forcibly exiled from Bhutan on account of their ethnic origin or political beliefs.  Amnesty International, Bhutan: Forcible Exile, 1994.

In this way the refugees are denied to their basic right to information by the Bhutanese authority.  Without access to information from the Bhutanese authority Bhutanese refugees have not been able to form their opinion.  The exchange of ideas can always help to resolve the refugee issue.

Bhutan news onlie:  Bhutan’s first private online news magazine features web-based news, background information on Bhutan, and links to South Asian newspapers.

Druknet: is Bhutan’s only Internet Service Provider.

Censorship:

Bhutan also receives Indian newspapers but most of these news papers are censored.  Letters sent by mail are opened and sometimes the person receiving the letter is punished for no fault of his/her own.  Because of this censorship, people have least access to information on country’s politics, law, development and government policies.  Without the freedom of expression, opinion and press, the enjoyment of other human rights is curtailed and this has resulted to the creation of statelessness.

IV. Media laws in Bhutan and Nepal:

Bhutanese laws and creation of refugees:

People’s right to freedom of expression has been suppressed by the following laws of Bhutan.  These rigid laws award capital punishment to those who criticise the king and his government.

Lawof Thrimsung:  It is the first law banning the freedom of expression in Bhutan.  The law of Thrimshung Chenpo, 1957 has been used to misinterpret the meaning of three refuges of Buddhism, Buddha (omniscient), Dharma (the spiritual law) and Sangha (the order) to mean Tsa-Wa-Sum or three elements of king, government and the kingdom to suit ruler’s political interest.  The king is the head of the government.  This law declares any act of “making conversation and correspondence” criticising the king and his government by Bhutanese citizens as treasonable offence.  On March, 1996, the National Assembly of Bhutan confirmed and approved death punishment for offences against this law.  Rakesh Chhetri, Silent suffering from Bhutan.

National Security Act:  This Act was enacted in 1992 and given retroactive effect from November, 1989.  This Act imprisons any person whose “words, either spoken or written, or by any means create misunderstanding between the government and people of Bhutan”.

Citizenship Act:  This Act says that a citizen shall be deprived of citizenship if he is found to criticise the king and his government.  Such citizens who have been deprived of the citizenship must dispose all properties and leave Bhutan for ever.  All Bhutanese refugees fall under this category.  Any one found in possession of dissident literature and criticising the government policies will have to forego his/her citizenship.  Such is the practice of the government to suppress the peoples’ voice.

Role of Legislature:  Bhutan’s National Assembly (Parliament) is not elected.  The members are selected by the Dzongdas (Chief District Officers).  There is no opposition in the Assembly.  All members belong to the Treasury bench.  They are not allowed to criticise the government and its policies.  The MPs do not have the right to freedom of expression even in the walls of the Assembly.  They are intimidated by the regime and warned of dire consequences, if they speak anything contrary to what the government wants.  Members are never allowed to present a bill on their own.  It is always the government ministries that table the bill.

Role of the Courts:  Bhutanese courts do not protect peoples’ right to freedom of expression and opinion.  They always uphold the government decisions.  In order to please the executive, they sometimes award longer sentences than what has been provided in the statute books.

Nepalese Laws and the refugees:

Although Nepal does not have any specific provision tosafe-guard refugees, it has generously housed large number of refugees.  Refugees are treated as aliens under the existing laws of Nepal.  The constitution of Nepal doesn’t make any distinction between citizens and aliens in regard to certain basic rights.  The Citizenship Act 1975, section 3, permits the naturalisation of refugees.  the immigration act of 1991 retains the power of expulsion of aliens on the grounds of national interests.  The extradition Act of 1991, section 12 (1) supports the principle that political offenders are not to be extradited.  This clause supports the international refugee law.  As Nepal doesn't have any particular legislation to regulate the inflow of refugee in to the country, it is being tackled by administrative measures.  Government policy as regards to entry and stay of refugees and aliens has been quite liberal.

Media and laws:  Article 16 of the constitution of Nepal says that every citizen shall have the right to demand and receive information on any matter of public importance.  This implies that the right to information has become a human and constitutional right of the people in Nepal.  The denial of this right can be contested under Article 23 of the constitution.  The supreme court of Nepal under article 88(2) holds tremendous power to enforce this right.
Although the right to be informed and to inform others applies to refugees too, but there are cases where they have been denied the right to information.  To give few examples, the refugees who have been verified till date don’t know about the status of their verification, similarly all the eastern Bhutanese refugees who have been denied registration don’t know as to why they have been denied refugee status.

V. Bhutanese Refugees: nature of communication

Bhutanese refugees inside the refugee camps:

The refugees were not allowed to express their thoughts, ideas and opinions freely in Bhutan.  When they reached Nepal they were then able to share their thoughts and ideas and publish them in words.  This made their life easier and safe.  Today there are seven camps in Nepal where over 100,000 refugees are staying.  Communication and information have helped the Bhutanese refugees to take charge of their own destiny.

Today there are political parties, NGOs and other different groups formed in exile who are advocating for their cause at national, regional and international level.  The refugees even today cannot communicate or express their thoughts and opinions with their relatives or any one in Bhutan.  If any citizen in Bhutan is found with literature that speaks about the refugees in Nepal or the human rights struggle in Bhutan then he or she is immediately arrested imprisoned or evicted from the country.

When we look back to Bhutan and India, Bhutanese Refugees have more access to information in Nepal, but we cannot say that they have fair access to information.  In this world of advanced communications system, Bhutanese refugee camps don’t enjoy the library, computer, internet, or TC facilities, few refugees who can afford have radio sets.  Radio is one of the most important source of information for the refugees inside the camps.  For official purpose each camp is connected with radio set and this is used to communicate between camps during emergencies and important work.

There are refugees who have not made a single telephone call and there are many who have not seen computer and very few know about the e-mail, internet and web account.

News Board Programme:  Print media is not available for the refugees inside the camps, although AHURA Bhutan a refugee organisation initiated a programme “News board programme”.  Under this programme the organisation collected the news, relevant to refugees and put it on the news board in each of the refugee camps, where refugees used to come and read and share with those who could not read.  This programme doen’t exist today because of the lack of resources.

Sandesh weekly:i  Now a group of refugee youths have started a weekly newspaper called “Sandesh”.  Initially the government authorities tried to stop this initiative of the refugee youths which was finally permitted under the condition that they write Sandesh weekly it is being published from Bhutan.  This paper is now playing a very important role to fill the communication gap between the refugees.  This has also helped to control corruption and other unlawful activities among the refugees and the groups involved with the refugee activities.

Medium of communication should be made available to the refugees, and if they are given an opportunity to share their thoughts and ideas and opinions freely with their own communities in the outside world then these refugees themselves will be advocating for their cause towards the durable solution to their problem.

Verification of the refugees:

The verification process in Khudanabari refugee camp started on March 26, 2001 and ended on December 13, 2001.  Altogether 1,933 families or 12,092 individuals have been verified out of 100,000 refugees in the camps.  Out of the total verified 99.8% have presented valid documentary evidences to prove their Bhutanese identity to the Joint Verification Team (JVT) of the Royal government of Bhutan and his Majesty’s Government of Nepal.  Today 12, 092 people are waiting for the result of their verification.  The refugees have all the right to be informed about their status soon after the verification process.  Today even after ten months JVT has not been able to inform about the result of the verification to the refugees.

There are another 88,000 plus Burmese refugees in the camps and over 20,000 outside the camps.  the verification team had taken eight and half months to complete one camp and it is more than 10 months since the two delegations left the verification process.  The refugees don’t know when the verification will start again and if it is ever resumed then it will take many many years for the completion of the verification alone.  During the verification refugees have been able to communicate with documentary evidence to the Bhutanese government that they have been forcefully evicted from Bhutan by the Bhutanese authority.  Even after this the Bhutanse government is telling to the world that these people in the camps are not from Bhutan, these are people who have come from India and Nepal.

Non-registered Bhutanese refugees in Nepal:

There are approximately 20,000 Bhutanese refugees staying on their own in Nepal and India, and many among these 20,000 have approached the Government of Nepal, where they have been denied registration as refugees.  Most of them do not know as to why they have been denied asylum.

There are around 100 refugees from eastern Bhutan and another 4,000 refugees from south Bhutan who have been denied registration in Nepal.  Many among them have their family or relatives who are registered and are inside the refugee camps.  Therefore a large chunk of non-registered refugees are staying inside the camps with their family or relatives.

Till date no organisation has been able to do a study on the conditions of these refugees from Bhutan who have been denied registration.  Perhaps because it’s a difficult task as they are scattered and it is not very easy to trace them.  South Asia Forum for Human Rights is now doing a pilot survey of the non-registered refugees in and around the refugee camps.  This can be an important source of information for the groups working for the non-registered refugees.

It is important to document these cases and advocate for their registration.  The non-registered refugees have made several appeals to the government of Nepal and UNHCR without much success.

Bhutanese refugees and the Nepalese Media:

The Nepalese media have given due importance to the Bhutanese refugee issue and it is one of the major source of information for the people around the world.  Nepalese media have played a vital role to highlight this issue.  “Ghatna ra Bichar” is a programme from radio Nepal and this is one medium of information even for the people inside Bhutan about the Bhutanese refugees, there are reports that the people in Bhutan have been arrested and imprisoned for listening to this programme.  The print media like the Kathmandu Post, The Kantipur, Himalayan Times, Himal magazine, People’s review are some papers from Nepal that have played a major role to highlight the Bhgutanese refugee issue.  The news published in the paper are also available at their website so this makes it easier for the people outside Nepal to access the information.  Most of the important news on Bhutan, like Appeal March to Bhutan, Bilateral negotiation between Bhutan and Nepal got the from page coverage or the editorial coverage.

There are some Bhutanese refugees who write regularly in some of the above mentioned papers.  They are Mr. Rakesh Chhetri who has published more than 60 articles on Bhutan in Nepalese media, others are Mr. Narayan Kattel, Dr. D.N.S. Dhakal, R.P. Subba, Dr. Dhurba Rizal who regularly publish in some of the above mentioned papers.  NBon0Bhutanese from Nepal and outside Nepal also publish articles on Bhutan but it is mostly refugees who contribute.  Refugee groups occasionally conduct press conferences, workshops, meetings and rallies demanding for the resolution of the refugee issue.  The Human Rights groups of Nepal also conduct programmes on Bhutanese refugee issue occasionally.

Communication and Networking

The Bhutanese refugees leaders have been able to establish the network with some of the groups working with the refugee issues around the world.  Due to lack of resources they have not been able to make the best use of these established network.  The EU has passed two resolutions on Bhutan likewise there have been some resolutions passed at UN Commission and Sub-commission but they have not been able to follow up and lobby for the cause due to lack of the resources.  The networking and communication is not very strong between the refugee groups because of differences among them.

Some of the Bhutanese refugee groups in exile have their regular publications, e-mail network, website through which they communicate about the refugee issue.
Travel document:  Travel document is issued by the Ministry of foreign Affairs, Nepal for the Bhutanese refugees for a period of one year.  To process for a travel document you will have to have all the papers, like invitation letter, programme schedule and other relevant papers. When you have all these papers at hand then you will have to have a letter from the refugee camp secretary and the same is forwarded to Refugee Co-ordination Unit of HMG then to the District office of HMG and then to the Home Ministry. Home Ministry will forward to Foreign Ministry and finally if foreign ministry thinks it is okay you will get your travel document for a single country you are travelling to.  The whole process take more than a month if one keeps on following and can impress the concerned authority otherwise it will never get done.  This way the right of the refugees to travel to other countries and to lobby on their behalf is being controlled very much.  This is one of the reasons why the refugees have not been able to communicate about their issue with the outside world.

Conclusion:

The right to freedom of expression, opinion and press must be protected by rule of law.  Realising this, the United National General Assembly in 1948, proclaimed the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), “as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations”.  The UDHR is an integral component of the Un charter.  All members-states are considered to have acceded to this “common standard”.  Article 19 of the UDHR explicitly says that, “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression”.  And Article 19(1) of ICCPR which clearly says that “everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference” and Article 19(2) of ICCPR says “everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression”.  Here Bhutan is not the member of ICCPR but Nepal is.  These rights are the most important pillar of a civil society.  A channel of communications must be established between the government and the aggrieved parties to sort out the problems.  However, the Bhutanese government, instead of opening dialogue with dissidents has crushed the voice of its citizens and their right to freedom of opinion and expression remains curtailed. It does not respect peoples’ voice.  the current movement for human rights and democracy was launched only after the government refused to listen to peoples’ appeal for amendment of the Citizenship Act, 1985.  The regime has made bhutan a completely closed society.

The media, UN organisations, INGOs, NGOs and individuals working with the Bhutanese refugee issue have played a very important role to keep the Bhutanese refugee issue alive.  They have helped to promote public understanding and encourage generous assistance to refugees. On the other hand the negative reporting and writing of the Bhutanese government have been otherwise.
REFUGEE WOMEN AND THE FUNDAMENTAL INADEQUACIES IN INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES IN SOUTH ASIA[84]


Paula Banerjee
Department of South and Southeast Asian Studies
Calcutta University



Over one percent of the total world populations today consists of refugees.  More than eighty percent of that number are made up of women and their dependent children.  An overwhelming majority of these women come from the developing world.  South Asia is the fourth largest refugee-producing region in the world.  Again, a majority of these refugees are made up of women.  “Refugee women and children form 76 per cent of the total refugee population in Pakistan.  79 percent in India, 78 percent in Bangladesh and 87 percent in Nepal.”[85]  The sheer number of women among the refugee population portrays that it is a gendered issue.  On the basis of examples taken from different refugee experiences in South Asia this paper argues that both displacement and asylum is a gendered experience.  At least in the context of South Asia it results from and is related to the marginalisation of women by the South Asian states.  These states at best patronise women and at worse infantilise, disenfranchise and de-politicise them.  It is in the person of a refugee that women’s marginality reaches its climatic height.  By refusing to create a South Asian refugee regime states in South Asia continue their castigation of non-conforming women to the sttus of political non-subjects.

Etienne Balibar has argued that the fissures in the “modern political community” emerge from the “practical and ideological sexism as a structure of interior exclusion of women generalised to the whole society,” which leads to the “universalisation of sexual difference.”[86]  Thus, modern states that are built on gender difference develop a precarious relation with its women.  Women became both subjects of the state as well as its other.  In pluralistic societies such as those found in South Asia “the modern projects of national independence, state building and economic development have had distinctive gender implications and outcomes.”[87]  The nation building projects in South Asia has led to the creation of a homogenised identity of citizenship.  State machineries seek to create a “unified” and “national” citizenry that accepts the central role of the existing elite.  This is done through privileging majoritarian, male and monolithic cultural values that deny the space to difference.  Such a denial has often led to the segregation of minorities, on the basis of caste, religion and gender from the collective we.  I argue that one way of marginalising women from body politic is done by targetting them and displacing them in times of state verses community conflict.  As a refugee a woman loses her individuality, subjectivity, citizenship and her ability to make political choices.  As political non-subjects refugee women emerge as the symbol of difference between us/citizens and its other/refugees/non-citizens.  Refugee women become the material for the symbolic construction of the nations boundaries.  By taking some select examples from South Asia this paper addresses such theoretical assumptions.  Here the category of refugee women will include women who have crossed international borders and those who are internally displaced and are potential refugees.[88]  I will discuss their experiences of displacement and analyse how as dislocated subjects they negotiate spaces to retrieve agency in the face of institutional apathy.

State Formation and the Question of Abducted Women

The partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 witnessed probably the largest refugee movement in modern history.  About 8 million Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan to resettle in India while about 6-7 million Muslims went to Pakistan.  Such transfer of population was accompanied by horrific violence.  Some 50,000 Muslim women in India and 33,000 non-Muslim women in Pakistan were abducted, abandoned or separated from their families.[89]  Women’s experiences of migration, abduction and destitution during partition and State’s responses to it is a pointer to the relationship between women’s position as marginal participants in state politics and gender subordination as perpetrated by the State.  In this context the experiences of abducted women and their often forcible repatriation by the State assumes enormous importance today when thousands of South Asian women are either refugees, migrants or stateless within the subcontinent.

The two states of India and Pakistan embarked on a massive Central Recovery Project during which some 30,000 women were recovered by their respective states.  Some incidents relating to these abducted women exemplify the politics of gender during partition.  Even when the two countries could decide on little else they decided that the abducted women must be restored to their families.  Problems arose over the process and progress of recovery.  An Abducted Persons bill was brought in the Indian Parliament.  Boys below the age of 16 and women of all ages were brought under this bill which gave unlimited power to police officers regarding abducted persons.  If a police officer detained any women under this bill they could not be questioned in any court of law.  Although numerous amendments were proposed in the House the bill passed unchanged on 19 December, 1949.[90]

According to Rameshwari Nehru, adviser to GOI, Ministry of Rehabilitation, many abducted women showed extreme unwillingness to leave their “captors.”[91]  Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin in their recent book on partition observes that women were:

abducted as Hindus, converted and married as Muslims, recovered as Hindus but required to relinquish their children because they were born of Muslim fathers, and disowned as ‘unpure’ and ineligible for marriage within their erstwhile family and community, their identities were in a continuous state of construction and reconstruction, making them... ‘permanent refugees’.[92]

These women were forcibly repatriated though refused rehabilitation by their families.  How did India and Pakistan achieve such commonality of interest regarding abducted women?

Many explanations are given for this forcible repatriation of women.  Menon and Bhasin point out how national honour was bound to women’s bodies.  According to Jan Jindy Pettman repatriation was made a nationalist project because women’s bodies became markers of male honour.  As usual women’s bodies became “part of other people’s agendas.”[93]  Both countries made claims of moral superiority over the other based on their ability to protect/control female bodies.  This control was essential for the self-definition of the male identity that was in a state of crisis.

Abducted women were not considered as legal entities with political and constitutional rights.  All choices were denied to them and while the state patronised them verbally by portraying their “need” for protection it also infantilised them by giving decision making power to their guardians who were defined by the male pronoun “he”.  By insisting that the abducted women could not represent themselves and had to be represented, the State marginalised them from the decision making process and made them non-participants.  Even today the refugee women do not represent themselves.  They are represented by officials.  For the abducted it was their sexuality that threatened their security and the honour of the nation.  Thus, their vulnerability was focused on their body.  This made all women susceptible to such threats and so had to be protected/controlled.  By denying agency to the abducted women the State made it conceivable to deny agency to all women.  Even after fifty-years, state politics in South Asia regarding women in general and refugee women in particular remain essentially similar to the partition days.

Untold Tales of Dislocation: An Exercise in Nation Building

Following the Partition 30 lakh refugees entered West Bengal by 1960.  In the 1970s the state witnessed another massive exodus from East Pakistan during the formation of Bangladesh.  Some ten million refugees fled to India.  Although the GOI received the refugees but it also made it clear that the refugee would be temporary.  The refugee camps along the border were called ‘transit’ relief camps’.  Over fifty percent of refugees from East Pakistan/Bangladesh consisted of women.[94]  In case of these refugees the treatment was slightly better than that meted out to the abducted women of former years.  Many women’s organisations came up to help these women such as the Nari Seva Sangha and Ananda Ashram.  During the first phase of refugee influx from the East the West Bengal Government established five sponsored colleges with stipulation that 75 percent of the students must be from refugee families.  Four of these were co-educational colleges and only one, the Sarojini Naidu College for Women in DumDum was women’s college.  During the second phase the GOI had applied and got a huge loan from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).  The number of women refugees increased because of fear of sexual persecution of women.  Rape had already been recognised as an instrument of war.

During the first phase many women were sent to camps in Titagarh, Kartickpur, Ranaghat, Bansberia and Bhadrakali.  But there was only one institution named Uday Villa that was responsible for the rehabilitation of single women.[95]  There were however many women who did not find space in these camps.  They were forced to seek refuge in Kashi or Brindaban.[96]  Subhoranjan Dasgupta interviewed many such displaced women in Brindaban of whom Ila Bandyopadhyay was one.  She came to Brindaban in 1947 and has lived there since.  Even during the second phase of migration many women were forced to settle in Brindaban.  Chapalasundari Dhar, a child widow came over to India from Noakhali when the riots started in late sixties.  She did not find a safe habitat in Calcutta so she was pushed to Brindaban.[97]

Even 29 years after the creation of Bangladesh there are 2910 Bengali women struggling to survive in Brindaban.  One of them is Gopika Saha who came to India during the second wave from Bangladesh.  She tried to make a living in Calcutta but after her husband died, without any kind of institutional support she was forced to go and live in Brindaban.[98]  Most women who are now living in Brindaban have had little or no institutional support.  They earn their livelihood often by begging.  These women are both hapless and helpless.  Many of them have been sexually abused during the riots in East Pakistan.  They were unwanted in their country of birth and were displaced due to persistent fear of further abuse.  According to some estimates over 200,000 Bengali women were raped in Bangladesh between 1971-1972.[99]  Even when they came to India, the state run institutions found their position precarious.  The Indian State could not push them back because it was trying to portray the “issue at sate was a humanitarian one.”[100]  Neither could they rehabilitate them within the majoritarian community, as they were not considered respectable enough.

Women refugees from East Pakistan/Bangladesh portray that institutional responses varied with individuals.  If women were considered respectable and therefore useful for the nationalising and state building project they were accommodated within the majoritarian community.  Otherwise they were further displaced and forced to live their lives outside the community.  They remained permanent refugees living in the margins of society.  As women are seen as “the most dangerous bearers of moral decay,” their rehabilitation becomes even more precarious.[101]  Any threat to their character is looked upon as a threat to the nation.  This entails increased control of women.  Since displacement may mean erosion of familial control the state assumes the guardianship of women.  One way of controlling women whose protection becomes problematic is by reducing them to the status of a political non-subject by permanently relegating them to the periphery.  This is what has happened to Bangladeshi women living in Brindaban.  Yet even in the peripheral state they challenge patriarchal modes by living together in “Amar Bari” as single women, rising above their sufferings and despair and participating in the discourse by happily narrating their experiences.

A Failed Nationalising Project: Sri Lankan Women

Ethnic tensions between the Tamil minority and Sinhala majority leading to armed conflict since 1980s have led to several waves of refugees from Sri Lanka.  They are victims of a failed nationalising project.  By 1989 there were about 160,000 refugees from Sri Lanka to India, again largely women with their dependents.  Initially the State Government provided these refugees with shelter and rations, but still many of them preferred to live outside the camps.  Like the second wave of refugees from East Pakistan/Bangladesh India stressed that the Sri Lankan refugee would have to go “home”.  However, unlike the refugees from the East the Sri Lankans were called “refugees” rather than “evacuees”.  They were registered and issued with refugee certificates.  In terms of education and health both registered and unregistered refugees enjoy the same rights as the nationals.  Nevertheless in absence of specific legislation their legal status remain ambiguous.[102]  The precarious nature of their status became clearer in the aftermath of Raji Gandhi’s assassination.  NGOs access to the camps, refugees, freedom of movement and access to education and informal occupations were all curtailed.

On January 6, 1992 the Indian and the Sri Lankan governments signed a bilateral agreement to begin refugee repatriation on 20 January.  Soon the programme was suspended when UNHCR raised doubts about their safety once they return.[103] In July 1992 the GOI signed an agreement with the UNHCR and allowed the agency a token presence in Madras.  By April 1993 refugee camps were reduced from 237 to 132 in Tamil Nadu and 1 in Orissa.[104]  Representatives of UNHCR were allowed to be in the transit area and could speak to returning refugees.  Before conflict was resumed in 1995 some 55,000 refugees were repatriated from India to Sri Lanka.

After Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination the politicians began to shun the refugees.[105]  As most of these were women they were initially considered harmless but with the number of female suicide bombers swelling there was a marked change in GOI’s attitude to women refugees.[106]  What the government of India failed to acknowledge was that the number of female bombers swelled after the IPKF operations, due to a demographic imbalance.[107]  The government turned a blind eye when touts came to recruit young women from the refugee camps in Tamil Nadu to work as “maids” in countries of Middle East. Most of these women were then smuggled out of India and sent to the Gulf countries.  Often they were badly abused.  On such case that caught the public eye was that of a young girl called Sivitha.  She was smuggled to the Gulf with thirty other women.  Her employer “took sadistic pleasure in thrashing her.”  Twice she fell into a coma.  Unable to bear this she sought refuge in the Sri Lankan embassy.  She was sent back to Sri Lanka, into the war torn area of Vavuniya.  She tried to get back to India to her parents but failed.  Ultimately she committed suicide.[108]

Even when the situation is not so extreme it is still traumatic for young women.  In Indian camps refugee families are given a dole of Rs.150/- a month, which is often stopped arbitrarily.  Women are discouraged from taking up employment outside the camps.  During multiple displacements women who have never coped with such situations before are often at a loss for necessary papers.  When separated from male members of their family they are vulnerable to sexual abuse.  The camps are not conducive for the personal safety of women as they enjoy no privacy.  But what is more worrying is that without any institutional support women become particularly vulnerable to human traffickers.  These people aided by network of criminals force women into prostitution.  Millions of rupees change hands in this trade and more lives get wrecked every day.[109]  Yet even in these miserable conditions many of the widows living in camps wear the pottu.[110]

Women from the North and Northeast Sri Lanka are worst affected by the political conflict.  Many of them who are unable to cross international border swell the ranks of the internally displaced.  Even in such camps women are responsible for holding together fragmented families.  Today roughly one-third of all households in Sri Lanka are headed by women and the numbers increase many fold in the camps for internally displaced.  In Alles Garden Camp in Trincomalee majority of women IDP’s are widows.[111]  Although 89 percent women in Sri Lanka are literate, due to two decades of armed conflict women from North and East have lower levels of education with one in every four being illiterate.  A report based on a research carried out a Mannar district portray that among 190,000 IDPs women often find it impossible to generate enough income for buying food for the whole family.  In Illupakkadavai, all 36 heads of female headed households stated that they rely on dry rations for approximately 90 percent for their nutritional needs and that the children of women headed households are most vulnerable to exploitation.  In Sri Lanka suicide rates for women have doubled in the last two decades.[112]

A failed nationalising project in Sri Lanka has encouraged the government to segregate women who are considered threatening.  They are displaced from their homes and ghettoed in camps.  Most are then displaced from one camp to another, which discourages them from establishing any kind of social or political networks.  Their involvement in any kind of political activities, even if peaceful, is considered as threatening.  Many of these women are displaced and pushed beyond the borders.  Countries in which they seek asylum often equally consider them as threatening.  As for Sri Lankan Tamil women in India, Rajiv Gandhi’s death convinced the State that these women are of little use for India’s nationalising and nation building project.  From asylum seekers they were reduced to the status of hostages who were so dangerous that they had to be segregated.  Thus when agents of human trafficking arrived the State turned a blind eye.  This was one way of phasing out women who were considered problematic.  No matter how the state try to homogenise these women as “victim” they assume agency though small acts of defiance such as wearing the pottu even when widowed, refusing to be repatriated or coming back to India after repatriation and holding on to jobs outside the camp.

Of State(lessness) And Other: Women from Myanmar

Since independence, Burma has been torn apart by civil wars between the central government and the various opposing ethnic groups.  Such ethnic rivalries were in part a legacy o the divide and rule policy of the occupying British government and in part the policy of discrimination practised by the ruling elite.  Political instability in Burma, later renamed as Myanmar, led to the military coup of 1962.  Since then a ruthless military junta rules the country.  This junta has suppressed any dissent from either then ethnic groups or pro-democracy movements leading to massive desertion and displacements.  There are many ethnic minorities that have suffered discrimination under successive Burmese governments, and massive persecution by the present Burmese regime.

Following the brutal crack down of 1988 by the State Law and Order Restoration Council 9SLORC), against democratic movements in Burma refugees came to Mizoram in large numbers.  Here we will discuss conditions of two different groups of refugees from Myanmar: the Chins and the Rohingyas.  Refugee camps were set up in Champai and Saiha districts of Mizoram to accommodate these Chin refugees by the Mizoram Government.  However, these camps were closed down in 1994/95 when the Indo-Myanmar border trade talks began.  One of the main reasons for closing down the camps was the request of the Burmese Government which believed that the Chin National Front (CNF) which is fighting for the independence of Chin State, was operating from these camps.  Since then the Chin refugees have been scattered all over Mizoram and forced to find work for their survival.  Government of India followed largely a hands-off policy regarding the Chin refugees.  It has so far allowed the Mizoram government a free hand to deal with the situation.  In September 1994 and in June 1995, when the ongoing anti-foreigner movement in Mizoram targeted the Chins, and statements were made by local politicians that all foreigners including the Chins were pushed back, a large number of Chin refugees came to Delhi and requested UNHCR and large numbers of these were pushed back, contrary to the principles of non-refoulement.  As in any displaced population more than fifty percent of the Chins who came to India were women.[113]  Many of these women took up jobs in local schools.  Yet when the pushback came even they were not spared.

One such woman is a Chin whose father was a Christian pastor.  She said she was arrested in Burma in 1993 after she spoke against the Government within earshot of an army officer.  She said the officer beat and raped her.  She fled to India but last year returned to Burma.  The abuse that she faced was not ground enough to give her refugee status in India.  She was never tried under the Foreigners Act and was merely pushed back.  On going back she continued her political activity when she heard that the military was after her she fled to Guam.  When she arrived, she tested positive for tuberculosis in a skin test.  Because she was pregnant, officials were afraid to take an X-ray.  Instead, they kept here in isolation.  But when the church group toured the prison and found the woman, they were alarmed by the effect of months of isolation.  The Reverend Jerry Elmore, pastor of the University Baptist Church, offered to sponsor the woman himself so she could be released from custody to his care.[114]  The situation of this woman is not exceptional.  Such cases are happening in increasing frequency.  Young women who are particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment are being abused by the police and then pushed back.[115]  The women are not given the status of refugees as sexual abuse is never ground for such a status.

The situation of the Rohingya women is even worse than the Chins.  These women are Muslims and are considered “resident foreigners,” even in their homeland.  Their subordinate status within their own community discourage them from procuring education or working outside their homes.  The State authorities and the army habitually sexually abuse them.  Sayeeda, an 18 year old Rohingya girl, who has had some education was of the opinion that the state machinery used rape as a way to push women out of Myanmar.[116]  Forced relocation especially without compensation is also used to push women out of Myanmar.[117]  These women are first taken to Bangladesh.  But after the UNHCR repatriation programme started in Bangladesh new arrivals were no longer admitted to UNHCR camps.  They were often pushed across the borders to India and then to Pakistan.  The Rohingya population in Pakistan is mostly concentrated in the suburbs of Karachi, including Korangi, Organi and Landhi.  Rohingya settlements are named after their place of origin, such as “Arakanabad”, “Burmi colony”, “Arakan Colony” etc.  All these settlements receive regular visits from law-enforcement agencies extorting money from their undocumented inhabitants.  The Government of Pakistan has largely ignored the issue of trafficking of Rohingya women.  Besides the risk of being sold Rohingya women become victims of slavery through debt bondage.  Because of their undocumented status, Rohingya women constantly face arrest and imprisonment.[118]

The Chin and the Rohingya women epitomise the plight of stateless women in South  Thus fearAsia.  Unwanted in their homeland the women are victims of gender based crimes such as rape which are hardly ever considered as grounds for refuge.  In a foreign country without any supporting documents these women are disenfranchised and depoliticised.  They are unable to protest against sexual crimes for want of a legal status.  The abuse that had pushed them across international border in the first place often seems to follow them in their new settlements.  If they successfully repatriate to their birthplace they are still in a state of not belonging.  In patriarchal systems women are constantly reduced to the status of non-subject.  Crimes that are perpetrated particularly against women are often trivialised.  Thus fear for loss of life can become ground for asylum or refugee status; fear of rape is not.  Yet women from Myanmar brace both these fears and repeatedly cross borders and participate in the protest movements in their effort to lead their lives in their own terms.

Of Dislocated Nation:  Afghan Women in South Asia

Afghanistan is a landlocked country strategically located between the CIS states in the north, China in northeast, Pakistan in the east and south and Iran in the west.  Sitting on the crossroads between four regions with such diverse histories, the people of Afghanistan draw their heritage from all of these regions.  Pushtoons are the largest group of people in Afghanistan comprising about 54 percent of the total population, followed by the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen.  Pashtu and Dari are the official languages but there are over thirty unofficial languages.  In this multi-lingual, multi-cultural state probably the only one common factor that the people share is Islam.  Yet Islam has many different strands, which may divide as much as it can unite.

In 1978 there was a coup popularly known as the Sayr revolution.  This coup brought the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to power followed by massive Soviet intrusion in Afghan affairs.  From that time on there is a constant flow of Afghan refugees to South Asia.  Maximum number of Afghan refugees settled in Pakistan as Pakistan was ideologically opposed to the Soviet Union and gave asylum to Islamic and pro-western refugees.  However, from the time Soviet Union started drawing back the mujahideen’s gain power.  Yet even they could not give a viable government and their failure paved the way for Taliban, a fanatically right-wing group, deeply committed to the Sunni sect of Islam, with “a great capacity for discipline, for austerity, military decisiveness, and where necessary, high levels of violence.”[119]  Most of Afghanistan is still under Taliban control and the flow of refugees to South Asia countinues enabated.  During the period of Soviet intrusion in Afghanistan over US $ 1 billion was channelled to Pakistan for the welfare of the refugees.  However, like other South Asian countries Pakistan’s Afghan policy was based purely on administrative practice.  The precarious nature of refugee protection became evident when in 1993 after the Soviet withdrawal Pakistan closed its borders to refugees on the grounds that they were no longer fleeing foreign intervention but were dissident Afghans.  Beginning in late January 2000 the situation became worse when Pakistani security personnel began arresting Afghan nationals and putting them into trucks, which travel to the nearby border town of Torkham.  The Afghans are then sent back to their country.[120]  The situation for all refugees became tough and particularly so for women.  They are discriminated against by their own families as well as by the State.

An Amnesty International report entitled “Women in Afghanistan: A Human Rights Catastrophe – 1995” stated that Afghan women were attacked, molested, raped and killed by warring factions and had to bribe people at various check posts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan while fleeing.  Rape of war widows is common, 30 percent of prostitutes in NWFP are Afghan and Afghan refugee women in Pakistan “see no future for themselves.”[121]  The plight of the Afghan women is particularly severe when they have opted to live in the camps after 1995. A case in point is the situation of the inmates of the Kot Chandana camp.  At one time Kot Chandana had as many as 180,000 people living there but today there are only 33,000.  Over 60 percent of these are women.  Today the Pakistan government refuses to spend any money for the up keep ofrefugees living in the camp.  Even in the camp purdah is strictly observed much to the detriment of women headed households.  The plight of the widows are so severe that they prefer to remarry their husband’s brothers or cousins rather than staying single.  Most men in the camps have at least two wives.  Even in education girls face discrimination.  About 1558 girls are enrolled in primary schools and 860 boys.  Yet there is only one middle school that is only for boys.  The termination of government aid means that once the girls pass class five they are confined to their homes.  Even in health care boys are given precedence.[122]  High education among girls is therefore not encouraged and self-sufficiency for most of them is a distant dream.

In Pakistani camps urban Afghan women opposed to Taliban and their discriminatory policies are often attacked.[123]  Elsewhere such women face other kinds of problems.  Those Afghan women who get Residential Permit in India are not allowed the right to work.  The lack of work opportunities adds to the dislocation of these women.  There is the case of one Afghan refugee women who was one of the first women to work in the construction industry in Afghanistan.  She was a member of PDPA and mobilised thousands of women to engage in the public sphere.  But as a refugee she had to give up her public activism.  Lack of job opportunities and steady flow of income “have rendered her desolate and forced her to contemplate suicide.”[124]  For these women physical dislocation has been transformed into emotional dislocation so that they are forced to live in a state of constant displacement.  Even in this state of dislocation they repeatedly tell any one who wishes to lend their ear of their intention to participate in the movement for peace.

Institutional Response or Lack of It...

None of the South Asian states are signatories to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or the 1967 Protocol.  As India is the largest South Asian state it should be interesting to see how women refugees are dealt with here.  In India Articles 14, 21 and 25 under Fundamental Rights guarantee the Right to Equality, Right to Life and Liberty and Freedom of Religion of citizens and aliens alike.  Like the other South Asian states India had ratified the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1993.  Although there is no incorporation of international treaty obligations in the Municipal laws still rights accruing to the refugees in India under Articles 14, 21 and 25 can be enforced in the Supreme Court under Article 32 and in the High Court under Article 226.  The other guiding principles for refugees are the executive orders that have been passed under the Foreigners Act of 1946 and the Passport Act of 1967.  The National Human Rights Commission has also taken up questions regarding the protection of refugees.  It approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the  Constitution and stopped the Expulsion of Chakma refugees from Northeast India.[125]  Yet all these orders are adhoc in nature and the legal position remains nebulous.  This is true not just of India but all of South Asia.

Pakistan also operated under the 1946 Foreigners Act.  According to the provisions of this Act no foreigner could enter Pakistan without a valid passport or visa.  Such an act can be detrimental for all persons fleeing for their lives and especially for women who are unused to handling documentation proving citizenship.  When six to seven million persons entered Pakistan after partition this Act proved useless and had to be supplemented by the Registration of Calims Act of 1956 and the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act  1958.  Such Acts did not establish a legal regime for refugees in Pakistan only the claims of a group of refugees.  The ad hoc nature of Pakistani refugee regime continued.  As for Sri Lanka, it is not a refugee receiving country but a refugee generating country.  There are two Acts, which are especially detested by displaced people, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and Emergency Regulations.[126]  Sri Lanka does not have any special acts that help or privilege internally displaced women who are vulnerable to abuse because of their gender.  As for other state laws in South Asia, Nepal has an Immigration Act of 1992, which provides that no foreigner is allowed to enter or stay in Nepal without a visa.  His Majesty’s Government has full authority to expel any foreigner committing immigration offences.  Most South Asian states have punitive measures for immigration offences but hardly any measures for helping displaced people.  Further, none of these States have made any special stipulations for women refugees although a majority of all South Asian refugees are women.  Why this lack?

According to one observer South Asian attitude to women has been guided by “mystified notions of chastity.”[127]  This has led to the acceptance that women in South Asia belong to their communities.  Indian and Pakistani attitude during the nascent stage of State building institutionalised this through their treatment of abducted women.  It was agreed that in a state of dislocation women could lose the power to represent themselves.  This was essential as dislocation meant that traditional control on women was eroded.  Male centric states then assumed the prerogative of control.  Women were often put under not just cultural but political control.  They were restricted by representations and practices that homogenise and degrade them by transforming them into non-autonomous and dependent social category of “victim”.  They as victims have no political voice.  Their individual identity is subsumed within the identity of their communities.  Therefore when women are displaced in large numbers the focus shift from them as a person to their communities.  But methods of displacing women are often gender centric.  Abuses are based on their individual gender roles.  Thus when states try displacing communities oike the Burmese vis a vis the Rohingyas they use rape as an instrument for displacement.  Yet when a large number of Rohingya women are pushed out and when other states respond institutionally, the gender dimension is often overlooked.  Not merely South Asian states but also international actors often overlook the gender dimension of this problem.

As for international actors UNHCR is acquiring some importance in the region for their efforts regarding refugees and internally displaced.  There are around 20,000 refugees who are protected by UNHCR in India, of whom a majority are Afghans.[128]  There are over eighty six thousand Sri Lankan refugees and sixty thousand internally displaced that concern UNHCR.[129]  The UNHCR has a guideline for the protection of women refugees but it is left to the discretion of countries to follow these recommendations.[130]  In patriarchal states where policies are weighted against women, if these guidelines are left societies, nor within the UN agencies.”[131]  Thus the gender bias found in state policies regarding women’s dislocation might also be reflected in theattitude taken by international agencies.

Taken individually the cases above reflect on specific characteristics of women’s depoliticisation due to dislocation.  But taken cumulatively it portrays that the overwhelming presence of women among the refugee populations is not an accident of history.  It is a way by which states have made women political non-subjects.  By making women permanent refugee, living a savage life in camps, it is easy to homogenise them, ignore their identity, individuality and subjectivity.  By reducing refugee women to the status of mere victims in our narratives we accept the homogenisation of women and their depoliticisation.  We legitimise a space where states can make certain groups of people political non-subjects.  A legal refugee regime may work as a necessary corrective and dissuade states from ignoring the gender dimension of the problem.

Marginal Women

It should be recognised that even in their marginality refugee women are never merely victims.  Bolan Gangopadhyay’s essay on women refugees from East Pakistan portrays how women exert agency even in situations of marginality.[132]  It has been recognised that the women refugees from East Pakistan/Bangladesh have altered the work pattern of women in Bengal and changed the definition of what constitutes a bhadramahila.[133]  Women have often used their marginality to retrieve agency.  The Women of Vitasta in Kashmir is a case in point.  Afghan women in Pakistan have for long agitated for their voices to be heard in peacemaking.  Dislocation is a debilitating experience no doubt but many exceptional women have transformed it into an empowering one.  They have assumed newer roles as head of households.  Such experiences have increased their confidence, though at times it may have contributed to their trauma.  I have met a number of women in camps in Sri Lanka who have used dislocation as an empowering incident.  They have happily assumed the role of breadwinners.  When these women take refuge in a different country they assume agency even at the face of opposition from asylum giving states because in a new area they are able to transcend patriarchal control.  Sometimes repatriation can seem problematic because these women are then forced back within the control of traditional patriarchy.  However we cannot get into a lengthy discussion on this matter here.

A State centric narrative on the situation of refugee women leads to their trivilisation as mere victims.  It shifts attention from the argument that State policy often results in the creation of refugees.  State policy is not ungendered.  It results from a political effort to homogenise citizenship.  The ruling elites decide who belong and who does not.  Rape, to the discretion of the government then it does not succeed in its purpose.  further, the programmes of these institutions such as UNHCR are built on certain practices.  Similar to state practices the practices of international organisations such as the UNHCR also delegate woman to the status of victim, which is a disenfranchising phenomenon.  The women have little or no say on policies that govern their lives and bodies even in camps run by the UNHCR.  Albeit the UNHCR concern itself with the protection of these women but they do not work towards their agency.  This is not to suspect intention of UNHCR but many of their policies such as the policy of repatriation can work against women who have acquired agency over their own person.  Decisions regarding their relocation also assumes that refugees/women cannot have any say in it.  Even refugee subsistence allowance does not empower women but rather works towards their homogenisation as victim.  The Afghan urban women in India are denied agency by the UNHCR when they are not allowed to hold jobs.  The Sri Lankan women refugees are denied agency when they are forced to use passes to get in and out of their camps.  The practices that govern the daily lives of women in these camps also relegate them to the status of dependants.  Then they are degraded in governmental and non-governmental reports and discourses as miserable victims.

In this paper five cases sof women as dislocated subjects has been selected with a purpose.  The abducted women portray how exercised of state building have used the incidents of abduction to give a male face to the citizenry.  Women in Brindaban portray that States assume the right to decide which groups of women refugees asre acceptable on the basis of their gender roles within their communities.  The Sri Lankan case reflects on how bilateral relations affect attitude to refugees and how that affects women.  It also portrays how specific incidents are made occasions for exerting greater control on women whose sexuality is perceived as threatening.  Thus after Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination by a female human bomb all NGOs were stopped from working in the refugee camps.  Women inmates of these camps were heavily dependent on these NGOs as most often they were their only links with the civil society.  It was from around the same time that the maid running business assumed notorious proportions.  The Sri Lankan case also reflects how the media privileges a certain image of women (in this case young women with guns on their shoulders) which justifies the asylum giving communities apathy regarding questions of security of refugee women.  Women from Myanmar portray the ramifications of statelessness.  In situations of statelessness women are more vulnerable to gender related onslaughts.  Yet their gender related vulnerabilities are never considered ground for refugee status.  The Chin women portray that control/protection notwithstanding the States of South Asia can ignore well established international norms regarding non-refoulement.  The situations of Afghan refugees portray that even international agencies such as the UN and UNHCR can ignore gender dimension of the problem.  Thus during budget crunches it is the schools for women which are hardest hit.  Even international agencies such as the UN Gender Mission can contribute to depoliticising women.  A case in point is Angela King’s mission to Peshawar and Islamabad.  When Afghan women requested the UN through Ms. King that they should try to mobilies educated Afghan women in peace-making, Ms. King reportedly asked them to apply to UN jobs instead.  After the meeting the women felt “confused, insulteld, hurt, angry and substantially ignored.”  But they noted bitterly “this is not an unusual situation – neither within our sexual assault and other gendered crimes are perpetrated against women to dislocate the civil society (which in conflict situation is formed largely of women) of the other in moments of conflict.  Crimes against women are then trivialised as a natrual result of conflict.  Therefore death or a serious threat to liberty becomes a reason for asylum but rape or vulnerability to human trafficking does not.  Such a value judgement makes it even more difficult for women to seek asylum.  This is a way of marginalising crimes against women and then marginalising the woman and making her a political non-subject just as in Hitler’s Germany where the Jews were first feminised and then reduced to the status of political non-subjects.  To retrieve women’s experiences from such marginalisations it is essential to recognise the individual voices of refugee women in any narrative of displacement.  Narrative based on responsed of South Asian states cannot do so because governmental discourse reduce women to the status of victim and then justify their experiences as marginal and hence unimportant.  Only by retrieving refugee women’s own voices and not dismissing their individual experiences as anecdotal can we centre the marginal.


Refugees in their own land - Forced Migrant Women in Srilanka,A struggle amidst Hope


In the ongoing civilian war in Srilanka it is estimated that 75% of the 730,000 internally displaced people in the North and East are women.  A number of factors determine their future existence, they include army / rebel operations, availability of food and medicine, psychological support, security of the family (women in the east generally are more concerned about the security of the family than themselves) etc.  Despite the deprivation of many of these factors, the extraordinary never say die spirit of the displaced women has created a special place for them in an era where women are hardly respected.  Their fight for survival against all odds shows the adaptability of women when most men are completely broke.  In the traditional Eastern society women play a major role within the family, which has helped in maintaining family values. It is the women who take care of the house and plays the role of a homemaker while the men earn the livelihood.
“In the bitter Srilankan war for a Tamil homeland, the ideal woman is portrayed by the rebel Liberation Tigers for Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ideology as an aggressive soldier or a fearless suicide bomber.  On the other hand the rare media reports of that war often present women as pitiful, poverty stricken, dependent victims.  These images distort the role of women in refugee situations.”  - Fr. Chinnappan Amalraj SJ, a Tamil Jesuit who is the former Regional Director of Jesuit Refugee Service South Asia.[134]

Women as carriers of culture:
Frequent displacements have led to the eroding of cultures.  The Srilankan experience shows us that continuity of culture depends on sustenance of a community in their natural habitat, most of the Srilankan Tamil diaspora who number around 800,000 do not want to return home even if the peace moves succeed.  They had moved away from Srilanka as a result of the civil war.  As a new generation is born abroad, they have never seen their country of origin nor do they know about their culture as they have grown in a different atmosphere.  The story of those living amidst the war is different.  Srilankan Tamil women have always lived side by side their male family members as equals.  When traditional norms and values are forgotten due to displacement it is the women who have taken up the responsibility of infusing these values in their wards.  They are the symbols of protecting the culture.
The Fr. S. Singarayan strongly opines that women are mentally stronger than the men, he says,  “ At the onset of a displacement, the men are perplexed as they run out of ideas and are confined to isolation, as they are psychologically shattered.”[135] In this crisis situation when everyone is in a confused state of mind the women puts her act together. Fr.Jeyakumar observes “The children and others in the family immediately look up to the mother to act.  It is she who gathers a few pieces of firewood, dry leaves to set up an urn and prepare a cup of tea for the others.  In this way she has succeeded in keeping the flock together. This crisis may be a burden to a man but is a silent response to the challenge for a woman.”[136]

Changing role of women in war:

The agonizing war has victimized women but it has also made her stronger.  The best out of her qualities is brought out.  Before the war she was an affectionate wife, mother etc taking care of all the ‘home needs’.  Violence has forced her to learn a number of new tricks of survival.  If her husband is missing she has to go to the town, enter the abandoned streets in darkness, search for her beloved missing one, meet the police, army, navy, contact the local religious and political leaders speak to them, plead with them.  She takes up the role of an investigator taking clues from persons who had seen him before his disappearance.  These were things unknown to her before the out break of the war.  Today she is an active participant in the dharanas, human rights rally’s, protest marches, and organizing peace meetings.  They are also breadwinners for many families.  As the war fatigue males are worn out and also face a danger of disappearance, torture or forced conscription into the militant movements women take up the responsibility of feeding him.  Many times frustrated with the treatment meted out to her she dares the men by joining the militant movement. 
Human Rights Violations on Women:
a)      Check points ( freedom of movement)
The towns of North and East Srilanka are known for checkpoints where everybody is required to undergo a check compulsorily.  In Vavuniya there are 50 checkpoints every time you pass across one of them, you have to prove yourself to be innocent and you are subjected to a physical check.  The checkpoints provoke fear because people may be detained there and disappear.  Girls and women fear not only sexual harassment by soldiers at checkpoints, but rape as well.[137]
As soldiers manning these checkpoints do not speak Tamil, young women are always subjected to verbal gender abuse.  Not many checkpoints have female soldiers manning them.  The Jaffna residents have complained about their treatment at the checkpoints, particularly the inappropriate, often humiliating searches of women.[138]  In a large number of cases of disappearance and rape the victims were last found at one of the innumerable checkpoints.  The widespread fear of rape by soldiers, people worry about girls and women having to pass through military checkpoints.  That concern is exacerbated by a perception that soldiers delay girls at the checkpoints.  One woman said, “girls walking alone are kept for fifteen minutes at checkpoints as soldiers ask them unnecessary questions to amuse themselves”.[139]
B) Rape, Disappearance and Torture:
“The Sri Lankan security forces have continued to commit serious human rights abuses, sexual violence, in the context of the 17 year armed conflict against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Sri Lankan Police have also repeatedly committed rape and other sexual abuse in the course of the fighting”.
- Report by UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women
[22 Dec 2000]
These are some of the terror tactics adopted by the Srilankan armed forces.  In war women are also more likely to encounter situations where someone wants to exercise power over them due to the tension and level of violence in the environment.  Women particularly made mention of soldiers who respond to a ‘herd instinct’ and take chance of ‘any opportunity’ to abuse women.  In war it is also easier to justify such abuse, simply as one of those “inevitable” consequences of war, as the soldiers ‘are in natural need of sexual activity’.[140] 
Most soldiers often see the manifestation of male superiority in the form of rape as a show of power over the males of the victims’ community.  In North and East Srilanka a woman’s role has been primarily defined to take care and nurture the family and home, thus the attack and disappearance of family members cripple her role and her identity as wife and mother. [141]  Disappearances are occasionally reported but that is not the case with rape, as the victims fear social ostracization.  When cases are reported.  Families complaining rape cases also face retribution.  It is often reported that drunken soldiers enter nearby resident localities after 6.pm when people are not allowed to come out and the soldiers take away young women and girls to rape them.  Neighbors do not dare to come out fearing violence against them.  In the now famous Ida Carmelitta rape case.[142] Five soldiers entered her house, tied the victims’ mother to a lamppost, shut the other relatives in another room, raped Ida, ate her breast, and shot her through the genitals.  The entire family fled Srilanka fearing threats from the army and the case was closed. The continuing pattern of sexual violence against Tamil women persists because of the climate of virtual impunity that prevails.
 Apart from the solitary Krishanthy Kumaraswamy case, there has not been any other instance of the alleged offenders being meted out justice though there are some judicial inquiries on, they are being conducted in a manner that indicates justice would never be done. Cases are transferred out of the original jurisdiction in favour of the accused. This however places a great burden on the living victims or those giving evidence on their behalf. What happens also is that as cases get protracted the will to seek justice gets enfeebled. The system seems designed to help the alleged offenders rather than the hapless victims.[143]As the soldiers are from the southern parts of Srilanka they fear facing the courts in the north.
The UN Special Rapporteur in March 2000 highlighted the case of Sarathambal Saravanbavananthakurukal, a 29-year-old Tamil woman who had been reportedly gang raped and then killed by navy soldiers on 28 December 1999 in Pungudutivu, near Jaffna. She observed that despite an order by the President of Sri Lanka to immediately investigate the events, it was reported that "very little [was] being done to pursue the matter". Sarathambal Saravanbavananthakurukal had been abducted from her home, situated at about 500m from a navy camp. Her father and brother were tied up by four security officers dressed in black. Her dead body was found on barren land about 100m away from their home the next day. After public protest, her body was sent to Colombo for post-mortem by a senior JMO who indicated that the cause of death was "asphyxia due to gagging"; that her underpants had been stuffed inside her mouth; and that "forcible sexual intercourse" had taken place. The father and brother were allegedly threatened not to reveal the identity of the four men who came to the house. According to the Director of the Criminal Investigation Department, who had been instructed by the President of Sri Lanka to investigate the rape and murder, the brother had "not been able to identify any of the four persons who came to the house". The criminal investigations into the rape and murder of both Ida Carmelita and Sarathambal Saravanbavananthakurukal have not proceeded beyond the initial inquiry stage. No charges have been filed against the alleged perpetrators and it is unlikely that those responsible for the rape and murder of the two women will ever be brought to justice.[144] Reported cases of rape in Northern Srilanka  are as follows:

1996 - 17
1998 - 05
2000 - 01
1997 - 16
1999 -03
2002 - 06
(Source: Sexual violence against Tamil women in Srilanka by D.B.S Jeyaraj- Sunday Times Jan 2002)

Plight of the school going girls:
 For most female students in the uncleared areas the schools were a fertile breeding ground for militant indoctrination.  Many join the militant movement as they see the discrimination of the state towards the minority Tamils and become victims of male chauvinism.  These girls do not even have the privilege of getting education aids like books, maps etc as they are banned items.  Exams are not conducted on schedule and they cannot move to the South for higher education as a result of the dreaded pass system.  In the cleared areas school going girls have to bear the burden of standing in queue to get the movement pass and also pass through a series of checkpoints.  Each of these check points are a threat to the modesty of these girls as it here that it is feared, disappearances take place resulting in the rape and killing of innocent girls by armed forces.  The famous Krishanthi Kumaraswamy case was a great eye opener to the entire world about the practice of kidnapping and raping of school going girls by the soldiers being perfected at these checkpoints.  As their families are poor as a result of the economic blockade, parents see the girl child as a burden in a society where dowry is prevalent, hence the option for survival is very limited, either to suffer or join militancy.

Though the girls in the uncleared areas are economically privileged they suffer the same plight of their sisters in the uncleared areas as too many restrictions on them prevent them from seeking higher education in the south in the absence of any university in the North except for the Jaffna University in the Jaffna peninsula.  Apart from all these problems girls have to bear the mental agony of frequent displacements and at times continued loss of studies by which they are forced to remain at home and slowly tune to the sense of non-worthiness of education.

Women and Medical Aid:
In the Uncleared area there is only one big hospital at Akkarayan. Frequently there have been complaints from the medical staff about lack of infrastructure and severe shortage of essential medicine.  The plight of the pregnant women is the most miserable.  They do not get adequate forced to take care of themselves.  This results in severe pains, bleeding during delivery of the child.  More than 75% of children born in the uncleared areas suffer from under weight and malnutrition.  Lactating mothers do not get enough to eat to feed their young ones.  Baby food is unheard in the uncleared areas.  Malaria, Diarrhoea, Cholera, typhoid are very common, women and children are the most vulnerable.  As movement of people from the uncleared to cleared areas is restricted to a single day in a week and further restricted to a fixed number, the plight of the sick is un-seeable as they are stranded in a place where there is no medicine and death awaits them joyfully.

In the cleared areas, there are two hospitals, one in Mannar town where there was no gynecologist for a very long time.  The other hospital is in Vavuniya, which has to cater to a very larger number of people from both the cleared and uncleared areas, but has only 60 beds with no proper X-ray facility and soldiers most often occupy the available beds.  Further they cannot even travel to the south for medical help.
Corruption is rampant in these hospitals and these poor displaced women are forced to sell their jewels to save their dear ones or themselves.  Here one gets a feeling that unless permanent peace dawns the commerce in tears would continue unabated.

Psychological status of displaced women:
The psychological pressure women undergo have resulted in the following: -
q  Boredom
q  Immunization of sufferings leading to lack of reactions
q  Losing emotions
q  Mental illness
q  Losing interest is self and family finally leading attempts to suicide and suicide itself,
q  Tendencies of irresponsibility / careless attitude towards life,
q  Vulnerability to anti-social activities to release mental stress,
q  The guilt feeling of not being able to earn and look after the family,
q  Constant fear of getting killed/harassed,
q  Children developing imaginary visions of being attacked and harmed by armed group leading to loss of sleep and a buzzing noise in the ears.
q  Difficulty in delivery,
q  Expectant mothers/young mothers undergo stress because they cannot give a good living condition/environment to the children,
q  Children are curbed from their natural growth (e.g. playing, good food and health), which makes them indifferent.
No psychological help exists in the uncleared areas.  In the cleared as the entire community has undergone lots of stress they do not have adequate stress releasing techniques.  In the uncleared areas there is no availability of medicine.  In the cleared areas it is very expensive, out of reach of the common people.[145]
Plight of the widows: 
The young widows are very vulnerable to immoral activities; a good number of them take another husband, a few try to go abroad to earn a living and end up as maid slaves in the middle east, a few land up in the brothels of Bangkok, a few serve as concubines to the travel agents or other middle men who promise them to send abroad.  The armed groups at times use them as informers.
The middle-aged widows try to work, but getting employment is very difficult, they have to struggle to make both the ends meet.  If there is some support from the family members who work abroad, they survive or they are entirely dependent on charity.
The plight of the old widows in the worst especially if they have lost their earning sons, also they don’t see any point in living.  They lead a life a remembering the past (the good times) and weep over that has happened.[146]  Death is their destiny.

Women in Prison:
A large number of displaced Tamil women are confined to the Anuradhapura prison and the Welikade prison, which are in the Southern Srilanka where it is impossible for the Tamils from north to visit.  Most of them are only suspects; they are made to live in common dormitories along with women who are held on charges of prostitution, robbery cheating, other immoral, anti-social activities etc.  As these prisons are located in the south, it is practically impossible for their relatives to visit them.  These women face a danger to their lives, as prison riots are common and harassment by jail authorities in the order of the day.  Women in jails suffer from psychological disorder, malnutrition, unhygienic sanitary conditions, and alienation from society.  Though more than 95% of them are acquitted by the courts they are branded as “jail returnees” and face ostracization from their society.  They do not have a compensation mechanism where the innocents can get their justful right of getting monetary help from the state for confining them unjustfully in the jail.

Displaced Religious women:
The church has had a massive role to play in the civil war.  The most important of their several activities is that of accompanying the displaced and rehabilitating them.  As a majority of the displaced are women, the nuns from different congregations working among the displaced portray the compassionate side of women.  They have dedicated their lives for the protection of women and children.  They have withstood various kinds of pressures on them with the sole aim of helping the needy without any discrimination.  In situations where men find it difficult to work these religious women have contributed immensely in the education programme, giving medical aid, counseling, providing emergency needs and most importantly accompanying them in their daily struggle as part of their religious obligations, yet in spite of all their hardship these courageous women, who’s own families are displaced posses a smile to brighten the life of others.
Women Fighters in the LTTE:
In violent civil war conditions men dictate terms, women hardly have any role to play. Srilanka is an exception. Women have identified violence as a means of retaliation. Half the LTTE cadre are women. Freedom struggle is not the struggle of men alone.  As an assertion of equality to the male fighters in the LTTE, women have played an important role in carrying on their ideology of war into the enemy territory. Women cadre came to the limelight after the Indo-Srilanka pact in 1987.  In order to seek revenge for the atrocities committed by the Indian Peace Keeping (IPKF)[147] against the Tamil women.  Dhanu, a human bomb blew herself killing the former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.  Since then it is common to see women Tigers carrying pictures of Dhanu for strength and protection. “The self-sacrifice of the female bomber is almost an extension of the idea of motherhood in Tamil Culture,” says Mangalika Silva, Coordinator of women for Peace in Colombo, Srilanka.  [148] Women in the LTTE form half the estimated membership and fight shoulder to shoulder along side their male counterparts as part of the frontline troops against the Srilankan army in a conventional war. Women tigers are more efficient than their counterparts, that is one of the reason they constitute the majority in the Black tiger, suicide squads. Once they are given the target they camouflage themselves till they finish the target even if it takes a few years. 
Why do these women take a risk of losing their life and face such hardship in the battlefield?  How can they transform from being traditionally confined to the kitchen to taking up arms?  How can they wear battle attire from their traditional saree?  How can they bare the harsh training which include climbing, living in jungles, trenches, starvation and living along with men?  How can they suppress their femininity and sexuality as they are disallowed to marry till they turn 25 years of age?  These are some pertinent questions asked by any observer of the women tigers.
Violence in the form of different Survival mechanisms
As a mechanism  against the state structure          
The atrocities committed by the Srilankan State forces act as a natural stimulant to the young girls to join the ranks of LTTE.  The frequent rapes and killing of women, disappearances of young girls, molestation, and eve-teasing at security check points, frequent house raids instill a sense of fear in the minds of the young girls who also see their siblings being taken away, tortured or killed.  This happens even to their parents. The state sponsored economic embargo and restriction of movement helps them in making a decision to fight against the unjust state structure.

As a curative mechanism

 The insecure feeling of being targeted by the state  drives them to join the “freedom struggle” wearing an uniform and cyanide capsule gives them and gives them a sense of pride, protection, invincibility and a cause to live or die. One of the healing processes identified by these women is to target the enemies as they have experienced violence on themselves, their families and community. Targeting their enemies gives them a sense of satisfaction and cures their deep wounds. It brings a healing and soothing effect when they are successful in accomplishing their mission.

As a defensive mechanism

The LTTE discourse usually depicts Tamil women as either victims of oppression by the Sinhala state, or they are fighting against it, wearing a uniform, with a gun in hand and a cyanide capsule around the neck.[149]Female fighters of the LTTE are cast as a symbol of the emancipated Tamil woman, who has taken her place in the trenches alongside men as an equal in the war for the liberation of the Tamil state. In doing so, it is symbolic of breaking free from oppressive social customs against women in Tamil society, [150] which to this day practices the custom of superiority of men over women, assigning the women a place in the kitchen. They  see the better treatment and opportunities provided to their brothers by the parents, dowry harassment is common it is here they feel that one of the methods of asserting equality with the men is by joining the LTTE. By doing this she is able to give a befitting answer to the State sponsored violence as well as the unjust society.

To conclude, in the words of a displaced female student from Jaffna, “The BBC carried the stories of women from Kosovo as they were Europeans, the Church and UN played a vital role in projecting the problems of East Timorese women, the Americans shed tears on the Afghan women, this is not to undermine their struggle but Srilankan women are yet to see any saintly soul projecting our stories”. The glaring omission of these brave struggle by the women here has gone unnoticed in the fourth estate. It is time they too start noting the struggle of these women and give them a voice.

A glimmer of hope has dawned the island in the form of a structured ceasefire and the most happy people here are the women who possess a never say die spirit in facing the new realities.  Yet peace alone in the island nation is not enough unless the rights and aspirations of the women are catered to, it is sad to note that when different groups are represented to air their views in the on going peace process one notable group omitted here are the women.  War was created by man to further his interests and later he incorporated women into it, it is time for man to act in a sane manner and sponsor peace.  Only everlasting peace in Srilanka can end the woes of the spirited and inspired women of Srilanka Though they know violence is evil, it is another technique mastered by these women for their survival. It is they who have experienced violence on themselves and they know it is time for peace.

Paul Newman
JRS South Asia,24, Benson Road, Bangalore – 560046. India






BHUTANESE  REFUGEE  REPRESENTATIVE  REPATRIATION  COMMITTEE -  A presentation on Refugees and Right to communication
By: S.B.Subba
Chairman

On behalf of the Bhutanese refugees and on my own would like to take opportunity to thank World Association for Christian Communication (WACC) for availing me to participate in the seminar on “Refugee and Right to communication”. I am very pleased to be among the selected participants here. It’s a new exposure to me and first of its kind. I have no doubt that the seminar is going to enhance the participants particularly me with insight knowledge of  different mechanism of establishing communication especially in difficult situation like Bhutanese refugee state and dissemination of information to concern places. I hope all the participants will be further enriched with more knowledge of communication to apply effectively in day to day work. I have profound hope that at the end we go out equipped with maximum information on right to communication not only from the deliberation but also sharing of experiences, interactions, exchange of views and ideas. I am sure the participants here are not refugee like myself but are only dealing with the refugee issue. Nevertheless, I know how difficult it is to work for the refugee cause for any body especially for the refugees’ rights when I look through the prism of myself. It is not quite easy to get access to media especially when the issue is sensitive as some of the participants might have experienced or media persons are biased and take side by influence and impression. On the other hand media plays important role particularly in a case like Bhutanese refugee where we have no abundant resources to physically approach to apprise the problem or reach to the mass. Neither we have free access to communication facilities without risk inside Bhutan. However, despite of many hindrances in getting day-to-day information especially from inside which is very necessary to keep update to all our concerned agencies, we have not felt securing it though may not instantly.

Communication system in Bhutan

 News paper: There is no multi-media like in other countries and there is absence of freedom of press in Bhutan. There is only one government controlled weekly paper called “Kuensel” which is published in three languages- English, Nepali and Dzongkha the national language of Bhutan and come to the market on every Saturday. Before publishing all the news are scrutinized and censored by the king himself.
No one can write in oppose of the government policies and refugee news are never carried. There is no chance to directly reach the refugee voice to general public to able to understand and sympathize. Instead the government has distorted the facts and figure about the southern Bhutanese (Nepali speaking) and misinformed the other two ethnics- Ngalong and Sarchop to create misunderstanding and attribute culprits for creating problem in the country. People have least chance to learn about the refugee problem in Bhutan.

Telephone: The Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB) is now trying to connect 201 blocks at the village levels in total of 20 districts for convenience of public. However, most of the STD and ISD telephones holders whose relatives are in exile are bugged and monitor the communication. Not only that all the correspondence and mail letters are censored by the Police of those people whom they doubt of having correspondences with the people now living in the refugee camps. Therefore, there is not at all any privacy of individuals in Bhutan. In special cases the government even plan secret watch on the activities and movement of the individuals. Therefore, there is great risk for the relatives living inside Bhutan to communicate with the relatives in the refugee camps and punish if any relatives from the camps contact them.  It is very difficult to get direct instant information because of government strict vigilance.

No reporters are allowed to go inside Bhutan freely: RGOB does not allow any reporter from outside to go inside Bhutan to write news report. It is strictly guarded and reporters are allowed only on invitation and one who writes in favor of government. Therefore, it is not easy for the refugees and others to exactly know the current situation in Bhutan and other development therein. The government mouth piece “Kuensel” reports only the good sides of the government. In absence of freedom of press and everything monitor by the government, it is difficult for anybody to know the real prevailing situation in Bhutan.

Bhutan TV: After much criticism from the people outside and the international community the King has announced the lifting of ban on TV on 17th December 1999 on the 91st National Day of Bhutan. Till then the use of TV was banned on fear of being influenced to the people politically and socially not considering that the TV is one of the most effective means of communication and fast way of spreading information and education to the rural people. However, still the use of Nepali channels from Nepal are not allowed. It is because it carries sometimes the news of refugees in Nepal and interview of leaders.

Bhutan Broadcasting Service (BBS):  There is a Bhutan Broadcasting Service which airs in four languages for half an hour each in English, Dzongkha, Sarchops and Nepali every morning and evening. It covers domestic and international news but never on the refugees’ problem. It mostly broadcast the government version. Therefore the people inside Bhutan except the elites do not know much about the problem in the southern Bhutan and Bhutanese refugees in Nepal.

How we get the information from inside Bhutan: Despite the government strict vigilance, the Bhutanese Refugee Representative Repatriation Committee (BRRRC) has established its own sources of information from inside Bhutan covering all 20 districts. We have clandestinely employed our people inside Bhutan with contact points on the border areas in India and also sometime direct telephonic talks from India with code words. Occasionally we do send secret mission from the camps in the accessible areas to collect information and meet our contact people. We also provide cameras to take photographs of anything interesting wherever possible and also collect other documentary evidences of government circulars and orders issued to the relatives or on change of government policies, rules and regulation. Also collect information from the relatives of the refugees visiting the camps. In some instances we quietly smuggle reporters inside Bhutan especially in the bordering areas of India and who reports the fact in the international arena of RGOB's deeds and treatment towards the southern Bhutanese. Any reports we get and needs international attention are immediately disseminated as “Update of BRRRC” for information and action.

Prison and prison condition: BRRRC not only collects the information and follow up of the government activities but also closely keeps track of the prisoners and prison conditions in Bhutan. On the basis of our reports the Amnesty International, United Kingdom and International Committee for Red Cross (ICRC), Delhi visited some prisons in Bhutan and urged the RGOB to improve the conditions and treat the prisoners as human beings. As a consequences the government has improved the condition of some prisons and better facilities are being provided although there are many prisons in every district remains to be improved. We also keep records of the death and circumstances of death in prison. On the insistence of Amnesty International, ICRC and other international community the Bhutan government has allowed relatives of some prisoners from the camps to visit them in Bhutan especially in Chemgang Central jail in Thimphu where the political prisoners are kept. On the pressure from the Amnesty International, ICRC and International community the government has released more than 2500 prisoners.

Resettlement: The RGOB has started the resettlement program on the lands belonging to the people now living in the camps since 1990. The people from north and east are settled on the land and complicating the resolution of the problem and repatriation of the refugees. About 8000 families have been resettled in the 6 districts of southern Bhutan. Many of them forcefully resettled as they denied once they came to know that the land belonged to the people living in the camps. However, they were compelled to come as the government threatened to evict them or made them to sign agreement that they would no more request land from the government. So people in the camps are kept informed of the situation of their land in Bhutan and wherever possible even give name of the occupant.

Maintenance of record and data: In order to avoid any complication on the event of repatriation and also to refute the government allegation of presence of non-Bhutanese in the camps, the BRRRC keeps the data of the refugee families properly recorded in the register with detail information of family members including the address in Bhutan and in the camps. It also helps to keep records of the exact population in the 7 camps and provide the data whoever requires it.

Information on discrimination: As far as possible BRRRC is trying to keep all the records of discrimination meted out not only to the southern Bhutanese but other ethnics too. The RGOB has not only persecuted and discriminated the people on the ground of political belief but also on the religious practice. On the religious ground, the hard hit people are the Christians. The government has banned the practice and proselytizing of Christianity in Bhutan. However, despite the ban, many northern, eastern and southern Bhutanese have embraced Christianity but are being threatened by the government of severe punishment and deprived of government facilities. All these people practice Christianity in the guise of being Hindu or Buddhist. Children of Christians and the southern Bhutanese whose relatives are in the camps are deprived from education and other government opportunities. They have to produce No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the Home Ministry and the Police to get admission in the schools which is not issued on ground of being Christian and relatives of anti-national.

Role of media in India: In early 1990s when the refugees influx to Nepal were at the peak, most of the leading Newspaper in India had widely carried out the issue and flagrant human rights violation in Bhutan though some individual who received favor of the RGOB reported negatively. It helped a great deal in disseminating information to the diplomatic mission and other agencies in Delhi who also represent their respective country to Bhutan as non-resident representative. The following were the main papers which carried the news of Bhutanese refugees and helped in disseminating.
1. In Delhi:
  1. The Statesman(English)
  2. Hindustan times(English)
  3. Indian Express(English)
  4. The Pioneer(English)
  5. The Times of India(English)
  6. The Observer(English)
  7. Navabharat(Hindi)

2. In West Bengal:  The State of West Bengal share common border with Bhutan and the people are link socially, culturally and religion. The refugees first entered the immediate State for shelter, safety and security. During this period the media in West Bengal played a vital role in spreading the news of plight of Bhutanese refugees and human rights violation in Bhutan. The following are the main newspaper:

  1. The Telegraph(English)
  2. Aja Bholi(Nepali)
  3. Sunachari(Nepali)
  4. Bharat Darpan(Hindi)
  5. Jan Satta(Hindi)
  6. Amrita Bazaar Patrika(Bengali)

3. In Assam: The State of Assam share major portion of the geographical border with Bhutan stretching from Dhansari, the eastern most part with Assam up to Sunkosh bordering West Bengal covering almost 500 km. In the time of influx of Bhutanese refugees due to forceful eviction from Bhutan, a large number of Bhutanese refugees entered Assam for safety, security and shelter. However, on expression of Assam State government unable to provide safety, security and shelter, the refugees were forced to come to Nepal. In one instance the Assam Police hounded about 894 Bhutanese refugees at Nalbari district and forced to crossed the Assam border within 24 hours. Anyway, the various following newspaper reported about the human rights violation in Bhutan and the plight and sorry state of the Bhutanese refugees in the region. It still keeps on reporting about the presence of insurgents like United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) inside Bhutan through which we refugees are also aware.
  1. The Sentinel(English)
  2. Probanchal( Hindi)
  3. Abhiyan( Nepali quarterly magazine)

4. In Nepal: Since the arrival of the Bhutanese refugees in Nepal in the beginning of 1991 the leading newspaper of Nepal including the Radio Nepal, Nepal TV and Channel Nepal have been constantly carrying out the news of refugees and helping in disseminating the information in the region as well as in the international arena. Unlike the break in the Indian newspaper, the newspaper in Nepal continuously reports on the situation of the refugees and any development on the process of resolution of the problem and repatriation. Refugees are kept up-to-date with the day-to-day happenings on the issue.
The BRRRC in order to keep the refugees well informed of any developments or problem pertaining Bhutanese refugees sends photocopy of the  news cutting to all the 7 camp committees, schools and women focal point besides other social organizations working in the camps. The following are the newspaper of Nepal:
  1. The Kathmandu Post(English)
  2. The Rising Nepal(English)
  3. Himal Magazine(English)
  4. Gorkha Patra(Nepali)
  5. Kantipur(Nepali)
  6. Rajdhani(English)
  7. Samacharpatra(Nepali)
  8. Space Times(Nepali)
  9. Blast(Nepali)
  10. Purbanchal(Nepali)
  11. The Himalayan Times(English)
  12. Nepal Television(English and Nepali)
  13. Channel Nepal(English and Nepali)
  14. FM-Kantipur(Nepali) and Kanchanjunga FM
  15. Radio Nepal(English, Nepali and Hindi)



In view of the need of creating awareness among the refugees with up-to-date information particularly from inside Bhutan and day-to-day activities in 7 camps, the following news letter/paper from the refugee community are also published mostly on monthly basis. These papers are mostly circulated in the camps and few copies inside Bhutan clandestinely.
  1. The Bhutan Review( now stopped)
  2. Bhutan Focus( now stopped)
  3. Amar Bhutan ( now stopped)
  4. Bhutan Today(English)
  5. Sangrila Sandesh(English)
  6. Bhutan Jagaran(Nepali)
  7. Naulo Awaj(Nepali)

In addition to these, the BRRRC prepares Update, leaflets and pamphlets and circulates in the camps and to international community and concern individuals. Therefore the refugees in the camps besides themselves following the news through Radio and TV, they are kept well informed through various media and also holding meetings and sharing the information.








COMMUNICATION, DISINTEGRATION AND THE TAMIL REFUGEES IN LONDON
Rev.Dr. Albert W. Jebanesan
Theological College of Lanka, Pilimatalawa, Sri Lanka


My personal experience of working for six years among internally displaced people in Sri Lanka, had led me to study the human experience of refugees.  I lived in the northern part of Sri Lanka from childhood. Later I lived in the same area as a Methodist minister from 1988 to 1994.  I lived there throughout almost the whole period since the armed struggle broke out between the government troops and the Tamil militants.  Men and women, young and old, started leaving the traditional inhabited areas to different parts of Sri Lanka and to other parts of the world as ‘refugees’.  Furthermore, I lived as a refugee in refugee camps along with my family.

In the meantime, I went to the UK for my postgraduate programme.  There, I observed the Tamil refugees caught up in a state of helplessness and without appropriate support systems.  Resources that they would have relied upon in their homeland are not found in the UK, and the existing resources available to them here appeared alien to them.  I have realised that for many Tamil refugees the adaptation process had become painful.  They were forced to move from the ‘extended family’ mode of existence to the nuclear family: from group existence to individual existence.  The differences of language and life style had complicated the process of adjustment.  Although refugee families experience difficulties that are common to many ordinary British families, they face unique psychological, environmental and economic stresses such as tough immigration laws, and media and public opinion, all of which portrayed refugees as a ‘problem’ in Britain for the British population.  They were forced to move through the accommodative path carrying emotional distress, and symptoms of tension.

It is estimated that over 35,000 Sri Lankan Tamils have settled in London[151] since 1983 as a consequence of the prolonged armed conflict between the government military forces and the LTTE in the North and East Provinces of Sri Lanka.  Tamil speaking Sri Lankans have entered the UK as asylum seekers and the live in Greater London in small groups.

I felt that Tamil refugees had tried to replicate, as far as possible, the pattern of life in their original villages, being far from home.  I felt at home, but not quite at home.  An old man complained to me: “Back in Sri Lanka I was a village leader, people respected me and my relatives even venerated me in my own house: but here they find me a nuisance.”  A middle-aged man complained that children and women here enjoy more freedom than in their homeland.  University students stated that they have abandoned their Hindu religious practices as soon as they arrived in London, and that “Hinduism has lots its impact here.”  Soon I realised that Tamils were adopting new sets of values and mores, and that even the most sacrosanct “blood solidarity” had lost its compelling force. 

All in all, with their exodus to London, Tamil culture had collapsed in the minds of the refugees and had given place to British culture, which the Tamil refugees did not understand.  Many Tamil refugees saw themselves as respected and civilised members in Sri Lanka, but not so in London.  For example, Ganesh was a teacher, people saw him a leader in the Sri Lanka society, but found himself confused in London.  He is working like so many others, in a grocery store.  Ganesh said that he was ‘lost’ in London.
According to my understanding of the Tamil refugees, they did not feel that they were ignorant.  Yet they expressed their inability to cope with the demands of a different life style and culture that was forced upon them.  The entire concept of life style has changed for them very quickly, even before they realised that they needed to change themselves.  The contrast between the ‘out here’ and the ‘back there’ is dramatised by the case of Ratnam the practising solicitor in London.  “Peace of mind is not here.”  “Peace of mind” or “Inner Peace” summarises the feeling of happiness resulting from a good relationship with house, temple and community of family, relatives and acquaintances who “mingled with us like one family.”  The opposite of this kind of peace is not war, but restlessness and insecurity.

Most of the interviewees said that the fact of leaving their homeland did not solve their problems, but created new unexpected problems in their daily lives.  All of them were explicit and concordant when they spoke of their integrated life in Sri Lanka. However, their explanations and viewpoints grew in drama till they reached peaks of intensity in their words and gestures and silences, when they referred to ‘problems’ that forced them to leave Sri Lanka.  They were willing to give lengthy explanations about their past life and the present life in London, but they said very few things about their transition from Sri Lanka to London.  The explanation about their Diaspora occurred when the interviewees discussed specific news from Sri Lanka in their get-togethers, not so much in our individual interviews.

Tamil refugees bring with them the memories of horror, and they know that it is precisely because of the horrors of war that they were accepted in this new society and given temporary shelter, protection and acceptance.  However, is London a shelter for them?  The British government’s continually changing of asylum policies, introducing tighter measures against accepting any more refugees and deporting a good number of them are frequent discussions in newspapers and television channels.  For the British population, the refugees pose a problem and are a problem to them, not just people who have come with problems.  If they accept the mass media alarmist programmes uncritically, British people will come to the conclusion that their government tried to solve the problems of the refugees and, by doing so, introduced a new problem to the white British population.  After the horror and trauma of disintegration of their houses and families and villages and their corresponding exile, now they need permission from the authorities to live, and to exist, and to be.  If they do not have that permanent or temporary permission, they are no longer refugees but have become transients and even fugitives from the law of the country that offered them ‘refuge’.  Wandering from place to place, from country to country, and from one detention centre to another detention centre; the mere survival has become their main goal in life.  To achieve this goal, all means are legitimate in their view, but even so they live a “dog’s life” (Hanna) without any meaning or purpose.

I met Hanna at a Tamil Church.  I introduced myself and asked a question: “How’s life in London?”  Her abrupt reply opened for me a new avenue of exploration of the life of the Sri Lankan refugees in the Western countries:

Me:   How is your life in London?
Hanna:     What is this life?  This life is a dog’s life!

Her reply seemed abrupt and even slightly improper.  This is not the answer to expect for a greeting, that she was living like a dog in London.  I could detect bitterness, anger and frustration in her words and in her eyes.  Her reply made me feel that she had some grievances about her life in London; later I realised that she had only a small circle to move around.  So I persisted:

Me:   Why do you say that your life here is a dog’s life?
Hanna:   There is no peace in my mind here (...) No peace, happiness, culture, climate or language available for me in this country (...)  As a Hindu I spent time in temples, and wanted to do the same here; but that is denied to me.  (...) I was busy in Sri Lanka, and had friends and relatives; even that has been refused to me here.

In this verbal outburst which I have shortened, we immediately identify several ‘generative words’[152] often repeated with equal emotion by other interviewees: peace, happiness, culture, climate, language, family, friends, relatives etc.  Her life in Sri Lanka was filled with life; in London her life seems filled with the void, an empty life, the life of a dog.[153]  It is true that, comparatively speaking, her standard of living in London was higher than in Sri Lanka, yet the quality of life, if we give credit to her words, was the lowest ebb.  According to her, the standard of living has nothing to do with material things, but the quality of her life has to do with things spiritual; they may not be in opposition all the time, but they must not be confused either.

For some time I wondered whether I could find a single term or expression that could encompass the many terms Tamil refugees used to express the disillusion and misery they found very soon had subsided in London, after their dreams and initial sense of relief and joy at reaching their intended destination.  Finally, I thought that the striking Tamil expression “a dog’s life”, repeated quite often in conversations as a passing reflection, and with the utmost intensity by two women, Hanna and Saro, was a very graphic and accurate expression.  In my search for an equally appropriate and more respectable term for translating dog’s life I came across the word anomie. [154]  They live a life of dogs’ life, a life in a prolonged state of anomie.

In a flash thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils have made the transition from a pre-industrial society to a post-industrial mass culture, from a pre-modern environment of rural landscapes to a post-modern environment of skyscrapers.  This has shattered their ancestral family life.  They fee suffocated and dizzy in the modern Western city.  The word anomie was introduced into the vocabulary of the social sciences by the Franch sociologist Emile Durkheim in his study on Suicide,[155] and his previous book on Division of Labour in Society[156] precisely to explain what happened to the peasant masses that had to abandon their ancestral rural villages and settle in the newly grown industrial cities during the industrial revolution in Europe.  We could safely say that the general state of civil strife of a society is equivalent to a general state of anomie in that society.  In a general context, the American sociologist Levin expressed this very clearly:

Suddenly the rules that regulated daily life are thrown into turmoil, and the resulting confusion about how to act is called anomie, or the state of normlessness.[157]

The values and norms by which people had ruled their lives are no longer viable for life, and people have to devise schemes to cope with the new unexpected reality.  One instance of this dramatic and sudden transition from a normal state (state with norms) to an abnormal state (state without norms) was the industrial revolution in the West, which is the background of Durkheim’s study.  Another instance of destruction of the familiar ordered universe and the fall into a state of no-norms is the present prolonged ethnic war in Sri Lanka.[158]

The destruction of the cosmos and descent into chaos in societies has some effects on individuals and groups, they fall into a state of shock, numbness and utter confusion, which Durkheim calls “anomie”.  According to him, one of the possible consequences of the state of anomie is the suicide of many, a refusal to cope with the new reality in desperation.  This fact, discovered by Emile Durkheim in the 19th Century, is now widely recognised as one acute problem of planetary dimensions.  The total transformation and even destruction of traditional cultural patterns may be the result of the sudden introduction of modern technology, with the corresponding destructive results of a state of anomie in entire cultures.[159]  Levin gave a most comprehensive definition of anomie in these terms.

A condition of social ambiguity in which an individual does not know how to act because the rules of behaviour (norms) are either unclear, entirely absent, or in some way unsatisfactory.[160]

In this definition the ambiguity of not knowing the morms for relating with others is not only a transitory state of anomie, but also a prolonged state, or even a permanent condition.  Levin applies his definition to ‘individuals’, in this study we extend it also to groups.  This prolonged state of confusion that is so prevalent among Sri Lankan refugees is understandable only when we let the refugees express their own living conditions in exile.  However, due to the lengthy restrictions, let me give you one example.

“THE WANDERING TAMIL”

The case of Sathiveli, though not typical of all, is symptomatic of the restlessness and insecurity of life in exile, a life not worth living,  “a dog’s life,” at the mercy of decisions made by ohters for no apparent reasons.  We offer here an abridged narrative in Sathiveli’s own words:

From Sri Lanka to Sweden:

Soon after the Elephant Pass battle in 1992, I left Sri Lanka and went to Sweden.  The Swedish authorities rejected my asylum application in June 1993.  There were several cases of Sri Lankans rejected along with mine.  They kept us in a detention camp till the deportation orders were completed.  We were terribly frightened and sad about the decision.  We knew that once we got back, we would end up in one of the Colombo prisons.  The Sri Lankan government was arresting all the Tamils deported from other countries, for interrogation.  I had heard that many of them have ended up in indefinite imprisonment. (...)  So all the inmates in the detention camp got together and made a big protest to the Swedish authorities.  One held in custody poured petrol on his body and set fire to himself (...)  That did not solve the problem (...)

From Sweden to Norway:

I managed to escape to Norway in April 1994.  I changed my name because I was afraid that the Norwegian authorities would discover my identity.  If they found out that I had lived in Sweden for some time, they would immediately send me back to Sweden. (...)  My new life in Norway did not last long.  The Norwegian authorities too rejected my case.

The stigma of Criminality:

I was arrested and taken to the police station.  I was told that they were going to deport me to Sri Lanka.  They also informed me that changing one’s name is a criminal offence.  Also I was informed that they had found out my previous stay in Sweden as a refugee (...) They also said that I would be locked in the remand prison until a decision was made on my case.  They took photographs of me and ordered me to wear the prisoner’s uniform.

I was wearing a small cross in my neck chain.  I had to remove that as well.  I was not a Christian, but I had the feeling that the cross was a protective symbol, and I had been wearing it for a long time (...)  Just before removing the chain, I held the cross and said, Jesus!  If you are a living God, save me from this trouble.  I do not want to get back to Sri Lanka!  Is just prayed without knowing any implications about Christian prayer.

Utter Degradation:

I was kept in a prison cell without light.  Every hour someone would come and, with the help of torchlight, looked at what I was doing.  The prison cell looked like an animal cage in the zoo.  I started crying and prayed throughout the night.  At about 3 ‘o’ clock in the morning a policeman came, opened the prison cell, and told me: “We have decided not to deport you to Sri Lanka.  We have received a message from the Swedish authorities saying that they are willing to accept you.  “It was a shock to me!  Several others who had been arrested along with me had been deported or were still in prison; but I was taken out of the prison cell.  I could not believe my eyes! (...)  the Norwegian police took me and handed me to the Swedish police.  The Swedish police asked me why I had left the country.  I told them that I did not want to go back to Sri Lanka.  They said that they could not make decisions about me now, and that I had to wait until a decision was made.  Just imagine my situation!  I thought that I was going to be accepted by the Swedish government [as I had been told in Norway] but now they were telling me that I had to wait for a decision.  Later I was sent to the refugee camp where I had stayed earlier. (...)  I lived in Sweden for six months, but in Sweden refugees are not allowed to work.

Escape to Denmark and Deportation back to Sweden:

Again I left Sweden and this time went to Denmark to find employment.  I was arrested by the Danish police and handed over to the Swedish authorities. (...)

Dislodged to Sri Lanka

In the meantime in Sri Lanka there was a peace accord between the government and the LTTE in the later part of 1994.  At this point the Swedish government deported many of us to Sri Lanka.  I reached Sri Lanka in June 1995. (...)

From Sri Lanka to London:

I started again on my carpentry work in Jaffna. (...)  At that time the security forces killed my sister-in-law’s husband. (...)  My brother-in-law, who was living in the United Kingdom, was willing to pay money to a travel agent and sponsor my sister-in-law’s eldest son to travel to the UK.  They wrote to me asking for my assistance to bring him to Colombo, because of the security risks involved for a young person to travel alone.  So the two of us travelled to Colombo and, while we were there, my brother-in-law told me over the phone that he was willing to give me a loan to pay the travel agent. (...)  Although I had no plans to go abroad again, I decided to give another try.  I agreed to the proposal, paid the money and landed in the UK on the 22nd of November 1996. (...)

His life started once again in a new country, the UK.  Sathivel testified: “I felt that I was chased down like an animal.”  The condition of being a fugitive rather than a refugee forced him to a separation from the whole of reality; the supreme value of his life was just to keep alive, a refugee from Sri Lanka and a fugitive from three Scandinavian countries.  The experience of restlessness, fear and rejection developed in him an acute anomic condition.  Yet he is trying to break this situation by taking the new emerging reality courageously upon himself and enter the new social order to save what was left of his human dignity.  His Tamil culture and religion did not provide any meaning or purpose to Sathivel’s life; and the present British culture in which he found himself immersed could not give any meaningful content to his life.  He was tossed by invisible and incomprehensible political powers from one country to another, from one location to another, with nothing to look forward to, except the preservation of his life; and even this preservation was in the hands of others.  Sathivel is one of many who were forced to exist with new ideas and values, but his social points of reference were elsewhere.  Once you have been uprooted from the soil, any location is good enough if it provides a shelter for survival in the storm.  Yet the traumatic fact is that many refugees experience a mere bilogical existence, not a social or culturally meaningful existence.  They do not know where they are heading until they reach a specific Western country and precariously settle in it.  The researcher finds many stories of Tamil refugees stranded in remote countries, in Moscow as well as other countries in Eastern Europe and even in Africa, without even knowing the name of the country of their arrival, in their attempt to devise circuitous ways to reach the Western European countries.  Sathi told the following story with jovial humour:

About five years ago, one day I received a telephone call from a shop owner in my village.  Someone from Heathrow Airport telephoned, asked me to come to identify this man and release him from the immigration authorities.  I went there immediately and helped him.  As soon as we came out of the airport he said, “brother! Your father told me that you were living in London; how come that you are in Germany?  I said, “This is London”.  Then the fellow said, “My agent told me that they were taking me to Germany.  I do not know what happened; it looks like they have put me on a London flight”.

This experience of living an unstable existence impels them to provise norms and rules that are valid “for the time being”.  This experience reveals and reinforces an acute anomic condition that, among other ill effects, separates the refugee from the whole surrounding reality.  Durkheim very appropriately said:

All man’s pleasure in acting, moving and exerting himself implies the sense that his efforts are not in vain and that by walking he has advanced.  However, one does not advance when one walks toward no goal, or which is the same thing – when his goal is infinity.[161]

In Sri Lanka Tamils lived in community and had communion and communication with each other.  They find that all this is lost in London.  Their Exodus and Diaspora are so recent and have come so suddenly!  In order to live in a community, the refugees have to create it; and to create their own community they have to devise certain methods of socialisation[162] in London.  They seek and find shelter and security, and the possibility of intimacy with friends and acquaintances, in the creation of their own ghettos to replace the social atmosphere of the village as far as it is possible, with necessary adaptations.  There is no question of ‘Why?’  It is just a fact; they need a community and they create their own community, and from the bosom of their newly created (not newly found) community they look at their surroundings with a sense of self-affirmation.  The transition to a metropolitan environment has shattered the ancestral family life.  They wanted to experience an extended family system, but that was not available to them.

The need to belong[163]is, no doubt, a universal biological, social and spiritual requirement for us if we are going to be fully human; without belonging somewhere we are spiritually, socially and even biologically dead.

Erich Fromm stressed that humans have a compelling need to belong to a community, , “to avoid aloneness.”[164]  The emotional feelings Tamil refugees feel about their lonely life in London corresponds very closely to Fromm’s analysis on solitude and belonging.  Erich Fromm concludes his analysis:

To feel completely alone and isolated leads to mental disintegration just as physical starvation leads to death.  This relatedness to others is not identical with physical contact.  An individual can be physically alone for many years and yet he may be related to ideas, values, or at least social patterns that give him a feeling of communion and “belonging”.  On the other hand, he may live among people and yet be overcome by an utter feeling of isolation, the outcome of which, if it transcends a certain limit, is the state of insanity, which schizophrenic disturbances represent.  This lack of relatedness to values, symbols, patterns, we may call moral aloneness and state that moral aloneness is as intolerable as the physical aloneness, or rather that physical aloneness becomes unbearable only if it implies also moral aloneness.[165]

We do not need to expand on the disintegrating effect of suddenly being thrown out into the unfamiliar and unknown and the consequent feeling of solitude and void; one of the most recurrent expressions.  It is no wonder, then, to hear the expression “I feel lonely” even from the lips of people who have managed to bring their families or have formed a family here.[166]

When the conventional inherited symbols are no longer bearers of meaning, as Levin points out, when there are no clear guidelines in the social system to control people and give their lives meaning and purpose, people will fall into confusion (anomic confusion), will tend to rduce their world, and escape from the larger world they do no longer understand or accept.  Social interaction and inter-personal communication require a commonly accepted system of signs and symbols with their respective meanings given to the signs employed.  When the old familiar signs have lost their significance and no new signs have developed to explain the new reality, we have the phenomenon of anomie; one of its most common expressions is meaning-less-ness.[167]  In my interviews the expression “meaning of life” (or lack thereof, “meaning-less-ness” [dog’s life]) often comes accompanied with the expression “purpose for living”.

Meaninglessness produces an acute sense of anxiety or anguish that Paul Tillich understands as “due to the loss of a spiritual centre.”[168]  Durkheim’s sociological concept of anomie and Tillich’s theological/philosophical concept of anxiety are closely related to each other.  The frequent mention of “lack of meaning” that goes accompanied with “no peace of mind” and less frequently with “no-purpose” is so overwhelming that Tillich’s “anxiety of emptiness and meaninglessness” resembles our concept of self-alienation so characteristic of Tamil refugees in London.  Tillich writes:

The anxidty of emptiness is aroused by the threat of non-being to the special contents of the spiritual life.  A belief breaks down through external events or inner processes: one is cut off from creative participation in a sphere of culture, one feels frustrated and about something which one had passionately affirmed, or is driven from devotion to one object of devotion to another and again to another, because the meaning of each of them vanishes and the creative Eros is transformed into indifference or aversion.  Everything is tried and nothing satisfies.  The contents of tradition, however excellent, however loved once, lost their power to give content today.  And present culture is even less able to provide the content.[169]

I can find no more accurate description of the human predicament of Tamil refugees in London, especially among teachers, students and professionals, who constitute the majority.  Tillich continues with relentless clarity and accuracy

Anxiously one turns away from all concrete contents and looks for an ultimate meaning, only to discover that it was precisely the loss of a spiritual centre, which took away the meaning from the special contents of the spiritual life.  But a spiritual centre cannot be produced intentionally, and the attempt to produce it only produces deeper anxiety.  The anxiety of emptiness drives us to the abyss of meaninglessness.[170]

Tamil refugees in London feel acutely that they have lost that centre to which they can turn to orient their lives at all moments, and which irradiates meaning to life in all situations.  The family is lost, the village is lost, the temple is lost; can they recreate these three pillars in London?  That would be a goal to achieve that could give direction, purpose and meaning to their lives.  At least many of them have attempted the task.
With the data at hand, we may safely conclude that Sri Lanakan Tamil refugees are not only the children of the war, we could say also that they carry a war within themselves in their lives in exile; they find no inner peace, only turmoil and conflict between opposing cultures, interests, values and codes of conduct, also a conflict between their expectations of the new reality on the one hand, and the expectations of the new social reality around them on the other; a conflict between promise and fulfilment, between expectations and achievements.  The painful question we need to ask in this situation is that, is communication possible in a disintegrating community?

In a situation of war, all norms, patterns of understood communication methods are denied or temporarily suspended.  After overcoming the shock of disintegration of their families and villages, in London they have found themselves in a state of ‘communication shock’; when prolonged without a satisfactory solution, this state has led to their anomic state.  The centre of their lives and norms of communication have been shifted or totally removed[171] because in London they cannot find normal or traditional methods of communication.  In the new social and cultural environment they feel lonely, confused, living aimless lives, under the spell of ‘anomic terror’.

                                                                                                Rev.Dr. Albert W. Jebanesan




 

News Barriers: Reporting on forced migration in times of globalisation


Max Martin

1.      introduction

On August 14, 2002, the eve of the Indian Independence Day, Bangalore made an appearance on The New York Times (NYT) as a hub of globalisation. The paper’s celebrity foreign affairs columnist Thomas L Friedman wrote: “Consider Bangalore, where the traffic is now congested by all the young Indian techies, many from the lower-middle classes, who have gotten jobs, apartments -- and motor scooters -- by providing the brainpower for the world's biggest corporations” (Friedman, 2002a). Earlier, on August 11 he wrote: “…India has been able to connect its millions of educated, English-speaking, low-wage, tech-savvy young people to the world's largest corporations…” (Friedman, 2002b). Friedman’s point was that democracy, liberal education and economic liberalisation offered excellent economic opportunities for a lot of people, participants in globalisation.   He remained a bit starry-eyed even after going home: “Bangalore, India's SiliconValley, where hundreds of thousands of young Indians, most from lower-middle-class families, suddenly have social mobility… -- thanks to globalization” (Friedman 2002c).

My argument is that the process of globalisation that liberates a lot of people excludes many people, who actually need to be liberated. While it gives freedom to a set of people and its promoters celebrate the virtues of freedom, the same rhetoric of freedom works against another set. But it remains largely unnoticed. While singing Hallelujah to globalisation, the media ignores this set, as if they lived in the netherworld.

When Friedman spent time in Bangalore, reportedly getting curious about young people listening to Led Zeppelin at coffee shops, there were certain other happenings in and around the city. Northern Karnataka farmers, hit by a continuing drought, were streaming into Bangalore slums. A set of urban refugees were stranded in Bangalore in the aftermath of 9/11, when several countries declined refuge to exiles from Afghanistan, Palestine and several war-torn African countries[172]. And a few kilometres away from Bangalore, there were Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in a camp and some refugee children were studying within the city – keenly awaiting the outcome of the peace process in Sri Lanka, incidentally, Friedman’s next destination. But these bits of “news” largely escaped the attention of the NYT and local newspapers, some of which reported on Friedman’s trip and stories.

Media reportage is determined by a set of filters through which news pass through, including business and advertisement concerns, political mood of the country, ownership, and source selection and sort of internal censorship within media organisations (Chomsky and Herman, 1988). It is difficult for forced migrants, the majority of whom are poor and neither readers nor advertisers of newspapers, to get their side of the story passed through these filters, unless when they make a dramatic entry or exit. Once a city local reporter commented about a colleague’s intention to report on the crammed refugee camp conditions near Bangalore: “What is new? They have been living there for many years.”[173]

Friedman has argued in his book, Lexus and the Olive Tree, globalisation has meant different things to different people (Friedman, 1999). As the title suggests, some people get a chance to make Lexus cars for the global market, but some others end up fighting to save their olive trees. The market economy and local clashes, which are sometimes connected, leave a set of people who find no place in a globalised world. When barriers are broken for capital, images, values and news, new barrier are erected to stop the ‘flow’ of people escaping from violence. Their place in the media is also increasingly getting restricted as a result of invisible “news barriers”.

The first part of this essay describes the process of globalisation and the changing migration scenario. Secondly, it probes how forced migrants are becoming increasingly unwelcome world-wide, even on news pages, as the third part of this essay notes. The concluding section probes the possibility of a more positive coverage of refugee issues.


2.      Breaking barriers

The current phase of globalisation, as Friedman argues, had its most defining moment in breaking of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (Friedman, 1999).  It symbolised the end of the Cold War and spread of the market to erstwhile closed economies. It also marked the replacement of the Cold War-based system by another international system, based on market competition. Globalisation denotes integration of capital, technology, and information across national borders, in a way that is creating a single global market and, to some degree, a global village (ibid.).  As part of it, all parts of the globe were linked into a single network of rapid and cheap transport and nearly instant communications. Spread of literacy and cheap mass reproduction and transmission of world’s images and sounds led to a worldwide “common” culture (Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayao, 1989).

Friedman further elaborates in his book: “The globalization system, unlike the Cold War system, is not static, but a dynamic ongoing process: globalization involves the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree never witnessed before -- in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations, and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before, and in a way that is also producing a powerful backlash from those brutalized or left behind by this new system” (1999). The driving idea behind globalisation is free-market capitalism, he argues.
The often-unreported flipside of globalisation involve rapidly changing politics, policies and lifestyles. Globalisation, in fact, happened in a world in turmoil. The period since the 1980s has been a turbulent one. The post-Cold War years, as in the period after the first and the second world wars, witnessed the demise of the old ideologies, the collapse of existing empires and the formation of new states (UNHCR, 1997). Inevitably, these political changes led to huge population displacements.
In and around the former Soviet Union, conflicts arose over national boundaries and ethnic communities in the Caucasus, Baltic States and Central Asia. By 1999, there were about a million refugees and internally displaced persons in the former Soviet Union (Suhrke 1997).  Meanwhile African Asian and Latin American countries witnessed problems of state formation and a development in new and more severe forms during the 1990s (ibid). By the end of 1997, there were 13 million refugees – those fleeing persecution, armed conflict or violence. Of an estimated total of 50 million people of forced displacement, including internally displaced people, 22 million were people of concern to the UNHCR (UNHCR, 1997). Meanwhile an increasing number of refuges and asylum seekers were stepping into Europe.
The refugee phenomenon was shaped by a set of contradictory developments in the last decades of the 20th century. The end of the cold war left a unipolar world and a new world order, where market played an important global role.  Globalisation, an essentially economic phenomenon, linked commodity and capital markets across the globe as a composite entity. Technological innovations made it possible to transmit vast amounts of money almost instantaneously across the world.

The changes brought about were for the good of a large part of the world, but they also involved sharp inequalities. “This global entity is characterized by an enormous gap between a few capital-rich, technologically advanced, and strategically powerful countries and the rest, whose internal conditions are largely shaped by the external policies of the leading countries and the activities of their firms and export agencies” Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayao, 1989). The global market influenced even the life of a village peasant in a developing country. Studies by the Institute of Social and Economic Change (ISEC), Bangalore, have traced linkages between farm commodity crisis in Karnataka, a key reason for exodus from the region, with changing trade policies and recommended government action including better safety nets for farmers. On a larger plane, there has been a widening gap between the rich and the poor. Globally, the 20 per cent of the world’s people in the highest-income countries account for 86 per cent of total private consumption expenditures – the poorest 20 per cent a minuscule 1.3 per cent (UNDP, 1998).

Increasingly, there is evidence that links refugee flows with skewed income distribution. Of the eight major concentration of refugees in the early 1990s, five originated states that fall within the World Bank’s lowest category of low income countries, with an average gross national product (GNP) per capita (1985) of US $ 270. And most of the world’s refugee camps are located within these countries, and a large proportion of the refugees is resettled in these countries. A major consequence has been a massive south-north migration.   “The violent conflicts that produce refugee flows are in themselves subject to influences and pressure on resources and the environment ” (Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayao, 1989).
Besides, there is migration for better economic opportunities. “Globalization also has its own demographic pattern--a rapid acceleration of the movement of people from rural areas and agricultural lifestyles to urban areas and urban lifestyles more intimately linked with global fashion, food, markets, and entertainment trends” (Friedman, 1999). But the movement is not necessarily in search of better lifestyle, but it is often a desperate run, seeking some form of livelihood as in the case of north Karnataka farmers.

3.      New barriers

When barriers are removed for everything else, there are new barriers put in place before people trying to cross borders in a globalised world. Within nation states, cities welcome skilled worked force, but tend to push unskilled labourers and the poor to slum and shanties. Internationally, in the context of increasing migration, several nation states adopted a multi-pronged strategy that included control over illegal migration, guest worker policies and tighter refugee policies. Refugee polices clearly differed from immigration policy, as international law obligates them to the principle of non-refoulement.

The response of the Western Countries can be divided into three broad categories – stricter immigration and asylum norms and regional co-operation in checking the flow of migrants and asylum seekers and a greater stress on humanitarian intervention. To reduce the intake of refugees and to prevent the misuse of asylum, Western states tried to modify the asylum process, to limit the access to asylum and to seek regional co-operation to restrict the movement of asylum seekers. One of the most direct and controversial of these methods is interdiction in a neutral territory. For instances, the United States interdicted Haitian refugee boats on high seas. Often, parts of international airports are considered to be outside the national territory, so that illegal aliens can be removed, without offending international law. Interestingly, there have been reported instances of interdiction of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees on the straits, but without any criticism from the media.

More indirect forms of the limiting strategy are visa restrictions on refugee-producing counties and sanctions on carriers that bring undocumented passengers. Western states refused to entertain the asylum application of those coming form “safe” countries. Apart from resorting to border controls, Western states resorted to a collective peacekeeping role, accompanied by liberal relief supplies but restrictive asylum (Suhrke, 1997).

There are several reasons for the cold response to refugees in the post- Cold War era. Once the cold war ended, the refugees no longer possessed the ideological or geopolitical value they once had (Chimni, 1998). They are no longer voting with their feet against repressive Communist regimes so that liberal democracies can gain political mileage out of hosting them. Now, increasingly, the trend is to close the doors on refugees and to send humanitarian aid packages for people trapped in wars.

Chimni further argues that the ideology of humanitarianism mobilises a range of meanings and practices to establish and sustain global relations of domination. In particular, it manipulates the language of human rights to legitimise a range of dubious practices, including its selective defence. It has a dual essence: the justification of the use of force, in particular interventions and wars, and the amelioration of painful local conditions engendered by globalisation through a neo-liberal political and economic package (Chimni, 1999). He further argues that the ideology of humanitarianism uses the vocabulary of human rights to legitimise the language of security in refugee discourse, blur legal categories and institutional roles, pushing repatriation as the only solution. And it promotes a neo-liberal agenda in post-conflict societies leading the systematic erosion of the principles of protection and the rights of refugees (ibid).

The situation has turned even worse post 9/11, when the security discourse found increasing acceptance worldwide, when international terrorism became a clear and present danger in some parts of the world. The attack on Afghanistan by the US was justified as the US alleged the Taliban government posed a security threat, it did not respect human rights, and it protected Osama bin Laden, the prime accused in the attack over the Twin Towers in New York. But, when bin Laden remains at large, evidence suggests that human rights abuses continue in Afghanistan and refugee flow is still continuing, including to India. Worse, the threat perception brought about by the 9/11 attacks has brought about new barriers for refugees, including from Afghanistan.

4.      News barriers

The media attitudes to refugees in the 1990s also witnessed a change, in tune with the lukewarm or cold welcome they received in host countries. Significantly, the media used terms such as “flood”, “surge” and “tide” to describe the “flow” of refugees, hinting it is something that has to be dammed. There have also been instances of racist attacks on refugees and asylum seekers (Berthiaume, 1995). Even when they do appear in the media, they often remain in the background, as a “wallpaper”, without voice (Wright, T, 2002). While covering globalisation, journalists tend to faithfully echo the established political vocabularies and the prevailing politico-economic orthodoxy (Parenti, 1986). 

Pilger argues that in media’s “global village” other nations do not exist unless they are useful to “us” (Pilger, 1998). People who live outside or on the peripheries of the market economy seldom make news. The project of economic liberalisation hugely subsidises the rich and exploits and the poor, but such dynamics of globalised economy are hidden under the garb of modernisation (ibid). And the human face of war, including war casualties and refugees, hardly make any significant appearance on the mainstream media. The Gulf War in 1991, one of the most widely reported wars in history, few journalists reported the truth, largely unknown, that a quarter of a million Iraqis were slaughtered or died unnecessary deaths (ibid).

Scraton writes about the war on Afghanistan: “On the ground, the war was conducted by the notoriously fractured Northern Alliance, whose own history of human rights violations made it an uneasy bedfellow for Western democratic Governments espousing the rhetoric peppered with the vocabulary of ‘freedom’, ‘justice’, ‘community’ and ‘rights’.” (Scraton 2002). Concluding a firsthand account of himself having been attacked and injured by a mob of Afghan refugees, Fisk writes: “I feared other versions would produce a different narrative, of how a British journalist was ‘beaten up by a mob of Afghan refugees.’ And of course, that’s the point. The people who were assaulted were the Afghans, the scars inflicted by us – by B-52s, not by them” (Fisk 2002).

Locally, anti-refugee, anti-migrant propaganda is often accepted by the media. Bangladeshi economic migrants, who have been living in city slums, including in Bangalore, are of late often described in the media as “infiltrators”. First the media reference was to a few people with militant connections who sneaked in from across Bangladesh border, but soon it became a tag for migrant population from Bangladesh in general.  When there is prominent media coverage of political statements regarding security concerns raised by refugees and migrants, there is little coverage of the genuine concerns of these people, leave alone a critique of the “security” discourse, founded on shaky grounds. As for migrants who do not pose a security threat, they remain far away from the media glare.

               5. Conclusion

Globalisation is not a smooth process that liberates people and gives them opportunities, but it is a rather schizophrenic phenomenon that brings about new divides and new barriers. It generates a clear set of losers, including forced migrants. The losers are increasingly finding doors closed against them. And the media tend to celebrate globalisation and its winners without much bothering to check about what happens to its losers, who are unwelcome even on news pages. At the same time a new discourse based on “security concerns” wrongly and cruelly tag refugees and many migrant populations as dangerous.

Can the media play a more positive role in highlighting issues of forced migration and putting it in the larger context of global political and economic changes? In many instances, local reporting is skewed by slanted news offered by readily available news sources. International newspapers pick up and enhance locally available news. There is need to develop reliable alternative news sources for media. Often refugee and migrant settlements are out of bounds for media practitioners due to a variety of reasons. They may be unknown fringes of the city or closed camps. More importantly they are outside the mindscape of urban media practitioners and consumers. Humanitarian workers who do get to see these people living on the margins could try to tell the media about the reality of forced migration and encourage a true depiction of ground reality. Reporters and editors should also get better opportunities to see the big picture, often hidden by the glitter of globalisation and hear voices of migrants, often deafened by shrill propaganda against them. Otherwise the truth will remain hidden.

(It is a revised version of a paper presented at the seminar on Refugees and Media. The author is a Bangalore-based  freelance journalist, who writes on environment, development and forced migration.)







References:

Zolberg, AR,  Suhrke, A, Aguayao, S 1989, Escape from Violence,  Oxford: Oxford University Press (OUP).

Chimni, B.S. (1998): The geopolitics of refugee studies, a view from the south, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol 11, no. 4, Oxford: Oxford University Press (OUP).

Chimni, B. S. (1999): Globalisation, Humanitarianism and the Erosion of Refugee Protection, RSC Working Paper no.3, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, UK

Chomsky, N and by Herman, E S (1988) Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, Pantheon Books,

Friedman, T (1998), The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc

Friedman, T (2002a) Where Freedom Reigns, The New York Times, August 14, 2002, New York

Friedman, T (2002b), India, Pakistan And G.E., The New York Times, August 11, 2002, New York

Friedman, T (2002b), Where it matters most, globalization thrives, The New York Times, September 23, 2002, New York

Parenti, M (1986): Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media, cited by Pilger, J (1998)

Pilger, J (1998): Hidden Agendas, London: Vintage

Wright, T (2001), Collateral Coverage: Media Images of Afghan Refugees during the 2001 Emergency, working paper no, 62, Geneva: UNHCR

Suhrke, A (1997), Refugee movements in the second half of the twentieth century, in Gungwu, W (ed), Uncertain Globalisation, Oxford: Westview

UNDP (1998), The Human Development Report – 1998, Oxford: OUP

UNHCR (1997), The State of the World’s Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford: OUP



WACC South Asia Consultation
“Refugees and their Right to Communicate – South Asia Perspective”
UTC Bangalore, 25-27 October, 2002

Report on the Consultation

            A three-day consultation was held at the United Theological College (UTC), Bangalore from 25th to 27th October 2002. The program was sponsored by WACC. The main theme of the consultation was “Refugees and their Right to Communicate”. It was timely and appropriate, particularly in the context of South Asia. Many participants from Srilanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and India arrived on 24th in order to engage in the discussions on the theme. The participants were given a grant welcome by the Principal of UTC and by the Secretary, Asia Region WACC. The whole programme was inaugurated by the UNHCR, Chief of Mission at New Delhi, Mr Lennart Kotsalainen. His excellent talk highlighted the issues related to refugees in South Asia and their rights. He provided a lot of information about refugees and also highlighted the UNHCR’s Model National Law on Refugees. It was followed by Professor Fr Dr Michael Traber’s speech on the “Right to Communicate”. His scholarship in the field of communication and his experience in Africa enlightened the participants in the main areas of right to communication in relation to refugees. Other speakers referred to his examples as well. Dr Pradeep Thomas, Director of Research Programs at WACC, introduced the topic “Refugees and Their Right to Communicate - A South Asian Perspective” to the participants. He told the participants that many such seminars are conducted in other parts of the world and highlighted the importance of emphasising on the right to communicate particularly in relation to refugees. 
            The inaugural session was followed by Fr Amalraj’s main talk on Refugees in South Asia – a sub regional overview. He put his experience in the field of working with the refugees to good effect. The participants were challenged to think about the scenario. Using common terminologies and real life examples he engaged everyone in a critical awakening. Prof. Ranabir Samaddar brought to the notice of the audience a new concept of the “ethics of care”. The afternoon was taken up by a programme arranged by the students of the United Theological College in Hosur. The visit to the Srilankan refugee camp gave a first hand experience to the participants. The interaction with the Srilankan Tamil refugees was helpful in knowing what they felt. The students of UTC performed street theatre and involved all the people from the camp.
            On the 26th Prof. Dr. N.Subramania of the National Law College gave a presentation on “ Communication and right of expression of refugees”. The presentation gave an idea of the legalities involved. What were the procedures that could be followed to fight for the rights of the refugees? Paul Newman discussed the various ways in which the refugees were portrayed in the media. His talk was interspersed with live examples of how the situation in Chennai is. Chennai also has a camp for the refugees from Srilanka and the conditions there are appalling. Dr. Paula Banerjee dwelled on the representation of refugee women in South Asia. The presentation generated a lot of discussion especially with regard to the identity of women. The post lunch session was taken up by Dr. Albert Jebanesan who deliberated on “ Refugee issues in Srilanka” and Dr.Jagat Mani Acharya who followed it up with “ Communication rights and media representations of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal”. S.B. Subha gave a pointer towards the problem in Nepal.
            Max Martin, a reporter of the New Indian Express gave a lively representation of what the media chooses to publish and how creative writing can go a long way in highlighting issues. Dr. Bhumitra Chakma followed it up with a presentation on the refugee issues in Bangladesh. After the presentations group discussions were held and proposals and recommendations were submitted from the groups. A special committee was set up in order to bring out a resolution which was accepted by the participants of the consultation.


W ACC South Asia Consultation "Refugees and their Right to Communicate -South Asian Perspectives". UTC Bangalore, 25 -27 October, 2002

Resolution
1. The three-day Consultation convened by W ACC at United Theological College in Bangalore from 25 -27 October 2002 deliberated on the theme of "Refugees and their Right to Communicate -South Asian Perspectives". The consultation discussed various experiences of protection of refugees in the region, their powerlessness, and absence of their right to communicate, and the torture, brutalities and indignities suffered by women refugees in particular, who form the majority of the refugee population. The consultation also took note of the bias in reporting of news related to refugees in the mainstream media, or the absence of any coverage there, the prison-like condition of many refugee camps, and the general social, political and administrative tendencies to view the refugees either as a breeding ground for terrorism or as objects of pity, charity and welfare, who have to be taken care of and who are not supposed to have any voice in determining the framework intended to protect their human rights. A visit to the (Hosur) Sri Lankan refugee camp exposed participants to some of the constraints faced by refugees.
2. The consultation took note of the following major issues in the course of the discussion.
a) Refugee protection is both a humanitarian and human rights issue. b) The ethics of care and the ethics of rights go together.
c) The right to communicate is a significant right of the refugee towards ensuring justice for them, and measures have to be taken by human rights and humanitarian communities so that refugees gain the capacity to exercise their right to communicate.
d) The refugees have the right to inform and to be informed. This will also go a long way towards showing the society that refugees are not reconciled to remaining victims but people demanding justice and becoming active to that end.
e) In the issue of right to communicate, the theme of access is important- such as access by the refugees to the judiciary, to the media and information resources.
1) A consistent programme of bringing to the notice of the media issues relating to the refugees is necessary.
g) The human rights community, media practitioners, faith communities and other concerned communities have to deliberate on alternate media and communication practices, given the fact that news relating to human rights violations reach the audience of the mainstream media only through several stages of filters. Such alternative practices call for programs of training and awareness relating to issues of justice to the refugees, in particular women and other vulnerable categories of people.
h) An alert mechanism that includes early warning, reporting systems is necessary to strengthen the field of communication relating to the rights of the refugees.
i) A periodic media audit on refugees in South Asia will be a significant step.
3) On the basis of these discussions, the consultation proposes the following initiatives:
a) A short duration intensive research program on media coverage of select cases of massive displacements in acute conflict situations. Such a program will help the spread of media literacy.
b) A media workshop for refugee activists, human rights activists working with refugees and media practitioners. Such a workshop will also familiarise them with similar communication practices by refugees elsewhere.
c) A legal literacy and assistance centre for refugees is needed. Such a centre can build a compendium of judicial decisions and case laws in South Asia, particularly India, where such decisions have been most in number.
4. The consultation urges upon the participants to find ways of realising these initiatives. It also urges WACC to send this resolution to all international and national humanitarian and human rights institutions including the UNHCR, and circulate it among members of the Human Rights and faith communities.
5. In the text of this resolution, "refugees" also means the victims of internal displacement.
Follow up measures.
A workshop for writers (Refugees) was mooted along with a content analysis of the selected media. The expenses towards the same will be born from the same account.


 WACC  South Asia Consultation
“Refugees and their Right to Communicate – South Asia Perspective”
UTC Bangalore, 25th to 27th October, 2002-10-22



Names, addresses and e-mails of resource persons and the participants



Pradip Thomas
WACC
357 Kennington Lane
London SE 11  5Qy, UK

Rev Cyril S. Cornelius
CARVAS, 15 civil lines
Jabalpur

Rev.Dr. Joshva Raja
United Theological College
P.O. Box No.4613
63, Miller’s Road
Benson Town
BANGALORE – 560 046.


Dr.Michael Traber                                                       July To December
January to June                                                           1, Ranelagh Mansion
United Theological College                                        New Kings road, Fulham
P.O. Box 4613                                                                        London SW6  4RH.  UK
63, Miller’s Road                                                        michaeltraber@yahoo.com
Benson Town
BANGALORE – 560 046.

Mr. Lennart Kotsalainen
Chief of Mission
UNHCR New Delhi

Jagat Mani Charya
3/23 Shree Durbar Tole Lalitpur
G.P.O. Box 12855
Kathmundu, Nepal.
C.Amalraj
24, Benson Road
Bangalore – 560 046.

S.B. Subba
BRRRC
Setumari Road, Damak –13
Jhapa, Nepal

Dr. N.Subramanya
Research @ UNHCR Chairon Refugee Law
National Law School of India University
Nagarbhavi,
Bangalore – 560 072.

Narayan Sharma
National Law School of India University
Nagarbhavi, Bangalore – 560 072

Ranabir Samadda
Calcutta Research Group

Fr. S. Jayanathan
A.C.C.
P. Box 4650
Bangalore – 560 046

Fatima N.
Asian Age

Venkatesh Babu
Staff Reporter,
Deccan Herald
M.R. Road
BANGALORE – 560 001.





Dr.Paula Banerjee
G.D. 272, Sector 111
Salt Lake – Kolkata – 700 091
West Bengal


Amitha A.V.
221, 11 Cross, 11 Main, KEB Layout
Aswath Nagar, Bangalore

Albert W. Jebanesan
Theological College of Lanka
Pilimatawa, Sri Lanka

Rev.Ruban M. Ariyanagam
Jeevodhayam, Muruakan (MB)
Sri Lanka

Paul Newman
24, Benson Road
Benson Town
Bangalore – 560 046

Dr.Bhumitra Chakma
Dept. of International Relations
University of Dhaka
Bangladesh

Rev.Julias Khristy
CNI Church, Dipal Circle,
Maninagar East
Ahmedabad, Gujarat – 380 008

B. Amenla Cunningham M.Th II (Comm.)
A-3 UTC Quarter
97, Nandidurga Road
Benson Town
Bangalore – 560 046.

Hangpi M.Th II (Comm.)
United Theological College
Post Box No.4613
63, Miller’s Road
Benson Town




[1] The term ‘refugee’ is an evolutionary as well as a contested concept.  There is considerable confusion and a lack of clarity in its meaning, nature, scope and usage.  The terminologies that are used relating to the term – political refugees, economic refugees, environmental refugees, resource refugees, developmental refugees, eco-migrants, internal refugees, external refugees etc. – indicate its multi-context usages and a certain degree of confusion over its definition.  On the changing contour of refugee definition, see Pirkko Kourula, Broadening the Edges: Refugee Definition and International Protection Revisited (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997).
[2] Lok Raj Baral and S.D. Muni, “Introduction: Refugees, South Asia and Security,” in Refugees and Regional Seurity in South Asia, eds., S.D. Muni and Lok Raj Baral (Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1996), p.1.
[3] Minority Rights Group, The Biharis in Bangladesh, Report 11, 4th edition, January 1982, p.7.
[4] E. Haque Chowdhury, “Non-Bengali Refugees in Bangladesh: Patterns, Policies and Consequences,” in Refugees: A Third World Dilemma, ed. John Rogge (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefied, 1987), p.220.
[5] For an overview on political persecution and its implications from international legal point of view, see Sumit Sen, “Stateless Refugees and the Right to Return: The Bihari Refugees of South Asia,” – Part I, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol.11, No.4 (1999), pp.625-645.
[6] Sumit Sen, “Stateless Refugees and the Right to Return,” p.635, based on the figure calculated in Minority Rights Group, The Biharis of Bangladesh.
[7] Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh (Dhaka: Government of Bangladesh, 1982), p.3.
[8] New York Times, 13 February 1972; cited in Dilara Chowdhury, Bangladesh and the South Asian International System (Dhaka: Academic Publishers, 1992), p.297.
[9] The Economist, 13 May 1972.
[10] Chowdhury, Bangladesh and the South Asian International System, p.297.
[11] Minority Rights Group, The Biharis of Bangladesh, p.16.
[12] Robbar (Dhaka), 11 September 1983, p.17.
[13] Ittefaq, 2 January 1985.
[14] The New Nation, 3 January 1985.
[15] Ittefaq, 10 December 1985.
[16] Cited in Abu Taher Salauddin Ahmed, “Bangladesh-Pakistan Relations: An Evaluation,” in Bangladesh and SAARC: Issues, Perspectives and Outlook, eds.  Ifthekaruzzaman and Imtiaz Ahmed (Dhaka: Academic Publiishers, 1992), p.189.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Far Easter Economic Review, 19 October 1989.
[19] Daily Star, 11 July 1992.
[20] The Morning Sun, 31 December 1992.
[21] The Daily Star, 9 May 1993.
[22] Dawn, 20 December 1994.
[23] On the development of lethnic resistance movement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, see Amena Mohsin, The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of Chittagong Hill Tracts (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1997); Syed Aziz-al-Ahsan and Bhumitra Chakma, “Problems of National Integration in Bangladesh: The Chittagong Hill Tracts,’ Asian Survey, Vol.XXIX, No.10 (October 1989), pp.959-970.
[24] Amena Mohsin and Bhumitra Chakma, “The Muth of Nation-Building and Security of Bangladesh: The Case of Chittagong Hill Tracts,” in Bangladesh and SAARC: Issues, Perspectives and Outlook, eds., Ifthekaruzzaman and Imtiaz Ahmed (Dhaka: Academic Publishers, 1992), pp.283-315.
[25] on this point, see S.S.Chakma, “Can Chittagong Hill Tracts Accommodate More People?” in On the Margin: Refugees, Migrants and Minorities, ed., Chowdhury R. Abrar (Dhaka: Refugee and Migratory Movement Research Unit, June 2000), pp.185-189.
[26] For example, the Bengali settlers were involved with the army in the Panchari massacre in the mid-1980s.  For this, see Amnesty International Report, Unlawful Killing and Torture in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (London: Amnesty International, September 1986).  Field reports also indicate forcible eviction of the Paharis by the ‘armed bengali settlers.’  See, Ina Hume, “The Internally Displaced Persons of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, Case I: Sajek Union; Case II;Farua Union,” paper presented at a conference on The Internally Displaced Persons in Bangladesh: Towards Developing Research and Policy Agenda, at BIISS auditorium, Dhaka on 15-16 January 2000.
[27] For an account of Bangladesh military’s repressive measure, see The Report of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, ‘Life is Not Ours,’ Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh (Copenhagen: IWGIA, May 1991): Report of the Anti-Slavery Society, The Chittagong Hill Tracts: Militarisation, Oppression and the Hill Tribes (London: Anti-Slavery Society Publication, 1984); Amnesty International Report, Unlawful Killing and Torture in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (London: Amnesty International September 1986); Wolfgong Mey ed. Genocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, IWHIA Document 51 (Copenhagen: IWGIA, December, 1984).
[28] Father R.W. Timm The Adivasis of Bangladesh (London: Minority Rights Group International, December 1993), p.13.
[29] M.Q.Zaman, “Tribal Issues and National Integration: The Chittagong Hill Tracts Case,” in Tribal Cultures in Bangladesh, ed. M.S. Quraishi (Rajshahi University Press, 1984).
[30] The Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, ‘Life is not Ours’: Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, Update 2 (Amsterdam: Organising Committee Chittagong Hill Tracts Campaign, April 1994), p.11.
[31] Satyabrata Chakravarty, “Political Solution Eludes Chakma,” The Statesman (Calcutta), 12 May 1994.
[32] The Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, ‘Life is not Ours’: Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, Update 2 (Amsterdam: Organising Committee Chittagong Hill Tracts Campaign, April 1994), p.11
[33] The Daily Star, 28 February 1998.
[34] The Bangladesh Observer, 2 January 1989.
[35] ‘Life is not Ours’ Update 2, pp.12-13.
[36] On this point, see, B.G. Verghese, India’s Northeast Resurgent: Ethnicity, Insurgency, Governance, Development (Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1996).
[37] On the dynamics of nation-building and the political process in Myanmar, see Shwe Lu Maung, Burma: Nationalism and Ideology (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1989).
[38] Human Rights Watch/Asia, September 1996, Vol.8, No.3.
[39] Imtiaz Ahmed, “Refugees and Security: The Experience of Bangladesh,” in Refugees and Regional Security in South Asia, eds., S.D. Muni and Lok Raj Baral (Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1996), 137.
[40] Printed in Bangaldesh in International Affairs Vol.1, No.4 (April 1978), pp.13-14.
[41] Muhammad Shamsul Huq, Bangladesh in International Politics: The Dilemmas of the Weak States (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1993), p.139.
[42] Keesing’s Contemporary Archives Vol.XXIV, 1979, p.29238.
[43] The Bangladesh Times, 10 July 1978.
[44] Based on UNHCR figure, Morning Sun, 1 May 1993.
[45] Pakistani national daily Dawn reported such border skirmishes citing Bangladesh military officials.  See Dawn (Karachi), 3 January 1992.
[46] The Daily Ittefaq, 25 July 1997.
[47] Abdur Razzaq and Mahfuzul Haque, A Tale of Refugees: Rohingyas in Bangladesh (Dhaka: The Centre for Human Rights, 1995).
[48] Cited in Shahdeen Malik, “Refugees and Migrants of Bangladesh: Looking Through a Historical Prism,” in On the Margin: Refugees, Migrants and Minorities, ed., Chowdhury R. Abrar (Dhaka: Refugee and Migratory Movement Research Unit, June 2000), note 26, p.34.
[49] Ain O Salish Kendro, Human Rights in Bangladesh, 1998 (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1999), p.215.
[50] Mahindra P. Lama, Managing Refugees in South Asia: Protection, Aid, State behaviour and Regional Approach, Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit Occasional Paper No.4 (Dhaka: Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit, April 2000), p.22.
[51] On this point, see Imtiaz Ahmed, “Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and the Stateless Rohingyas,” The Daily Star, 15 June 2001.
[52] The Ittefaq, 29 July 1997.
[53] Which was done at Geneva on 28th July 1951 and date of entry into force being 22nd April 1954. The preamble made a reference to the Charter of the UN and the UDHR (approved on 10th December 1948) and which “endeavoured to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights [meaning the principle that ‘human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination]. It also sought to ‘revise and consolidate previous international agreements relating to the status of refugees and to extend the scope of and protection accorded by such instruments by means of a new agreement”.
[54] Which entered into force on 4th October 1967.The Protocol was signed by the President of the General Assembly and by the Secretary General on 31st January 1967.
[55] Organization of African Unity signed at Addis Ababa on 10th September 1969 which entered into force on 20th June 1974.
[56] Adopted by the colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama. held in Cartagena on 19-22 November 1984.
[57] The other salient features of the OAU convention are that the ‘member states shall use their best endeavours consistent with their respective legislations to receive refugees and to secure the settlement of those refugees who for well founded reasons are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin or nationality”. It contains provisions AGAINST the practices of NON ENTRÉE  and UPHOLIND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON REFOULEMENT [Article 2 Para3] which reads “ No person shall be subjected by a Member state to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion which would compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened for the reasons set out in Article 1 Paragraphs 1 and 2 [ definitions ].
[58] It reiterates “ the importance of the principle of Non Refoulement (including prohibition of rejection at the frontier) as a corner stone of the international protection of refugees”.  It also mentions about the setting up of refugee camps and settlements in frontier areas inland at a reasonable distance from the frontier with a view to improving the protection afforded to refugees, safeguarding their human rights and implementing projects aimed at their self sufficiency and integration into the host society.
[59] Adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly vide Resolution 217 A (III) of 10th December 1948.
[60] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc
A/810 at 71 (1948).

[61] For complete texts and other details see INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS ON REFUGEE PROTECTION AND RELATED ISSUES,  Volumes I, II and III compiled by N.Subramanya for the Chair on Refugee Law at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore, 2002
[62] Some of them are regional instruments and as such their applicability is to the respective regions but the principles contained in them are similar and are worth a study.
[63] Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 16th December 1966. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.

The main provisions of this convention which was created to “… promote universal respect for and observance of human rights and freedoms”, relate that everyone has the right to Life [Part III Article 6 Para 1] , liberty and security of person, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, equal treatment in the courts among many other rights . This has provided for Self-determination [ Part I Article 1] by virtue of which all peoples freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. No one shall be subjected to torture [ Article 7], slavery [ Article 8],forced labour [Article 8] and arbitrary interference in his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence. However “ In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and existence of which is officially proclaimed the States parties to the present covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, sex, language , religion or social origin. [ Part II Article 4 Paragraph 1].
[64] Adopted for signature, ratification and accession by the United Nations General Assembly resolution dated 16th December 1966. The main provisions of this covenant are that Everyone has the right to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions at work, social security, an adequate standard of living, the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, education and to take part in the cultural life and enjoy the benefits of scientific progress – among other rights. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res.2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.

[65] Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 10th December 1984.
[66] Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly on 20th November 1989. RIGHTS OF THE CHILD Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 1386 (XIV), 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959).

Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force Sept. 2, 1990.

[67] Adopted for signature, ratification and accession by the United Nations General Assembly and entered into force on 3rd September 1981
[68] The other international instruments for safe guarding human rights of women, with relevance to the refugee issue are as follows.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981.

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, G.A. res. 54/4, annex, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (Vol. I) (2000).

Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 193 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force July 7, 1954.

Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, G.A. res. 3318 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 146, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).

Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. res. 48/104, 48 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 217, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993).

Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, A/CONF.177/20 (1995) and A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995).

The Human Rights of Women: A Reference Guide to official United Nations Documents

Draft Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Commission on the Status of Women U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/1999/10 (1999).

[69] Quoted in “Need for national refugee law “ by V.Suryanarayan
[70] Full list of such activities at pages 41-43 in the report on the Fifth Informal regional consultations on refugee and migratory movements 1998.
[71] “Fifth Informal Regional Consultation on Refugee and Migratory Movements” report , Kathmandu, Nepal 9-10 November 1998.
[72] I meeting at Geneva in November 1994, II meeting at Colombo in  September 1995,III meeting at New Delhi in November ,1996, IV meeting at  Dhaka, November 1997,  V meeting at Kathmandu November 1998.
[73] ibid
[74] Full text of paper at pp29-35 of the report. In his paper Professor Dr V.Vijaya Kumar, Chair on Refugee Law at National Law School of India University presented a paper titled The need for a national legislation on refugees which critically evaluated the current  approach of the Government of India towards refugees in light of constitutional provisions designed to protect aliens. He argued that India’s membership in the Executive Committee of the High Commission’s Programme (EXCOM) , the highest policy making body of UNHCR obligated India both politically and morally to adopt national legislation on refugees. Drawing on a number of decisions of the Supreme court rulings in India, he pointed to an emerging legal framework. He argued that national legislation should not be viewed as violations of state sovereignty ad integrity but as formalizing India’s commitment to human rights. The paper stressed that having a national law on refugees would ensure the protection of refugees, uphold the constitutional provisions provided to ‘persons’, prevent discrimination from policy makers with respect to particular groups of refugees, formalize previously ad hoc policy and enable the Indian courts to better prevent violations by administrative authorities
[75] p 45-51 of the report
[76] Ananthachari.T in “Refugees in India : legal framework, law enforcement and security” 2000
[77] Most notably the Guwahati High Court in Mr.Boggi v Union of India. “ The petitioner who is an under-trial prisoner has approached  us for allowing him to go to Delhi to seek political asylum from UNHCR….the petitioner apprehended that on expiry of his detention if he is deported to Burma his life would be in danger.  Therefore the petitioner prays for granting an opportunity to enable him to make attempt to obtain political asylum…We therefore direct the respondents [Union of India] to release the prisioner..for a period of two months…” Civil Rule No 1847/89 Guwahati HC. A similar case was in Ms.Zothansangbuii v State of Manipur and others & in the case of an Iranian national in Seyed Mohammadi v Union of India where in the petitioner was granted refugee status by the UNHCR and the court ruled that “..there is no question of deporting the accused under the circumstances”.( Criminal Writ Appeal No 1450 of 1994).
[78] Cr W.P 583/193 Supreme Court of India
[79] Justice Shah relied on Article 73(1) of the Constitution which states “subject to the provisions of this Constitution the executive power of the Union shall extend
[a] to the matters with respect to which parliament has power to make laws and
[b] to the extent of such rights, authority and jurisdiction as are exercisable by the Government of India by virtue of any treaty or agreement”. He also relied on Article 253 “ Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement to convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international conference, association or other body”. While the
Article conferred upon Parliament certain power it did not seek to circumscribe the extent of the power conferred by Article 73 “ Our Constitution makes no provision for making legislation as a condition of entering into an international treaty either in time of war or peace. The Executive is qua the State competent to represent the state in all matters international and may be an agreement, convention or treaties incur obligations which in international law are binding upon the state”.
[80]  Colin Gonsalves in the article “ the somewhat automatic integration of International refugee conventions in Indian law”, Bulletin on IHL& Refugee law, Vol. 3 No 21 p 247
[81] 2000(2(SCC 465
[82] The purpose of this part is to safeguard the basic human rights from the vicissitudes of political controversies and to place them beyond the reach of political parties who by virtue of their majority may come to form the government at the centre or in the state.”. 

[83] Article 20 provides protection against conviction for offences and Article 22 Providing safeguard against arbitrary arrest and detention.
[84] The author carried out part of this research in her capacity as the WISCOMP Scholar of Peace fellow for 2000-2001.
[85] Syed Siskander Mehidi, “Chronicles of Sufferings.”  Refugee Watch. Nos. 10 & 11 (July, 2000) pp.33-34.
[86] Etienne Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and After Marx.  Translated by James Swenson (New York: 1994) pp.57-58.
[87] Valentine M. Moghadam, “Gender, National Identity and Citizenship.”  Hagar: International Social Science Review, Vol.I, No.1 (2000) p.42.
[88] I have not included women who cross border motivated by economic concerns.  I recognise the arbitrary nature and the inherent difficulties of doing such an exercise because in South Asia political, social and economic reasons for flight are often intertwined.
[89] For a scholarly account of gender in the politics of partition refer to Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin.  Border and Boundaries: Women in India’s Partition (Delhi: 1998) and Urvashi Bhutalia, Thes Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India (Delhi: 1998).
[90] Paula Banerjee, “Refugee Repatriation: A Politics of Gender.” Refugee Watch No. 1 (January, 1998) pp.8-9.
[91] Rameshwari Nehru Papers.  Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML).  Delhi.
[92] Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin, “Abducted women, the State and questions of Honour,” Gender Relations Project Paper 1 (Canberra: 1993) p.13.
[93] Jan Jindy Pettman, “Boundary Politics: Women, Nationalism and Danger,” in New Frontiers in Women’s Studies: Knowledge, Identity and Nationalism. Mary Maynard and June Purvis. eds. (London: 1996) p.194.
[94] Statistics on Bangladesh refugees is not easily.  Sukumari Chowdhury suggested the percentage to the author in September, 1996, in Calcutta.
[95] Bolasn Gangopadhyay, “Reintegrating the Displaced Refracturing the Domestic: A Report on the Experiences at Uday Villa,” Refugees in West Bengal: Institutional Practices and Contested Identities. Pradip Bose, ed. (Kolkatta: 2000) p.100.
[96] Institutions such as Shesh Kiron in Varanasi and Amar Bari in Brindaban house women refugees from Bangladesh.
[97] Interviews taken by Subhoronjon Dasgupta.  Excerpts of the interview published in “Widows of Brindaban: Memories of Partition,” Refugee Watch, Nos. 10 & 11 (July, 2000) pp.44-45.
[98] ibid.
[99] Derek Summerfield, “The Social, Cultural and Political Dimensions of Contemporary War,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival, Vol. 13 (1997) p.7.
[100] Irene Khan, “The Refugee Problem: A South Asian Perspective,” Peace Studies Reader, I (Forthcoming: Sage 2001).  The paper was presented in Maulana Azad Institute of Asian Studies in 1997.
[101] D. Kandiyoti, ed. Women, Islam and the State (London: 1991) p.8.
[102] Nirmala Chandrahasan, “A Precarious Refugee: A Study of the Reception of Tamil Asylum Seekers in Europe, North America and India.”  Harvard Human Rights Yearbook, Vol. 2 (1989) pp.55-96.
[103] B.S. Chimni. “The Legal Condition of Refugees in India,” Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol.7, No.4. (1994), p.385.
[104] Asha Hans, “Sri Lanksn Tamil Refugees in India,” “Refuge, Vol. 13, No.3 (1993) p.30.
[105] C. Amalraj, “Sri Lanka: The One-eyed Hope,” The New Leader (1-15 June, 1995) p.19.
[106] About 23 female suicide bombers died by March 1998.  Source: Yerimalai Report.
[107] Joke Schirjvers, “Constructing Womanhood, Tamilness and The Refugee,” in Selvy Thiruchandran ed., Woman, Narration and Nation: Collective Images and Multiples Identities (New Delhi: 1999) p.179.
[108] “The Maid Running Madness,” South Asia Refugee Information, Vol.3 (September, 1996) p.1.  Also see “A Journey Without End: Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees in India”, Refugee Watch, No.2 (April, 1998) p.9-11.
[109] “Refugee – The Human Cargo,”  South Asia Refugee Information, Vol.5 (December, 1997) pp.5-6.
[110] Dharini Rajhasingham-Senanayake analyses why pottu is a mark of challenge when widows wear it as tradionally it is a mark of married women in “Post Victiminisation: Cultural Transformation and Women’s Empowerment in War and Displacement,” Selvy Thiruchandran ed., Women, Narration and Nation: Collective Images and Multiple Identities (New Delhi: 1999) pp.136-151.
[111] The author visited Alles Garden Camp Trincomalee on 24th and 25th January, 2001.
[112] Paula Banerjee, :Agomies and Ironies of War,” Refugee Watch, No.2 (April 1998) p.21.
[113] Paula Banerjee.  “Chin Refugees in Mizoram,”  Refugee Watch No.13 (March 2001, Forthcoming).
[114] “Hundreds of destitute Burmese asylum-seekers marooned on Guam” South China Morning Post, 6 February 2001, Source: Europe Intelligence Wire.
[115] H.V. Stanley”Chin Refugees in India,” Refugee Watch, No.13 (March 2001, Forthcoming).
[116] Interview with the author on 20 September, 1998, in Dhaka.
[117] “Trafficked from Hell to Hadis,” Report by Images Asia (November 1999).
[118] Soma Ghosal, :Stateless and Oppressed from Burma: Rohingya Women,” Refugee Watch, Nos. 10 & 11 (July 2000) p.15.
[119] J.N. Dixit, An Afghan Diary: Zahir Shah to Taliban, (New Delhi: 2000) p.495.
[120] “Pakistan gets tough with refugees,” Inter Press Service via News Edge Corporation, 5 February 2001.  www.pcpafg.org.
[121] Quoted in Syed Sikander Mehdi, “Chronicles of Sufferings – Refugee Women of South Asia,” Refugee Watch Nos. 10 & 11 (July, 2000) p.35.
[122] Atta ur Rehman Sheikh, “Women Refugees of Kot Chandana,” Refugee Watch, No.12 (December, 2000) pp.39-40.
[123] Syed Sikander Mehdi, “Chronicles of Sufferings – Refugee Women of South Asia,” Refugee Watch Nos. 10 & 11 (July, 2000) p.35.
[124] Kckondjo Kaapande and Shere Fenn, “Dislocated Subjects: The Story of Refugee Women,” Refugee Watch Nos. 10 & 11 (July, 2000) p.28.
[125] See National Human Rights Commission vs. Union of India (1996: 1 SCC 295); Also Khudiram Chakma vs. Union of India (1994: Supplementary 1 SCC 614).
[126] Interview with Yashoda in Sithamparapuram camp, Vavuniya, 22 April 1996.
[127] Samir Das, “Ethnic Assertion and Women’s Question in Northeastern India,” A.K.Jana, ed., Indian Politics at the Crossroads (New Delhi: 1998) p.177.
[128] J.H. Hre Man, Report on the Chin Refugees in Mizoram State in India (New Delhi: 2000) p.10.
[129] Figures taken from UNHCR reports at the end of 1998.
[130] UNHCR, “Guidelines for Protection of Refugee Women,” EC/SC/67, Geneva, July 1991, para 53/la.
[131] Cassandra Balchin, “United Against the UN: The UN Gender Mission AttitudeTowards Afghan Women Refugees Within its Own Rank is Glaringly Hypocritical,” Newsline (April, 1998), p.95.
[132] Bolan Gangopadhyay, “Reintegrating the Displaced, Refracturing the Domestic: A Report on the Experiences at Uday Vila.” Refugees in West Bengal: Institutional Practices and Contested Identities, Pradip Bose, ed., (Kolkatta: 2000) pp.98-105.
[133] Manju Chattopadhyay, “Refugee Women of Bengal,” Refugee Watch Nos. 10 & 11 (July, 2000), pp.45 and 47.
[134] War has changed our Life not our Spirit- Pg. 5  JRS Publ. Rome Feb-2001.
[135] Fr.S.Singarayan SJ of the Jesuit Refugee Service has been welcoming and taking care of the Pastoral needs of the Srilankan Tamil refugees in the Mandapam Transit camp for Srilankan Tamil refugees in India since 1996.
[136] SARI- South Asian Refugee Information Feb 1998, publ by JRS South Asia .Fr.Jeyakumar, a Catholic priest belongs to the Jaffna Diocese and lived with the displaced people in 1996 when more than 500,000 people were displaced within three days.
[137] Displacement in Srilanka-USCR Report 1997
[138] Ibid as above
[139] Ibid as above
[140]  Kate de Rivero,War and its Impact on women in Srilanka –Refugee Watch, June 2000
[141]  Kate de Rivero, War and its Impact on women in Srilanka –  Refugee Watch, June 2000
[142]  Human Rights in Srilanka, Human Right Watch 2000 annual report
 [143]D.B.S.Jeyaraj,  Sexual Violence against Tamil Women in Srilanka- Sunday Times(India) Jan 2002
[144] Srilanka- Rape in Custody, Amnesty International online report ASA 37/001/2002
See Amnesty International report, Sri Lanka: Torture in custody (AI Index: ASA 37/10/99) of June 1999 for more details on key aspects of torture, including rape and deaths in custody. The paper comments on the legal, institutional and political factors which allow these human rights violations to happen and impede victims and their relatives from obtaining redress. The current report should be read in conjunction with the above-mentioned report.
[145] These observations are based on the author’s field visits to Srilanka’s cleared, uncleared areas as well as the government hospitals in Mannar town and Vavuniya.  The uncleared areas refer to land controlled by the LTTE.  The cleared areas are controlled by the government troops.
[146] Paul Newman, Human Rights Violations in Srilanka, Preventing Internal Flight Options –JRS South Asia Publ, Bangalore.  1999
[147] The Indian Peace Keeping Force was sent to Srilanka as part of the Indo-Srilankan Peace Accord of 1987, concluded between the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and the Srilankan President Mr. J.R. Jeyawardane.
[148] Nirupama Subramaniam,  Women Tiger: How enabled are they?  The Hindu, March 10, 2002.
[149] Ibid, 3
[150] Ibid,3
[151] See Background Paper on Sri Lankan Refugees and Asylum Seekers,” Geneva: UNHCR Centre for Documentation on Refugees, November 1994, pp.4-5; also Grenier, Matthew, Protection Denied: Sri Lankan Tamils, the Home Office and the forgotten civil war. London: The Refugee Council, February 1997.
[152] I borrow this expression from Paulo Freire, The method of using ‘generative words’ was introduced and developed by the Brazilian pedagogue Paulo Freire in his ‘educational base communities’ for his literacy campaigns for the peasants in the huge cities of Brazil.  See Freire, Paulo, Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Seabury Press, 1968, pp.75-118.
[153] The quality of village dogs has not improved a hair in the past decades.  Miserable, mangy refugees from the happy hunting grounds, they skulk around, apparently enduring a joyless, painful, half-starved existence, only showing signs of life when threatened by their own kind with the possibility of ending it.  Only crows, cats and small rodents show them respect.  Those that range the lanes and roads and slink about wherever human gather, particularly at public functions where they vie with crows for crumbs and crusts, have neither personal appearance nor charm of personality to appeal to the viewer.  Holmes, W. Robert, Jaffna (Sri Lanka) 1980.  The Christian Institute for the Study of Religion and Society of Jaffna College, 1980, pp.67-8.
[154] For the debated concept of anomie, its development and applications see Orru, Marco, Anomie: History and Meanings.  Boston & London: Allen & Unwin 1987 and Passas, Nikos, Morton’s Theory of Anomie and Deviance: An Elaboration. (Ph.D. Thesis), University of Edinburgh, 1989.  A good summary of the concept’s development and a classified bibliography can be fojnd in Clinard, Marshall Barron (ed.,), Anomie and Deviant Behaviour: a Discussion and critique. New York: Free Press of Gencoe, 1964.  A recent assessment can be found in Passas, Nikos & Agnew, Rogert (eds,), The Future of Anomie Theory. Boston: Northwestern University Press, 1997.
[155] See Durkheim, Emile. [Spaulding J.A. (tr.)] Suicide: A Study in Sociology. New York: Free Press, 1951, pp.241-76.
[156] Durkheim, Emile. (translated by W.D.Halls).  The Division of Labour in Society. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984.
[157] Levin, William C., Sociological Ideas – Concepts and Applications. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, [1984] 1988, p.300.
[158] For the study of ethnic conflict in a global perspective, see Horowitz, Donald L., Wthnic Groups in Conflict, London: University of California Press, 1985.
[159] The UNESCO prepared a manual under the title Cultural Patterns and Technical Change under the direction and editorship of the cultural anthropologist Margaret Mead.  The insight underlying the entire project was that rapid technical development led to the rapid social change and that entire populations could not cope with such a change and consequently would fall under the condition that Durkheim and others would call “anomic state”.  See Mead, Margaret (ed.), Cultural Patterns and Technical Change. (A Manual prepared by the World Federation for Mental Health), NY: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1961 (6th printing).
[160] Levin William C., Sociological Ideas 0 Concepts and Applications, op.cit., p.299.  Further assessment of anomie can be found in Merton, Robert K., Social Theory and Social Structure, 2nd ed., New York: Free Press [1949] 1968.
[161] Durkheim, Emile [Spaulding J.A. (tr.)] Suicide: A Study in Sociology, op.cit., p.248.
[162] By the term ‘socialisation’ Sri Lankans mean getting together for some meaningful prupose, and usually the fact of being together is the purpose of socialisation, an end in itself.
[163] For additional information on the meaning of oneness and belonging in Tamil life, consult “The Ideology of Love” in Trawick, Margaret.  Notes on Love in a Tamil Family.  California: University of California Press, 1999, pp.89-116.
[164] Fromm, Erich, Escape from Freedom. NY: Avon Books, 1969 [1949], p.34.
[165] Ibid., p.34.
[166] Paul Tournier narrates numerous clinical cases of mental disturbances resulting mainly from the pervading feeling of loneliness among his patients.  See Tournier, Paul, Escape from Loneliness.  Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962.  Both Erich Fromm and Paul Tournier agree that the sense of loneliness is universal and often leads to a personal disintegration.  Perhaps the difference between the solitude of Tamils living in London and in the solitude of others living in their own culture is a question of degree and diffusion, not of kind.  It would be safe to say that, in London, refugees in general, and Tamils in particular, suffer the melancholy of solitude in a higher degree and more thoroughly than the rest of the population.
[167] Blauner, Robert.  Alienation and Freedom: the factory worker and his industry.  Chicago: University of Chivago Press, 1964, p.22.
[168] Tillich, Paul.  The Courage to be. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1952, p.48.
[169] Ibid., pp.47-48.
[170] Ibid., p.48.
[171] See Durkheim, Emile. Suicide: A Study in Sociology, op.cit., p.252.
[172] Personal meetings with UNHCR personnel, and individual refugees

[173] Personal experience


[i] While I raise this question in the context of the denial of refugee status to the Naga rebel leader Mr. T. Muivah, it is significant to note that the issue of grant of refugee status as a part of reconciliation strategy occurs albeit in an indirect way in the report on the recommendations of the UNHCR Regional Symposium on Maintaining the Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Asylum, Refugee Status, Camps, and Other Locations, 26-27 February 2001, Pretoria. Paragraph 14 speaks of the right of the "deserters and others who do not wish to return to the country of origin "to seek refugee status. Paragraph 16 speaks of the "right of persons with a military background to seek asylum".
[ii] For a general argument, Wenona Giles, Helene Moussa, and Penny van Esterik (eds.), Development and Diaspora – Gender and the Refugee Experience (Toronto: Artemis Enterprises, 1996); see also N. Kelly, "Gender Related Persecution – Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women", Cornell International Law Journal, 26, 1993.
[iii] Again my observations are in the context of total absence of any sense of responsibility-sharing in South Asia at state level in terms of refugee care, and the ethical source or absence of any sense of ethical imperatives relating to that, the current protection literature on responsibility sharing is increasingly recognizing the imperatives. Thus UNHCR EXCOM resolutions or the European Council decisions (such as on 28 September 2000 establishing a European Refugee Fund, Official Journal L/252, 6 October 2000, p. 12) reflect a growing awareness of the ethical issues involved besides material and financial. See also the section on "Sharing Responsibilities More Equitably" in the Report of  the Second Global Consultations on International Protection specifically dealing with asylum processes, EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 2001.    
[iv] On this see, Pia Oberoi, "South Asia and the Creation of the International Refugee Regime", Refuge, 19 (5), May 2001, pp. 36-45.
[v] See in this context the Report of the Asia-Pacific Seminar of Experts on Migrants and Trafficking in Persons with particular reference to Women and Children, 5-7 September 2000, Bangkok, which in Paragraph 1 of its Conclusions admitted that "migration concerned the movement of people within across national borders and that people migrated inter alia because of poverty, perceived deprivation, racial discrimination, internal conflicts, lack of opportunity, discrimination against women, and to reunite separated families". The same report also spoke of legislative and other institutional inadequacies in protecting migrants and victims of trafficking in persons.
[vi] There is now a growing awareness of the inadequacy of existing institutional system of protection in situation of mass influx for the overall protection framework, prima facie determination on group basis, temporary protection, civilian character of asylum and screening of armed elements as well as status and treatment of ex-combatants, registration, mechanisms of responsibility-sharing, preventive strategies, and humanitarian evacuation and transfer. See for example, the Report of Global Consultations on International Framework, EG/GC/01/8, 20 April 2001.
[vii] It is interesting to note that in his address to the Roundtable Workshop on Refugees in the SAARC Region, the President of SAARCLAW (India Chapter), A.M. Singhvi, while admitting that these questions of state obligations need to be viewed in the context of human rights, did not feel necessary to feature the refugee as a determining agent in the matter. The debate on the need for a national refugee law in India and the work on a model law has been conducted often from a courtroom angle, and not from the perspective of massive and mixed flows – though it must be admitted that such debate represents a clear advance from the earlier state of affairs in policy matters. On the address, see, “Report on Roundtable Workshop on Refugees in the SAARC Region – National Legislation on Refugees”, SAARCLAW and UNHCR, New Delhi, 30 April 1999; pp. 13-18.
[viii] I refer here to the title of Gil Loescher and John Scanlan, Calculated Kindness – Refugees and America’s Half-Open Door, 1945-Present (New York: Free Press, 1986).
[ix] Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, trans. Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 16.
[x] Steve Hindle, “Dearth, Fasting and Alms – the Campaign for General Hospitality in Late Elizabethan England”, Past and Present, 172, August 2001, pp. 44-86.

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