Refugees and
their Right to Communicate -South Asian Perspectives
Content
1.
Introduction
Page 2
a.
General Introduction
b. Introductory Speech by Lennart Kotsalainene, Chief of Mission, UNHCR, New Delhi.
c.
Dr Pradip Thomas
d. Dr Michael Traber
2.
State of Refugees in South Asia
a. Mixed Flows and Massive Flows - Protection
and Care Of the Victims of Forced
Migration in South Asia by Ranabir Samadhar
b. Bhutanese Refugee Representative Repatriation
Committee - Bhutanese Refugee
Repatriation and Present Situation Subha
c. Refugees: The Experience in
Bangladesh – Bhumitra Chakma
3.
Law and Refugees
a. International Provisions for
Refugees – N Subramanya
b. Model National Law on Refugees - Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees.
4.
Human Right Violations and Right to Inform
a. Human Rights Violations and
Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal: Right to information
and Communication - Jagat Mani Acharya
b. Refugee Women and The Fundamental
Inadequacies in Institutional Responses in
South Asia - Paula Banergee
c. Refugees in their own land - Forced Migrant
Women in Srilanka, A struggle amidst
Hope – Paul Newman
5.
Media and Refugees
a.
Bhutanese Refugee Representative Repatriation Committee: Media and Refugees - Subba
b.
Communication, Disintegration and The Tamil Refugees in London – by A W Jebanesan
c. News Barriers: Reporting on forced migration in times of globalisation by Max
Martin
6.
Conclusion
a. Report on the Consultation
b.
Appendix- Resolution
c.
Names, addresses and e-mails of resource persons and the participants
Refugees and Their Right to Communicate
1. Introduction
Refugees and their Right to Communicate
A Speech by Lennart, Kotsalainen, Chief of
Mission, UNHCR, New Delhi.
Refugee issue has become globalized and political context has changed (USSR gone and freedom struggle in Africa belongs to the past). All continents produce refugees and have become affected (developments in Europe, former USSR in particular). The refugees move from one continent to another as a result of changes in transportation and communication means. The admission of asylum-seekers and refugees is highly controversial political issue in particularly in Europe and Australia. The refugee issue has increasingly been connected to migration debate in the developed countries, in particular irregular migration and failure in terms of integration (especially Europe). The security aspects of large refugee movements increasingly a concern (militarization of refugee camps (Zaire/ Tanzania), terrorism). The number of Internally Displaced Peoples (IDP) has grown and exceeds no of refugees world-wide; these issues increasingly linked (e.g. Balkan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka). The media play a major role in globalising the refugee issue
The
management of refugees and IDP movements is increasingly becoming a complex
issue. While refugee issue is essentially related to social, humanitarian root
causes whereas solutions are often linked to political negotiations (Western
Sahara, Sri Lanka). DPA and DPKO are increasingly involved in complex
emergencies (Kosovo, Timor, Afghanistan,) and refugee issues are even discussed
in the United Nation’s Security Council. The co-ordination of humanitarian
actors are difficult with expansion of NGOs and many UN agencies are involved
and the response was the establishment of Office of Co-ordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) at the global level within the UN and Humanitarian
Co-ordinators at country level. No single UN agency is with mandate to deal
with IDPs which makes co-ordination necessary. There is an increased role of
military (NATO intervention in the Balkans) and humanitarian intervention at
International level. There is a gap between humanitarian and development
actors, e.g. in post conflict situations.
The
role of UNHCR in India is to provide protection to the refugees and also
individual refugee status determination under UNHCR’s mandate. It also enhances
the promotion of refugee rights including the adoption of national refugee
legislation and India’s accession to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. Finding durable solutions for Afghans
refugees; helping voluntary repatriation due to changes in Afghanistan, guiding
resettlement to the west, supporting naturalisation for those with Indians
spouses and Indian origin Afghans are part of the job of UNHCR. There are
attempts to find a durable solution for Sri Lankan Tamil refugees: If peace
process successful in Sri Lanka the UNHCR is verifying voluntariness of return
during large scale voluntary repatriation.
THE
INFORMATION/COMMUNICATION RIGHTS OF REFUGEES IN SOUTH ASIA
Pradip Thomas
Most of you here are experts or at least have
extensive knowledge of the situation of refugees and IDPs in South Asia. So I do not plan to reiterate information
that you already know related to the composition, numbers, politics, economics
of refugees and IDPs in South Asia, or the geo-political ramifications of the
refugee situation in South Asia. Neither
do I plan to deal with the manifold theoretical issues related to Diaspora and
migration during this session.
Article 19
What I would like to focus on during this brief
presentation is on issues related to the right to communicate as it affects
refugees and IDPs. Article 19, from the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) is often used as the basis for
derivative understandings of the right to information and communication. It reads as follows: “Everyone has the right
to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”. Article 19 does of course apply to all human
beings regardless of whether they are citizens of a country or are
stateless. This article has become the
basis for a variety of initiatives – at global, regional, national and local
levels aimed at ensuring guarantees related to the freedom of expression – a
freedom that has been compromised by state censorship, the wilful silencing of
persons and communities, corporate silencing, restrictions because of poverty,
and by the continuing lack of access and participation of ordinary people in
the cultural and communication environments that they inhabit. In spite of this reality, many institutions,
organisations, charters, policy initiatives and advocacy efforts including UNESCO’s
controversial MacBride Commission that was instituted in the 1970s to look into
the world’s communication problems, the calls for a New World Information
Order, the UK-based NGOs Article 19 and Index on Censorship, a variety of right
to information campaigns in many parts of the world including India and
Thailand, and the People’s Communication Charter, among many other initiatives,
have either tacitly or expressedly grounded their terms of reference within
Article 19.
Other
Limitations to Refugees and their Rights
There is however a major problem with Article 19, a
problem that is often glossed over or bypassed.
Article 19 is a non-binding right along with all the other rights
expressed in the UDHR. the UDHR was a
resolution of the UN General Assembly.
It did not have the status of a UN Convention of Covenant. Article 19 essentially functions as a moral
right, a statement of intent, a horizon that is worth working towards. The few countries that have enacted domestic
right to information legislations have been guided by the moral force of
Article 19. Article 19 has also been
used as a guide within the UN to develop binding conventions such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1976, and its
companion treaty, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political
Rights (CESCR), 1976 that contain more substantive Articles related to the
right to information. However, the
potential import of these provisions have been curbed/limited by a number of
caveats that allows states to suspend certain rights in the context of a
national emergency, for reason of security, public health or morals. Unfortunately, one of the rights in the ICCPR
that can be suspended by member states is that related to the right to information
contained in its Article 19.
A second problematic related to our topic is that
neither key international refugee conventions, the 1951 UN Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees nor its 1967 Protocol (neither of which,
incidentally, have been ratified by governments in South Asia), contain any
reference to the information rights of refugees. I am aware that the Red Cross runs a tracing
service that helps link displaced people with family. Red Cross messages are a principle means of
communication between family members separated by conflict. The mandate of the UNHCR that is based on the
1951 Convention is limited to the provision of physical safety,
non-discrimination and subsistence. It
does not cover the information rights of refugees.
Many critics of this convention have argued that it
needs to be reformulated in the light of a very different refugee situation
prevailing in our world today from that which existed in the immediate
aftermath of the second-world war and during the Cold War. These critics have pointed out that today’s
refugee crisis’, unlike Cold War related dislocations that involved refugees
usually a family unit, or individuals, involves mass, cross border movements
and dislocations, and have also pointed out that the causes for displacement
have increased – for instance IDPs who have been created by inter-ethnic, civil
and communal conflicts, or are the by-products of mega and small developmental
projects, and natural disasters. Other
critics have queried the other than moral validity of the Convention in the light
of the fact that countries in South Asia, that are not party to the refugee
convention, have nevertheless extended support to certain refugee groups – for
instance Tibetans in India. In other
words they have pointed out, that countries like India by not signing the
Convention, have been able to take a flexible line on refugees precisely
because they have not signed the Convention and are therefore not bound by its
statutes. They also point out that many
of the countries that have signed this Convention do not have an enviable track
record on refugees.
A third problematic is the fact that governments in
South Asia, like most governments in the South, have not enacted domestic
legislations related to refugees and for that matter IDPs. In South Asia, all marginalised citizens, at
least nominally, have rights. While in
principle the Indian Constitution does give rights to all people resident in
India, in practice these rights accrue to citizens and not to stateless
people. Other specific legislations such
as the Protection of Civil Liberties Act, 1976 relate to the protection of
specific communities, in this instance, Dalits.
Whether these are Dalits in India, or indigenous people, or women – they
are heirs to constitutionally guaranteed rights or are covered by national and
international laws. These marginalised
communities have the right to resist their subjugation and demand their basic
rights from what is often a habitually recalcitrant state. But the stateless person has minimal
rights. In fact, as it is clear from
Article 2 of the 1951 Convention, every refugee has to abide by the laws and
regulations of the country that he/she is a temporary resident of. Even international human rights law such as
the ICCPR in its Article 13 states that ‘aliens’ can be “expelled ...for
compelling reasons of national security”.
This apparent unwillingness to enact domestic
legislation related to refugees and IDPs is difficult to fathom, especially in
the light of major populations of stateless people in every South Asia country,
the victims of the frequent inter-country spats in South Asia – Sri
Lanka-India, Pakistan-India, Pakistan-Bangladesh, Bangladesh-India,
Pakistan-Bangladesh-India, Pakistan-Afghanistan, Nepal-Bhutan. One of the problems is that stateless people
are disadvantaged twice over. The
stateless person, living on no-man’s land, in border zones, in detention camps,
as hidden, invisible workers in the formal and informal economy – these people
by their circumstances and their hiddenness, are not an acknowledged part of
any society, are not ‘legitimate’. In
the light of the war against terrorism and sweeping national security
provisions such as that contained in the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance,
2001 in India, it would seem that stateless people will continue to pay the
price for being vulnerable and marginalised.
A fourth problematic is the fact that governments in
South Asia are yet to ensure the freedom of information for their citizens let
alone for stateless people. While the
India parliament enacted the Freedom of Information Bill 2000, the Government
of Pakistan introduced a Freedom of Information Ordinance in 2000 and the Law
Commission in Sri Lanka prepared a draft Access to Official Information Act in
November 1996, these efforts have been criticised for the many caveats and
‘reasons for suspension’ that have been included in each of these
packages. The Article 19 report Global Trends on the Right to Information: A
Survey of South Asia, July 2001 (p.125) lists the following caveats in the
Access to Official Information Act in Sri Lanka. “Access to information may be refused if it
pertains to, or adversely affects, one of the following: the economy, personal
or commercial privacy; intra-departmental communications; law enforcement; personal
safety, a financial institution; geological or geophysical information;
privileged information; national defence; foreign policy; or international
relations”.
Such broad exceptions make these exercises rather
meaningless. If, as in the case of the Tehelka
disclosures in India, official lapses cannot be discussed, made public or the
guilty brought to trial, but instead those who exposed the scam are
relentlessly harassed and brought to trial, one can only surmise that it is not
a serious piece of legislation.
Furthermore a slew of Official Secrecy and now anti-Terrorism
legislations have compromised right to information legislations in South
Asia. In any case, the Freedom of
Information Bill, 2000 explicitly states in the Prologue that it exists in order
“to provide for freedom to every citizen to secure access to information”. that precludes among others, the rights to
information of non-citizens like Bangladeshi Muslims resident in India, Chakma
and Hajong tribal refugees resident in Arunachal Pradesh, ad infinitum. Such exclusions also affect in other national
contexts, Bihari Muslims in Bangladesh, Bhutanese of Nepali origin in Nepal and
the many categories of the internally displaced throughout South Asia.
The right to information is, as it is defined and
legislated in South Asia, a rather restrictive right. While it does make possible the disclosure of
information from public bodies, state departments and the like, the process of
getting this information is rather complicated and the onus is placed on the
plaintiff. It also does not include for
disclosures from private entities – from the Monsantos, Enrons and their local
counterparts in South Asia, thus exonerating a major employer in South Asia. More worryingly, it explicitly exempts national
security apparatuses from the purview of this right. The move in this direction is a global trend.
The Right to
Communicate
The right to communicate however, is a much broader
right. Michael Traber, formerly from
WACC and now with the UTC has written extensively on the right to communicate –
its philosophy, its liberative core.
While the right to communicate is yet to be recognised by the UN as a
human right, for WACC and many other organisations, it remains a fundamental,
non-negotiable right. Why is it
non-negotiable? Because we recognise
that communication expressed first and foremost through language is the very
basis for our existence as relational human beings – we are what we are because
we communicate. Communication is the
basis for relationship, for community, for the sharing of meaning. Communication is in this sense, always
inter-subjective. The media, important
and unique in their own right, are in a real sense technological extensions of
the human capacity to communicate. Every
successive technology is in this sense an attempt by human beings to know the
world and order it in our image. One can
argue that our right to communicate in a language of our choice is the basis
for all rights – food, security, health and education. The right to language is a fundamental basis
of the right to communicate.
One can therefore argue that issues related to the
right to language ought to become a priority issue for refugees and IDPs who
have little or no access to resources in their own language, to an education in
their own language, or to preserve their cultural heritage. At a similar workshop that covered the same
issues in South-East Asia, we were told that non-formal education in Karen
dialects in the refugee camps situated on the Thai-Burma border were for the
most part carried out by NGOs such as the Burma Border Consortium and Burma
Issues. That Karen refugees in the camps
had better access to resources in their own language than Karen IDPs in Burma
who have been forced to lead nomadic lives on account of the military. And that one of the ways in which SLORC deals
with the few groups not involved in negotiation is by denying them the use of
their language. There are other issues
related to language. For instance, the
availability of regular information in the mother tongue of refugees and IDPS
from family back at home, on the political and civil situation, on their
status. This type of information is
absolutely critical to the cultural continuity of communities who have been
displaced and have been forced by circumstances to live for long periods of
time in unfamiliar environments.
The obverse of communication is silence. Of course, silence has its own merits but he
wilful silencing of people and communities goes against the fundamental
principle of communication as a right – against the axiom that we, as
individuals, are born to communicate.
The right to communication starts from the individual. The freedom of expression is a minimum but
important right in the plethora of claims under the right to communicate. That freedom, best-expressed in Article 19 of
the UDHR, holds that all human beings have the right to hold, impart and
receive information. But the right to
communicate goes much further. For it
recognises that it would be a limitation to have the freedom to express but not
have access to the channels of communication – that are the means by which one
can tell one’s story to the world.
Access allows one to participate in the making of meaning, to contribute
to and shape the cultural environments in which we all live. This is near impossible for most of us today
-–for whether you live in this part of Bangalore, in Colombo or Dhaka, our
cultural environments are beyond our control.
Access is often denied by reasons of economics, politics and
culture. The vast majority of people in
South Asia do not have access to the channels of communication because of their
poverty. Recent policy changes related to
the media in South Asia – the lifting of restrictions to cross media ownership
for example and the greater concentration of media ownership are bound to
accentuate these divides. Our cultural
environments are suffused by a variety of communication channels that are
owned, in most part, by rapidly shrinking coterie of cultural industrialists
and industries. We rarely have the means
to tell our stories or to shape the cultural environments in which we live.
The
Representation of Refugees
If this is a reality for people like us, it must be
a nightmare for refugees and IDPs who often exist beyond the reach of civil
society. Refugee camps are often
situated in remote or in between areas – making access impossible. If these camps are close to towns or other
habitations, the chances are that refugees will either be envied and hated by
local people for the shelter and food security that they enjoy and other
‘legitimate’ citizens lack. This, in
turn, feeds into a cycle of resentment and from no representation to
mis-representation. If is often the case
that refugees and IDPs are turned into scapegoats and are blamed for all sorts
of social ills by the media – from thieving, for taking away jobs from the
locals, to more serious crime. They then
are turned into the favourite whipping boys and girls for politicians who
routinely blame them for all the ills in any given constituency. I remember that refugees from Sri Lanka who
were resettled in the Nilgiris, were often given a hard time by the media – the
local press in particular. While, in
that case, there was the possibility that some among the people taking refuge
were involved in ‘illegal’ activities, the majority were law-abiding and wanted
to just get on with life. When a
truckful of illegal immigrants from China were found dead in Dover two years
ago, there was scarcely any sympathy in the media over their plight. This merely led to the reinforcement of the
public perception of illegal immigrants as unwanted people who deserved what
they got. The same mentality is rife in
Australia where the media have aided and abetted the incarceration of refugees
in remote camps in the bush or in off-shore detention camps in the Pacific, and
where a one-point electoral agenda on the threat posed by refugees was used by
the conservative government of John Howard to get back into power earlier this
year.
Another routine problem with the reporting of
refugee situations in parts of Asia is that much of this reporting is second
hand or is a re-hash of information handed out by official sources. It is very rare for a reporter to go into the
field and come back with first hand reports on refugee situations, their
stories, their hopes, with enough background information that could make a
difference to public opinion related to refugees. I understand that there are a few NGOs – for
instance the Kathmandu-based Centre for Protection of Minorities and Against
Racism and Discrimination (CEMARD) who use a variety of media to create
awareness of the plight of Bhutanese refugees – the Nepalese speaking Southern
Bhutanese Lhotshampa, many of whom have been evicted from Nepal and live in six
UNHCR-managed refugee camps in Easter Nepal. I have met a handful of
journalists who have tried to make a difference – Steven Gan and Irene
Fernandez, both from Malaysia, who got into major trouble for reporting
detention deaths of Bangladeshi workers in Malayasian detention centres and
Peter Mares from Australia who has consistently written on the government’s
handling of the refugee crisis in that country, including the book Borderline: Australia’s Treatment of
Refugees and Asylum Seekers. Rather
unfortunately, media reporting of refugees has, on the whole, been very
negative. In the context of Fortress
Europe for instance, the media have had a field day amplifying the ‘threat’
from refugees, often through the use of highly emotive headlines that
communicate invasion, the swamping of the country, the break down of social
services, refugees and asylum seekers as welfare scroungers, a threat to
national culture and national identity – all leading to moral panics that have
merely led to the reinforcing of public opinion against all immigrants. The tabloids have led and the broadcast media
have, with some exceptions, followed suit.
This kind of reporting, has, in turn affected public policy on asylum
seekers and refugees. In fact all right
of centre governments in Europe, including New Labour in the UK, have bent over
backwards to take an anti-asylym line, ostensibly in order to stem the use of
the race card by the extreme right. In the
post 9/11 situation, this climate has got even more out of hand, bordering on
the paranoid. There is also another
reason for the non-reporting of refugee issues.
Media environments in South Asia, like everywhere else have become
highly competitive and commercial. In
this world, there is little space for issue-based journalism.
Concluding
Remarks
In conclusion, I believe there is a lot that can and
needs to be done. Should the right to
communication matter for people who, for the most part, are primarily concerned
with basic rights – food, shelter, physical and mental security? Is it a luxury that they can forego or should
it count as a basic and irrevocable human right? I believe that for uprooted and displaced
people, the right to communication ought to become a prior, basic right, for on
it depends the negotiation of all other fundamental rights. Asylum seekers and refugees need to be
granted the right to understand and to be understood the right to a language of
their choice and the right to receive and impart communication.
So what ought this right to entail in the context of
refugees who are frequently denied their right to reside in the country that
they have chosen to seek asylum in? And
who is responsible for guaranteeing this right?
While I believe that governments do have a major responsibility for
guaranteeing this right, in the absence of government support for pro-refugee
policies in this part of the world, it would seem that NGOs, concerned
journalists and faith communities involved in refugee work must take on some of
the responsibilities for extending this right.
This is probably easier said than done, given other pressing
claims. However, I believe that support
for and implementation of this right is necessary because the human dignity of
refugees is closely tied to their freedom to communicate. Survival has both economic and cultural
dimensions. To a certain extent, the
cultural identity of a stateless person has already been negatively affected by
the many factors that have contributed to his/her uprooting from a relatively
stable environment. A new, often hostile
environment merely exacerbates that situation.
Add to that the loss of family, fear of constant violence from the
military or the militia and the daily search for some form of food security
and, life becomes precarious to say the least.
Surely then, apart from the real priorities of shelter, food and life
securities, there also has to be support for the cultural survival of these
communities through support for their communication rights.
The right to communication is inclusive of the
following:
·
The right of refugee communities
to use their own native language or alternatively a language of their choice to
conduct their internal and external affairs.
·
The right of refugee communities to basic education and literacy in a
language of their choice.
·
The right of refugee communities to practice a culture of their choice,
and to have the freedom of religion.
·
The right of refugee communities to have access to information on their
status under international and national law and to respond to and take part in
on-going negotiations
·
The right of refugee groups to hold, impart and receive opinions
through all media.
·
The right of refugees to petition the government in the country that
they have sought refuge, for human rights in line with international
declarations and conventions such as the UDHT and the Status of Refugees.
·
The right of refugee groups to counter the wilful misrepresentation of
refugees in the national media through appropriate representations at press and
media councils or other regulatory bodies
·
The right of refugee groups to have access to and control over their
own media – for instance, newsletters, community radio, on-line services
however this is possible. The media can
be used to keep and preserve tradition, connect to the diaspora community, be
used for information, education and entertainment purposes, and for advocacy
and networking. Given decreasing costs
and increasing bandwidth – there are more opportunities today for using a range
of media than was the case a few years ago.
·
The right of refugees to skills training in communication.
Let me conclude with some examples of refugee right
to communication projects – Radio Kwizera (Hope) in Tanzania. I am aware of the
fact that the media scenario in South Asia is very different from that in
Tanzania – but the example is illustrative of what can be done. The radio station was part of a larger
information project – the Refugee Information Network, carried out jointly by
the UNHCR, the JRS and other NGOs, Radio Kwizera was established in 1995 in
Ngara to help refugees – mainly from Rwanda and Burundi – establish a forum
where they could voice their concerns.
It was also established to serve the needs of the local population. The refugees had fled the genocide and many
had memories of Radio Mille Collines, the radio station that had been used by
nationalist Hutus to incite the genocide.
The refugees had felt isolated, abandoned, and many suffered from
psychological trauma – self-denial, fear and anxiety. In October 1997 Radio Kwizera launched a
training programme in broadcasting skills that involved both locals and
refugees. Four trainee Kirundi refugee
broadcasters were employed at Radio Kwizera.
Apart from these full timers, over a hundred refugees contribute in a
variety of ways to Radio Kwizera. Radio
Kwizera has been used to provide a public forum for discussions on a number of
pressing issues including repatriation, violence and reconciliation. The station has introduced health and educational
programmes and both locals and refugees now have a stake in Radio Kwizera.
Radio Kwizera has had its share of woes. Its relationship with UNHCR suffered after
Tanzanian soldiers took over the radio station in 1996 and used it to push
forward the agenda of forced repatriation.
While this had been sorted out, the relationship between Radio Kwizera
and the Tanzanian government has been difficult. The Tanzanian Refugees Act allows the entry
of non-refugees to refugee camps only after official permission has been
granted. This restriction has been used
by the government to place refugee camps off limits to broadcasters. The act also forbids speaking to more than
five refugees. There is also the
implicit threat of repatriation for those refugees who divulge information that
is perceived to be sensitive. These
on-going problems have been exacerbated by the World Food Programmes recent
decision to cut the food ration to the camps by about forty per cent. Still, the example of Radio Kwizera
illustrates the highs and lows of the right to information of refugees.
There are other examples. I understand that Radio Angola has just
launched a sort of ‘Reality Television’ programme directed towards enabling the
reconciliation of families who had been victims of forced separation. The national Roll Back Xenophobia campaign
that was launched in South Africa was aimed at placing refugee issues on the
agenda of the national media, creating national awareness and favourable attitudes
towards refugees. The worsening economic
climate in Southern Africa had led to a huge influx of refugees from Zimbabwe
and other countries. Violence against
refugees had increased and a consortium consisting of the South African Human
Rights Commission, the National Commission for Human Rights Affairs and the
UNHCR launched this multi-media campaign in 1999 using radio, art and photo
exhibitions, documentaries, workshops on refugees for journalists organised by
the Institute for the Advancement of Journalism. Refugees were themselves involved in
producing 5 minute documentaries and there was a series of 10 radio programmes
on former South African exiles now in government positions. I am also aware of a series of radio
programmes Right to Refuge produced
by the BBC World Service Education in partnership with the BBC World Service
Trust. This was a series of radio
programmes linked to creating refugee awareness in nine languages that was
broadcast in conjunction with the 50th anniversary of the UN
Convention in 2001.
These examples point to the kind of practical
programmes that can be established to help strengthen the
information/communication rights of refugees, and the channels of communication
that can be used to create positive awareness of refugees. I trust that during the next two days, we
will work towards a practical agenda related to enabling the right to
information/communication of refugees and IDPs in South Asia.
Pradip N.
Thomas, WACC
References
Article 19 (2001), Global Trends on the Right to Information: A Survey of South Asia,
July.
Mares, P. (2001), borderline: Australia’s Treatment of Refugees and Asylum Seekers,
UNSW Press, Sydney
Thomas, P.N. (ed.) Refugees and their Right to Communicate: Perspectives from South
East Asia, WACC/CCA. 2001.
Media
Development
3/1998, Migrants, Refugees and the Rights to Communicate
(available
at www.wacc.org.uk)
Mjanga, C.M. (2001) ‘Presentation of JRS-Radio
Kwizera’, at the WACC-AR/WACC
Refugees,
Displaced Persons and the Right to Communicate in the Horn of Africa
Workshop, 11-15 June 2001, Nairobi, pp.1-5.
2. State of Refugees in
South Asia
A. Mixed
Flows and Massive Flows: Protection and Care Of the Victims of Forced Migration
in South Asia
Ranabir Samaddar
(South Asia Forum for Human
Rights and Calcutta Research Group)
1. Mixed patterns of forced migration and their
consequences for a protection policy and the broad humanitarian network
1.1 The
reason why we should pay attention to the issue of mixed patterns of forced
migration in the region of South Asia is that the phenomenon of mixed flows of
forced migration raises significant issues for "humanitarian
politics" - a name under which the international work on protection and
care of the escapees and victims of violence, discrimination, environmental
degradation and disaster, famine, economic deprivation, brutal and
indiscriminate structural adjustment policies accompanied by pronounced
structural violence goes on. The new mix of forced and unwanted population flows
and the inadequate appreciation of the new phenomenon in refugee protection
policies particularly in a region like South Asia raise the problem of method
from several angles. It is important to note the following in this context:
First,
studies of forced population movements particularly in South Asia have been
hitherto pursued from economic and demographic angles. The link between over
all politics of the state and population flow cannot be seen through
rose-tinted glasses.
Second,
the notion of forced is so narrowly
defined, that the structural violence permeating these societies escapes our
attention, though violence and coercion are considered as benchmarks in
determination of refugees. Therefore though we are aware of the complications
and controversies around the issue of determination, we are not ready to probe
the entire political ethic of determination involving state primacy in
determination, repatriation, issues of collective exodus, and regional grouping
in constructing standards of denial of refuge under an essentially international humanitarian regime.
Third,
population flow under various conditions of coercion has been through ages,
epochs, and centuries. Yet conditions of modernity guide us to a state of
oblivion, where there is only the present of the conflict to envelop our minds;
and the history of enmeshing of peoples recedes into some hoary past in which
contemporary scholars engaged in fixing problems and finding solutions have
little interest.
Fourth,
the politics of humanitarian regime subsumes the ethic and sentiment of care,
protection and hospitality that are supposed to be the core of humanitarianism
guiding international work on victims of forced migration, which still remains
a half way house. This politics neither adequately guarantees the ethic and
sentiment, nor it allows expansion of the institutional framework adequately to
ensure full justification of the notion of humanitarianism. There is now a
great urgency to address these questions in the context of our region, and take
general note of the inadequacy of the frameworks, practices, and the received
notions. The definitions and concepts produced from within the discourse of
refugee care and protection have acted on institutions and practices, while
certainly the practices of refugee protection, care, rehabilitation, also the
politicization and confinement of the issue of refugees have reflected on the
discursive legacy as well.
1.2 In the
perspective of new kinds of flow in this region, in framing protection policies
for the victims of forced migration we have in the first place the problem
posed by the connection between (a) grant of refugee status to a person
declared an outlaw by a state, (b) the need for his immunity from the draconian
law of that state, and (c) the viability of a peace process. Second, we face
here the problem posed by the location of the power to define, determine, and
exclude a person from the status of the refugee. Third, we are required to take
into account the problematic of the political ethic of reconciliation in
determining the humanitarian nature of an international arrangement. In short,
protection policies in this region have to take into account the imperatives of
peace and reconciliation in this region – imperatives, which supposedly were not
concerns of a protection regime. Given the significance accorded to the
question of "well grounded fear of persecution" in determining the
status of refugee, exclusion clause is meant to be an extreme measure, and even
then the person can be protected against forcible return (refoulement), for among other things Article 3 (1) of the
Convention against Torture (1984) covered excluded persons and aliens. Article
1F (b) of the 1951 Convention also specifically mentions that crimes to be
considered under the exclusion provision have to be "non-political".
Yet, we must remember that the system grew in the wake of cold war and great
power competition, and possesses no capacity to respond to the imperatives of
justice and reconciliation.[i]
2. Gender specificity of the
current protection regime
2.1 We have to take note
also of the non-gender specific nature of humanitarian practices and law here.
Nowhere it is more apparent, as several reports on refugee care and care of the
internally displaced people in South Asia bear out, than in the way women
feature as refugee-subjects in refugee management. Citizenship as a status
marked by universality and equality flows above all from the structure of the
liberal-humanitarian regime, which is characteristically patriarchal. This
implies that the humanitarian system by itself dominates women, or is
constituted by forms of rule in which men will systemically dominate women. The
humanitarian law is almost a male agency. The way a refugee is defined, or the
way in which the Geneva Conventions define humanitarian protection in war,
shows that such laws see and treat women the way condescending men see and
treat women. It is the male gaze that frames the humanitarian. The non-gender
specific nature of fear, persecution and threat as outlined in The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria on Determining Refugee Status does not therefore think deeply on
the fear, the fear of violence, fear
of state, of law, assault, and breakdown of security and life around, faced by
more than half of the refugees on earth. The gender-blind concept and
application of humanitarian law can go to harsh extent, as evident from the
experiences of Sri Lanka today.
2.2 The
non-gender orientation of the protection ethic and arrangement is a classic
case of what we may call as "procedural neutrality". It recognizes
that there may be a specific nature of abuse suffered by a "social
group" (it is primarily this route by which vast number of abuses are
identified), but upholds general principles as the basis of adjudication of claims. Hence the
humanitarian law is procedurally neutral, as law under patriarchy is often so;
but this procedural neutrality on which the humanitarian law is founded bases
itself on a prior construction of a liberal-humanitarian regime where male
power is entrenched. Thus rape, violence, localized mass murder, eviction,
girl-sale, illegal underpaid female labour, sex-slavery – all these flourish,
as they do in our region, because the humanitarian aims at protecting the
population facing abuse, but only under certain rigorous conditions, turning
the victims into petitioners whose appeals (in law claims) have to be adjudicated, while the very gender-structure of
abuse continues. And this, as I had argued in my work, The Marginal Nation – Transborder Migration from Bangladesh to West
Bengal (Sage, 1999), is one of the characteristics of the current forced
population flow in South Asia.
2.3 We can
speak here of three implications of this situation. First, taken collectively
the cases of women's dislocations reflect on the fact that the overwhelming
presence of women among the forced migrants in this region is not an accident
of history. It is a way by which states have made women political non-subjects
in the vast panorama of conflicts. Second, it should be recognized that even in
their marginality displaced women are never merely victims, they exert agency
even in situations of marginality. Dislocation is a debilitating experience no
doubt, but women have many times transformed it into an empowering one. Third,
and this seems to me most significant in the context of this discussion, a
system-centric narrative on the situation of refugee women leads to their
trivialization as mere victims. It shifts attention from the argument that
policies have been by themselves gender-specific to the extent that such
humanitarian policy would consider death or a serious threat to liberty a
reason for asylum but not rape or vulnerability to human trafficking. Such
value judgment not only makes it more difficult for women to seek asylum, it
acts as a way of marginalizing crimes against women in order to marginalize the
woman into political non-subjects.[ii]
3. The non-entree regime
in South Asia
3.1 The massive refugee
flow, forced repatriation, the decline of liberal asylum practices, the
creation of virtual non-entrée regime
in this region following European examples indicates that, the “fortress
Europe” mentality is engulfing this region also, thus making the refugee care
arrangement in this region, and the vision of 1951 inadequate for negotiating
the population flow today. In any case the Convention of 1951 was intended for
Europe, and did not consider the millions fleeing homes in the wake of
de-colonization, partition, and the emergence of new states in South Asia. No
UNHCR was there to take care of the refugees in this region that was being
de-colonized. A report in the Human
Rights Tribune describes in details the charade of the Dublin Convention,
the Amsterdam Treaty and the new Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the
European Union that do not take into account the rights of the non-European
citizens – and this despite the passage of immigration and asylum matters to
the first pillar under the Amsterdam Treaty. In this region also, each state is
free to devise guidelines for the conduct of its security forces. Besides not
being exercised with the abuse around prevention of entry of shelter-seekers,
the country-specific protection regimes in South Asia, as elsewhere, are still
unable to administer quick and proper care of the thousands fleeing from
violence, terror, environmental devastation and insecurities. The situation
aggravates because states by way of prioritizing refugee issues decide to
ignore some cases while taking up godfather's role in others in a completely
disproportionate manner, or administer care to a victim group quickly some time
while ignoring the same group at other times in tune with diplomatic and
security considerations. In face of the structural adjustment policies that
produce what the historian of indentured labour from South Asia Hugh Tinker
called “new slavery”, and with the entire sub-continent being populated today
by aliens leading a submerged existence - whom following Eric Wolf we may call
"people without history", it is meaningless to stick to current
citizenship policies. The current controversy over citizenship in Nepal, India
(particularly the Northeast), Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (in each of these cases
vast number of people remain disenfranchised or inferior even in legal equality)
reinforces the need to study the mixed phenomenon of forced migrants, unwanted
migrants and migrants of the submerged world within the country and across the
country – all that have made the relevance of the current institutionalized
care and protection suspect.
3.2 Also,
as Judge Geoffrey Care of the International Association of Refugee Law Judges
has demonstrated, the peculiar nature of the Convention leaves a tremendous
burden on jurisprudence and enormous freedom to the state. Referring to one particular
case (R v. SSSS ex p JCWI: R v. SOE ex p B [1996] 4 All ER 385), he has
commented that increasingly the courts and tribunals have given interpretation
of the states' obligations under the Convention, which are not always in
conformity with the views of the executive of the state itself. The manner in
which the Convention is applied has also frequently been with the reality for
the individual himself or herself very much in mind. In his words, "to put
it another way, the courts have distanced themselves from the litigant parties,
as courts do... I have in mind... two decisions of the Court of Appeal (in UK).
The Courts were faced with refugees who, under the interpretation of the
regulations, which the state would have followed, would put the refugees on the
street. The courts interpreted the regulations to prevent this saying that
'parliament could not have intended such an inhumane result'. Parliament did
however, because the regulations were promptly amended." Refugee
determination procedure on individual basis and the unequal sharing of burden
of care have now produced confused, traumatized, and nervous shelter-seekers
who travel rarely with supportive documents, false or no papers, and land in
alien systems which are in Judge Geoffrey Care's words "frequently hostile
or incredulous" hosts. The more fundamental question is, how much can
decisions of determination of refugee status on individual basis but taken on
broad collective political, economic and cultural considerations be able to set
up an international ethic and framework of care, hospitality, and kindness?
Also, how would law in such cases settle on proofs? Judge Care has reminded us
again while referring to another case of similar nature involving a Sri Lanka
Tamil who had fled persecution allegedly at the hands of the LTTE (R. SSHD ex
parte Karunakaran 25 January 2000, unreported) that, the civil standard of
proof, which treats anything, which probably happened, is part of a pragmatic
legal fiction. It has no logical bearing on the assessment of the likelihood of
future events or (by parity of reasoning) the quality of past ones... The
method of evaluation is itself not one of hard facts. But it requires knowledge
not only of applicant's own tale, and what is accepted of it, but a whole range
of other factual matters. Therefore, it is not merely the issue of narrowness
of determination-principle as indicated in the Convention, but a more
fundamental structural issue is here at stake. The refugee flees in fear from
the induced violence of the state, private armies, systemic discriminatory
institutions, environment disaster, and developmental catastrophe - but s/he
flees from a state where s/he is a
citizen, and lands in another state
no matter where it is, and here is a system that tries to frame rules of the
game - escape and refuge, how you are to escape and how you are to get refuge.
How can an ethic of care and kindness and a framework of responsibility grow
from that? If at all it can, it will develop very incrementally. It is this bizarre
scenario of hosting the distressed and displaced through the state by the
international that has produced the alien. The geography and politics of fear is
thus perched on power that influences in a substantive manner the ways in which
discourses of fear are manufactured through institutionalized politics with the
effect that fear reinforces the exercise of power. It is significant therefore
to look into how fear is defined and utilized within hegemonic discourses, the
ways in which fear is constructed around certain social identities, how it is
reflected in experiences of public spaces, territories and environments, how
fear surfaces in relation to racism, homophobia, sexism, ethno-sectarianism and
contemporary patterns of political, legal, and social exclusion. All these indicate the need to re-conceptualize the theme of refuge,
one of the most important aspects of humanitarian politics in today's world. It
means above all the imperative to investigate the political practices of giving
refuge, practices that are supposed to be guided by the ethic of care and
reconciliation. It also means that if we do not broaden the framework of
protection and care in the present perspective, even direct victims of violence
will not get due shelter and care. Thirdly, it means that this broadening
implies the notion of responsibility.
3.3 People
displaced by agencies/other people are, prima
facie, wronged. How shall we judge the moral obligation of others, in this
case other states, towards the wronged, the actual and potential victims of
this region? We have here not only the relevance of the ethic of care,
kindness, and hospitality, but an added ethic, that of responsibility. Responsibility has two implications –
responsibility of the state and of the international community. The word, responsibility carries two senses also -
responsibility of the host and that of the expelling state, or state that
allows the "nice exit". Ethically then the issues, they must
confront, but unfortunately fail to do so, are – what is morally owed to the
victims of displacement? How do we place and apportion responsibility for man
made disasters, say from a developmental process (a dam, a highway, a famine, a
flood)? What is the politics of reparation in these cases? And what will be the
norm of responsibility in the more complex cases of indirect displacement and
repeated displacements? What will be the method? How shall we settle for what
is known as minimal justice? These
are questions of ethics staring before those who have held that those issues of
care, kindness and hospitality are matters of system and a humanitarian
doctrine. While there may be substantial agreement about preferred values,
there is clearly deficit in agreements over strategies to meet the emerging
situation marked by three conditions.[iii]
3.4 Broadly, these three
conditions are –
First, refugees
are today a phenomenon of mass flight, mass movement, and massive displacement,
but individual determination of the status of the shelter seeker that comes as
a shadow of the principle of no forcible
return overwhelms the principle of care of the victims of forced migration.
Second, the
movement of the displaced is so mixed that, while states today do not claim any
more an absolute right to return the displaced to persecution and peril, there
is a greater freedom of action made available to the states by this new
phenomenon with the result that the terminology of refugee protection is
obsolete with the rise of new words such as, displaced persons, illegal
immigrants, economic migrants, aliens, stowaways, interdiction, safe third
country, visa requirements, carrier sanctions, and finally the internally
guaranteed security zones.
Third,
hospitality is now subject to rules, procedures, laws, and practices that must
be thought anew in terms of the imperatives of the ethic of hospitality.
Raising these
questions means taking into account emerging policies and perspectives relating
to conflicts, collective actions, and human rights perspectives. We cannot rest
content with traces of group care (care of groups and care by groups) as the
basic pattern of protection of refugees in his region, and not interrogate the
way in which states in South Asia respond to inflows of refugees and other
kinds of forced migrants. Thus while admittedly there is a difference between
what is termed as "Northern approach" and "Southern
approach". By northern approach we imply individual determination,
emphasis on law and procedure, host of administrative and quasi-judicial
mechanisms, and attempts to adhere to 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. By
southern approach we indicate the prevalence of heavy reliance on bilateral
method to resolve refugee crisis (India-Sri Lanka Accord being one such
example), group determination, community care and protection, placing responsibility
at the essential level of a community norm, and an almost deliberate reluctance
to legally stabilize a related situation.[iv]
While acknowledging the truth of the difference in the two sets of practices,
human rights perspective would demand that the emerging reality of mixed flows
of forced migration, the increasing rigidity of states to offer shelter to the
victims, and the woefully inadequate institutionalization of practices of care
and protection be recognized, and steps be suggested towards a broader and
coordinated approach. Such a perspective, instead of being vexed with the
question, would rather encourage new insights, that question being, "Who
are they - refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, students or nomads?
Should they be classified in this way or should all the reasons that have
driven them to leave their countries of origin be taken into account? And would
not a humanitarian policy of the state demand that besides allowing entry
attention be paid to economic, demographic, social and health issues?"
Further it would encourage the policy planners to face the reality that a
refugee cannot be defined by a single event that has supposedly produced the
shelter-seeker. The partition of 1947 has produced refugees long after the states
had thought that the event was dead in terms of producing refugees. Yet,
researches including mine on the linkages between various phases of forced
migration in the sub-continent show how long after the states stopped
concerning themselves with that bygone event, it continued to produce escapees
of fear and insecurity. This realization should have political and legal
implications.[v]
4. A South Asian forced migration observatory
4.1 All these show that there is in the first place
the need to take account of the various streams of forced migration, their
dimensions, and their mixed nature in order to grasp the complexity of the
challenges to humanitarian tasks. One way of gaining such an account may be to
set up a South Asian migratory observatory and to conduct a feasibility study
for such a step along the lines of discussion for such an observatory for
Europe. Such a feasibility study will not only establish and connect various
research institutions and organizations active in the field of forced migration
thus producing a wealth of information on migration within the region and
outside, it will also facilitate the analysis of the information systems used
by policy makers and others, and identify the relative importance of specific
information sources and networks. It will show that for policy makers
particularly, their main problems are inherent in the sheer volume and
diversity of information on migration. Sources are frequently unknown or
inaccessible to them, or there is a lack of resources to digest and evaluate
what is available.
4.2 There may be several gaps in the information on
forced migration information, available to users. The first may be related to
access to and co-ordination of existing information. Second can be lack of a
comprehensive and up-to-date source on national policy, legislation, case laws,
and administrative and quasi-judicial orders relating to forced migration. A
South Asian forced migration observatory can easily fill these gaps. The third
gap relates to the need, especially of policymakers, for more timely, reliable
and harmonized statistics. A migration observatory would be unlikely to produce
many more up-to-date statistics, but it could enable other improvements,
notably by serving as a catalyst for data harmonization, and by overseeing the
provision of comprehensive meta-data. The fourth gap may be in the provision of
analyses of trends and patterns of migration. An observatory would be able to
perform a series of analytical roles, as well as develop ways of enhancing statistical
databases that would improve the depth and quality of its analyses. The
shortage and inadequacy of country reports, which can support the development
of an early warning system constitutes a fifth gap. The proposed observatory
would ameliorate this problem by compiling its own reports, by sign-posting
existing country-based information, and by synthesising reports already in
existence. Another gap can be the lack of a comprehensive source of information
on what research is currently being done or planned, and the identification of
gaps in the current research effort which may necessitate reorientation of
funding. The mandate for such an observatory should be to make more accessible
the information that already exists. It should primarily serve the needs of
policy makers, analysts, human rights groups, and multilateral humanitarian
agencies for information on all aspects of forced migration in the region, and
for all these it has to be an open institution. Based on the up-to-date
information technology, it should be network-based and have a clearly defined
set of analytical tasks. It should have a major role in information
co-ordination with limited research assignments. It should develop a database
on national policies and legislations in the region with respect to all aspects
of forced migration. It should not be expected to gather statistics, or to
compile large statistical or other databases that replicate those, available
elsewhere. It should not only respond to current identified needs, but should also
anticipate and be able to respond to new information requirements. A forced
migration observatory with such mandate will go a long way in facilitating not
only information needs for humanitarian tasks, but also help in indicating the
trend of current legislation, court pronouncements, and administrative
practices, and the trend of proper direction of all these. An annotated
directory of services and persons involved can be the first step towards such
an observatory.
5. Innovative and democratic border-management by
easing labour inflow
5.1 This is the second
suggestion offered in this paper. It relates to democratic border management by
easing labour inflow between countries marked by trans-border movement of
illegal immigrants, primarily of working population driven by insecurities of
various kinds. As an example, we can refer to the situation obtaining between
India and Bangladesh. Both India and Bangladesh have proved woefully inadequate
in dealing with the reality of the border between the two countries. It is
ironic that the border which was drawn by the British in 1947 to rationally
reorganize the political space in the region, has eventually not only generated
its own irrationality, but has also created many new problems for the region.
The border, with its long history of movements between people, cultures,
beliefs, ideas and customs was completely unreal from the beginning. Land on
both sides of the border was mostly cultivable and was locked and there were
farms that were within forty yards of zero point on either side. Perhaps the
most important characteristic of the border was that in many cases it was not
contiguous. There are 53 rivers in the region that make functioning of the
border more complicated. Almost all of India's disputes with East Pakistan
related to this border, mostly involving rivers. Even more problematic was that
each country had its enclaves within the boundary of the other, meaning that
the border was rife with potential for problem. After the liberation of
Bangladesh it was hoped that the border would lose much of its potential for
creating disputes and enmity with the improvement of bilateral relations. Sadly, even after more than twenty-five years
of the birth of Bangladesh, almost all the outstanding issues between India and
Bangladesh continue to be related to the common border. These include sharing
of water-resources of common rivers, CHT, demarcation of maritime boundaries
and the ownership of South Moore/Talpatty Island, illegal cross-border
activities, illegal migration, Berubari corridor and the granting of entry/exit
facilities. Convictions about the sanctity of the border are weaker in this
region than elsewhere in India. Out of a combination of despair and political
pressure, the Government of India has built barbed wire fencing on parts of
both Assam and the West Bengal sides of the border. In South Bengal sector
alone 358 km s and in Assam 159 km s of fencing programme has been
sanctioned. Other measures such as
regular patrolling and check posts continue. But these have not stemmed the
flow of either people or goods; indeed, it is no secret that border guards on
either side accept and demand bribes from those seeking to cross illegally. As
a result of the influx, the size of which is difficult to estimate, a constant
state of tension exists, in Assam in particular and other states of the
Northeast as well as between migrants, perceived migrants and the host
communities. If one is to accept that migration is a natural human phenomenon
that occurs in varying degrees world wide, one must also accept the fact that
few countries in the world have successfully contained it, be it a Super Power
like the United States or a medium power country like Germany. Again, if one is
to go by the premise that immigration, especially illegal immigration cannot be
stopped, one must go a step further and say that it can only be contained or
regulated. Or rather, it can be negotiated through a process of meaningful
economic activities, exchanges, regulatory mechanisms, and above all through
dialogue. The problem of cross-border migration is sometimes complicated by
religious factor. Either the minorities look to the option of taking shelter in
the neighbouring country exasperated with majoritarian insensitivities, or
remain potential refugees or illegal migrants. During 1972-1993, a total number
of 41,25,576 people arrived in India from Bangladesh. Out of that a total of
8,36,524 overstayed (difference between the immigration and emigration
figures). Of them 5,38,501 were Hindus.
5.2 One can
think of certain policy suggestions, such as (a) a system of identity cards
acceptable to local population, particularly those living on the border in the
eastern and the North Eastern region has to be ensured; (b) wile the system of
visas for nationals of either country will continue, for those who cannot or do
not want to use the visa system for economic and quasi-economic reasons, a
specific, time-bound legal system sanctioning their presence in the host area
for mutual economic benefit of both sides, legal and acknowledged, has to be
devised. We can take the specific case of the several Indian border districts
that share river or land border with Bangladesh. The process of acquiring a
passport (for which one has to travel long often in an opposite direction, to
the capital city of Calcutta or Guwahati) and a visa (for which one has to
travel again to Calcutta) are both cumbersome and time-consuming; (c) this will
involve the development of a scheme to allow migrants to come legally into the
region on the basis of work permits issued by a Central Work Permit Authority
with the backing of the relevant state set up by an Act of the Parliament, with
specific clauses involving the officials of the local state and village-level
administrators who will act as checks and balances to each other ensuring that
no one group becomes too powerful so as to be able to bend the system. This may
be worked out in association with the Home Ministry as well as Ministry for Law
and Company Affairs. A retired Supreme Court/High Court judge may head such a
panel and a member of the NHRC may be associated with it.
5.3
Since the permits are intended to discourage illegal migration, and promote
healthy economic cooperation at sub regional and local level of both sides, the
preliminary step may be that the permits be issued to groups (of say, 20 or so)
rather than to individuals. It should be allowed in the following fields:
agricultural operations at harvest time; construction; boat-building; fishing
and allied activities. In doing so, the following procedure might be followed:
- the work permits could be issued at the border at posts set up for this
purpose by cells that would include at its top a representative of the District
Magistrate with members: one senior member of the local panchayat (village
council system), a police officer, a member of an NGO or some other public
organization, a representative of the labour board, and a person representing
labour organizations - with at least two of these five being women. Since the border
is long, a system of such posts needs to be worked out either situating them at
existing check posts or beside them.
5.4
The permits will be issued on spot after verification of the following
documents: (a) the identity of the applicant(s) as proof of
nationality/residency; (b) a clear
statement on the place he/she will be residing for a maximum of next one year
(work permits will be given for a maximum of one year to begin with) and the
name of the employer who or whose representative must be present for the issue
of the permit with supporting documents from his side; (c) a document of
undertaking signed by the employer stating the employer's responsibility for
the immigrant group/individual and his/her duty to report to the local
authority (preferably local labour board) three times in a year; one, at the
time of arrival to register; two, after six months to reconfirm their presence;
three, at the time of departure at the end of the year. If the permit is to be
extended, it can be done by the DC or the Labour Commissioner of the relevant
district, for a period not beyond another two years; (d) the work permit will
carry the photograph of the permit holder and will be laminated with his thumb
impression/signature on the document to prevent misuse of the same; (e) the
permit holders will have no voting or political rights but will have access to
courts of the host country if their civil rights are injured in any way and
will be permitted to receive payment for services at the same level as local
workers and repatriate their savings to their home country; (f) the entire
arrangement will also give due consideration to the rights of local citizens
while making use of a dynamic human resource.
5.5
For the Indo-Bangladesh border, an autonomous bi-national commission can be
formed to act as a flexible instrument for formulating strategies of
cooperation. Such a commission will form temporary working groups of local
parallels as existing between West Bengal/Assam/Meghalaya/India and Bangladesh
on matters of land-holdings, employment, social and economic resources and
formulate policies based on commonalities and the market. Border demography,
settlement problems in border areas, ethnic divisions within the region,
viability of developing environmental provisions to convert the area into a
self-sustaining unit with linkages to both countries will be ascertained by
groups set up by the commission, the ultimate goal being to hand over local
administration to largely de-centralized administrative units which can work
with greater competence and stability in comparison to the vested interest
groups and consequently the promotion of an atmosphere of greater understanding
between two countries and also in the sub-region.
5.6
In brief, the example of such a proposal (worked out in details by four
researchers in Economic and Political Weekly, 4 September 1999) shows that care
and protection policy for victims of forced migration can be innovatively
widened in its conceptual horizon if the attending factors such as labour market
linkages, work-permits, local cooperation, decentralization of
border-management and control, are considered, and national and military
security is not held up as the cornerstone of state policy towards illegal
immigrants who are mostly deprived of livelihood and remain victims of
insecurities of all kinds.
6. Mixed
situation, need for mixed response and mixed policies
6.1
The above analysis and the examples of innovative measures suggest that the
mixed situation in forced migration calls for new outlook on the overall
protection framework in the region in a situation of mass influx, policies on
prima facie determination on group basis, temporary protection, need for
combining the rules of protection with the need for reconciliation, operational
measures to enhance security of the victims of forced migration, sharing of
responsibility, combining issues of internal displacement with issues emanating
from exodus outside in a general perspective on forced migration, and planning
for durable solutions based on gender equity.[vi]
Human rights based approach in place of state security centric approach will
call for deep reflection on all these, because only human rights based approach
can fashion appropriate response in the wake of mass influx, and call for new
policies, measures, information-coordination for protection of the victims.
Clearly South Asia has to go beyond other regional standards, and seek its own
model while learning from these in terms of coping with mass displacement and
influx. The civilian character of protection will be enhanced when the human
rights based approach will be given priority, justice to the victims will
become the prime value, and roles and responsibilities will be democratized.
The refugee will not be an object of protection administration only, but the
subject of a humanitarian framework.
6.2
Mass influx in South Asia will continue to affect not only host states, but
also the entire regional community. Besides adopting international tools there
is therefore a current need to further develop them particularly in order to
cope with the task of determining the prima facie status for groups of victims
of forced migration, making available for them temporary protection through
better harmonization of approaches with acceptable standards, and attaining a
degree of flexibility in protection-based response to mass influx in the
region. This will need both national mechanisms and regional cooperation in
tune with international standards to share responsibilities and burdens in mass
influx situations, and to frame policies for democratizing citizenship issues,
resettlement of the victims, humanitarian transfers, and other appropriate
procedural mechanisms. It is important in all these cases that we proceed not
from international resolutions mainly, but from local best practices and local
experiences and burdens. It is only then that we shall be able to go some way
towards sharing responsibilities more equitably (first country of asylum, safe
third country option, undocumented shelter-seekers, broadening appeal
procedures, protection of illegal immigrant workers, etc.), and coordinating
refugee protection mechanisms with other protection policies such as the UN
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers
and members of Their Families. That is where an immigration policy based on
human rights begins. From a simple protection framework for refugees who are
mostly individually and sometimes group-wise determined, it becomes a framework
against racism, oppression of migrants, trafficking of women and children,
various discriminations – a framework for tolerance and greater enjoyment of
economic, social and cultural rights. Broadening the horizon is essential for
broadening the framework.
6.3
In short, in dealing with mixed and massive flows forced migration based on a
fundamental concern for the victims, the choice is between human rights and
care oriented approach and state security oriented approach. There is no way
that with a fundamentally state security oriented approach in the context of
massive flows, conflicts can be contained, mitigated, and tackled on a
cooperative basis. Responsibility-sharing and care, protection, hospitality,
settlement, re-settlement, and wherever possible eventual and voluntary return,
being the only route to protect the victims of forced migration, a justice and
human rights-based approach is the only option. It will not only help
humanitarianism to cope with the paradoxes of humanitarian politics, but will
help the political societies of the region to realize also, that conflicts
occur not to due to demography or population flow, but because of a
nation-state security centric attitude, which forecloses all possibilities of
cooperation, co-existence, and the imagination of new avenues of accommodation.
7. Lessons
of the fifty-five year’s history of refugee care
7.1 In
terms of a policy on refugee protection by the State and a study of such
policy, our fifty years’ experiences suggest attending to the: (a) definition
of the term “refugee” and its scope; (b) the concept of “non-refoulement and
its scope; (c) and, the administrative-judicial machinery to determine the
status of a shelter-seeker as a refugee and once determined, the quantum of
assistance the shelter-seeker needs.[vii]
It also means trying to understand, where does the refugee feature in such
policy formulation? We shall see, ease of physical accessibility, cultural and
economic networks, and political support of host government and communities are
among the significant elements that make the refugee a critical component in
the determination of a policy on the refugees – these are elements that impel
care but also add to the power of the state to decide towards whom to extend
hospitality, and whom to deny.
7.2 If we go
through the detailed narratives of how shelter-seekers were saved, cared,
rehabilitated, and many were left out, refused, and neglected in the same
period, how hospitality always went on with calculation, best described now in
that well-known phrase in the literature of refugee studies, “calculated
kindness”,[viii]
we shall appreciate the need for a many-sided interrogation of the logical
structure behind what we call the political ethic and duty of hospitality.
Refugee studies in this country had been waiting for such an interrogation of
the contradictory nature of our attitude towards the shelter-seeker, and the
policy of strategic ambiguity of our rulers. Neither the security explanation,
nor the kindness explanation, nor even the international law and international
regime explanation, will be adequate in making us understand the mysteries
behind one of the most-observed and least comprehended political conduct of our
time, namely the asylum and refugee care policy of the a post-colonial state.
We have in this history a contention between two notions – that of charity and
right. On one hand there is the responsibility of the State to care for the
public, on the other hand the demands of the shelter seeker to receive such
care. Indeed two visions of rights inform the situation – one emerging from the
concept of nationhood and citizenship, and the other emerging from the affected
population’s daily negotiations with governmental authority over every tiny bit
of subsistence-means and the consequential expansion of the moral universe of
claims. One results in an expansion of citizenship, and the other results in
expansion of social security beyond strictly legal confines, that, as several
judicial decisions show, ultimately get accepted by the judicial authority and
the juridical discourse. The birth of social security is made possible by
detailed governmental policies and techniques for sheltering the refugee
population, the expanding universe of nation, and the daily contest between the
state that appears as the government and the refugee population that becomes
another segment of the population being governed.
7.3 A regime of rights, as often found, calls for
its effectiveness centralization of power, power to be concentrated at one
point to make rights effective, and rarely at multiple points. Yet, as we know,
hospitality is provided often by local communities, to whom the shelter-seekers
are neighbours from near abroad, also
when this hospitality is denied by them The effectiveness of a rights regime,
informal or formal, depend much on this response; it is conditioned by
prevailing sentiments of tolerance, democracy, and nationalism. One of the
challenges before cosmopolitanism is how to make such sentiments relevant for
the host communities in response to arrival of guests from near abroad – for
cosmopolitanism depends on how you behave to your neighbours, and not to whom
you had never seen. In Europe and elsewhere we have today the call to create
“cities of refuge” that invokes the tradition of past several centuries. That
tradition has been present in the East also – all the more therefore the need
to re-emphasize the significance of empowering the host communities, and not so
much a single institution called the state or one of its organs, in deciding
issues of providing shelter, relief, and hospitality. The vigilance that human
rights institutions and public platforms have shown, for instance, in case of
the Sri Lankan refugees in Tamil Nadu, proves the point that the politics of
democracy and justice sits at the heart of the issue of hospitality. The call
for a democratisation of the rights regime from top to bottom - the
international, the nation-state and the local power structure - will therefore
inevitably arise in any discussion on the history of hospitality in India in
the last fifty years. For, after all the politics of hospitality is a constant
negotiation between the unconditional and the conditional, the absolute and the
relative, cosmopolitan and the particular – between the “unconditional purity”
or the “infinite responsibility” that humanity’s own ethics constantly evokes
by creating its own history, also the history of the quotidian - the legal,
political, and the social. Can we reconcile these? It seems that this will
remain an eternal task, as much for countries and societies that have signed
the 1951 Convention and those that have not, or as much for countries that have
national refugee laws and those that have not.
7.4 Guests, as the Tibetan refugees in India have
shown, can be creative and productive, they can add to the wealth and colours
of life, in as much as refugees as guests can become murderers as the Taleban
experience in Pakistan and Afghanistan suggests. Therefore beyond law remains
ethic, though one can reasonably inquire as Derrida does in a recent lecture,
can one “cultivate an ethic of hospitality? Hospitality is culture itself and
not simply one ethic among others.”[ix]
Granting the suggestion of the impossibility in this task, the issue still
remains, and what Derrida himself could not ignore, what is the Great Law of
Hospitality? The law that will combine the absolute virtue with the
conditional, the ethic with plural and restrictive laws of asylum, shelter, and
sanctuaries, supervision with visitation, stay with creativity, and finally protection
with reconciliation? These are no doubt obscure questions, but I believe, it is
time that we draw certain references from the Indian experience narrated in
these eleven essays. For, once we have drawn these broad references, we shall
be in a better position to understand the paradoxes of hospitality, and shall
be therefore more sensitive to the limits of law and the confines of legal
practices, and thus appreciative of the imperative to push the frontier of the
ethics of care. We shall acquire a greater capacity to transform and improve
the law within the available historical space to approximate the moral law of
an unconditional hospitality by expanding the conditional law of a right to
hospitality.
8. Inferences
from India’s fifty-five years’ history of refugee care
8.1
These broad inferences from India’s fifty-five years’ history of refugee care
are:
·
The
first refugees to arrive in independent India were not the aliens who had to be
given shelter; they were part of the nation.
·
The
first practices of refugee care and administration built up through not so much
law as practices – practices of care, rehabilitation, and social security.
·
Institutions
became the concrete results of these practices and the few laws, resulting in a
durable tradition of hospitality that the State cannot fully endorse and
embrace, nor can reject.
·
“Partition
refugees” thus leave deep mark on the subsequent pattern in which the state is
to combine care with power; this is the mark of ambiguity.
·
The
contest between the notions of charity and rights that began as soon as
refugees first started pouring in has influenced the subsequent discourse of
“hospitality”, a term that is supposed to overcome the contradiction. The
current discourse of human rights on refugee protection in India takes off from
this old contest between the two notions.
·
The
foundations of the legal discourse on the aliens as developed in the colonial
time provided the beginnings of strategic ambiguity in this respect. Who
becomes alien, when, declared by whom – became a deeply circumstantial matter,
never to be finally defined by law.
·
Alien-hood
thereby became the other part of a democratic state, which had needed and
created at the same time the citizens as its political foundation. Thus India
got citizens who through several succeeding years chose to opt out of
citizenship and move to other countries as aliens, or the country found it
faced with aliens who had opted for India and now wanted her citizenship.
Similarly, some communities became part-citizens, part-aliens, and some who had
been all through citizens, became in changed circumstances the “stranded
minorities”. In all these metamorphoses, the foundations laid by colonial law
and practices held ground.
·
Because offering
shelter and protection became deeply circumstantial, including the issue of
near-permanent residence much beyond temporary visitation, local communities
developed their response of charity and fatigue, benign care and ill feeling
and animosity – a response that characterized the conduct of the State also.
Local response and responsibility have turned out to be as important if not
more in influencing the fate of the refugees, also the language in which the
task of protecting the rights of the refugees goes on.
·
Keeping the
shelter-seekers in ghetto, proscribing there movement, creating ever new penal
colonies, thus underwriting the nature of charity that the State has been
providing to shelter-seekers, become in time a feature of the asylum and care
practices of the State, though with some exceptions. What began in the Andaman
Islands and Dandakaranya, continues – protecting and penalizing have become
inter-linked responsibilities. The policy of having prison-like refugee camps bears as in many
other cases in this context such practices in the West, for example in Sungatte
in France, where non-documented would-be refugees, actually non-identities, are
detained and from where the detainees try to escape to Great Britain.
·
Refugee
flows in India in time became massive and mixed flows (it had been indeed often
massive, and now became mixed), and to a large extent, the foundational history
of care in the early years of independent India saved many shelter-seekers, who
formed part of the mixed and massive flows. Now, the two discourses have become
linked – the issue of illegal immigrants and that of refugees. One influences,
predicates, and prejudices the other.
·
Finally,
what the Convention of 1951 was powerless about is that, the states-system
would finally decide the relation between visitation and residence. Thus,
refugees who thought on arrival in India in 1947 that they would go back, did
not, and were in all seriousness never told by the State also to go back;
similarly, the Tibetan refugees have not been told to go back, or repatriated;
on the other hand, hundreds and thousands of refugees from East Pakistan went
back as soon as the war of 1971 was over. Part of the Chakma refugees flowing
in this country in successive phases stayed back, part went back, and part had
to be induced to go back. In some cases, the State allowed the refugees to come
in, and then inexplicably, it shut the door on them. Without a deliberate
effort, the behaviour of the State in this respect has been exactly according
to the spirit of the cold war that largely influenced the drafting of the 1951
Convention regarding visitation and residence. The enigma, if there is any, is
therefore not so much in India’s non-accession to the Convention, but on the
way it defines and configures its responsibility. Responsibility is other great history, which runs parallel to that
of rights and care, still largely unwritten, but this history has no doubt has
defined the relation between care and power.
8.2 These
inferences indicate features of the social economy of care and hospitality
exhibited by communities, gentry, and the state. They show the circumstances
when the State felt the need for policy initiatives to encourage citizens to
give alms and show hospitality to the outsiders seeking refuge, at times
insisting on compliance by the subject population of its directives, and at
times setting up massive arrangements and campaigns for general hospitality.
They also show the circumstances when the State has felt the need no more than
to leave it to local population and local governments. Yet, as a result of the
episodic general campaigns launched by the State for hospitality and care,
organizations spring up, which taking the mandate seriously want to carry on
with the work – their hospitality then becomes a point of disturbance for the
State policy of withdrawing from a general campaign for hospitality.
Notwithstanding the dramatic forms of generosity of the State, therefore, it is
an overall picture of graded care, fundamentally weak welfare system, a
hierarchy of priorities of the State in giving help, shelter, and care, and a
differentiated notion of charity in public welfare provision for the strangers.
To be true, possibly there was never an undifferentiated notion of charity,
though at times the rich and the poor were equally moved to take the work of
care and charity seriously. As we know, to remove the uncertainties in
responding to the needs for care, countries gradually move into a legal
obligation regarding the principle of compulsory welfare of the shelter-seeker.
The price to be paid for, it seems to me, is in the form of accepting
discretion of the legal authority to define the terms of entitlement. Public
welfare provisions have become thus in this case, as in every other field, a
matter of “calculation, discrimination, and discretion”.[x]
2. Bhutanese Refugee Repatriation and Present Situation.
BHUTANESE REFUGEE
REPRESENTATIVE REPATRIATION COMMITTEE
S.B.Subba
Chairman
- Introduction
Bhutan is a tiny Himalayan
Kingdom, situated in eastern Himalayas, bordered to the north by Tibetan
Autonomous Region of China and to the east, west and south by India. According
to a publication of the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB), entitled BHUTAN:
Himalayan Kingdom, 1979, pp.14; "Bhutan's people fall into three broad
ethnic groups. The first, the Sarchops (37%
of the total population), are believed to have been the earliest inhabitants of
the country. Apparently Indo-Mongoloid in origin, the question of where they
came from, or exactly when they reached Bhutan, remained unresolved. Today the Sarchops live largely in eastern
regions. The second group, known as the Ngalongs
(20%) is the descendants of Tibetan Immigrants, who came to Bhutan from
about the 9th century onwards, settling primarily in the west. The
third section of the population is the (ethnic) Nepalese called Lhotsampas (43%) who began to settle in
the south towards the end of last century".
Until early 17th
century Bhutan existed as a conglomeration of numerous discordant petty
principalities. In 1616 AD Shabdrung Nawang Namgyel, an incarnate Lama
belonging to the House of Rgya of Druk at Ralung in Tibet came to Bhutan,
united the country, established theocracy and became its supreme head. In 1651
AD he established a dual form of government called Chhoesid, with a division of authority between the political head,
the Desi and the spiritual head the
Je Khempo. After almost three and a half century of existence, Chhoesid system was abolished and the
present hereditary monarchy was established in 1907 by Tongsa Penlop(Governor)
Ugyen Wangchuk.
In 1953 the third King Jigme
Dorji Wangchuk established Tshongdu (National
Assembly). He declared Bhutan as a constitutional Monarchy through resolution
12 of the 30th Session of National Assembly held in 1969, wherein
after a system of vote of confidence on the King was introduced. Bhutan became
the member of United Nations on September 21, 1971. Following the demise of his
father in 1972, 17 years old Crown Prince Jigme Singye Wangchuk ascended the
golden throne. Thereinafter all democratic reforms brought about by the third
Monarch were reverted establishing Royal Absolutism.
- Genesis of the problem
The creation of more than
100,000 Bhutanese refugees is not an overnight act of RGOB. It is a carefully
thought policy and maneuvering plan to depopulate the Lhotsampa(Nepali speaking) through the mechanism of census
exercise. The RGOB enacted 1985
Citizenship Act after revoking the earlier Citizenship Acts of 1958 and 1977
ostensibly to disenfranchise as many Lhotsampas
as possible which otherwise there was no need of enacting such acts
frequently. In early 1988 the RGOB began
implementing the 1985 citizenship act and conducted census in the 6 districts
of southern Bhutan. The officials consisting only from the north and east
demanded the documents of proof of only 1958 and unable to produce were
declared non-Bhutanese and ordered to leave the country. The officials never
considered the then existing system of non-issuing of tax receipts and were
mostly paid in kinds. The exercise was aimed not only to detect illegal
immigrants per se but also find fault
and declare Lhotsampas as illegal
immigrants though living there for generations. The government has empowered
the census officials to confiscate all the citizenship cards issued in 1982 and
other documents in possession of the people. Besides the census, several other
methods were used to force the people leave the country. In 1989 cultural
pluralism was banned. Against this backdrop, Bhutan witnessed a Human Rights
Movement in 1990. Instead of addressing the people's genuine grievances the
RGOB let loose a reign of terror and the consequences were appalling. Thousands
were arrested, tortured, raped and killed by the Security Forces and many began
to flee the country for safety. On top of this, the RGOB from 1991 started a
systematic process of coercing tens of thousands of Bhutanese citizens to fill
and sign the "Voluntary Migration Forms" and forcibly evicted them,
heightening the refugee crisis. Unable to obtain safety, security and relief
from the Government of India though immediate neighbor and supposed to be the
first country of asylum the Bhutanese refugees were compelled to come to third
country-Nepal to seek asylum.
The crux of the issue is the
question of fundamental rights to nationality and citizenship to Lhotsampas. Bhutan was an example of a
nation with peace and tranquility where Lhotsampas
lived together with other ethnics harmoniously and contributed for the
development of the nation without any doubt and fear of such unprecedented
misfortune. It becomes hard to believe that a human calamity would erupt from a
small and peaceful Himalayan Kingdom. Every one thought in the serene heart of
"Sangrila" a bastion of Mahayana Buddhism, which teaches tolerance,
brotherhood and compassion the people were happy and living in peace. Today the
country which is proud of holding high the principles of Buddhism has created
miseries and suffering to about 130,000 its own citizens. The regime has shown
the seed of hatred to a section of its subject and has arbitrarily and
systematically uprooted them from the country.
- Refugees in Nepal
A trickle of 234 Bhutanese refugees
crossed over India and first arrived in Nepal in 1991. The refugees pitched up
their shanty huts barely enough to protect them from the sandy wind of the bank
of Maidhar River. They eked out their livelihood from the alms given by the
local Samaritans. However, as the RGOB intensified its eviction program with
the help of the security forces, the arrival of the refugees started swelling
up in Nepal as Bhutan's immediate neighbor, India could not provide asylum.
When the number became tangible to 7000 and their situation became harrowing
with more and more Bhutanese refugees flowing in creating unmanageable
situation, His Majesty's Government of Nepal (HMG-Nepal) requested UNHCR to
provide relief assistance. Now there are more than 100000 Bhutanese refugees
living in 7 camps in 2 districts of eastern Nepal.
- Role of HMG-Nepal
Apprehensive of the large
exodus of Bhutanese refugees, HMG-Nepal has initiated dialogue with the RGOB
during the SAARC summit in Dhaka in 1993. The King of Bhutan waive the matter
just by requesting the HMG-Nepal to close the gate for asylum which would
attract more arrivals. But the King of Bhutan never assured that there would be
no further eviction. The refugees arrival increased in multiple which now
numbers more than 100,000 in the seven camps managed by UNHCR and its
implementing partners. HMG-Nepal provides shelter and security to the Bhutanese
refugees. It is an extra burden to shoulder the 100,000 plus refugees with its
poor economic situation coupled with sukumbasi(landless) problem.
- Bilateral Talks and outcome
It is almost twelve years that
Bhutanese refugees have been languishing in the seven camps in the districts of
Jhapa and Morang in eastern Nepal with a very uncertain future. UNHCR and its
implementing partners manage the camps. Gradually the facilities are reducing
because of the fatigue compassion of the donor agencies.
In an endeavor to find an
amicable solution, HMG-Nepal has initiated bilateral talk with the RGOB since
1993. So far eleven rounds of bilateral talks had taken place. On 10th
round of bilateral talk and after tremendous pressure from International
community the RGOB agreed for verification of the refugees in the camps. As
agreed the Joint Verification Team (JVT) started the verification of refugees
in Khudunabari camp one of the 7 camps on 26th March 2001 and
completed on 14th December 2001 verifying 12804 individuals and 1933
families. But the result of the verification which was expected immediately is
not yet out even after the lapse of 14 months. The delay of declaration of the
result of verification and non-continuation of verification in the remaining 6
camps is frustrating and disillusioned the refugees for early, amicable and
permanent solution. This is solely because of the intransigent position of the
RGOB. It has always been delaying the resolution of the issue with a view to
frustrate the refugees to the maximum extent that would automatically lead them
to opt for local assimilation or settle elsewhere. However, in the recently
concluded 12th round of talk on 5th- 6th
February 2003 the two governments of Bhutan and Nepal have agreed to declare
the result of the verified refugees on basis of 4 categories and start
repatriation. Though the process would start but is going to take indefinite
time to completely resolve the problem or never as Bhutan is reluctant to take
all the Bhutanese back.
Although there has been all party
consensus on resolution of Bhutanese refugee problem, there had not been much
concerted effort. This was opined mainly due to the unstable Government and the
lack of serious homework on the part of HMG-Nepal. It is also observed that two
Ministries-Home and Foreign of HMG-Nepal which are responsible for the
Bhutanese refugees and resolution of the problem lack close coordination on the
issue. The refugees are apprehensive that unless the two Ministries work very
closely if possible with the refugees too it is impossible to deal with the
RGOB effectively. On the other hand, RGOB has been all the time prepared and
successfully maneuvering HMG-Nepal with its clever ploy. The HMG-Nepal has made
mistake by accepting the proposal of the RGOB to categorize the refugees in four
categories:
- Bonafide Bhutanese if evicted forcefully
- Bhutanese who emigrated
- Non-Bhutanese and
- Bhutanese who have committed criminal acts.
Now this has became an irksome
condition for HMG-Nepal to salvage. This has given an opportunity to RGOB to
beat around the bush and procrastinate the progress in the talk and declaring
the result of the verification. To show to the world that the RGOB is very much
concern for the resolution of the Bhutanese refugee problem ahead of HMG-Nepal,
it even invited the individuals and opposition leaders from Nepal to give
inputs as how to find the solution. But refugees never felt the impact of the
visits instead Bhutan seems to have won their heart. On the other hand,
HMG-Nepal holds no any responsibilities of providing permanent settlements
other than asylum on humanitarian ground. So there is fear of creating
statelessness by the imbroglio and decision to declare the result on the basis
of 4 categories and Bhutan which has been always refusing to accept the people
in the category 2. We are also not interested to take non-Bhutanese or force
any Bhutanese who would like to settle elsewhere.
- Role of the Government of India (GOI)
Bhutanese refugees have approached
the GOI for help to resolve the problem amicably besides requesting for
shelter. Many appeals have been made to the GOI to help resolve the problem as
being immediate neighbor and also the Foreign policies and Security of Bhutan
are guided by India as per the 1949 Indo-Bhutan treaty. So far there has not
been any response. It is also learnt that informally, the HMG-Nepal also had
requested the GOI to help resolve the Bhutanese refugee issue.
On the other hand the GOI has so
far maintained the neutral stand and has waived the issue to be solved
bilaterally. But every one is of the opinion that the Bhutanese refugee problem
cannot be solved without the involvement of the GOI in view of the following
facts:
- India is the immediate neighbor of Bhutan and Nepal and would have been the first country of asylum.
- There are Bhutanese refugees taking shelter in India.
- The RGOB has been alleging that there are Indians in the refugee camps in Nepal.
- The Bhutanese refugees crossed over to Nepal through Indian soil.
- The Bhutanese refugees have to pass through India in the event of repatriation.
Therefore, the GOI's involvement is
felt necessary to resolve the Bhutanese refugee problem amicably and
permanently.
- International Community
In the initial stage of the refugee
arrival, the international communities were very active and supportive to the
Bhutanese refugee issue. There has been wide campaign and advocacy on the
flagrant human rights violation and arbitrary deprivation of basic human rights
to a section of the Bhutanese citizens on ethnic ground.
The American Senator's letter to the
King of Bhutan, two visits of the Assistant Secretary of State from US, the
State Department reports on Bhutan, the visit of UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, visit of High Commissioner UNHCR, the discussion of the Bhutanese
refugee issue in the UN Commission and two chairman's statement in the
Sub-Commission, adoption of two resolutions by the European Parliament,
discussion of the Bhutanese refugee issue in the British Parliament, frequent
diplomatic missions visits to the refugee camps etc created pressures on the
RGOB which compelled to open dialogue with His Majesty's Government of
Nepal(HMG-Nepal) in 1993 and agree for verification in 2000. However, despite
the tremendous pressure and urge from International community Bhutan still is
not sincere and have political will to resolve the problem peacefully and
permanently which is obvious from the delay of the verification result of the
Khudunabari camp. Therefore unless the International community takes up some
assertive steps rather than cajoling, Bhutan is not easily going to accept all
the Bhutanese back. On the other hand because of lack of progress in the
resolution of the protracted refugee problem, the International community has
started showing fatigue compassion which is adversely affecting in all the
areas of refugee concern.
- Role of donor agencies to Bhutan
Bhutan is being highly appreciated
for its performance and efficiency in the aid management and keeping intact its
cultural and traditional values. On the other hand, they have ignored that in
the pretext of protecting the culture and tradition a section of ethnic
community are being arbitrarily deprived of their fundamental rights and
indiscriminately thrown out of the country. The diplomacy of the donor agencies
to keep Bhutan happy has been a clean chit to Bhutan which has encouraged
further to implement various discriminatory policies to coerce the southern
Bhutanese to leave the country. There is no any aid reduction inspite of 1/6 of
population being thrown out in exile and spending a harrowing lives in the
refugee camps. They are very skeptic and careful not to offend with pernicious
refugee issue to Bhutan. The Bhutanese refugees are the victim of systematic
ethnic cleansing and blatant human rights violation. We appreciate the stand
taken by the Government of Denmark in the Round Table Meeting (RTM) in Thimphu
in 2000 and subsequent decision to close its Aid Monitoring Office in Bhutan
from July this year. However we are dismay over again renewing the policy and
reopening it from January 2003 which should not have been until the refugee
problem is resolved. The 8th Round Table meeting (RTM) of donor
countries to Bhutan was held in Geneva from 18th- 19th
February 2003 and reportedly the countries this time were more firmed in their position
on resolution of the refugee problem and Bhutan was pressurized to agree for
repatriation of Bhutanese who would like to return.
9. Role of INGOs
Most of the INGOs are actively
involved and continuing their support to the plight of the Bhutanese refugees.
Besides their role in advocacy and campaign through publications and their
participation in the international forum, many of them have been supporting
some of the Bhutanese groups financially for their activities. Organizations
like the Amnesty International, ICRC are closely monitoring the human rights
situation and the prison conditions in Bhutan even though they are not
permitted free access of places of choice and the prisons. However, this has
enhanced to highlight the human rights situation in Bhutan and improvement in
the prisons and prisoners' conditions to some extent. This has also pressurized
the RGOB to release prisoners detained arbitrarily and without fair trial.
However, political prisoners like Gomchhen Thinley Weizer and others still
continue to languish in the prisons in Bhutan.
- Role of NGOs in Nepal
Most of the NGOs in Nepal are
actively supporting the Bhutanese movement and help resolve the refugee issue.
They have been raising the issue in various forums besides organizing workshops,
seminars and interaction programs for the refugees. Nonetheless, some isolated
support and tie up programs with some individual Bhutanese organizations have
not yielded desired end results in terms of bringing closeness and harmony
among the Bhutanese refugee groups. In an effort to give impetus to the effort
of HMG-Nepal, Bhutanese Refugee Repatriation Support Group (BRRSG) was formed
on 18th August 2002 by the senior citizens consisting of
Ex-Ministers, Ex-Ambassadors and Ex-Foreign Experts of Nepal coordinated by
Shailendra Kumar Upadhya, Ex-Foreign Minister. They have been extensively
campaigning for repatriation of the refugees and possibly trying to mediate
dialogue with the Bhutan government and the refugee representatives.
- Role of NGOs in India
The first NGO to take up the
Bhutanese refugee issue is the South Asian Human Rights Documentation Center
(SAHRDC). The Executive Director personally visited the affected border
districts of Bhutan in 1991 for first hand information and helped in disseminating
classified cases to the Amnesty International and other International agencies.
The center is continuing its support through its publications and raising the
issue in international forums. Other groups like Bhutan Solidarity India (BSI)
and Indo-Bhutan Friendship Society (IBFS) are also actively involved in
campaign and advocacy of Bhutanese refugee issue with the GOI. They also
organize meetings and conferences.
- Situation inside Bhutan
The Lhotsampas continue to live in a state of fear and persecution.
There is no freedom of movement and freedom of speech. On every check point the
southern Bhutanese have to show identity card and register their names with the
police for traveling to interior Bhutan. They are being deprived of most of the
government facilities. Education to the children, health facilities and other
public services are not accessible to them easily. Production of No Objection
Certificate (NOC) is mandatory for availing these facilities. Even for private
employment the southern Bhutanese have to produce NOC.
Over 3000 Lhotsampas civil servants are expelled
from government jobs after the refugee problem began. According to the decision
of the 75th National Assembly session of Bhutan, 219 relatives of
the people living in the refuge camps were compulsorily retired from the
government service in the beginning of 1999. The situation is becoming all the
more worst as the recently concluded 80th National Assembly Session
has further urged the RGOB not to allow to return the refugees in case of which
might create insecurity for the country. But the same assembly members
expressed their grave concern of apprehension of the threat posed by the
presence of United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), National Democratic Front
of Bodoland (NDFB) and Kamtapuri Liberation Organization (KLO), in Bhutan,
insurgents from Assam and West Bengal. The insurgents were given safe haven by
the RGOB in order to prevent them from conniving with the refugees.
The King has taken the full
responsibility of resolving the problem of militants from India but has ignored
the refugee problem as if solved which once was also the responsibility taken
by the King in 1993 and even threatened to abdicate the throne within 3 years
if could not resolve the southern Bhutanese problem. To further complicate the
issue, the government is continuously distributing the lands owned by the
Bhutanese refugees now living in the camps in Nepal. About 8000 families from
the north and eastern Bhutan have been resettled on the lands belonging to the
refugees in various districts. This is going to create serious conflict in the
event of repatriation. The RGOB is determined to erase the existence of the Lhotsampas from Bhutan and has even gone
to the extent of changing the names of the districts and villages and also the
land registration numbers that are being held by the people now living in the
camps.
13. Changing policies of RGOB
The King of Bhutan to
everyone's surprise dissolved the age-old cabinet in the 76th
National Assembly in 1999 and appointed well-qualified ministers and entrusted
them with the responsibility of running the government. He also appointed the
Chairman synonym to Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers on a rotation
basis of one year tenure. He also further declared that he would remain only as
the Head of the State and not as the Government. Further in November 2001 the
King has appointed 39 members headed by the Chief Justice of High Court to
draft the constitution of the country. The process of changes that suppose to
benefit all the Bhutanese however is aimed to bring changes despising the
refugees in exile. The southern Bhutanese are given very insignificant role in
the government administration and more and more northern Bhutanese are inducted
to gradually replace the southern Bhutanese.
The government has started
decentralization of developmental activities. It is encouraging more
participation of the grass roots and take responsibility of the developmental
activities in the respective village, block and district. The government has
established Gewog Yargay Tshogchung-GYT(Block
Development Committee) and Dzongkhag
Yargay Tshogchung-DYT(District Development Committee). They are also
entrusted with the responsibility to plan and implement the development
activities. All these changes are to keep the people happy and not support the
repatriation of the refugees with whom have to share the benefits. Also this is
to show to the International community that democratic changes are favored and
process is taking place.
14.
Refugee situation in the camps
The Bhutanese refugee
problem is a protracted problem with no complete solution insight despite the
bilateral talks between 2 governments of HMG Nepal and RGOB and completion of
verification of refugees in Khudunabari one of the 7 camps. However, the
refugees are still living on hope to go back to Bhutan. There are no any single
Bhutanese who would not like to go to Bhutan. On the other hand there is
frustration and expression of hopelessness yet no body is openly able to
express what exactly should be the suitable solution and arrangement that to be
made. The recent decision of the two governments to verify the people in 4
categories and start repatriation whoever are accepted is a little solace but
not a complete solution. The two governments have decided to work on the
categories from 24th February 2003 and on 24th March 2003
the Joint Ministerial Level Committee (JMLC) meeting will be held and
repatriation would start. Nevertheless there are still 6 camps almost with 90000
people are to be verified and repatriated.
15. Role of Bhutanese Refugees and
formation of BRRRC
There are more than 60
Bhutanese organizations and political parties altogether. All are formed in
exile to take up the Bhutanese refugee issue and to establish human rights and
democracy in Bhutan. Seeing no any concrete progress achieved by any of the
organization and political party, the people in the camps have decided to form
a single consolidated body to give proper direction to achieve the goal of
repatriation. Therefore, they have decided to elect their leaders from the
respected districts, camps and human rights organizations and formed a body
known as the Bhutanese Refugee Representative Repatriation Committee (BRRRC).
The objective of BRRRC is" Early
Repatriation of all the Bhutanese refugees to their original homesteads with
safety, dignity and honor". It is the only peoples' mandated and
legitimate body to speak on behalf of the Bhutanese refugees. After its
formation on 16th January 1999, it has taken up many activities to
achieve its aims and objectives. It is endeavoring to garner support and
solidarity and build international opinions to pressurize RGOB to help solve
the refugee problem peacefully and permanently as early as possible and enable
the Bhutanese refugees' repatriation with safety, dignity and honor.
3. REFUGEES[1]:
THE EXPERIENCE IN BANGLADESH
Dr. Bhumitra
Chakma
Associate
Professor
Department of
International Relations
Dhaka
University
Dhaka
Section I:
INTRODUCTION
The
movement of people although has been a constant phenomenon in Human history,
but the ‘forcing of people’ from their established and known habitats emerged
with the birth of a territorial nation-state.[2] The nation-state system emerged in Europe in
late eighteenth century and the post-revolutionary France is considered as the
first such political entity. The
structural elements of the nation-state created political, social, economic and
environmental conditions during the nation-building process, which led to a
widespread displacement of people from their usual habitats. The problem intensified with the world-wide
spread of the nation-state system gradually assuming religious, racial and/or
ideological character. Although remained
dormant under the structure of superpower politics and rivalry during the Cold
War years, the refugee phenomenon became an issue of serious concern in global
politics with the phenomenal rise of involuntary or forced movement of people
across national boundaries as a undeniable reference point in the study of
international security in the post-Cold War era. The upsurge in refugee flow in the post-Cold
War era, it is noteworthy, was primarily caused by nation-state induced
factors, such as the state repression for political or ethnic reasons or
failure of the state to provide economic, social or environmental sense of
security to the people. Not
surprisingly, this refugee phenomenon is more evident in the developing regions
of the world. With the ethnic,
socio-political, economic and environmental turmoil being on the rise at the
global level, more visibly in the South Asia region, the refugee problem will
remain a matter of serious concern for humankind.
The
refugee phenomenon has been an integral part of Bangladesh’s state formation
process. It is a refugee-generating as
well as a refugee-receiving state.
During the war of independence, Bangladesh produced about ten million
refugees, who took refuge in neighbouring India. Upon independence, about three hundred
thousand Biharis became refugees who proclaimed themselves as ‘Stranded
Pakistanis’ in the aftermath of the war and opted for repatriation to
Pakistan. An agreement in 1974
facilitated repatriation of 170,000 Bihari refugees. But Pakistan’s domestic politics and its general
disinterest in receiving the Biharis have prevented a permanent settlement of
the problem till date.
Furthermore,
in the post-independence era Bangladesh generated as well as hosted
refugees. It produced over 50,000 ethnic
conflict-induced Pahari refugees, who crossed international broder to take
refuge in the neighbouring Indian state of Tripura. A substantial number of Hindus have also
allegedly migrated to India since independence.
Insecurity and discrimination against this religious minority community
as well as the factor or religious affinity with the majority population of
India have precipitated their movement.
In addition, development activities and environmental degradation in the
process of nation-building and natural calamities have displaced a large number
of people in Bangladesh, some of whom have crossed international borders and
settled in various Indian states, i.e., Tripura, Assam, Meghalaya etc. Bangladesh also hosted about half a million
Rohingya refugees from Myanmar twice in its short history as an independent
state.
Given
the above background, this paper explores how states in order to protect their
narrowly defined national interest have ended up in producing refugees and
violated the human rights of these displaced people keeping the context of
Bangladesh into perspective. For a
closer exposition, three particular cases – the Bihari refugees, the Pahari
refugees, and the Rohingya refugees – are examined in greater details. The next section presents each of the three
selected cases with particular emphasis on the sources and reasons of their
displacements, which tell the story of their miseries. The final section will sum up the main points
discussed in the previous section.
SECTION II:
CASES
Case I: The Bihari Refugees
The
history of the Bihari refugees goes back to the partition of India in
1947. Their displacement occurred in the
wake of communal violence during and in the aftermath of the partition (for
example, 30,000 Muslims were killed in the ‘Great Bihar Killing’ in
October-November 1947). About a million
of them migrated into the eastern wing of Pakistan (East Pakistan),[3]
mostly from the eastern Indian states of Bihar, West Bengal, Assam, Orissa,
Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura and Sikkim.[4] During the period of united Pakistan
(1947-1971), the Urdu-speaking Biharis were not assimilated with the society of
East Pakistan and remained as a distinct cultural-linguistic group. They generally associated and identified
themselves with the West Pakistani society primarily based on a shared
linguistic heritage and supported the West Pakistani governing elite in the
process of capturing the economic and political power in East Pakistan. The Biharis, consequently, enjoyed preferential
treatment in various sectors of the East Pakistan economy and a relatively
privileged position in terms of official patronage during the period of united
Pakistan. Indeed, initially the arrival
of Biharis and the positive discrimination of the Pakistan Government in terms
of refugee rehabilitation were not resented by the Bengalis. However, the euphoria of the formation of
Pakistan and the positive attitude of the Bengalis towards the Biharis was
short-lived. It was over as early as
March 1948 when Mohammad Ali Jinnah announced in Dhaka that “Urdu and Urdu
alone shall be the State language of Pakistan.”
During the language movement, the Biharis instead of supporting the
Bengalis sided with the West Pakistani ruling elite. Furthermore, in the 1954 provincial election
and in the 1970 general election, they extended their supportto the Muslim
League, which symbolised and championed the domination of the West Pakistanais
over the Bengalis. They also supported
the West Pakistani ruling elite and many of them actively participated in the
military actions against the Bengalis in the 1971 Bangladesh independence
War. The exclusive attitude of the
Biharis and their pro-West Pakistani political activities resulted in the
formation of an anti-Bihari sentiment among the Bengalis.
Against
the above backdrop and more importantly, because of their active anti-independence role (for example, their participation in
the East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces, i.e., Razakars and Al-Shams, raised by
the Pakistani authorities), the Biharis became subject to widespread political persecution preceding and during
the Independence War, and in the aftermath of liberation.[5] Following independence, the Bihari political
persecution continued and their properties and houses were taken over by the
Bengalis. Several Government initiatives
[for example, the Acting President Order I of 1972, the Bangladesh Abandoned
Property (Control, Management and Disposal) Order 1972, President’s Order 16
etc.] were also responsible for the dispossession of Bihari properties. As a result, by the middle of 1972, a total
of 1,008,680 Biharis were domiciled in various shanty camps spreading all over
Bangladesh.[6]
The
Biharis were offered Bangladeshi citizenship in 1972 under the Presidential
Order – 149. According to Bangladesh
Government sources, 600,000 Biharis accepted the offer,[7]
while 529,669 registered with the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC)
opting to return to their ‘country of nationality’ – Pakistan. Islamabad, however, was less interested and
showed a lax attitude about the repatriation of the Biharis except those who
joined the East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces and surrendered with the Pakistan
Army. As a Pakistani Foreign Ministry
official said: “What are we supposed to do with them (the Biharis)? We have enough problems already. Besides, you must remember that they are
really Indian refugees.”[8] Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the post-1971 first
civilian president of Pakistan, was even unwilling to admit any sizeable number
of Bihari refugees to be repatriated to Pakistan.[9] Hence, Pakistan adopted such a policy and
legislated categories of Biharis to be able to qualify to return in such a way
which effectively stymied the repatriation process and denationalised the
Biharis in Bangladesh.
On
the other hand, Bangladesh’s diplomacy with Pakistan began with the position
that it would not establish and normalise relations with Islamabad unless the
former agreed to, and expedite the repatriation of the non-Bengalis including
the Biharis. This forced the Pakistan
Government to agree to take back a large number of Biharis in the 1973 New
Delhi Agreement as well as in the Tripartite Agreement of 1974 in exchange for
the return of the Bengalis in Pakistan.[10] Followisng the conclusion of these
agreements, the ICRC registered 539,639 Biharis who intended to return to
Pakistan. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) facilitated the return of 108,750 Bihari
refugees by June 1974.[11] After that it had to suspend the repatriation
process due to exhaustion of funds. The
Bangladesh Government complained to Islamabad about the slow repatriation of
the Biharis and raised the issue during the 1974 Mujib-Bhutto summit. The Pakistani side, as it was earlier, showed
little interest in it. Bangladesh raised
the issue at the Commonwealth Leader’s Conference in Jamaica in May 1974 and in
the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly in December of the same
year. Despite vigorous diplomatic
initiatives and in international campaign to create pressure on Islamabad, no
more Bihari refugees were repatriated to Pakistan during the remaining period
of the Mujib rule (till August 1975).
Following
the fall of the Mujib Government in 1975, Dhaka initiated new diplomatic
initiatives to persuade Islamabad to resume the repatriation process. Saudi Arabia offered a C-130 transport plane,
and Qatar and Kuwait contributed $500,000 and $50,000 respectively to restart
the repatriation of the Bihari refugees.
During a visit to Bangladesh in August 1977, Pakistan’s Foreign
Secretary agreed to take 25,000 hardship cases through international
agencies. But these were from the 1974
ICRC registered list and no new hardship cases were in fact included. Islamabad was even reluctant to receive the
above-noted promised number of refugees and during the visit of Bangladesh
Foreing Secretary to Pakistan in July 1978, the Pakistani Government “brought
down the figure from 25,000 to 16,000”.[12]
The
Bangladesh Government raised the issue at the Saana Islamic Countries’ Foreign
Ministers sConference in January 1985 and urged the Muslim countries to exert
pressure on Islamabad to take back the Bihari refugees.[13] The move was the direct result of Islamabad’s
recent position that it was “the problem of Bangladesh.”[14] These indeed indicated a deadlock on the matter.
Despite
the above, Pakistan’s President Zia-ul Haq, however, desired a solution to the
problem on humanitarian grounds and asserted that Pakistan was ready to accept
the Bihari refugees if sufficient financial resources were raised for their
transfer and rehabilitation. During a
visit to Bangladeh in December 1985, he stated that Pakistan was ‘not legally
bound’ to take ‘non-locals,’ “but on humanitarian and moral grounds we have
agreed to look into the matter.” Zia
also met a delegation of the Bihari refugees during the visit and assured them
that they would be repatriated as soon as necessary arrangements were made.”[15] On 27 November 1986, Pakistan’s Foreign
Minister Shahibjada Yakub Khan stated in Pakistan’s National Assembly that his
country was ‘morally committed’ to the repatriation of the rest of the
non-Bengalis from Bangladesh for which a sum of Rs.490 million was required.[16] Pakistan and Rabita Al-Alam Al-Islami (an
Islamic charity organisation, hereafter Rabita) signed a trust agreement in
1988,[17]
wherein the former agreed to resettle the Bihari refugees on humanitarian
grounds. A repatriation and resettlement
plan was drawn up which included the construction of 36,000 houses spread over
80 sites costing about $278 million and with approximately $30 million for
community services and $10 million for the transportation of the refugees. Despite alaborate preparations, the
repatriation process could not get oof the ground and the first scheduled
flight was cancelled due to violent protest and demonstration in Sindh.
Benazir
Bhutto was traditionally opposed to the idea of transferring the Biharis to
Pakistan and followed the party politics (Pakistan Peoples Party to PPP) and
the state policy of her father (Zulfikar Ali Buttto) after she came to power in
1988. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, it is
noteworthy, introduced the restrictive entry regulations for the Bihari
refugees in the early 1970s. during her
tenure as Prime Minister, Benazir did not grant the citizenship rights either
to the refugees in Bangladesh or to the 100,000 Biharis who have moved to
Pakistan illegally since 1977. Terming
“the issue of stranded Biharis is a complicated one,” and “politically potent,”
she even proposed to Dhaka that they should be permanently settled in
Bangladesh. During her visit to
Bangladesh in October 1989, Benazir proposed the Ershad Government that the
Biharis be permanently settled in Bangladesh and Pakistan would help to raise
funds from the Muslim world for their settlement.[18] Benazir in fact feared that the Biharis would
end up in Karachi, which would exacerbate the existing ethnic tension between
Mujahirs and the Sindhi community.
Therefore, playing the Sindh card, Benazir Bhutto indefinitely put off
the repatriation of the Biharis to Pakistan.
Newaz
Shariff, Benazir Bhutto’s political opponent, was generally supportive to the
repatriation of the Bihari refugees from Bangladesh. After becoming Prime Minister, he took
substantive initiatives for the repatriation of the Biharis from
Bangladesh. In an interview with the Daily Star in 1992, he hoped to resume
the repatriation process in due course and linked the problem in general to
resource constraints.[19] He was ready to rehabilitate the Biharis in
his home state of Punjab and officially domiciled them there with the issuance
of identity cards. Following it, the
Pakistan High Commission in Dhaka registered more than 200,000 Bihari refugees
and provided them with identity cards in order to resume the repatriation process. Initially 3,000 families comprisiing 20,000
refugees were readied for return.
Although Islamabad indicated some ‘logistical and practical’ problems
for the delaying of the repatriation,[20]
however, symbolically the process began with the return of 235 Bihari refugees
on 10 January 1993. The repatriation
process could not proceed further as Newaz Shariff was removed from office in
April 1993 and Benazir Bhutto was reinstated as the Prime Minister of Pakistan.
Benazir
in her second term as Prime Minister initially indicated that the previous
government’s commitments for the repatriation of the Biharis would be honoured.[21] However, subsequently her government failed
to materialise the commitment. It
adopted a ‘go-slow’ policy and refrained from announcing a definite timetable
for repatriation.[22] This manifested a distinterest on the part of
the Benazir Government to resume the repatriation process. Indeed, during Benazir’s second term the
repatriation of the Biharis did not restart.
Since then, the issue has taken a backseat in Bangladesh_Pakistan
relations due to latter’s lax attitude and despite formers’ strong interest in
it.
Despite
the fact that a substantial number of Biharis have returned to Pakistan in the
last three decades, a large number still remain in the refugee camps of Bangladesh. They are still determined to go to
Pakistan. In the past, domestic
political factors in Pakistan, i.e., disinterest of some political prties,
inter-ethnic conflict, inter-sectarian violence etc., have prevented a smooth
repatriation of the Biharis. It is
indeed a political question rather than an economic one. Given the above, it will not be unrealistic
to conjecture that the factors that prevented a permanent settlement of the
problem in the past will influence the course of the matter in the same way in
the future. This means that the misery
of the Biharis will continue in the days to come.
Case II: The
Pahari Refugees
The
influx of Pahari refugees from bangladesh to India in the later 1970s and
throughout the 1980s had been the direct result of government’s repressive
measures carried out in order to contain an ethnic resistance movement that
developed in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) from the failure of
nation-building in the post-independent Bangladesh ‘nation-state.’[23] The state and nation-building process in the
state of Pakistan and later Bangladesh precipitated political, ethnic and
religious conflicts as well as created economic and developmental conditions,
which forced many people to migrate within and outside its territorial boundaries. Indeed the creation of a majoritarian and
domineering state where the nation was conceived in terms of the culture and
identity of the dominant and governing social group inflicted discrimination,
deprivation, marginalisation and alienation of the minority communities
resulting in ethnic and other types of conflict and the dispslacement of people
as refugees. As argued elsewhere, it has
been the ‘politics of nation-building’ or in other words, the failure to
accommodate the identity of the Hill People in the post-independent Bangladesh
state precipitated gradual alienation of the Paharis from the national
mainstream that eventually turned into a full-blown armed ethnic resistance
movement.[24] The Paharis organised themselves under the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity
(PCJSS) and its armed wing Shanti Bahini,
who carried out the armed struggle, what they termed as an ‘authonomy
movement’, to establish their ‘identity’.
The Bangladesh central government responded to this development by adopting
a two-pronged counter-insurgency policy.
One, it launched a settlement programme of Bengalis in the CHT from the
plains of Bangladesh in order to outnumber the Paharis in the district. The settlement programme inevitably fuelled
conflict over land between the settlers and the Paharis as there was hardly any
extra cultivable land left to accommodate new settlement.[25] It resulted in the viction of the Paharis
from their land as the administration and the law-enforcing agencies directly
or indirectly promoted the cause of the new settlers. It was in such a context that the settlers
joined in organised massacres with the military in order to create instability
and to evict the Paharis to grab their land.[26]
Two,
the government increased its military presence in the CHT and the military
carried out series of military operations with the aim of containing the Pahari
resistance movement. While doing this,
the military resorted to various repressive measures and mental and physical
violence on the Paharis. The repressive
measures included inter alia
deliberate harassment, restriction on movement, rape, extrajudicial killing and
organised massacres.[27] To avoid such repressive measures, thousands
of Paharis crossed international borders and too refuge in the Indian states of
Tripura and Mizoram. Each
counter-insurgency operation carried out by the Bangladesh military created a
fresh wave of refugee flows to India, such as seen in 1979, 1981, 1984 and
1986.[28] M.Q. Zaman also pointed out: “The waves of
refugees are directly related to the waves of violence against the tribal
people in the Hill Tracts.”[29]
A
total of 54,000 Pahari refugees took refuge in the Indian state of T[30]ripura.[31] It constituted more than ten percent of the
Pahari population in the CHT. The
Bangladesh government preferred and adopted a bilateral negotiating posture
with India to resolve the issue. During
Prime Minister Khaleda Zia’s visit to India in May 1992 the two governments
reached an agreement to repatriate the refugees and the Bangladesh government
committed itself to creating an atmosphere congenial to their return. Dhaka also agreed to send a government
delegation to India to make final arrangement for repatriation and encourage
the refugees to return. Although
apparently it seems that India emphasised the ‘voluntary’ repatriation of the
Pahari refugees, however, actually it resorted to ‘non-violent pressure’ to
make the refugees agree to repatriation by drastically reducing food rations,
excepting rice and salt, which resulted in near starvation and malnutrition of
the refugees.[32] It was even announced by the Tripura state
government that no rations would be supplied after July 1992 following a
directive from the central government to force the refugees for repatriation by
that date. The refugees initially
resisted the pressure and refused to return in view of the security situation
in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. However,
finally they could not resist it and agreed to the first ‘experimental’ batch
of repatriation of 2,000 refugees on 15 February 1994. Prior to that, a 20-point economic and
rehabilitation package agreement was signed in Agartala (the capital of the
Tripura state) between the Bangladesh government and the leaders of the Jumma
Refugees’ Welfare Association on 9 March 1997.
It projected an estimated repatriation of 63,861 Pahari refugees.[33] But the smooth implementation of the accord
was hampered by bureaucratic delays and uncertain political and security
situation in the CHT. The repatriation
process was only salvaged following the conclusion of a Peace Accord between
the Bangladesh government and the PCJSS to end the armed ethnic resistance
movement in the CHT in December 1997.
The agreement paved the way for the repatriation of 43,000 remaining
Pahari refugees from India. Repatriation
recommenced in November 1997 and was completed by 27 February 1998. One remarkable feature in the whole affair
was that neither Bangladesh nor India preferred or wanted involvement of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the repatriation
process.
Over
the years, the Pahari refugee problem became a dominant issue in
Bangladesh-India relations. For example,
Bangladesh Foreign Minister in 1989 opined Bangladesh-India relations to be not
in a ‘good condition’ and identified three major issues that must be resolved
to develop an ‘excellent neighbourly’ relations – water sharing, Tin Bigha and
Chakma refugees.[34] The importance of the Pahari refugee issue
therefore was that it was conceived in the same way as the Ganges Water dispute
in Bangladesh-India bilateral relations.
India also attempted to use the Pahari refugee issue as a bargaining
tool vis-Ã -vis Bangladesh to realise diplomatic objectives in other areas. For example, New Delhi wanted communication facilities
through Bangladesh as a quid pro quo
for resolving the refugee problem.
Bangladesh’s Communication Minister Colonel (Rtd.) Oli Ahmed claimed
that Indians wanted rail passage and port facilities from Bangladesh in
exchange for the repatriation of the Chakmas.[35] Bangladesh’s co-operative hand on these
issues, it is noteworthy, is important for India for containing insurgency and
for ensuring economic development in its north-eastern region.[36] Bangladesh for geographic reason is a very
important channel for various insurgent groups operating in the North-eastern
region to establish link with the outside world. For the same locational reason, Bangladesh
can play a significant role for the economic development of the North-eastern
India.
Following
the influx of the Pahari refugees, the Indian government demanded and pressed
for an amicable political solution of the CHT problem so that the refugees
could come back to their homes safely and as quickly as possible. The implication of this was that the production
of the Pahari refugees turned the CHT problem into an Indo-Bangladesh matter
and India was given an opportunity to have a hand in resolving an internal
rpoblem. Furthermore, it should also be
noted that India provided political and material assistance to the Shanti Bahini since the 1970s. India provided such assistance not out of
humanitarian gesture, rather on the basis of its own strategic assessment. For example, it was a move to counterbalance
alleged use of Bangladesh as conduit for channeling China and Pakistan’s
assistance to the insurgent groups of Northeast India and to contain Mizo
insurgency. Therefore, it is very
evident that both India and Bangladesh in this context were acting on the basis
of their own national interests which severely hampered the human rights of the
Pahari refugees. The Pahari refugees
were nothing more than political pawns in the strategic chess game of India and
Bangladesh.
Case III: The Rohingya Refugees
Like
the case of the Pahari refugees, the Rohingya refugee problem can also be
understood and explained in the contet of ‘nation-building’ in a new state
aimed and determined at imitating the Western model of ‘nation-state.’[37] Following independence, the ruling elite
attempted to bring national integration and adopted nation-building strategies
in multi-ethnic Myanmar imitating the Western wisdom of nation-state
system. The consequences of such a
venture in Myanmar, as can be observed, were gradual alienation of the minority
communities, heightening of inter-ethnic tension and growth of resistance
movements in various parts of the country.
The Myanmar ruling elite systematically used the ‘race and religion
card’ while pursuing the ‘mahoritarian’ and ‘authoritarian’ politics in
multi-ethnic Myanmar ruling elite claimed that the Muslim Rohingyas were the
illegal migrants from Bangladesh and they were the cause of social instability
and deteriorating law and order situation in Arakan. Therefore, they should be pushed back from
where they originated.
From
the beginning of independance, the Muslim Rohingyas were excluded from the
nation-building process. They were not
invited during the drafting of the constitution. Subsequently, successive military governments
undertook various repressive measures in order to drive the Rohingyas out of
Myanmar. Rohingyas were employed in
forced community labour and made subject to arbitrary taxation and
extortion. The military ruling elite
also imposed heavy restrictions on the movements of the Rohingyas and undertook
measures to deny them citizenship rights.
Under the 1974 Emergency Immigration Act, Rohingyas were provided with
Foreign Registration Cards codifying their non-citizen status, which was
formalised by the 1982 Citizenship Act thus making them stateless. In 1977, the Myanmar government launched
‘Operation Nagamin’ (Dragon King) to
“scrutinise each individual living in the State (of Arakan), designating
citizens and foreigners in accordance with the law and taking actions against
foreigners who have filtered into the country illegally.”[38] Gross Human rights villations occurred during
this operation. The end result of all
these repressive measures – system of forced labour, denial of citizenship
rights, arbitrary taxation and extorition, system of model villages, forced
relocation, restriction on freedom of movements and arbitrary deterioration of
economic and food security in Arakan etc. – was the exodus of over 150,000
Rohingyas into Bangladesh in early 1978.
Besides,
there was also an immediate cause behind the 1978 Rohingya influx. It was alleged that Rohingyas (both Muslims
and Buddhists) were involved in a failed coup of February 1976 and Bangladesh
Military Attaché at Rangoon had a hand in it.[39] Against such a backdrop, Rangoon felt the
need to adopt counter-insurgency measures to curb any possible insurrection in
Arakan. ‘Operation Nagamin,’ as cited above, was carried out in such a context. The Muslim Rohingyas caught the maximum
suspicion of the military government because religiously they constituted a
‘different category,’ they lived in border areas, and they were more likely to
resort to armed rebellion with assistance from fellow Muslims just across the
border in Bangladesh. Rangoon'’
suspicion also arose from the incident that in 1947 a section of the Rohingya
leadership approached Muslim League President Mohammad Ali Jinnah to
incorporate northern Arakan into East Pakistan.
Therefore, the Myanmar ruling elite since independence has always kept a
suspicious eye on the Muslim Rohingyas of Arakan.
By
June 1978, a total of 167,000 Rohingya refugees arrived in Bangladesh thus
making it a refugee-receiving nation for the first time in its short history as
an independent state. Strangely enough,
it occurred at a time when it seemed that Bangladesh-Myanmar bilateral relation
was on a sound track, particularly following the visit of President Ziaur
Rahman to Myanmer in July 1977.
Immediately after the beginning of the influx, Bangladesh in a protest
note warned that “the treatment meted out to the refugees constituted not only
a grave violation of Human Rights enshrined in the UN Charter, but also posed a
serious threat to the peace on the border and stability in the region.”[40] However, Bangladesh, for the sake of
maintaining the continuity of the steady growth of good neighbourly relations,
still adopted a bilateral negotiating approach to resolve the problem without
internationalising it. Dhaka considered
the refugee influx as a short-term problem and hence sought a ‘quick and safe
return’ of the refugees to Myanmar.[41] Bangladesh’s bilateral negotiating approach
soon floundered as its diplomatic initiatives failed to resolve the problem and
the refugee influx continued unabated.
Against this backdrop, President Zia in a strongly worded statement on 7
May 1978 accused the Myanmar government of “inhuman evictions of Muslims” and
demanded immediate repatriation of all refugees.[42]
Bangladesh
thereafter decided to internationalise the issue to supplement the bilateral
approach. Two factors prompted Dhaka to
advance such a posture. First, the
Myanmar government was deliberately pursuing a policy of procrastination to
resolve the matter. Dhaka alone failed
to create adequate pressure on Rangoon to impose a solution to the
problem. Therefore, it was thought that
internationalisation of the matter would help Bangladesh’s cause. Second, longer stay of the Rohingya refugees
was proving to be economically unbearable for Bangladesh. Hence, Bangladesh decided to seek
international assistance to feed the refugees.
Eventually,
Rangoon sent an eleven-member delegation to Dhaka in July 1978 led by Deputy
Foreign Minister U Tin Ohn to find out a solution to the refugee problem. After intense negotiations, an agreement was
reached on 9 July 1978, which facilitated the repatriation of ‘all’ Rohingya
refugees.[43] The repatriation began on 1 August 1978 and
ended by the end of the year with a total repatraition of 187,500 Rohingyas.
Although
all the Rohingya refugees went back within a relatively short period of time,
neither side actually paid any attention to remove the fundamental causes of
the Rohingya refugee phenomenon. Hence
it was not surprising that a second Rohingya refugee influx in a bigger
magnitude occurred in the early 1990s.
The structural and causal factors that led to the second influx were not
very different from the first one.
Additionally, this push was specifically executed by the military junta
in the context of its growing isolation and desperate effort to hang on to
power against a massive anti-military popular democratic movement in
Myanmar. The military was severely
discredited due to its failure to hand over power to the elected
representatives in September 1990.
Therefore, forcing the Rohingyas out of the country was a calculated
application of ‘race and religion card’ and an attempt to diver the attention
of the people from the democratic movement.
By
October 1992, about 265,000 Rohingyas took refuge in Bangladesh.[44] As can be observed, this figure is about
100,000 higher than the 1978 influx.
During the initial stage of influx, Bangladesh and Myanmar troops became
involved in border skirmishes,[45]
which possibly occurred from the former’s unwillingness to accept the Rohingya
refugees and forcible resistance to their entry. This development set the stage for a serious
deterioration of Bangladesh-Myanmar bilateral relations.
Immediately
following the initiation of the second influx, Bangladesh took the matter at
diplomatic level with the Myanmar authorities.
Protracted bilateral diplomatic negotiations resulted in the conclusion
of a memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Bangladesh government and the
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) of Myanmar on 28 April
1992. Under the MOU, Rangoon agreed to
take back those refugees who could establish their bona fide residency prior to their departure. Despite its commitment, Myanmar adopted a
policy of procrastination in implementing the accord. Bangladesh government hence in mid 1992 appealed
to the international community to render help to the refugees.
Dhaka was quite aware about the economic, social, environmental, security and diplomatic fallouts of the prolonged stay of the Rohingya refugees on its soil. Therefore, its policy from the early stage of the influx was to arrange repatriation of the refugees as expeditiously as possible and by an means, even by ‘use of force’. For example, the first repatriation on 22 September 1992 following the conclusion of the MOU was allegedly “accompanied by considerable pressure from the Bangladesh authorities”. Dhaka argued that Bangladesh could not feed and shelter the refugees for an indefinite period and it wanted “to set a policy in this connection, emphasising that the Rohingyas are refugees and they must go back to their country of origin.”[46] Another reason for Bangladesh’s ‘use of force’ for repatriation was that according to the MOU signed with Myanmar, the repatriation would have to be completed by 15 August 1997. Therefore, Bangladesh wanted an expeditious repatriation of the refugees. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other human rights organisations protested the coercive and forcible repatriation of the refugees. Bangladesh government thereafter restricted the access of UNHCR to the refugee camps. This was in breach of an earlier agreement signed between the Bangladesh government and the UNHCR on 8 October 1992, which allowed the latter to verify the voluntary nature of repatriation. UNHCR, as a result, withdrew from the repatriation process on 22 December 1992.
This
development triggered an international outcry against Bangladesh
government. Protest from the UNHCR,
other international organisations and the Western countries forced Bangladesh
to change the repatriation procedure and to make it more transparent.[47] After intense negotiations, Bangladesh
government signed another MOU with the UNHCR in May 1993, which allowed “free
access to officials of the UNHCR to independent interview of refugees in
transit camps.” The MOU further
committed the Bangladesh government that “no refugees will be coerced into
leaving against his/her will.” This
episode signified that the refugee phenomenon curtailed Bangladesh’s autonomy
in policy making and its ability to define national interest in its own term.
The
UNHCR also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Myanmar government in
November 1993. Under the terms of the
MOU, Rangoon assured that the returnee refugees would be allowed to go back to
their respective places of origins.
Following this, about fifteen to eighteen thousand refugees returned per
month. By April 1997, a total of 238,000
refugees went back to Myanmar leaving 21,117 Rohingyas in two refugee camps.
Although
initially there was no sign of discontent amongst the local people with regard
to the hosting of the Rohingya refugees, at a later stage the ‘compassion
fatigue’ surfaced as growing number of refugees took job outside the refugee
camps, which disturbed the local labour market.
It was also viewed as the main reason for lowering down the wages. Local negative attitude was also formed due
to the report that the refugees were causing massive deforestation in the
region. For example, the Forest Department
of Bangladesh claimed in 1993 that the Rohingya refugees had destroyed forest
resources worth Take 740 million by September 1992.[48] Moreover, it was observed that criminal
activities were on the rise in the region.
As of 31 December 1998, there were 213 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh
jails on charges of rioting, unlawful assembly, illegal entry, possession of
arms, rape or smuggling.[49] Therefore, the initial humanitarian gesture
that was accorded to the refugees gradually evaporated with the passage of
time.
Furthermore,
the Bangladesh authority also confronted formidable challenge from the armed
Rohingya refugee groups operating within the Nayapara and Kutupalong refugee
camps. They tried to block the
repatriation process by resorting to riots.[50] These armed groups resorted to rioting
against what they termed as ‘forced repatriation’. But it is alleged that they had links with
the right wing religious political forces i.e., the Jamat-I-Islami, in
Bangladesh and their resorting to rioting and refusal of access of any
Bangladesh officials in the camps were orchestrated in order to crerate
instability and to show that law and order situation had seriously
deteriorated. There were also ominous
sign of increased militancy amongst the frustrated Rohingyas and rising
phenomenon of drug-trafficking and arms smuggling in the border regions of
Bangladesh and Myanmar.[51] These ramifications of the Rohingya refugee
problem are quite challenging.
Most
of the refugees had gone back (about 22,000 still remains in Bangladesh) and
the problem had almost been ‘resolved’.
But the Rohgingyas still remained ‘stateless’ and the structural and the
causal factors that made them refugees did still exist. Against such a backdrop, fresh influx of
Rohingya refugees, although on a smaller scale, was reported.[52] The Bangladesh authority did not recognise
the ‘new arrivals’ as refugees; hence they were deprived of any camp
facilities. Bangladesh’s refusal to
accord them refugee status was indicative of aid and compassion fatigue as well
as due to absence of a standard national law in Bangladesh to determine the
refugee status.
Section III:
Conclusion
The
point is that refugees are the political pawns of the nation-states. Nation-states are generally concerned about
their own national interests, they are not at all attentive to the rights of
the displaced people. In other words,
nation-states pay almost no attention to the human rights of the refugees.
The
three cases that have been explored in this paper indicate that Bangladesh,
India, Pakistan and Myanmar have only been attentive to their own interests at
the expense of the rights of the refugees.
The Bihari refugee problem is truly a humanitarian issue. The biharis have been in the refugee camps in
a very miserable condition for last thirty years or more. Still the concerned states have not acted
based on humanitarian grounds. Rather,
they have played political game with the Biharis which severely hampered the
rights of these unfortunate people. The
story of the Paharis and the Rohingyas is similar. In fact, it can be concluded that the
nation-states have severely failed to protect the human rights of the
refugees. In this context, it is
alarming that all South Asian states have bypassed the international refugee
conventions and have not adopted national refugee laws. Therefore, the ground for violating human
rights of the refugees is quite open in South Asia.
INTERNATIONAL PROVISIONS FOR REFUGEES
Dr.N.Subramanya
National Law School of India University, Bangalore
The REFUGEES perhaps are the most talked about group
in the recent times. People are being uprooted from their homes and face
hardships and lead miserable lives fearing for the life and liberty of
themselves and their loved ones. The refugee issue with its sheer numbers and
intensity merits serious concern and attention of the international community.
It is inextricably intertwined with HUMAN RIGHTS violation of which causes the
painful plight of the refugees in the form of exodus from their usual habitats
often under grueling conditions exposing themselves to the perils- natural and
man made all the way.
Twentieth century was one of the most turbulent
periods in the history of mankind –with two world wars and scores of localized
equally ferocious battles, civil wars, internecine conflicts, ‘ cleansing ‘ of
‘ unwanted’ populations on the basis of ethnicity, tribe, religion, language
and all such divisive considerations which resulted in unleashing of
unprecedented animosities by man on his fellow human beings. It was an era of
de-colonization in most parts of the world and the redefining of transnational
borders and demarcation of territorial boundaries destabilized the delicate
balance, which held them together under an alien rule. The delicate demographic
complexion changed the equations unleashing fresh waves of struggle for power,
prosperity and domination over one another. Considerable number of new post
colonial rulers resorted to human rights violations on their own people on a
scale which even the colonial ‘masters’ hadn’t done. While many countries
adopted democracy type of governance most others landed up with an arbitrary,
totalitarian regimes. All these developments were parallely matched by the COLD
WAR between the two super powers USA and USSR which resorted to proxy wars in
many parts of the world creating a large number of refugees. Even much after
these wars ended the residuary issues triggered off large scale forced
migrations of people leading to escalation of the refugee problem and human
rights violations.
This state of affairs in which the sociopolitical
and economic fabric within the nation as well as on the global scene prompted
the international community to present and subscribe to many instruments for
protection of these vulnerable sections of the populations which resulted in
colossal relief and rehabilitation measures as well as efforts at finding out
durable solutions to the issues which caused the generation of refugee
movements and human rights violations. The real causes lay else where for which
negotiated political settlements are the only logical and ideal solutions.
Against this background we shall look into the
various international instruments which have direct or indirect applicability
for the refugees. First and foremost it is necessary to explain the term
refugee. In the layman’s parlance the world refugee is used to indicate any
displaced person. The words displaced persons and forced migrants are also
frequently used.
The most commonly employed definition of a REFUGEE
is in Article 1 Paragraph 2 of the 1951
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES[53]
which reads as follows.
“ As a result of events occurring before 1st
January 1951 and owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or
owing to such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country: or who not having a nationality and being outside the country of his
formal habitual residence as a result of such events is unable or owing to such
fear is unwilling to return to it”.
This definition was formulated in the aftermath of
the II World War and was specific to that fact. However the 1967 PROTOCOL
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES[54]
removed the cut off date requirement and broad based the definition so as to be
universally applicable. It took note of the fact that “new refugee situations
have arisen since the convention was adopted and that the refugees concerned
may therefore not fall with in the scope of the convention”. Te protocol
omitted the words “As a result of events occurring before 1st
January1951 and ..” and the words “ as a result of such events “. Paragraph 3
clearly said, “ The present protocol
shall be applied by the States parties hereto without any geographical
limitation….”
While this description of a refugee definition
seemed to cover the refugee issue the developments in many parts of the world
necessitated the broadening of the scope of the definition and regional
instruments came into force. The most notable among them are the 1969 OAU [55]
CONVENTION GOVERNING THE SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF REFUGEES PROBLEMS ON AFRICA, and
the 1984 CARTAGENA DECLARATION ON REFUGEES [56].
We will just read the definitions to have a broad overview of Refugee status.
Article 1 of the OAU convention adopts the same definition as the 1951
convention read with the 1967 protocol. Paragraph 2 broad bases the
applicability of the definition as follows.
“ The term “refugee’
shall also apply to every person who owing to external aggression, occupation,
foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part
of whole of his country of origin or nationality is compelled to leave his
place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside
his country of origin or nationality.”[57].
The definition of the Refugee as can be read in Part
III Paragraph 3 of the Cartage declaration[58]
is as follows.
“ …in addition to containing the elements of the
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, includes among refugees persons who have
fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened
by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive
violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed
public order”.
Any discussion on the issue of refugees issue
inevitably adopts a human rights discourse approach. Refugees are as much
citizens of this globe as one of us are, except that they are place in a
patently disadvantageous position.
The UN
Charter of 1945 can be said as the first instrument towards ensuring
Human Rights and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights[59]
is the most important document. These have provided for many basic rights to
the refugees.
The preamble to the charter mentions
about the “ .. dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and
small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be
maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in
larger freedom”. It aims to “…reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights”. This
set the tone for all the subsequent international instruments for the
protection of refugees. One of the purposes of the United Nations is “ in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;…”
The UDHR[60]
in the preamble recognizes the “inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family “ recognizing that it is
the “ foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”. Further it states “…disregard and contempt
for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the
conscience of the mankind ….”.
Article 14 of the UDHR is specific to the refugee
context. Clause (1) provides “ Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in
other countries freedom from persecution”. [ (2) However this right may not be
invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non political crimes
or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.]
In addition to these instruments for the protection
of refugees a number of other instruments have also been formulated[61]
and come into effect[62].
The most notable among these which have a direct relation to our theme namely
INTERNATIONAL PROVISIONS FOR REFUGEES merit a mention here.
·
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1950
INTERNATIONAL CONVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS 1966 and its optional Protocol.[63]
( ICCPR)
Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N.Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302, entered into
force March 23, 1976.
Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at
the abolition of the death penalty, G.A. res. 44/128, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at
207, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force July 11, 1991.
·
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS[64]
1966.
·
AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1978
·
AFRICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1981
·
COVENANT AGAISNT TORTURE AND OTHERCRUEL,INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT
OF PUNISHMENT[65]
1984.
·
COVENANT ON RIGHTS OF THE CHILD[66]
1989
The covenant against torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment contains in Article 3 the
protection against defilement which reads “ No state party shall expel, return
(“refuter”) or extradite a person to another state where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture”. Article 2 lays down the parameters for determination of grounds based
on the ‘existence’ in the state of ‘consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or
mass violations of human rights”.
The rights of the vulnerable sections of the world
and more specifically in this context the refugee children and women needs a
mention here.
Convention on Rights of the Child 1989 (CRC) is not
a refugee treaty but covers the refugee children as provided in Article 1 that
all CRC rights are to be granted to all persons under 18 years of age without
discrimination of any kind ( Article 2). “The CRC is important to refugee
children because it sets comprehensive standards. Virtually every aspect of a
child’s life is covered from health and education to social and political
rights. Some of the standards are specific for example the articles on juvenile
justice ( Articles 37 and 40 ), right to health (Article 24), right to
education ( Article 28) and so on. The CRC has gained importance for refugee
children due to the near universal ratification of the treaty ( more than 155
state parties ). The CRC tools can be
used as powerful tools of advocacy for ensuring human rights of refugee
children.
Women are a vulnerable section of refugees whose
human rights are often violated in the most humiliating way by almost all
parties whether state or non state. They are not safe from abuse in the country
of origin, their transit path and even in the refugee camps by other refugees
or persons under whose charge they are placed for protection.
While the human rights of refugees needs to be protected
at all stages and at all times there are stages in which they need utmost
protection.
·
Protection of human rights in the country of origin i.e. his own
country so that there is no need for him to leave his home and become homeless
exposing himself and his family members to hardships and uncertainty of the
life of a refugee in other words prevention of the genesis of the refugee
problem by ensuring basic human rights in the country of origin.
·
Protection of his human rights while in transit and this means that his
life, liberty and dignity are ensured and he is given protection from
harassment and worse from the state and non state actors in the areas through
which he /she passes.
·
Protection of his human rights in the country where he is seeking
asylum because necessary steps have to be initiated to ensure that those who
flee human rights violations are allowed to reach a place of safety and remain
there. It is here that the principle of NON REFOULEMENT is applied. That no
person should be sent back to his own country or from where he came if there
are grounds to believe that the human rights of the asylum seeker will be
jeopardized. This principle is contained in article 33 of the United Nations
refugee convention in addition to others which we have already examined.
There are many obstacles in the path of the asylum
seeker in obtaining asylum and refugee status. The western nations are
increasingly resorting to procedures like Non Entrée and Defilement since they
tend to look at the asylum seekers as economic migrants in disguise and there
may be such instances too but by and large the genuine refugees are being
turned away from these countries which even resort to imposing heavy penalties
on the air lines or shipping companies who bring people to their country
without valid visa and other travel documents which obviously no refugee will
be in possession of. We notice a kind of IMMIGRATION based approach. This is
true of many countries who are been signatories to the 1951 Convention and the
1967 protocol. This is apparently due to their interpretation of the term
“refugee” as different from the “asylum seeker” who has not yet entered their
territory, in the literal sense. There are instances of US Coast guard who have
chased away the asylum seekers from Haiti from the high seas in international
waters.
REFUGEES – SITUATION IN SOUTH ASIA
None of the South Asian nations have signed or
ratified the 1951 convention or the 1967 protocol. Neither do they have any
refugee specific legal framework but they have been commendably hosting
millions of refugees much more than all the other signatories or ratifies to
the convention have done. There are many reasons for not signing some of which
are that it is an euro-centric instrument and does not contain many provisions
which are so relevant in view of the ground realities prevailing in South Asia.
The other reason is that signing of the convention involves financial burden which they can ill afford. Some eminent scholars have put forth views : like Dr.B.S.Chimni who says that “ the Convention is being dismantled by the very states which framed the Convention” and that “ any talk of accession should be linked to the withdrawal of measures that constitute non entree and temporary protection regimes…”[69] The issue of ratifying the convention has engaged the attention of the Government of India, more so just before India became a member of the Executive Committee of UNHCR. The Ministry of External Affairs considers the Convention and Protocol as “ a partial regime for refugee protection drafted in an Euro-centric context” and that “ …they don’t address adequately situations faced by developing countries as it is designed primarily to deal with individual cases and not with situations of mass influx, they also don’t deal adequately with situations of mixed flows that is they don’t distinguish between political refugees and economic migrants…the convention does not provide for a proper balance between the rights and obligations of receiving and source states. The concept of international burden sharing has not been developed adequately in the convention”.
The other reason is that signing of the convention involves financial burden which they can ill afford. Some eminent scholars have put forth views : like Dr.B.S.Chimni who says that “ the Convention is being dismantled by the very states which framed the Convention” and that “ any talk of accession should be linked to the withdrawal of measures that constitute non entree and temporary protection regimes…”[69] The issue of ratifying the convention has engaged the attention of the Government of India, more so just before India became a member of the Executive Committee of UNHCR. The Ministry of External Affairs considers the Convention and Protocol as “ a partial regime for refugee protection drafted in an Euro-centric context” and that “ …they don’t address adequately situations faced by developing countries as it is designed primarily to deal with individual cases and not with situations of mass influx, they also don’t deal adequately with situations of mixed flows that is they don’t distinguish between political refugees and economic migrants…the convention does not provide for a proper balance between the rights and obligations of receiving and source states. The concept of international burden sharing has not been developed adequately in the convention”.
Before the countries of South Asia arrive at a
consensus on the Regional Convention on refugees , it may be ideal to enact
national legislations and to this end the model refugee law will be an ideal
instrument not only for spelling out the rights of refugees but also safeguard
the territorial integrity and security of the state..
There have been some serious initiatives taken in
South Asia in the form of organizing seminars and workshops[70]
in collaboration with Universities and organizations like the SAARCLAW , Indian
Centre for Humanitarian Law and Research ( ICHLR) and the Regional Consultation
of Refugee and Migratory Movements in South Asia. “ The…….latter…. was initiated by the UNHCR in Geneva in
November 1994, In a meeting held at Geneva at which five eminent persons were
present one each from Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka various
human rights and humanitarian issues were discussed. An outcome of this meeting
was the shared view that there were possibilities of developing common
approaches to many of the South Asia’s migratory and refugee issues. An
informal grouping of renowned and interested persons was then established in
each of the five countries by the eminent person concerned.”.[71]
These groups have been meeting annually[72]
in the region to “consult on common approaches to refugee and migration issues
and to develop strategies with a view to promote better protection regimes for
refugees in the region”. [73]
The fifth meeting held at Katmandu in 1998 reviewed
promotion al activities undertaken during the past year by the respective
eminent persons groups and discussed the future programmed of the eminent
persons, which focussed substantially on strategies to promote the Model law
with Governments and the adoption of national refugee legislation.
The UNHCR in collaboration with the Indian Chapter
of SAARCLAW hosted a Roundtable workshop titled “ National Legislation on
Refugees” on 30th April 1999.
A group of eminent persons under the guidance for former Chief Justice
of India of Justice P.N.Bhagwati drafted the Model National Law on refugees in
November 1996 ( under the umbrella of the Informal Regional Consultations on
Refugees and Migratory movements in South Asia)
, and this draft was presented at a SAARLAW seminar in New Delhi in May
1997. The next consultations unanimously decided that the Model Law should be
harmonized with country specific legislative and judicial requirements with a
view to formally proposing it to the respective governments of he region. Following the placing of the model law at the
SAARCLAW-UNHCR workshop for discussion[74],
a number of recommendations specific to India have emerged.[75]
WHEREEAS India is not a signatory to the convention
or protocol but has an admirable records of protecting the human rights of
asylum seekers and refugees . The Indian law also does not have any specific
refugee laws . But the judiciary in India has taken a humanitarian stand and by
relying upon Article 21 of the constitution have helped several refugees. The
National Human Rights Commission also has initiated positive measures for
protecting the human rights of refugees.
India has a tradition of helping people in distress
who seek assistance and consequently the sheer volume of such help to refugees
extended by India has created an appreciable track record which is recognized
internationally. But there is no legal frame work as such for protection of
refugees. While the Executive branch of the Government of India does not
recognize refugees as such the judiciary has taken a humanitarian stand and so
also the National Human Rights Commission.
REFUGEES, INDIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS
India has a history of hospitality and a glorious
tradition of even sacrificing ones own life to protect those who have been
given refuge and protection. Though India does not have a legal frame work
specific for the protection and treatment of refugees, the Judiciary has
adopted a humanitarian attitude and approach towards them relying upon and
applying various provisions in our Constitution.
Since there is no refugee law in India they are
treated as aliens. They are covered under the
·
Registration of Foreigners Act 1939 ( Central Act 16 of 1939) which is
applicable to all foreigners.
·
The Foreigners Act 1946 which empowers the state to regulate the entry,
presence and departure of aliens in India.
·
The Passport ( Entry into India) Act 1920
·
The Passport Act 1967
In the absence of refugee specific laws in India the
Indian Judiciary has played a constructive role in protecting the interests of
the refugees. In the famous case of NHRC vs. State of Raunchily Prudish
(1996) the supreme court held that “ the state is bound to protect the life and
liberty of every human being , be he a citizen or otherwise” “There are a few
articles in the Indian Constitution which are equally applicable to refugees
who are on the Indian soil in the same way as they are applicable to the Indian
citizens”.[76]
The Supreme Court of India has consistently held that the fundamental rights
enshrined under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution regarding the ‘right to
life and personal liberty’ applies to all people irrespective of the fact
whether they are citizens of India or aliens. While the protection of Article
21 can be availed by the refugees and it is the duty of the state to act in
consonance with Article 21 the Supreme Court in earlier cases of Khudiram
Chakma as well as Louis
De Raedt also held that the refugees are not entitled to the protection
of Articles 19(1)(d) and (e) of the constitution. It was said that Article 21
is confined to life and liberty and “does not include the right to reside and
settle in this country” and as Article 19(1)(e) is applicable only to the
citizens of this country and that “ the machinery of Article 14 can not be
invoked to obtain that fundamental right”. In the same judgement Supreme Court
approvingly referred to the Universal declaration of human rights in the
context of the refugee thus.
“ Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which speaks
of the right to enjoy asylum has to be interpreted in the light of the
instrument as a whole and must be taken to mean something. It implies that although an asylum seeker has
no right to be granted to admission to a foreign state, equally a State which
has granted asylum must not later return him to the country whence he came.
Moreover the Article carries considerable moral authority and embodies the
legal prerequisite of regional declaration and instruments”
Many High Courts have also granted relief to
refugees. In exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution read with
Article 21 the Guwahati High Court in the case of u.Myat Kaeew and another v State
of Manipur allowed the petitioners who had entered India without valid
travel documents and who were lodged in Manipur central jail to be released on
interim bail on personal bond to enable them to approach UNHCR, New Delhi to
seek refugee status. The courts did not
insist on local sureties as they were foreigners and local sureties would not
easily be available. Similar orders were
passed by the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana also. The courts in India have recognized UNHCR as playing an important
role in the protection of refugees. The High Courts in various states[77]
have recognized the refugee issue and permitted them to approach the UNHCR for
determination of refugee status while staying the deportation orders issued by
the district courts or the administration.
In the matter of Gurunathan and others vs
Government of India and in
the matter of A.C.Mohd Siddique vs Government of India and others the High Court
of Madras expressed its unwillingness to allow any Sri Lankan refugee to be
forced to return to Sri Lanka against their will. The Court acknowledged the
‘competence and impartiality’ of the UNHCR. The Bombay High Court in the matter
of Syed
Ata Mohammadi vs Union of India was pleased to direct that “ there is
no question of deporting the Iranian refugee to Iran since he has been
recognized as a refugee by the UNHCR”. The refugee was permitted to travel to
which ever country he desired. All these are in line with the accepted and
recognized principle of Non Defilement of the refugees to the country of their
origin.
Supreme Court of India has stayed the deportation of
refugees in a number of cases like the Maiwand’s Trust of Afghan Human Freedom vs.
State of Punjab and N.D.Pancholi vs. State of Punjab and others.
In the matter of Malvika Karlekar vs Union of India[78]
then Supreme Court directed the stay of the Andaman Island Burmese refugees
since “their claim for refugee status was pending determination and a prima
facie case is made out for grant of refugee status”. The judgment of the
Hon’ble Court in the Chakma refugees’ case clearly declared that no one shall
be deprived of his or her life or liberty without the due process of law. The
earlier judgments of the Supreme Court in Luis De Raedt vs Union of India and
also State
of Raunchily Pradesh vs. Khudiram Chakma also stressed this point.
Articles 22(1), 22(2) and 25(1) of the Indian
Constitution reflect that the rules of natural justice in common law systems
are equally applicable in India even to refugees. The Constitution of India
expressly incorporates the common law percept and the Courts have gone further
to raise it to the status of one of the basic features of the Constitution
which can not be amended.
The question of applicability of an international
treaties, Covenants ,and Conventions merits a mention here. International
Covenants can be enforced in Indian courts even in the absence of a statute
being enacted to give effect it. A discussion is found in the case Maganbhai
Ishwarlal Patel v Union of India (1969) in which it was held that “
Making of law….is necessary when [international] treaty or agreement operates
to restrict the rights of citizens or others or modifies the laws of the State.
If the rights of the citizens or others which are justifiable are not
affecting, no legislative measure is needed to give effect to the agreement of
treaty”.[79] “
The position therefore is that even if a treaty or convention or resolution is
not ratified or agreed to by India courts are still at liberty provided there
exists no Indian law to the contrary, to incorporate these conventions, treaties
and resolutions into India law and thereby enforce them. In Peoples
Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India the Supreme Court held “ The
provisions of the Covenant which elucidate and go to effectuate the fundamental
rights guaranteed by our Constitution can certainly be relied upon by the
courts as facets of those fundamental rights and hence enforceable as such”.[80]
Thus Courts may apply international law only when there is no conflict between
international law and domestic law and also if the provisions of the
international law sought to be applied are not in contravention of the spirit
of the Constitution and national legislation, thereby enabling a harmonious
construction of the laws. It has been held that in case of any conflict the
domestic laws shall prevail.
In case of any person trying to enter or leave India
the Immigration officials border police or the local police come into the
picture and the person after investigation is charged for violations of various
Indian Laws like the Passport Act, and Passport Act etc.
The following two cases illustrate the position of
law and the procedure that is being followed in India. Mahmud Ghazleh an Iranian refugee registered
with UNHCR was detained while illegally exiting India for Nepal via Uttar Pradesh.
He was travelling on forged and
fabricated travel documents. He as detained by the border authorities who prima
facie discovered the fact. They handed over the person to the local police for
investigation. A FIR was drawn under Sections 419,420,468 and 471 of IPC read
with Sections 3 and 6 of the Passport Act and Section 14 of the Foreigners’
Act. He was subsequently interned at the Gorakhpur sub-jail. In another
instance two Afghan refugees Shah Ghazai and his minor son Assadullah were
apprehended by the authorities at the Attari border in Amritsar while they
were attempting to illegally exit India
for Afghanistan via Pakistan. They were handed over to the local police and
subsequently interned at the Amritsar Central Jail.
It may sometimes happen that a person or groups of
persons who try to enter India are apprehended and simply sent back by the
border authorities as they don’t carry valid travel documents. This legally
amounts to Refoulement. But it does happen that way too. There are instances of
persons entering India with valid travel documents but don’t get the permits
renewed for some reason or the other. Or they may have entered India with
forged documents which are discovered subsequently. In all such cases the
police usually don’t consider any pleas for claim of refugee status,
persecution in the country of origin etc. Further the administrative
authorities vide Section 3 of the Foreigners Act 1946 may issue Leave India
notice to refugees who have failed to obtain extension of their travel documents
from the Foreigners Regional Registration Office. The High Courts in India have
granted an interim stay on such leave India notices as the Punjab and Haryana
High court at Chandigarh did in the case of two Sikhs from Afghanistan in the
case Gurinder Singh and Karmajit Singh.
Barring such instances of clear violations of the
Indian Law related to the entry and stay of foreigners in India or the usage of
forged documents or trying to enter or exit Indian borders or entry points
illegally , once the person is in Indian soil the law gives him some protection
as per the provisions as mentioned before.
Indian Government has accepted refugees without
discriminating in any way based on their country of origin or their religion or
political background in the true spirit of the numerous instruments though it
is not a signatory. There are no known instances of any person being handed
back to their country of origin too thus upholding the principles of non
refoulement.
During their stay in India there are of course some
reasonable restrictions imposed on the refugees. There is no concept of work
permits in India. Those who get the residential certificate as refugees do find
employment in the informal sector. Some refugee groups like the Tibetans are
getting loans from the Indian Banks and are enjoying subsidies and other
facilities as much as their Indian counterparts.
The refugees can freely practice their religion.
While persons or groups who have complied with or initiated the procedures
towards obtaining the refugee status are given more lenient treatment by the
administration those who have been known to have illegally attempt entry or
exit into or from India or have tried to use some fabricated document face more
restrictions.
Another land mark judgement in the case of Chairman
, Railway Board vs. Chandrimadas and others[81]
needs a mention here. Chandrima das a practicing lady advocate of Calcutta High
Court filed a writ petition before the High Court claiming compensation
for one Hanuffa Khatoon , a Bangladeshi
girl who was raped at the Rail Yatri Niwas of Howrah Railway Station with the
argument that since the offence was committed in a place belonging to the
Railways, they had to pay the compensation claimed. The High Court awarded a
compensation of Rs 10 Lakhs against which judgment was challenged on various
grounds including the question of locus standi as well as the right of
compensation not being enforceable under Article 226 of the Constitution. These
contentions were rejected by the Supreme Court referring to various
judgements and also to Article 21. The
Supreme court relied upon an earlier judgment in Bodhisattwa Gautam where it
was held that rape is a crime against the entire society, it is a crime against
the basic human rights and is violative of Article 21 : Right to life which
includes right to live with human dignity. The arguments of the State – in this
case the Railways claimed that since the victim was a foreign national and
therefore not entitled to any relief under the public law domain for the
violation of fundamental rights which are available only to the citizens of
this country. The Supreme Court rejected this contention on two grounds.
Firstly on the ground of human rights jurisprudence founded on the UDHR,
provisions form Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination
against Women ( CEDAW) and then observed that “ our
Constitution guarantees all the basic and fundamental human rights set out in the UDHR to its citizens and other persons. The Chapter dealing with the fundamental rights is contained in Part III of the Constitution.[82] It was held that wherever in Chapter III of the Constitution the term “person” is mentioned (like in Articles 21 and 14) it would apply to all persons including citizens and non-citizens. Similarly Articles 20 and 22[83] are also available to non-citizens. The court upheld the decision of the Calcutta High Court compensating the victim for violation of Article 21. This case may be called as a landmark in taking the jurisprudence of human rights on the highest level placing its decision on protection of human dignity. Another important feature of this judgement is that it opened the doors for Public Interest Litigations in case of a foreign national.
Constitution guarantees all the basic and fundamental human rights set out in the UDHR to its citizens and other persons. The Chapter dealing with the fundamental rights is contained in Part III of the Constitution.[82] It was held that wherever in Chapter III of the Constitution the term “person” is mentioned (like in Articles 21 and 14) it would apply to all persons including citizens and non-citizens. Similarly Articles 20 and 22[83] are also available to non-citizens. The court upheld the decision of the Calcutta High Court compensating the victim for violation of Article 21. This case may be called as a landmark in taking the jurisprudence of human rights on the highest level placing its decision on protection of human dignity. Another important feature of this judgement is that it opened the doors for Public Interest Litigations in case of a foreign national.
International provisions for the protection of the
life and liberty have helped to a large extent in extending relief ,
repatriation and rehabilitation of millions of refugees. But a considerable gap
still exists between the legal provisions and their effective implementation
due to many reasons including lack of supportive domestic laws and absence of
an efficient and humane executive and
enforcement machinery. The refugee issue is multidimensional and complex, which
demands a careful and in-depth study of all perspectives.
Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
MODEL
NATIONAL LAW ON REFUGEES
Preamble:
Acknowledging the fact that India has a long
tradition and experience in accommodating inflows of regugees, and
demonstrating its faith in the principle of non-refoulement;
Affirming its commitment to uphold international
human rights principles through accession to all major human rights treaties,
and adoption of appropriate legislative steps to implement them;
Considering the pronouncements of the Supreme Court
and High Courts extending the protection of fundamental rights to refugees and
asylum seekers;
Reaffirming the initiatives taken by Parliament
under Article 37 and 253 of the Constitution of India to provide an
administrative system free from arbitrariness and guarantee equality, fairness
and due process of law;
Recognising the need for an appropriate legal
framework to process matters relating to forced migration in respect of
determination of refugee status, protection from refoulement and treatment
during stay;
The following Act is enacted to consolidate,
streamline, and harmonise the norms and standards applicable to refugees and
asylum seekers in India; to establish a procedure and the requisite machinery
for granting refugee status; to guarantee them fair treatment, provide for
their rights and obligations and regulate matters connected therewith. For the purposes of this Act, the grant of
refugee status shall be considered a peaceful and humanitarian act and does not
imply any judgement on the country of origin of the refugee.
1. Short title, Extent and Commencement
a. This Act
may be called the Refugees and Asylym Seekers Protection Act, 2000.
b. It extends to the whole of India.
c. It shall
come into force on the day specified by the Union Government by notification in
the Gazette of India.
2. Terminology
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:
a. ‘Asylum
seeker’ means a person who seeks recognition and protectyion as a refugee.
b. ‘Refugee’
means a ‘refugee’ defined in Article 3 and includes dependants of persons
determined to be refugees.
c. ‘Country
of origin’ means the refugee’s country of nationality. Or if he or she has no nationality, his or
her country of former habitual residence.
d.
‘Commissioner’ means the ‘Commissioner of refugees’, defined under the
provisions of Articles 7 and 8 of this Act.
e. ‘Refugee
Committee’ means the ‘Committee’ established as an Appellate Board by the
Government under Articles 7 and 8 of this Act.
f. ‘Refugee
Children’ means children below the age of 18 years who are seeking refuge or
where protection is extended by the state to children under Article 22 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989.
g. “Serious
non-political offence” refers to any offence determined in accordance with
Article 17 of this Act, and listed in schedule A of the Act.
h.
“Government” shall mean Union Government.
3. Definition of a Refugee
A Refugee is defined as:
a. Any person
who is outside his or her country of origin, and who is unable or unwilling to
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of that country because of a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, sex, nationality, ethnic identity, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, or,
b. any person
who owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, serious
violation of human rights or other events seriously disrupting public order in
either part or whole of his or her country of origin, is compelled to leave his
or her place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place
outside his or her country of origin.
4. Persons who shall be excluded from refugee
status
A person shall be excluded from refugee status for
the purpose of this Act if:
a. He or she
is convicted for a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against
humanity, in accordance with the applicable principles and rules of
International Law/Conventions including the SAARC Regional Convention On
Suppression of Terrorism, 1987;
b. He or she
has committed a serious non-political crime as specified in the Schedule A,
outside India prior to his or her admission into India as a refugee.
5. Principle
of Non-Refoulement
a. No refugee
or asylum seeker shall be expelled or returned in any manner whatsoever to a
place where there are reasons to believe his or her life or freedom would be
threatened on account of any of the reasons set out in sub-sections (a) or (b)
of Article 3;
b. Where an
asylum seeker or refugee has been convicted by a final judgement of a crime
against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity and constitutes a danger
to the community, or where a Minister has certified that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that an asylum seeker or refugee is a threat to the
sovereignty and integrity of India, such an asylum seeker or refugee may be
asked to leave India. However, such asn
asylum seeker or refugee shall not be returned to a situation or to any country
in which his or her life or liberty is threatened for reasons of race,
religion, sex, nationality, ethnic identity, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion.
6. Application
a. Where an
application is made by, on behalf of, or in relation to an asylum seeker, for the
recognition of the said asylum seeker as a refugee, either at the point of
entry or subsequently, the applicant shall, in accordance with the principle
laid down in Article 5 be directed and assisted to apply to the Commissioner of
Refugees;
b. Where an
application is made by, on behalf of, or in relation to an asylum seeker, for
the determination of refugee status, pending determination of such status, no
restrictions shall be imposed on the asylum seeker save and except those that
are necessary in the interests of sovereignty and integrity or public order of
India. Such application may be made
within such reasonable time as may be prescribed in accordance with Article 17
of this Act;
c. Where an
application for refugees status is made by, on behalf of, or in relation to a
child, accompanied or unaccompanied; or where a refugee child is found within
the territory of India; he or she shall receive immediate and appropriate
protection and humanitarian assistance in accordance with the existing policy and
legal framework of the state. The
requirement of filing an application form on their behalf may be entrusted to a
local Legal Service Authority or their representatives or any other recognised
NGO involved in the welfare of children in general.
7. Constitution of the Authorities
In order to implement the provision of this Act:
a. The
President shall appoint the Commissioner of Refugees, and Deputy Commissioners
of Refugees as may be necessary on the basis of the eligibility requirements
and procedure laid down in Articles 7 and 8 of this Act;
b. Other
officers as may be necessary shall be appointed after consultation with the
Commissioner of Refugees;
c. The
President shall appoint the Chairperson and Members of the Refugee Committee
d. The Chairperson
of the Refugee Committee shall appoint the staff of the Committee.
8. Appointment and Functions
a. The
Commissioner of Refugees shall be a sitting or retired High Court Judge, and
shall be appointed after consultation with the Chief Justice of India.
b. The Deputy
Commissioner should be qualified to be appointed as a High Court Judge; and
shall be appointed after consultation with the Chief Justice of India.
c. The
Chairperson of the Refugee Committee shall be a retired Supreme Court Judge.
d. The
Refugee Committee shall consist of the following three members: a sitting or
retired High Court Judge, appointed by the President in consultation with the
Chief Justice of India, and two independent members with knowledge and
experience of refugee issues and refugee law.
e. The
Commissioner of Refugees may assign such of his functions as may be necessary
to the Deputy Commissioner of Refugees appointed under this Act.
f. The
decision of the Commissioner of Refugees shall be final. Any appeal against such decision shall lie
only with the Refugee Committee, as the Appellate Board for reconsideration of
the decision.
9. Determination of Refugee Status
a. An asylum
seeker who wishes to claim refugee status under the terms of this Act shall be
heard by a Commissioner of refugees before the determination of his or her
sstatus;
b. During the
refugee determination interview, the asylum seeker shall be provided necessary
facilities including the services of a competent interpreter where required,
and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence in support of his or her case;
c. The asylum
seeker, if he or she wishes, shall be given an opportunity, of which he or she
should be duly informed, to contact a representative of UNHCR;
d. The asylum
seeker, if her or she wishes, shall be entitled to be assisted in the
determination of the status by a person of his or her choice including a legal
practitioner. A list of competent
practitioners, who are conversant with refugee law, shall be provided by the
Government to the asylum seeker;
e. If the
asylum seeker is not recognised as a refugee, he or she could be given a
reasonable time as provided in the rules, to appeal to the Refugee Committee;
f. Where an
application by the asylum seeker is rejected, the Commissioner of refugees
shall give reasons for the order in writing and furnish a copy of it to the
asylum seeker;
g. If the
asylum seeker is recognised as a refugee, he or she shall be informed
accordingly and issued with documentation certifying his or her refugee status.
10. Publication of Findings and Decisions
a. the
findings, as well as the orders of the Commissioner of Refugees, the Refugee
Committee and other authorities established under this Act shall be published
by them periodically.
b. The
Commissioner of Refugees and the Refugee Committee shall publish an annual
report. The annual report and any other
periodic or special reports related to their work shall be made public.
11. Appellate Procedure
The Refugee Committee shall receive and consider
appeals made by asylum seekers against the decision of the Commissioner of
Refugees. The Committee may also
consider applications for refugee status suo
moto.
12. Persons who shall cease to be refugees
A person shall cease to be a refugee for the purpose
of this Act if:
a. he or she
voluntarily re-avails himself or herself of the protection of the country of
his or her origin; or
b. he or she
has become a citizen of India; or
c. he or she
has acquired the nationality of some other country and enjoys the protection of
that country; or
d. he or she
has voluntarily re-established himself or herself in the country which he or
she left, or outside which he or she remained owing to fear of persecution; or
e. he or she
can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he or she was
recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail
himself or herself of the protection of the country of his or her nationality.
13. Rights and Duties of Refugees
a. Every
refugee so long as he or she remains within India, shall have the right to:
1. fair and due treatment, without
discrimination on grounds of race, religion, sex, nationality, ethnic identity,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion;
2. receive the same treatment as is generally
accorded under the Constitution or any other laws and privileges as may be
granted;
3. be provided a means to seek a livelihood for
himself or herself, and for those dependent on them;
4. be given special consideration to ensure
their protection and material well being in the case of refugee women and
children;
5. choose his or her place of residence and move
freely within the territory of India, subject to any regulations applicable to
refugees generally in the same circumstances;
6. be issued identity documents;
7. be issued travel documents for the purpose of
travel outside and back to the territory of India unless compelling reasons of
national security or public order otherwise require;
8. be given the right to access to education,
health and other related services.
b. Every
refugee shall be bound by the laws and regulations of India.
14. Situations of Mass Influx
a. the
Government may, in appropriate cases where there is large-scale influx of
asylum seekers, issue an order permitting them to reside in India without
requiring their individual status to be determined under Section 11 of this
Act, until such time as the reasons for departure from the country of origin
have ceased to exist, or the Government decides that their status should be
determined on an individual basis under this Act;
b. Asylum
seekers who have been permitted to reside in India under this provision, may be
subject to reasonable restrictions with respect to their location and movement
but will otherwise be granted normally the same rights as refugees under this
Act;
c. Women and
children asylum seekers in mass influx shall have the right to be given special
consideration as to their protection and material well being.
15. Refugees Unlawfully in India
The government shall not impose penalties on
refugees on account of their illegal entry, or presence who, coming directly
from a place where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense provided
in Article 3, enter or are present in India without authorisation. Provided they present themselves with
immediate effect to the authorities and are able to show good cause for their
illegal entry or presence.
16. Voluntary Repatriation
The repatriation of refugees shall take place at
their free volition expressed in writing or other appropriate means, before the
Commissioner of Refugees. The voluntary
and individual character of repatriation of refugees and the need for it to be
carried out under conditions of transparency and safety to the country of
origin shall be respected.
17. Rules and regulations
The Government may propose to Parliament, from time
to time, rules and regulations, to give effect to the provisions of this Act.
18. Non-Obstante Clause
The provisions of this Act shall have effect
notwithstanding the provisions of any other law.
HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATION AND BHUTANESE REFUGEES IN NEPAL:
RIGHT TO
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION
Jagat Mani
Acharya
I. Background
Introduction:
Bhutan is a tiny Himalayan nation situated in the
eastern Himalaya sandwiched between two Asian giants, India and China. It has a geographical area of 48,000 sq.km
and a population of little over 6000,000.
Like most modern nations Bhutan is truly a multi-racial, multicultural,
multilingual and multi-religious Himalay country which consists of three major
ethnic groups. The western valley
consists people of Tibetan origin who are called Ngalongs, in the east are the
Sharchops and the southern foothills are inhabited by the Lhotshampas. The country has as many as fourteen different
ethnic groups.
Politics: past
and the present
Until the mid – 7th century, Bhutan was
under the political jurisdiction of India.
However the Indian rule ended with the invasion of Bhutan by a band of
Tibetan soldiers. Until the first
quarter of the 17th century, Bhutan existed as an agglomeration of
numerous independent, petty kingdoms. In
1616 A.D. Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal, a famous Tibetan monk of Drukralung in
Tibet, entered Bhutan and unified the country.
He established a theocracy and became its supreme head. However, on December 17, 1907, Governor Ugyen
Wangchuck of Tongsa province effaced the Shabdrung’s institution and
established Absolute Hereditary Monarchy in Bhutan. The present king is the fourth hereditary
monarch of the Wangchuck dynasty. The
current incarnation of the Shabdrung lives in exile in Manali, Himarchal
Pradesh, northern India.
Influenced by the Indian freedom movement, Mr. D.B.
Gurung in 1950 led the southern Bhutanese in a democratic movement, under the
banner of the country’s first political party, the Bhutan State Congress. The present king’s father, King Jugme Dorji
Wangchuck, brutally suppressed the uprising by killing many activists in cold
blood. The leaders were
incarcerated. However, realising the
sentiments of the Bhutanese people for political change, the king gradually
introduced some democratic reforms in Bhutan.
In 1953, he established the National Assembly. Sixteen years later, he introduced a system
of electing Ministers every five years; this allowed the system to be described
as Constitutional monarchy. Towards the
end of 1960s, the king himself began to guide the Bhutanese people towards greater
freedom and democracy.
With the demise of the King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck in
1972, Prince Jugme Singye Wangchuck the present king ascende the throne at the
tender age of 18. Soon the vested
interests of the palace coterie began reverting the reforms, thrusting Bhutan
into political regression. On October
10, 1973, during the 39th Assembly session, the Royal government
passed a resolution to abolish the system of “vote of confidence on the King”
introduced by the late king. Thus came
the demise of Bhutan’s short-lived constitutional monarchy. In 1978, during the 49th National
Assembly session, another resolution was adopted abolishing the system of
election of Ministers and from 1980 onwards, the Royal government also did away
with the ballot boxes which elected people’s representatives and instead began
nominating them. The result of all
theses reversions has been to re-establish Royal Absolutism in Bhutan.
The Kingdom of Bhutan has an obsolete monarchical
system of government dominated by the ethnic Ngalongs since its establishment
in 1907. It has not written constitution
or Bill of Rights. Its national Assembly
serves as a rubber-stamp Assembly and the Judiciary is subjected to absolute
control of the Assembly. Bhutan is all
set to declare itself a Constitutional Monarchy on November 11 or December 17
2002 when a written Constitution will be adopted by a Royal Proclamation. Bhutan is now drafting the constitution. While this constitution does not represent
the voice of the people in exile.
Bhutanese
Refugee: Short Story
Bhutanese fleeing Bhutan in early 1991 first arrived
in Assam and West Bengal in India. They
set up makeshift camps and hoped for the situation to normalise. Instead, as the situation in Bhutan worsened
and the refugees were not permitted to set up permanent camps in India, a small
group of refugees crossed in Nepal and established the first camp by the banks
of Mai river in July 1991 which housed only 235 refugees. From August 1991, the influx of refugees
increased at the rate of 1,000 per month.
The flow of refugees leaped in Februrary 1992 to a massive 10,000 per
month. The period from February to March
1992 saw the refugee population rise to 48,000.
Conditions at Maidhar in late 1991 were grim, but the refugee leaders
quickly organised themselves and sought help from the local community. Local Nepalese responded with donations of
rice, bamboo, money and wood. However,
with thousands to feed and shelter it was becoming impossible to manage. Many died and hundreds suffered from
malnutrition and diseases.
Bhutan
creating statelessness:
II. Bhutan and
the Bhutanese Media: Consequences
The isolation of the country, absence of media,
political institution, NGOs and INGO, gave enough space to the rulers to design
and implement national policies in their own interest rather the interest of
the common people of Bhutan. These
resulted in the eviction of more than 17% of the total population of the
country. Bhutan is the largest refugee
producing country of the world, where 100,000 people reside inside the Bhutanese
refugee camps in the eastern part of Nepal and another 20,000 outside the camps
in Nepal and India. Another 100,000
people are in exile today on account of non-violent expression of their
political and religious belief.
Major
Government policies and the role of the media
The major policies used by the government of Bhutan
to evict its own citizens are: I. Census
policy of 1988 II. One nation one people
policy III. No-objection
Certificate IV. Voluntary Migration
Forms V. Religion etc. In the basence of independent media, e-mail,
internet facilities the government could very well plan the process of eviction
and implement very easily in the beginning but in the later years when the
Bhutanese refugee issues was highlighted and the media personnel became active
to highlight the issues the Bhutanese government changed its policy of
eviction. In the later stage the
government introduced the Voluntary Migrations Forms (VMF), where the Bhutanese
people were made to sign the form at gun point and asked to leave the
country. All the papers which would
prove one’s identity as a Bhutanese citizens were taken away before one was
asked to leave the country after signing the VMF.
After 1988 when the government implemented the above
mentioned policies large number of people were evicted and were residing in
India. At that time media and NGOs could not take up these issues very strongly
as the Bhutanese government was very active to suppress this issue through
their own channel. At the later state
when the Bhutanese refugees came to Nepal via India in 1991, the media, NGOs
and INGOs and the refugee groups took up the Bhutanese refugee issue very
strongly. As a result of lobbying and
mass media coverage UNHCR was invited by the government of Nepal to help the
refugees. If the media and the NGOs
would not have given due importance to these issue then Bhutanese government
would have been very successful in their objective of producing more refugees
and stateless people.
Bhutan government is misinforming the people saying
that most of refugees in the camps are not Bhutanese citizens, while the survey
of the Bhutanese refugees by Ministry of Home Affairs, Nepal shows that 97% of
the refugees have documents to prove their Bhutanese identity, rest 3% say that
they have either lost or have been seized by the government authorities. During the recent verification process 98.8%
showed valid documents to prove their Bhutanese identity.
The Citizenship Act 1985:
The Citizenship act passed in 1985 and implemented
in the year 1988 was discriminatory against the Lhotshampas. Census operation was carried out in Southern
district and people who had been recognised as Bhutanese until then were
arbitrarily declared as illegal immigrants and it revoked the citizenship of
tens of thousands of southern Bhutanese who were otherwise bonafide Bhutanese
under the 1958 nationality law and 1977 Citizenship Act of Bhutan. On the basis of the 1985 Citizenship Act the
census team demanded the land tax receipt of 1958 in the year 1988 (after 30
years) to prove their residence in Bhutan on or before 1958. Based on it the census team categorised the
southern Bhutanese under seven groups: viz., F1 – Genuine Bhutanese; F2 –
Returned Migrants (those who had left the country but returned); F3 – Drop-outs
(those not available during the census); F4 – A non national women married to a
Bhutanese man; F5 – A non-national man married to a Bhutanese woman; F6 –
Adoption cases (children legally adopted); and F7 – Non-national (migrants and
illegal settlers). Those who were able
to produce the land tax receipt of 1958 were considered as genuine Bhutanese
and those who could not produce were declared as non-nationals.
“There has been concerns about the Royal Government
of Bhutan’s (RgoB) human rights practices including implementation of the 1985
Citizenship Act and the failure to prosecute security force members who
committed rape, torture and other abuses in the name of enforcing the
Citizenship Act”. United States of America in its State
Department;s report on Human Rights practices in Bhutan, 1994.
Department;s report on Human Rights practices in Bhutan, 1994.
Driglam Namza:
Driglam Namza an ancient code of social etiquette of western Bhutanese
was made obligatory for all ethnic communities.
Dzongkha language, the mother tongue of the Ngalong community was made
sole national language. Nepali, the
language of the southern Bhutanese was dropped from the school curriculum. The children from southern Bhutan lost their
right to be informed in their own language.
One Nation One People Policy: One nation one people policy sought to impose
a uniform Ngalongs culture on a multicultural, multiethnic society. Bhutan being the land of 14 different ethnic
groups the government implemented the One Nation One People Policy denying
other ethnic groups in Bhutan to enjoy their own culture, wear their ethnic
dress and use their own language.
Marriage Act of 1998:i Marriage Act of 1998 was
forcefully implemented in 1988 that targeted the Lhotshampas who were married
to non-national. government denied promotion
in government services, training and fellowships abroad.
No Objection Ceritificate: In 1990, the government introduced a new rule
requiring a ‘No Objection Certificate’, (NOC) from the police and the local
administration in southern Bhutan. It
was considered as a pre-requisite for access to health facilities, education,
civil service jobs and for sale of cash crops.
Even for children for admission in the school need NOC.
Voluntary Migration Forms (VMF): Eviction was legitimised with the introduction
of the so called VMF. The 70th
session of the national Assembly in 1991 resolved to evict anyone involved in
the peaceful demonstration or being suspected as the supporter of the human
rights movement. Sixty percent of the
refugees residing in therefugee camps were forced into signing these VMFs
voluntarily renouncing their Bhutanese citizenship. These forms were printed in Dzongkha
language. As the Lhotshampas couldn’t
read these forms they did not understand the content of the forms most of them
did not even know that they were voluntarily renouncing their citizenship of
Bhutan. Those who lsigned the VMF form
never knew about the content of it neither the authorities informed about it.
“Many refugees were coerced (under threat of arrest
and torture) to sign papers renouncing their land and citizenship, stating they
were leaving voluntarily. The concept of
voluntary emigrant is in no way compatible with the reports of violence,
summery arrest, vandalism of property and general intimidation” LWF, Refugees of the Peaceful Dragon,
December 1995.
Religion: The royal
government of Bhutan has used religion as tool to harassment and eviction of
the nationals from the country. In the
year 1992 Mr. Dal Jit Rai and his neighbours were celebrating Christmas. They were arrested, imprisoned and evicted
from the country for practising Christianity.
Likewise the harassment for the Hindus continue. They cannot practice their religion on their
will. They have no right to religion in
Bhutan.
The religious atrocities were met to the followers
of Nyingmapa sect of Buddhism in eastern Bhutan. During the peace protest by the eastern
Bhutanese in October 1997, 13 Shedras (monastries) have been closed and more
than 600 monks and students were sent to their respective villages by civil
administrators, police, army and security forces. Around 200 people including monks and
ordinary people were arrested and one monk was killed alleging them as
anti-national.
Resettlement
Programme in Bhutan:
The resettlement of Bhutanese people from north and
eastern zone in Southern Bhutan on the land belonging to the refugees started
in 1993. The first settlement programme
was carried out in Samdrupjongkhar district with 58 ex-Royal Bbutan Army
families. From 1998 the Royal Government
of Bhutan has undertaken a massive land resettlement programme in six southern
districts. The names of the districts,
blocks and villages have been changed particularly in the south to make them
sound more like names in northern Bhutan.
The Royal government of Bhutan, in the guise of rehabilitating landless
people, has been closing the possibility of the return of the evicted citizens
by distributing land belonging to them.
It is reported that the northern Bhutanese persons have often been
coerced into settling on land belonging to the evicted Lhotshampas.
Role of the
Bhutanese media in the re-settlement programme:
Kuensel, March
20, 1999.
Dzongkhag
Administration
Tsirang
Announcement
DAT/ADM-/98-99-
Landless
people from other Dzongkhag who got land allotment in TsirangT Dzongkhag under
resettlement programme have failed to report despite repeated requests of
Dzongkhag. therefore, Tsirang Dzongkhag
administration once again requests them to report immediately as the
cultivation season is already set in.
Non-compliance shall be viewed very seriously and Dzongkhag
administration shall not be held responsible if any complication arises in
future on the matter.
TOld name of Tsirang was Chirang
Dzongkhag
Kuensel: March 27, 1999
Sarpand
Dzongkhag
Announcement
All the
Shi-Sarps (Re-settlers) of phase one and two from different Dzongkhags should
report to their respective areas under SarpangT Dzongkhag within April 1999.
Failure to report within the above dateline, this Dzongkhag Administration
would consider the lands to have surrendered by the Shi-sarps (Re-settlers) to
the Government. The concern Dzongkhags
are also requested to kindly inform their respective Shi-sarps (Re-settlers),
to report within the above dateline. For
convenience of the Dzongkhags the list of Shi-sarps will be faxed to the
individual Dzongkhag within the week.
TOld name of Sarpand was Sarbhang
Dzongdag
During the 76th National Assembly session
held in August 1998 the Bhutanese government announced that around 1027
households from north and east of Bhutan had been rehabilitated in southern
Bhutan. The ‘people’s representatives’
asked the government to speed up the resettlement scheme and also to expand it
to other southern districts. Today
several hundred acres of land and housing properties to over 100,000 refugees
are being distributed to northern Bhutanese families sunder the resettlement
scheme of the Royal Government of Bhutan.
It may be noted that this scheme of resettlement in the south is of
recent origin and that it was not in practice before forcible eviction of the
Lhotshampas.
On the one hand, the Bhutanese government is trying
to convince the world community that it is negotiating for the return of
refugees with the Nepalese government, but at the same time it is distributing
the landed property of the refugees to the people from northern Bhutan.
The northern families now resettled in the south had
very little option but to accept what was forced upon them by the district
authorities. When those northern
Bhutanese learned that the land and houses being allocated to them actually
belonged to the Lhotshampas and that one day those people might return and
claim their land, the northerners did not want to take it. However, they were forced to resettle on
these lands by the Royal Government of Bhutan.
Most of the Bhutanese refugees in the camps don’t
know as to what has happened to their land.
All the refugees want to go back to their land from where they were
evicted. The refugees from Khudanabari
camp are unhappy to know that the verification team left out details on their
land and housing property.
The U.S. State Department report has clearly
mentioned that “the Bhutanese government’s restrictions on its citizens’ right
to privacy, freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion”. U.S.
State Department Report on Human Rights Practices – 2001.
III. State of
Media: Bhutan
Press Freedom:
Bhutan
is one country where there is no right to information, media is completely
owned and controlled by the government.
Anyone who speaks against the king, country and the people is considered
criminal in Bhutan. There are thousands
of refugees in Nepal who have been the victims of the royal Government of
Bhutan for speaking against the atrocities of the government authorities. The freedom of press is non-existent in
Bhutan. Private media is not
allowed. Bhutan’s only government-owned
weekly news paper Kuensel, television and radito Bhutan Broadcasting
Corporation publish and broadcast what the government wants the people to read
and know. Presence of a independent
media could have contributed to safeguarding the rights of the Bhutanese
people However, today there are over 100,000
refugees in Nepal.
Tek Nath Rizal the father of human rights movement in
Bhutan and Amnesty International prisoner of conscience was first arrested in
Bhutan in mid-1088 after campaigning against unfair practices adopted during
the 1988 census. He was released after
three days and soon after left for Nepal, where he continued to campaign
against unfair practices adopted during the census and the Bhutanese
government’s policy requiring ethnic Nepalese people to adopt northern
Bhutanese traditions and culture.
The following year he was arrested in Nepal and
handed over to the Burmese authorities.
After four years in prison he was finally tried and, in November 1993,
he was sentenced to life imprisonment for “treasonable acts”. He was granted a pardon by King Jigme Singye
Wangchuck three days after sentence was passed.
Tak Nath Rizal was released in November 1999 after King Jigme Singye
Wangchuck granted him unconditional release in an amnesty.
Mr. T.N. Rizal and other political activist were
arrested for no fault of their own, but expressing against the atrocities of
the government. Being the leader leading
the human rights movement, he could never express his thoughts, ideas and
feelings with the government, citizens of Bhutan, refugees in Nepal and
outsiders. The fact as to why he was
arrested is still unknown to the people inside Bhutan. This implies to all the political prisoners
in Bhutan.
Television: The
state-run Bhutan Broadcasting Service 9BBS) launched the first TV service as
part of celebrations surrounding King Jigme Singye Wangchuk’s silver
jubilee. The launch marked the end of a
general ban on television. Television
was introduced only in 1999, because for years Bhutan had a deliberate policy
of isolation, fearing that outside influences would undermine its absolute
monarchy, freedom and culture. While Bhutan
has been cited in the news media for being the last place in the world to
legalise television. It is just few
years that the Bhutanese people are allowed to view television. Before that no one in Bhutan except the
foreigners were allowed to watch television.
Bhutan today runs the television programme for about four hours per day
and it is controlled by the government.
Kuensel: Bhutan’s
one and only government-owned print newspaper, Kuensel also has a Web site that features news, links and information
about the country. Kuensel is the only
weekly paper or the print media communication of the royal government of
Bhutan. This is one of the tools at the
hands of the government to publish what they want the people to read and know.
“The Kuensel in recent months have become pages of
blatant lies. It has no conscience or
intelligence of its own; journalism is meant to be an intelligent portrayal of
a nation’s life. Here is a paper that
tells lies and lies alone when it covers the national news. The Kuensel news are meant to deceive and
confuse the people journalistic ethic is a stranger to it. A paper that says “yes” to every
stupidity” Bhutan we want justice, PFHR, 1989.
Bhutanese authority never tried to present the fact
of the creation of refugees or the refugee situation in Nepal and India. But the known fact is that they have always
published news that defames its own citizens in exile. Bhutanese authorities are very sensitive to
media, this is clear from the visit of the Bhutanese officials for bilateral
negotiations where they have always tried to avoid media. Bhutan has one dimensional polciy today and
whatever appears on Bhutan in the Nepali or the international press is
immediately transmitted through various sources employed by the government. They then try to react or diplomatically
solve the problem. In an attempt to
lobby and react to Bhutanese refugee issues at international level the
Government of Bhutan have set up two diplomatic missions, one in New York and
another at Geneva after the refugee problem started. The government has also brought a few
publications in an attempt to sideline the refugee issue.
Bhutanese people do not enjoy human rights as their
rights by Bhutan’s constitution and law.
This is as true as it was prior to 1990.
Specifically, Bhutanese people have, as a matter of law:
·
No right to Speech and Expression
·
No right to dissent or express dissent
·
No right to form association or organisation
·
No civil and political rights
·
No right to equality and freedom from discrimination
·
No cultural rights
·
No economic and social rights
Eris Sottas,
the Director of SOS/Torture, Development and Human Rights.
Amnesty International believes that many people in
the camps in Nepal have been forced out of Bhutan as a result of measures taken
by the Bhutanese authority. Amnesty
International opposes the practice of forcible exile when it is imposed as a
measure on account of people’s non-violent expression of their political,
religious or conscientiously held beliefs or by reason of their ethnic origin,
sex, colour or language. It believes
that many of those in the camps have been forcibly exiled from Bhutan on
account of their ethnic origin or political beliefs. Amnesty
International, Bhutan: Forcible Exile, 1994.
In this way the refugees are denied to their basic
right to information by the Bhutanese authority. Without access to information from the
Bhutanese authority Bhutanese refugees have not been able to form their
opinion. The exchange of ideas can
always help to resolve the refugee issue.
Bhutan news onlie: Bhutan’s first private online news magazine
features web-based news, background information on Bhutan, and links to South
Asian newspapers.
Druknet: is Bhutan’s only Internet Service Provider.
Censorship:
Bhutan also receives Indian newspapers but most of
these news papers are censored. Letters
sent by mail are opened and sometimes the person receiving the letter is
punished for no fault of his/her own.
Because of this censorship, people have least access to information on
country’s politics, law, development and government policies. Without the freedom of expression, opinion
and press, the enjoyment of other human rights is curtailed and this has
resulted to the creation of statelessness.
IV. Media laws
in Bhutan and Nepal:
Bhutanese laws
and creation of refugees:
People’s right to freedom of expression has been
suppressed by the following laws of Bhutan.
These rigid laws award capital punishment to those who criticise the
king and his government.
Lawof Thrimsung: It is the first law banning the freedom of
expression in Bhutan. The law of
Thrimshung Chenpo, 1957 has been used to misinterpret the meaning of three
refuges of Buddhism, Buddha (omniscient), Dharma (the spiritual law) and Sangha
(the order) to mean Tsa-Wa-Sum or three elements of king, government and the
kingdom to suit ruler’s political interest.
The king is the head of the government.
This law declares any act of “making conversation and correspondence”
criticising the king and his government by Bhutanese citizens as treasonable
offence. On March, 1996, the National
Assembly of Bhutan confirmed and approved death punishment for offences against
this law. Rakesh Chhetri, Silent suffering from Bhutan.
National Security Act: This Act was enacted in 1992 and given
retroactive effect from November, 1989.
This Act imprisons any person whose “words, either spoken or written, or
by any means create misunderstanding between the government and people of Bhutan”.
Citizenship Act: This Act says that a citizen shall be
deprived of citizenship if he is found to criticise the king and his
government. Such citizens who have been
deprived of the citizenship must dispose all properties and leave Bhutan for
ever. All Bhutanese refugees fall under
this category. Any one found in
possession of dissident literature and criticising the government policies will
have to forego his/her citizenship. Such
is the practice of the government to suppress the peoples’ voice.
Role of Legislature: Bhutan’s National Assembly (Parliament) is
not elected. The members are selected by
the Dzongdas (Chief District Officers).
There is no opposition in the Assembly.
All members belong to the Treasury bench. They are not allowed to criticise the
government and its policies. The MPs do
not have the right to freedom of expression even in the walls of the
Assembly. They are intimidated by the
regime and warned of dire consequences, if they speak anything contrary to what
the government wants. Members are never
allowed to present a bill on their own.
It is always the government ministries that table the bill.
Role of the Courts: Bhutanese courts do not protect peoples’
right to freedom of expression and opinion.
They always uphold the government decisions. In order to please the executive, they
sometimes award longer sentences than what has been provided in the statute
books.
Nepalese Laws and the refugees:
Although Nepal does not have any specific provision
tosafe-guard refugees, it has generously housed large number of refugees. Refugees are treated as aliens under the
existing laws of Nepal. The constitution
of Nepal doesn’t make any distinction between citizens and aliens in regard to
certain basic rights. The Citizenship
Act 1975, section 3, permits the naturalisation of refugees. the immigration act of 1991 retains the power
of expulsion of aliens on the grounds of national interests. The extradition Act of 1991, section 12 (1)
supports the principle that political offenders are not to be extradited. This clause supports the international
refugee law. As Nepal doesn't have any
particular legislation to regulate the inflow of refugee in to the country, it
is being tackled by administrative measures.
Government policy as regards to entry and stay of refugees and aliens
has been quite liberal.
Media and laws: Article 16 of the constitution of Nepal says
that every citizen shall have the right to demand and receive information on
any matter of public importance. This
implies that the right to information has become a human and constitutional
right of the people in Nepal. The denial
of this right can be contested under Article 23 of the constitution. The supreme court of Nepal under article
88(2) holds tremendous power to enforce this right.
Although the right to be informed and to inform
others applies to refugees too, but there are cases where they have been denied
the right to information. To give few
examples, the refugees who have been verified till date don’t know about the
status of their verification, similarly all the eastern Bhutanese refugees who
have been denied registration don’t know as to why they have been denied
refugee status.
V. Bhutanese
Refugees: nature of communication
Bhutanese
refugees inside the refugee camps:
The refugees were not allowed to express their
thoughts, ideas and opinions freely in Bhutan.
When they reached Nepal they were then able to share their thoughts and
ideas and publish them in words. This
made their life easier and safe. Today
there are seven camps in Nepal where over 100,000 refugees are staying. Communication and information have helped the
Bhutanese refugees to take charge of their own destiny.
Today there are political parties, NGOs and other
different groups formed in exile who are advocating for their cause at
national, regional and international level.
The refugees even today cannot communicate or express their thoughts and
opinions with their relatives or any one in Bhutan. If any citizen in Bhutan is found with
literature that speaks about the refugees in Nepal or the human rights struggle
in Bhutan then he or she is immediately arrested imprisoned or evicted from the
country.
When we look back to Bhutan and India, Bhutanese
Refugees have more access to information in Nepal, but we cannot say that they
have fair access to information. In this
world of advanced communications system, Bhutanese refugee camps don’t enjoy
the library, computer, internet, or TC facilities, few refugees who can afford
have radio sets. Radio is one of the
most important source of information for the refugees inside the camps. For official purpose each camp is connected
with radio set and this is used to communicate between camps during emergencies
and important work.
There are refugees who have not made a single
telephone call and there are many who have not seen computer and very few know
about the e-mail, internet and web account.
News Board Programme: Print media is not available for the refugees
inside the camps, although AHURA Bhutan a refugee organisation initiated a
programme “News board programme”. Under
this programme the organisation collected the news, relevant to refugees and
put it on the news board in each of the refugee camps, where refugees used to
come and read and share with those who could not read. This programme doen’t exist today because of
the lack of resources.
Sandesh weekly:i Now a group of refugee youths have started a weekly
newspaper called “Sandesh”. Initially
the government authorities tried to stop this initiative of the refugee youths which
was finally permitted under the condition that they write Sandesh weekly it is
being published from Bhutan. This paper
is now playing a very important role to fill the communication gap between the
refugees. This has also helped to
control corruption and other unlawful activities among the refugees and the
groups involved with the refugee activities.
Medium of communication should be made available to
the refugees, and if they are given an opportunity to share their thoughts and
ideas and opinions freely with their own communities in the outside world then
these refugees themselves will be advocating for their cause towards the
durable solution to their problem.
Verification
of the refugees:
The verification process in Khudanabari refugee camp
started on March 26, 2001 and ended on December 13, 2001. Altogether 1,933 families or 12,092
individuals have been verified out of 100,000 refugees in the camps. Out of the total verified 99.8% have
presented valid documentary evidences to prove their Bhutanese identity to the
Joint Verification Team (JVT) of the Royal government of Bhutan and his
Majesty’s Government of Nepal. Today 12,
092 people are waiting for the result of their verification. The refugees have all the right to be
informed about their status soon after the verification process. Today even after ten months JVT has not been
able to inform about the result of the verification to the refugees.
There are another 88,000 plus Burmese refugees in
the camps and over 20,000 outside the camps. the verification team had taken eight and half
months to complete one camp and it is more than 10 months since the two
delegations left the verification process.
The refugees don’t know when the verification will start again and if it
is ever resumed then it will take many many years for the completion of the
verification alone. During the
verification refugees have been able to communicate with documentary evidence
to the Bhutanese government that they have been forcefully evicted from Bhutan
by the Bhutanese authority. Even after
this the Bhutanse government is telling to the world that these people in the
camps are not from Bhutan, these are people who have come from India and Nepal.
Non-registered
Bhutanese refugees in Nepal:
There are approximately 20,000 Bhutanese refugees
staying on their own in Nepal and India, and many among these 20,000 have
approached the Government of Nepal, where they have been denied registration as
refugees. Most of them do not know as to
why they have been denied asylum.
There are around 100 refugees from eastern Bhutan
and another 4,000 refugees from south Bhutan who have been denied registration
in Nepal. Many among them have their
family or relatives who are registered and are inside the refugee camps. Therefore a large chunk of non-registered
refugees are staying inside the camps with their family or relatives.
Till date no organisation has been able to do a
study on the conditions of these refugees from Bhutan who have been denied
registration. Perhaps because it’s a
difficult task as they are scattered and it is not very easy to trace
them. South Asia Forum for Human Rights
is now doing a pilot survey of the non-registered refugees in and around the
refugee camps. This can be an important
source of information for the groups working for the non-registered refugees.
It is important to document these cases and advocate
for their registration. The
non-registered refugees have made several appeals to the government of Nepal
and UNHCR without much success.
Bhutanese
refugees and the Nepalese Media:
The Nepalese media have given due importance to the
Bhutanese refugee issue and it is one of the major source of information for
the people around the world. Nepalese
media have played a vital role to highlight this issue. “Ghatna ra Bichar” is a programme from radio
Nepal and this is one medium of information even for the people inside Bhutan
about the Bhutanese refugees, there are reports that the people in Bhutan have
been arrested and imprisoned for listening to this programme. The print media like the Kathmandu Post, The
Kantipur, Himalayan Times, Himal magazine, People’s review are some papers from
Nepal that have played a major role to highlight the Bhgutanese refugee issue. The news published in the paper are also
available at their website so this makes it easier for the people outside Nepal
to access the information. Most of the
important news on Bhutan, like Appeal March to Bhutan, Bilateral negotiation
between Bhutan and Nepal got the from page coverage or the editorial coverage.
There are some Bhutanese refugees who write
regularly in some of the above mentioned papers. They are Mr. Rakesh Chhetri who has published
more than 60 articles on Bhutan in Nepalese media, others are Mr. Narayan Kattel,
Dr. D.N.S. Dhakal, R.P. Subba, Dr. Dhurba Rizal who regularly publish in some
of the above mentioned papers.
NBon0Bhutanese from Nepal and outside Nepal also publish articles on
Bhutan but it is mostly refugees who contribute. Refugee groups occasionally conduct press
conferences, workshops, meetings and rallies demanding for the resolution of
the refugee issue. The Human Rights
groups of Nepal also conduct programmes on Bhutanese refugee issue
occasionally.
Communication
and Networking
The Bhutanese refugees leaders have been able to
establish the network with some of the groups working with the refugee issues
around the world. Due to lack of
resources they have not been able to make the best use of these established network. The EU has passed two resolutions on Bhutan
likewise there have been some resolutions passed at UN Commission and
Sub-commission but they have not been able to follow up and lobby for the cause
due to lack of the resources. The
networking and communication is not very strong between the refugee groups
because of differences among them.
Some of the Bhutanese refugee groups in exile have
their regular publications, e-mail network, website through which they
communicate about the refugee issue.
Travel document: Travel document is issued by the Ministry of
foreign Affairs, Nepal for the Bhutanese refugees for a period of one
year. To process for a travel document
you will have to have all the papers, like invitation letter, programme
schedule and other relevant papers. When you have all these papers at hand then
you will have to have a letter from the refugee camp secretary and the same is
forwarded to Refugee Co-ordination Unit of HMG then to the District office of
HMG and then to the Home Ministry. Home Ministry will forward to Foreign Ministry
and finally if foreign ministry thinks it is okay you will get your travel
document for a single country you are travelling to. The whole process take more than a month if
one keeps on following and can impress the concerned authority otherwise it
will never get done. This way the right
of the refugees to travel to other countries and to lobby on their behalf is
being controlled very much. This is one
of the reasons why the refugees have not been able to communicate about their
issue with the outside world.
Conclusion:
The right to freedom of expression, opinion and
press must be protected by rule of law.
Realising this, the United National General Assembly in 1948, proclaimed
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), “as a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations”.
The UDHR is an integral component of the Un charter. All members-states are considered to have
acceded to this “common standard”.
Article 19 of the UDHR explicitly says that, “Everyone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression”. And
Article 19(1) of ICCPR which clearly says that “everyone shall have the right
to hold opinions without interference” and Article 19(2) of ICCPR says
“everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression”. Here Bhutan is not the member of ICCPR but
Nepal is. These rights are the most
important pillar of a civil society. A
channel of communications must be established between the government and the
aggrieved parties to sort out the problems.
However, the Bhutanese government, instead of opening dialogue with
dissidents has crushed the voice of its citizens and their right to freedom of
opinion and expression remains curtailed. It does not respect peoples’
voice. the current movement for human
rights and democracy was launched only after the government refused to listen
to peoples’ appeal for amendment of the Citizenship Act, 1985. The regime has made bhutan a completely
closed society.
The media, UN organisations, INGOs, NGOs and
individuals working with the Bhutanese refugee issue have played a very
important role to keep the Bhutanese refugee issue alive. They have helped to promote public
understanding and encourage generous assistance to refugees. On the other hand
the negative reporting and writing of the Bhutanese government have been
otherwise.
REFUGEE WOMEN AND THE FUNDAMENTAL INADEQUACIES IN INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES IN SOUTH ASIA[84]
REFUGEE WOMEN AND THE FUNDAMENTAL INADEQUACIES IN INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES IN SOUTH ASIA[84]
Paula Banerjee
Department of South and Southeast Asian Studies
Calcutta University
Over one percent of the total world populations
today consists of refugees. More than
eighty percent of that number are made up of women and their dependent
children. An overwhelming majority of
these women come from the developing world.
South Asia is the fourth largest refugee-producing region in the
world. Again, a majority of these
refugees are made up of women. “Refugee
women and children form 76 per cent of the total refugee population in
Pakistan. 79 percent in India, 78
percent in Bangladesh and 87 percent in Nepal.”[85] The sheer number of women among the refugee
population portrays that it is a gendered issue. On the basis of examples taken from different
refugee experiences in South Asia this paper argues that both displacement and
asylum is a gendered experience. At
least in the context of South Asia it results from and is related to the
marginalisation of women by the South Asian states. These states at best patronise women and at
worse infantilise, disenfranchise and de-politicise them. It is in the person of a refugee that women’s
marginality reaches its climatic height.
By refusing to create a South Asian refugee regime states in South Asia
continue their castigation of non-conforming women to the sttus of political
non-subjects.
Etienne Balibar has argued that the fissures in the
“modern political community” emerge from the “practical and ideological sexism
as a structure of interior exclusion of women generalised to the whole
society,” which leads to the “universalisation of sexual difference.”[86] Thus, modern states that are built on gender
difference develop a precarious relation with its women. Women became both subjects of the state as
well as its other. In pluralistic societies such as those found
in South Asia “the modern projects of national independence, state building and
economic development have had distinctive gender implications and outcomes.”[87] The nation building projects in South Asia
has led to the creation of a homogenised identity of citizenship. State machineries seek to create a “unified”
and “national” citizenry that accepts the central role of the existing
elite. This is done through privileging
majoritarian, male and monolithic cultural values that deny the space to
difference. Such a denial has often led
to the segregation of minorities, on the basis of caste, religion and gender
from the collective we. I argue that one
way of marginalising women from body politic is done by targetting them and
displacing them in times of state verses community conflict. As a refugee a woman loses her individuality,
subjectivity, citizenship and her ability to make political choices. As political non-subjects refugee women
emerge as the symbol of difference between us/citizens and its
other/refugees/non-citizens. Refugee
women become the material for the symbolic construction of the nations
boundaries. By taking some select
examples from South Asia this paper addresses such theoretical
assumptions. Here the category of
refugee women will include women who have crossed international borders and
those who are internally displaced and are potential refugees.[88] I will discuss their experiences of
displacement and analyse how as dislocated subjects they negotiate spaces to
retrieve agency in the face of institutional apathy.
State
Formation and the Question of Abducted Women
The partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947
witnessed probably the largest refugee movement in modern history. About 8 million Hindus and Sikhs left
Pakistan to resettle in India while about 6-7 million Muslims went to
Pakistan. Such transfer of population
was accompanied by horrific violence.
Some 50,000 Muslim women in India and 33,000 non-Muslim women in
Pakistan were abducted, abandoned or separated from their families.[89] Women’s experiences of migration, abduction
and destitution during partition and State’s responses to it is a pointer to
the relationship between women’s position as marginal participants in state
politics and gender subordination as perpetrated by the State. In this context the experiences of abducted
women and their often forcible repatriation by the State assumes enormous
importance today when thousands of South Asian women are either refugees,
migrants or stateless within the subcontinent.
The two states of India and Pakistan embarked on a
massive Central Recovery Project during which some 30,000 women were recovered
by their respective states. Some
incidents relating to these abducted women exemplify the politics of gender
during partition. Even when the two
countries could decide on little else they decided that the abducted women must
be restored to their families. Problems
arose over the process and progress of recovery. An Abducted Persons bill was brought in the
Indian Parliament. Boys below the age of
16 and women of all ages were brought under this bill which gave unlimited
power to police officers regarding abducted persons. If a police officer detained any women under
this bill they could not be questioned in any court of law. Although numerous amendments were proposed in
the House the bill passed unchanged on 19 December, 1949.[90]
According to Rameshwari Nehru, adviser to GOI,
Ministry of Rehabilitation, many abducted women showed extreme unwillingness to
leave their “captors.”[91] Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin in their recent
book on partition observes that women were:
abducted as Hindus,
converted and married as Muslims, recovered as Hindus but required to
relinquish their children because they were born of Muslim fathers, and
disowned as ‘unpure’ and ineligible for marriage within their erstwhile family
and community, their identities were in a continuous state of construction and
reconstruction, making them... ‘permanent refugees’.[92]
These women were forcibly repatriated though refused
rehabilitation by their families. How
did India and Pakistan achieve such commonality of interest regarding abducted
women?
Many explanations are given for this forcible
repatriation of women. Menon and Bhasin
point out how national honour was bound to women’s bodies. According to Jan Jindy Pettman repatriation was
made a nationalist project because women’s bodies became markers of male
honour. As usual women’s bodies became
“part of other people’s agendas.”[93] Both countries made claims of moral
superiority over the other based on
their ability to protect/control female bodies.
This control was essential for the self-definition of the male identity
that was in a state of crisis.
Abducted women were not considered as legal entities
with political and constitutional rights.
All choices were denied to them and while the state patronised them
verbally by portraying their “need” for protection it also infantilised them by
giving decision making power to their guardians who were defined by the male
pronoun “he”. By insisting that the
abducted women could not represent themselves and had to be represented, the
State marginalised them from the decision making process and made them
non-participants. Even today the refugee
women do not represent themselves. They
are represented by officials. For the
abducted it was their sexuality that threatened their security and the honour
of the nation. Thus, their vulnerability
was focused on their body. This made all
women susceptible to such threats and so had to be protected/controlled. By denying agency to the abducted women the
State made it conceivable to deny agency to all women. Even after fifty-years, state politics in
South Asia regarding women in general and refugee women in particular remain
essentially similar to the partition days.
Untold Tales
of Dislocation: An Exercise in Nation Building
Following the Partition 30 lakh refugees entered
West Bengal by 1960. In the 1970s the
state witnessed another massive exodus from East Pakistan during the formation
of Bangladesh. Some ten million refugees
fled to India. Although the GOI received
the refugees but it also made it clear that the refugee would be
temporary. The refugee camps along the
border were called ‘transit’ relief camps’.
Over fifty percent of refugees from East Pakistan/Bangladesh consisted
of women.[94] In case of these refugees the treatment was
slightly better than that meted out to the abducted women of former years. Many women’s organisations came up to help
these women such as the Nari Seva Sangha and Ananda Ashram. During the first phase of refugee influx from
the East the West Bengal Government established five sponsored colleges with
stipulation that 75 percent of the students must be from refugee families. Four of these were co-educational colleges
and only one, the Sarojini Naidu College for Women in DumDum was women’s
college. During the second phase the GOI
had applied and got a huge loan from the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR). The number of women
refugees increased because of fear of sexual persecution of women. Rape had already been recognised as an
instrument of war.
During the first phase many women were sent to camps
in Titagarh, Kartickpur, Ranaghat, Bansberia and Bhadrakali. But there was only one institution named Uday
Villa that was responsible for the rehabilitation of single women.[95] There were however many women who did not
find space in these camps. They were
forced to seek refuge in Kashi or Brindaban.[96] Subhoranjan Dasgupta interviewed many such
displaced women in Brindaban of whom Ila Bandyopadhyay was one. She came to Brindaban in 1947 and has lived
there since. Even during the second
phase of migration many women were forced to settle in Brindaban. Chapalasundari Dhar, a child widow came over
to India from Noakhali when the riots started in late sixties. She did not find a safe habitat in Calcutta
so she was pushed to Brindaban.[97]
Even 29 years after the creation of Bangladesh there
are 2910 Bengali women struggling to survive in Brindaban. One of them is Gopika Saha who came to India
during the second wave from Bangladesh.
She tried to make a living in Calcutta but after her husband died,
without any kind of institutional support she was forced to go and live in
Brindaban.[98] Most women who are now living in Brindaban
have had little or no institutional support.
They earn their livelihood often by begging. These women are both hapless and
helpless. Many of them have been
sexually abused during the riots in East Pakistan. They were unwanted in their country of birth
and were displaced due to persistent fear of further abuse. According to some estimates over 200,000
Bengali women were raped in Bangladesh between 1971-1972.[99] Even when they came to India, the state run
institutions found their position precarious.
The Indian State could not push them back because it was trying to
portray the “issue at sate was a humanitarian one.”[100] Neither could they rehabilitate them within
the majoritarian community, as they were not considered respectable enough.
Women refugees from East Pakistan/Bangladesh portray
that institutional responses varied with individuals. If women were considered respectable and
therefore useful for the nationalising and state building project they were
accommodated within the majoritarian community.
Otherwise they were further displaced and forced to live their lives
outside the community. They remained
permanent refugees living in the margins of society. As women are seen as “the most dangerous bearers
of moral decay,” their rehabilitation becomes even more precarious.[101] Any threat to their character is looked upon
as a threat to the nation. This entails
increased control of women. Since
displacement may mean erosion of familial control the state assumes the
guardianship of women. One way of
controlling women whose protection becomes problematic is by reducing them to
the status of a political non-subject by permanently relegating them to the
periphery. This is what has happened to
Bangladeshi women living in Brindaban.
Yet even in the peripheral state they challenge patriarchal modes by
living together in “Amar Bari” as single women, rising above their sufferings
and despair and participating in the discourse by happily narrating their
experiences.
A Failed
Nationalising Project: Sri Lankan Women
Ethnic tensions between the Tamil minority and
Sinhala majority leading to armed conflict since 1980s have led to several
waves of refugees from Sri Lanka. They
are victims of a failed nationalising project.
By 1989 there were about 160,000 refugees from Sri Lanka to India, again
largely women with their dependents.
Initially the State Government provided these refugees with shelter and
rations, but still many of them preferred to live outside the camps. Like the second wave of refugees from East
Pakistan/Bangladesh India stressed that the Sri Lankan refugee would have to go
“home”. However, unlike the refugees
from the East the Sri Lankans were called “refugees” rather than
“evacuees”. They were registered and
issued with refugee certificates. In
terms of education and health both registered and unregistered refugees enjoy
the same rights as the nationals.
Nevertheless in absence of specific legislation their legal status
remain ambiguous.[102] The precarious nature of their status became
clearer in the aftermath of Raji Gandhi’s assassination. NGOs access to the camps, refugees, freedom
of movement and access to education and informal occupations were all
curtailed.
On January 6, 1992 the Indian and the Sri Lankan
governments signed a bilateral agreement to begin refugee repatriation on 20
January. Soon the programme was
suspended when UNHCR raised doubts about their safety once they return.[103]
In July 1992 the GOI signed an agreement with the UNHCR and allowed the agency
a token presence in Madras. By April
1993 refugee camps were reduced from 237 to 132 in Tamil Nadu and 1 in Orissa.[104] Representatives of UNHCR were allowed to be
in the transit area and could speak to returning refugees. Before conflict was resumed in 1995 some
55,000 refugees were repatriated from India to Sri Lanka.
After Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination the politicians
began to shun the refugees.[105] As most of these were women they were
initially considered harmless but with the number of female suicide bombers
swelling there was a marked change in GOI’s attitude to women refugees.[106] What the government of India failed to
acknowledge was that the number of female bombers swelled after the IPKF
operations, due to a demographic imbalance.[107] The government turned a blind eye when touts
came to recruit young women from the refugee camps in Tamil Nadu to work as
“maids” in countries of Middle East. Most of these women were then smuggled out
of India and sent to the Gulf countries.
Often they were badly abused. On
such case that caught the public eye was that of a young girl called
Sivitha. She was smuggled to the Gulf
with thirty other women. Her employer
“took sadistic pleasure in thrashing her.”
Twice she fell into a coma.
Unable to bear this she sought refuge in the Sri Lankan embassy. She was sent back to Sri Lanka, into the war
torn area of Vavuniya. She tried to get
back to India to her parents but failed.
Ultimately she committed suicide.[108]
Even when the situation is not so extreme it is
still traumatic for young women. In
Indian camps refugee families are given a dole of Rs.150/- a month, which is
often stopped arbitrarily. Women are
discouraged from taking up employment outside the camps. During multiple displacements women who have
never coped with such situations before are often at a loss for necessary
papers. When separated from male members
of their family they are vulnerable to sexual abuse. The camps are not conducive for the personal
safety of women as they enjoy no privacy.
But what is more worrying is that without any institutional support
women become particularly vulnerable to human traffickers. These people aided by network of criminals
force women into prostitution. Millions
of rupees change hands in this trade and more lives get wrecked every day.[109] Yet even in these miserable conditions many
of the widows living in camps wear the pottu.[110]
Women from the North and Northeast Sri Lanka are
worst affected by the political conflict.
Many of them who are unable to cross international border swell the
ranks of the internally displaced. Even
in such camps women are responsible for holding together fragmented
families. Today roughly one-third of all
households in Sri Lanka are headed by women and the numbers increase many fold
in the camps for internally displaced.
In Alles Garden Camp in Trincomalee majority of women IDP’s are widows.[111] Although 89 percent women in Sri Lanka are
literate, due to two decades of armed conflict women from North and East have
lower levels of education with one in every four being illiterate. A report based on a research carried out a
Mannar district portray that among 190,000 IDPs women often find it impossible
to generate enough income for buying food for the whole family. In Illupakkadavai, all 36 heads of female headed
households stated that they rely on dry rations for approximately 90 percent
for their nutritional needs and that the children of women headed households
are most vulnerable to exploitation. In
Sri Lanka suicide rates for women have doubled in the last two decades.[112]
A failed nationalising project in Sri Lanka has
encouraged the government to segregate women who are considered
threatening. They are displaced from
their homes and ghettoed in camps. Most
are then displaced from one camp to another, which discourages them from
establishing any kind of social or political networks. Their involvement in any kind of political
activities, even if peaceful, is considered as threatening. Many of these women are displaced and pushed
beyond the borders. Countries in which
they seek asylum often equally consider them as threatening. As for Sri Lankan Tamil women in India, Rajiv
Gandhi’s death convinced the State that these women are of little use for
India’s nationalising and nation building project. From asylum seekers they were reduced to the status
of hostages who were so dangerous that they had to be segregated. Thus when agents of human trafficking arrived
the State turned a blind eye. This was
one way of phasing out women who were considered problematic. No matter how the state try to homogenise
these women as “victim” they assume agency though small acts of defiance such
as wearing the pottu even when widowed, refusing to be repatriated or coming
back to India after repatriation and holding on to jobs outside the camp.
Of
State(lessness) And Other: Women from
Myanmar
Since independence, Burma has been torn apart by
civil wars between the central government and the various opposing ethnic
groups. Such ethnic rivalries were in
part a legacy o the divide and rule policy of the occupying British government
and in part the policy of discrimination practised by the ruling elite. Political instability in Burma, later renamed
as Myanmar, led to the military coup of 1962.
Since then a ruthless military junta rules the country. This junta has suppressed any dissent from
either then ethnic groups or pro-democracy movements leading to massive
desertion and displacements. There are
many ethnic minorities that have suffered discrimination under successive Burmese
governments, and massive persecution by the present Burmese regime.
Following the brutal crack down of 1988 by the State
Law and Order Restoration Council 9SLORC), against democratic movements in
Burma refugees came to Mizoram in large numbers. Here we will discuss conditions of two different
groups of refugees from Myanmar: the Chins and the Rohingyas. Refugee camps were set up in Champai and
Saiha districts of Mizoram to accommodate these Chin refugees by the Mizoram
Government. However, these camps were
closed down in 1994/95 when the Indo-Myanmar border trade talks began. One of the main reasons for closing down the
camps was the request of the Burmese Government which believed that the Chin
National Front (CNF) which is fighting for the independence of Chin State, was
operating from these camps. Since then
the Chin refugees have been scattered all over Mizoram and forced to find work
for their survival. Government of India
followed largely a hands-off policy regarding the Chin refugees. It has so far allowed the Mizoram government
a free hand to deal with the situation.
In September 1994 and in June 1995, when the ongoing anti-foreigner
movement in Mizoram targeted the Chins, and statements were made by local
politicians that all foreigners including the Chins were pushed back, a large
number of Chin refugees came to Delhi and requested UNHCR and large numbers of
these were pushed back, contrary to the principles of non-refoulement. As in any displaced population more than
fifty percent of the Chins who came to India were women.[113] Many of these women took up jobs in local
schools. Yet when the pushback came even
they were not spared.
One such woman is a Chin whose father was a
Christian pastor. She said she was
arrested in Burma in 1993 after she spoke against the Government within earshot
of an army officer. She said the officer
beat and raped her. She fled to India
but last year returned to Burma. The
abuse that she faced was not ground enough to give her refugee status in
India. She was never tried under the
Foreigners Act and was merely pushed back.
On going back she continued her political activity when she heard that
the military was after her she fled to Guam.
When she arrived, she tested positive for tuberculosis in a skin
test. Because she was pregnant,
officials were afraid to take an X-ray.
Instead, they kept here in isolation.
But when the church group toured the prison and found the woman, they
were alarmed by the effect of months of isolation. The Reverend Jerry Elmore, pastor of the
University Baptist Church, offered to sponsor the woman himself so she could be
released from custody to his care.[114] The situation of this woman is not
exceptional. Such cases are happening in
increasing frequency. Young women who
are particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment are being abused by the police
and then pushed back.[115] The women are not given the status of
refugees as sexual abuse is never ground for such a status.
The situation of the Rohingya women is even worse
than the Chins. These women are Muslims
and are considered “resident foreigners,” even in their homeland. Their subordinate status within their own
community discourage them from procuring education or working outside their
homes. The State authorities and the
army habitually sexually abuse them. Sayeeda,
an 18 year old Rohingya girl, who has had some education was of the opinion
that the state machinery used rape as a way to push women out of Myanmar.[116] Forced relocation especially without
compensation is also used to push women out of Myanmar.[117] These women are first taken to
Bangladesh. But after the UNHCR
repatriation programme started in Bangladesh new arrivals were no longer
admitted to UNHCR camps. They were often
pushed across the borders to India and then to Pakistan. The Rohingya population in Pakistan is mostly
concentrated in the suburbs of Karachi, including Korangi, Organi and
Landhi. Rohingya settlements are named
after their place of origin, such as “Arakanabad”, “Burmi colony”, “Arakan
Colony” etc. All these settlements
receive regular visits from law-enforcement agencies extorting money from their
undocumented inhabitants. The Government
of Pakistan has largely ignored the issue of trafficking of Rohingya women. Besides the risk of being sold Rohingya women
become victims of slavery through debt bondage.
Because of their undocumented status, Rohingya women constantly face
arrest and imprisonment.[118]
The Chin and the Rohingya women epitomise the plight
of stateless women in South Thus
fearAsia. Unwanted in their homeland the
women are victims of gender based crimes such as rape which are hardly ever
considered as grounds for refuge. In a
foreign country without any supporting documents these women are
disenfranchised and depoliticised. They
are unable to protest against sexual crimes for want of a legal status. The abuse that had pushed them across
international border in the first place often seems to follow them in their new
settlements. If they successfully
repatriate to their birthplace they are still in a state of not belonging. In patriarchal systems women are constantly
reduced to the status of non-subject.
Crimes that are perpetrated particularly against women are often
trivialised. Thus fear for loss of life
can become ground for asylum or refugee status; fear of rape is not. Yet women from Myanmar brace both these fears
and repeatedly cross borders and participate in the protest movements in their
effort to lead their lives in their own terms.
Of Dislocated
Nation: Afghan Women in South Asia
Afghanistan is a landlocked country strategically
located between the CIS states in the north, China in northeast, Pakistan in
the east and south and Iran in the west.
Sitting on the crossroads between four regions with such diverse histories,
the people of Afghanistan draw their heritage from all of these regions. Pushtoons are the largest group of people in
Afghanistan comprising about 54 percent of the total population, followed by
the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen. Pashtu
and Dari are the official languages but there are over thirty unofficial
languages. In this multi-lingual,
multi-cultural state probably the only one common factor that the people share
is Islam. Yet Islam has many different
strands, which may divide as much as it can unite.
In 1978 there was a coup popularly known as the Sayr
revolution. This coup brought the
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to power followed by massive
Soviet intrusion in Afghan affairs. From
that time on there is a constant flow of Afghan refugees to South Asia. Maximum number of Afghan refugees settled in
Pakistan as Pakistan was ideologically opposed to the Soviet Union and gave
asylum to Islamic and pro-western refugees.
However, from the time Soviet Union started drawing back the mujahideen’s gain power. Yet even they could not give a viable
government and their failure paved the way for Taliban, a fanatically
right-wing group, deeply committed to the Sunni sect of Islam, with “a great
capacity for discipline, for austerity, military decisiveness, and where necessary,
high levels of violence.”[119] Most of Afghanistan is still under Taliban
control and the flow of refugees to South Asia countinues enabated. During the period of Soviet intrusion in
Afghanistan over US $ 1 billion was channelled to Pakistan for the welfare of
the refugees. However, like other South
Asian countries Pakistan’s Afghan policy was based purely on administrative
practice. The precarious nature of
refugee protection became evident when in 1993 after the Soviet withdrawal
Pakistan closed its borders to refugees on the grounds that they were no longer
fleeing foreign intervention but were dissident Afghans. Beginning in late January 2000 the situation
became worse when Pakistani security personnel began arresting Afghan nationals
and putting them into trucks, which travel to the nearby border town of
Torkham. The Afghans are then sent back
to their country.[120] The situation for all refugees became tough
and particularly so for women. They are
discriminated against by their own families as well as by the State.
An Amnesty International report entitled “Women in
Afghanistan: A Human Rights Catastrophe – 1995” stated that Afghan women were
attacked, molested, raped and killed by warring factions and had to bribe
people at various check posts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan while
fleeing. Rape of war widows is common,
30 percent of prostitutes in NWFP are Afghan and Afghan refugee women in
Pakistan “see no future for themselves.”[121] The plight of the Afghan women is
particularly severe when they have opted to live in the camps after 1995. A
case in point is the situation of the inmates of the Kot Chandana camp. At one time Kot Chandana had as many as
180,000 people living there but today there are only 33,000. Over 60 percent of these are women. Today the Pakistan government refuses to spend
any money for the up keep ofrefugees living in the camp. Even in the camp purdah is strictly observed much to the detriment of women headed
households. The plight of the widows are
so severe that they prefer to remarry their husband’s brothers or cousins
rather than staying single. Most men in
the camps have at least two wives. Even
in education girls face discrimination.
About 1558 girls are enrolled in primary schools and 860 boys. Yet there is only one middle school that is
only for boys. The termination of
government aid means that once the girls pass class five they are confined to
their homes. Even in health care boys are
given precedence.[122] High education among girls is therefore not
encouraged and self-sufficiency for most of them is a distant dream.
In Pakistani camps urban Afghan women opposed to
Taliban and their discriminatory policies are often attacked.[123] Elsewhere such women face other kinds of
problems. Those Afghan women who get
Residential Permit in India are not allowed the right to work. The lack of work opportunities adds to the
dislocation of these women. There is the
case of one Afghan refugee women who was one of the first women to work in the
construction industry in Afghanistan.
She was a member of PDPA and mobilised thousands of women to engage in
the public sphere. But as a refugee she
had to give up her public activism. Lack
of job opportunities and steady flow of income “have rendered her desolate and
forced her to contemplate suicide.”[124] For these women physical dislocation has been
transformed into emotional dislocation so that they are forced to live in a
state of constant displacement. Even in
this state of dislocation they repeatedly tell any one who wishes to lend their
ear of their intention to participate in the movement for peace.
Institutional
Response or Lack of It...
None of the South Asian states are signatories to
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or the 1967
Protocol. As India is the largest South
Asian state it should be interesting to see how women refugees are dealt with
here. In India Articles 14, 21 and 25
under Fundamental Rights guarantee the Right to Equality, Right to Life and
Liberty and Freedom of Religion of citizens and aliens alike. Like the other South Asian states India had
ratified the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women in 1993. Although there is
no incorporation of international treaty obligations in the Municipal laws still
rights accruing to the refugees in India under Articles 14, 21 and 25 can be
enforced in the Supreme Court under Article 32 and in the High Court under
Article 226. The other guiding
principles for refugees are the executive orders that have been passed under
the Foreigners Act of 1946 and the Passport Act of 1967. The National Human Rights Commission has also
taken up questions regarding the protection of refugees. It approached the Supreme Court under Article
32 of the Constitution and stopped the
Expulsion of Chakma refugees from Northeast India.[125] Yet all these orders are adhoc in nature and
the legal position remains nebulous.
This is true not just of India but all of South Asia.
Pakistan also operated under the 1946 Foreigners
Act. According to the provisions of this
Act no foreigner could enter Pakistan without a valid passport or visa. Such an act can be detrimental for all
persons fleeing for their lives and especially for women who are unused to handling
documentation proving citizenship. When
six to seven million persons entered Pakistan after partition this Act proved
useless and had to be supplemented by the Registration of Calims Act of 1956
and the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958.
Such Acts did not establish a legal regime for refugees in Pakistan only
the claims of a group of refugees. The
ad hoc nature of Pakistani refugee regime continued. As for Sri Lanka, it is not a refugee
receiving country but a refugee generating country. There are two Acts, which are especially
detested by displaced people, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and Emergency
Regulations.[126] Sri Lanka does not have any special acts that
help or privilege internally displaced women who are vulnerable to abuse
because of their gender. As for other
state laws in South Asia, Nepal has an Immigration Act of 1992, which provides
that no foreigner is allowed to enter or stay in Nepal without a visa. His Majesty’s Government has full authority
to expel any foreigner committing immigration offences. Most South Asian states have punitive
measures for immigration offences but hardly any measures for helping displaced
people. Further, none of these States
have made any special stipulations for women refugees although a majority of
all South Asian refugees are women. Why
this lack?
According to one observer South Asian attitude to
women has been guided by “mystified notions of chastity.”[127] This has led to the acceptance that women in
South Asia belong to their communities.
Indian and Pakistani attitude during the nascent stage of State building
institutionalised this through their treatment of abducted women. It was agreed that in a state of dislocation
women could lose the power to represent themselves. This was essential as dislocation meant that
traditional control on women was eroded.
Male centric states then assumed the prerogative of control. Women were often put under not just cultural
but political control. They were
restricted by representations and practices that homogenise and degrade them by
transforming them into non-autonomous and dependent social category of
“victim”. They as victims have no
political voice. Their individual
identity is subsumed within the identity of their communities. Therefore when women are displaced in large
numbers the focus shift from them as a person to their communities. But methods of displacing women are often
gender centric. Abuses are based on
their individual gender roles. Thus when
states try displacing communities oike the Burmese vis a vis the Rohingyas they
use rape as an instrument for displacement.
Yet when a large number of Rohingya women are pushed out and when other
states respond institutionally, the gender dimension is often overlooked. Not merely South Asian states but also
international actors often overlook the gender dimension of this problem.
As for international actors UNHCR is acquiring some
importance in the region for their efforts regarding refugees and internally
displaced. There are around 20,000
refugees who are protected by UNHCR in India, of whom a majority are Afghans.[128] There are over eighty six thousand Sri Lankan
refugees and sixty thousand internally displaced that concern UNHCR.[129] The UNHCR has a guideline for the protection
of women refugees but it is left to the discretion of countries to follow these
recommendations.[130] In patriarchal states where policies are
weighted against women, if these guidelines are left societies, nor within the
UN agencies.”[131] Thus the gender bias found in state policies
regarding women’s dislocation might also be reflected in theattitude taken by
international agencies.
Taken individually the cases above reflect on
specific characteristics of women’s depoliticisation due to dislocation. But taken cumulatively it portrays that the
overwhelming presence of women among the refugee populations is not an accident
of history. It is a way by which states
have made women political non-subjects.
By making women permanent refugee, living a savage life in camps, it is
easy to homogenise them, ignore their identity, individuality and
subjectivity. By reducing refugee women
to the status of mere victims in our narratives we accept the homogenisation of
women and their depoliticisation. We
legitimise a space where states can make certain groups of people political
non-subjects. A legal refugee regime may
work as a necessary corrective and dissuade states from ignoring the gender
dimension of the problem.
Marginal Women
It should be recognised that even in their
marginality refugee women are never merely victims. Bolan Gangopadhyay’s essay on women refugees
from East Pakistan portrays how women exert agency even in situations of
marginality.[132] It has been recognised that the women
refugees from East Pakistan/Bangladesh have altered the work pattern of women
in Bengal and changed the definition of what constitutes a bhadramahila.[133] Women have often used their marginality
to retrieve agency. The
Women of Vitasta in Kashmir is a case in point. Afghan women in Pakistan have for long agitated
for their voices to be heard in peacemaking.
Dislocation is a debilitating experience no doubt but many exceptional
women have transformed it into an empowering one. They have assumed newer roles as head of
households. Such experiences have
increased their confidence, though at times it may have contributed to their
trauma. I have met a number of women in
camps in Sri Lanka who have used dislocation as an empowering incident. They have happily assumed the role of
breadwinners. When these women take
refuge in a different country they assume agency even at the face of opposition
from asylum giving states because in a new area they are able to transcend
patriarchal control. Sometimes
repatriation can seem problematic because these women are then forced back
within the control of traditional patriarchy.
However we cannot get into a lengthy discussion on this matter here.
A State centric narrative on the situation of
refugee women leads to their trivilisation as mere victims. It shifts attention from the argument that
State policy often results in the creation of refugees. State policy is not ungendered. It results from a political effort to
homogenise citizenship. The ruling
elites decide who belong and who does not.
Rape, to the discretion of the government then it does not succeed in
its purpose. further, the programmes of
these institutions such as UNHCR are built on certain practices. Similar to state practices the practices of
international organisations such as the UNHCR also delegate woman to the status
of victim, which is a disenfranchising phenomenon. The women have little or no say on policies
that govern their lives and bodies even in camps run by the UNHCR. Albeit the UNHCR concern itself with the
protection of these women but they do not work towards their agency. This is not to suspect intention of UNHCR but
many of their policies such as the policy of repatriation can work against
women who have acquired agency over their own person. Decisions regarding their relocation also assumes
that refugees/women cannot have any say in it.
Even refugee subsistence allowance does not empower women but rather
works towards their homogenisation as victim.
The Afghan urban women in India are denied agency by the UNHCR when they
are not allowed to hold jobs. The Sri
Lankan women refugees are denied agency when they are forced to use passes to
get in and out of their camps. The
practices that govern the daily lives of women in these camps also relegate
them to the status of dependants. Then they
are degraded in governmental and non-governmental reports and discourses as
miserable victims.
In this paper five cases sof women as dislocated
subjects has been selected with a purpose.
The abducted women portray how exercised of state building have used the
incidents of abduction to give a male face to the citizenry. Women in Brindaban portray that States assume
the right to decide which groups of women refugees asre acceptable on the basis
of their gender roles within their communities.
The Sri Lankan case reflects on how bilateral relations affect attitude
to refugees and how that affects women.
It also portrays how specific incidents are made occasions for exerting
greater control on women whose sexuality is perceived as threatening. Thus after Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination by a
female human bomb all NGOs were stopped from working in the refugee camps. Women inmates of these camps were heavily
dependent on these NGOs as most often they were their only links with the civil
society. It was from around the same
time that the maid running business assumed notorious proportions. The Sri Lankan case also reflects how the
media privileges a certain image of women (in this case young women with guns
on their shoulders) which justifies the asylum giving communities apathy
regarding questions of security of refugee women. Women from Myanmar portray the ramifications
of statelessness. In situations of
statelessness women are more vulnerable to gender related onslaughts. Yet their gender related vulnerabilities are
never considered ground for refugee status.
The Chin women portray that control/protection notwithstanding the
States of South Asia can ignore well established international norms regarding
non-refoulement. The situations of
Afghan refugees portray that even international agencies such as the UN and
UNHCR can ignore gender dimension of the problem. Thus during budget crunches it is the schools
for women which are hardest hit. Even
international agencies such as the UN Gender Mission can contribute to
depoliticising women. A case in point is
Angela King’s mission to Peshawar and Islamabad. When Afghan women requested the UN through
Ms. King that they should try to mobilies educated Afghan women in
peace-making, Ms. King reportedly asked them to apply to UN jobs instead. After the meeting the women felt “confused,
insulteld, hurt, angry and substantially ignored.” But they noted bitterly “this is not an
unusual situation – neither within our sexual assault and other gendered crimes
are perpetrated against women to dislocate the civil society (which in conflict
situation is formed largely of women) of the other in moments of conflict.
Crimes against women are then trivialised as a natrual result of
conflict. Therefore death or a serious
threat to liberty becomes a reason for asylum but rape or vulnerability to
human trafficking does not. Such a value
judgement makes it even more difficult for women to seek asylum. This is a way of marginalising crimes against
women and then marginalising the woman and making her a political non-subject
just as in Hitler’s Germany where the Jews were first feminised and then
reduced to the status of political non-subjects. To retrieve women’s experiences from such marginalisations
it is essential to recognise the individual voices of refugee women in any
narrative of displacement. Narrative
based on responsed of South Asian states cannot do so because governmental
discourse reduce women to the status of victim and then justify their
experiences as marginal and hence unimportant.
Only by retrieving refugee women’s own voices and not dismissing their
individual experiences as anecdotal can we centre the marginal.
Refugees in their own land - Forced Migrant Women in Srilanka,A struggle amidst Hope
In the ongoing civilian war in Srilanka it is
estimated that 75% of the 730,000 internally displaced people in the North and
East are women. A number of factors
determine their future existence, they include army / rebel operations,
availability of food and medicine, psychological support, security of the
family (women in the east generally are more concerned about the security of
the family than themselves) etc. Despite
the deprivation of many of these factors, the extraordinary never say die
spirit of the displaced women has created a special place for them in an era
where women are hardly respected. Their
fight for survival against all odds shows the adaptability of women when most
men are completely broke. In the
traditional Eastern society women play a major role within the family, which
has helped in maintaining family values. It is the women who take care of the
house and plays the role of a homemaker while the men earn the livelihood.
“In the bitter
Srilankan war for a Tamil homeland, the ideal woman is portrayed by the rebel
Liberation Tigers for Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ideology as an aggressive soldier or a
fearless suicide bomber. On the other
hand the rare media reports of that war often present women as pitiful, poverty
stricken, dependent victims. These
images distort the role of women in refugee situations.” - Fr. Chinnappan Amalraj SJ, a Tamil Jesuit
who is the former Regional Director of Jesuit Refugee Service South Asia.[134]
Women as
carriers of culture:
Frequent displacements have led to the eroding of
cultures. The Srilankan experience shows
us that continuity of culture depends on sustenance of a community in their
natural habitat, most of the Srilankan Tamil diaspora who number around 800,000
do not want to return home even if the peace moves succeed. They had moved away from Srilanka as a result
of the civil war. As a new generation is
born abroad, they have never seen their country of origin nor do they know
about their culture as they have grown in a different atmosphere. The story of those living amidst the war is
different. Srilankan Tamil women have
always lived side by side their male family members as equals. When traditional norms and values are
forgotten due to displacement it is the women who have taken up the
responsibility of infusing these values in their wards. They are the symbols of protecting the
culture.
The Fr. S. Singarayan strongly opines that women are
mentally stronger than the men, he says,
“ At the onset of a displacement, the men are perplexed as they run out
of ideas and are confined to isolation, as they are psychologically shattered.”[135]
In this crisis situation when everyone is in a confused state of mind the women
puts her act together. Fr.Jeyakumar observes “The children and others in the
family immediately look up to the mother to act. It is she who gathers a few pieces of
firewood, dry leaves to set up an urn and prepare a cup of tea for the
others. In this way she has succeeded in
keeping the flock together. This crisis may be a burden to a man but is a silent
response to the challenge for a woman.”[136]
Changing role of women in war:
The agonizing war has victimized women
but it has also made her stronger. The
best out of her qualities is brought out.
Before the war she was an affectionate wife, mother etc taking care of
all the ‘home needs’. Violence has
forced her to learn a number of new tricks of survival. If her husband is missing she has to go to
the town, enter the abandoned streets in darkness, search for her beloved
missing one, meet the police, army, navy, contact the local religious and
political leaders speak to them, plead with them. She takes up the role of an investigator
taking clues from persons who had seen him before his disappearance. These were things unknown to her before the
out break of the war. Today she is an
active participant in the dharanas, human rights rally’s, protest marches, and
organizing peace meetings. They are also
breadwinners for many families. As the
war fatigue males are worn out and also face a danger of disappearance, torture
or forced conscription into the militant movements women take up the
responsibility of feeding him. Many
times frustrated with the treatment meted out to her she dares the men by
joining the militant movement.
Human
Rights Violations on Women:
a) Check points ( freedom of
movement)
The towns of North and East
Srilanka are known for checkpoints where everybody is required to undergo a
check compulsorily. In Vavuniya there
are 50 checkpoints every time you pass across one of them, you have to prove
yourself to be innocent and you are subjected to a physical check. The checkpoints provoke fear because people
may be detained there and disappear.
Girls and women fear not only sexual harassment by soldiers at
checkpoints, but rape as well.[137]
As soldiers manning these checkpoints do not speak
Tamil, young women are always subjected to verbal gender abuse. Not many checkpoints have female soldiers
manning them. The Jaffna residents have
complained about their treatment at the checkpoints, particularly the
inappropriate, often humiliating searches of women.[138] In a large number of cases of disappearance
and rape the victims were last found at one of the innumerable
checkpoints. The widespread fear of rape
by soldiers, people worry about girls and women having to pass through military
checkpoints. That concern is exacerbated
by a perception that soldiers delay girls at the checkpoints. One woman said, “girls walking alone are kept
for fifteen minutes at checkpoints as soldiers ask them unnecessary questions
to amuse themselves”.[139]
B) Rape,
Disappearance and Torture:
“The Sri Lankan security
forces have continued to commit serious human rights abuses, sexual violence,
in the context of the 17 year armed conflict against the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam. Sri Lankan Police have also repeatedly committed rape and other
sexual abuse in the course of the fighting”.
- Report by UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women
[22 Dec 2000]
[22 Dec 2000]
These are some of the terror tactics adopted by the
Srilankan armed forces. In war women are
also more likely to encounter situations where someone wants to exercise power
over them due to the tension and level of violence in the environment. Women particularly made mention of soldiers
who respond to a ‘herd instinct’ and
take chance of ‘any opportunity’ to abuse women. In war it is also easier to justify such
abuse, simply as one of those “inevitable” consequences of war, as the soldiers
‘are in natural need of sexual activity’.[140]
Most soldiers often see the manifestation of male superiority in the
form of rape as a show of power over the males of the victims’ community. In North and East Srilanka a woman’s role has
been primarily defined to take care and nurture the family and home, thus the
attack and disappearance of family members cripple her role and her identity as
wife and mother. [141] Disappearances are occasionally reported but
that is not the case with rape, as the victims fear social ostracization. When cases are reported. Families complaining rape cases also face
retribution. It is often reported that
drunken soldiers enter nearby resident localities after 6.pm when people are
not allowed to come out and the soldiers take away young women and girls to
rape them. Neighbors do not dare to come
out fearing violence against them. In
the now famous Ida Carmelitta rape case.[142]
Five soldiers entered her house, tied the victims’ mother to a lamppost, shut
the other relatives in another room, raped Ida, ate her breast, and shot her
through the genitals. The entire family
fled Srilanka fearing threats from the army and the case was closed. The
continuing pattern of sexual violence against Tamil women persists because of
the climate of virtual impunity that prevails.
Apart from the solitary
Krishanthy Kumaraswamy case, there has not been any other instance of the
alleged offenders being meted out justice though there are some judicial
inquiries on, they are being conducted in a manner that indicates justice would
never be done. Cases are transferred out of the original jurisdiction in favour
of the accused. This however places a great burden on the living victims or
those giving evidence on their behalf. What happens also is that as cases get
protracted the will to seek justice gets enfeebled. The system seems designed
to help the alleged offenders rather than the hapless victims.[143]As
the soldiers are from the southern parts of Srilanka they fear facing the
courts in the north.
The UN Special Rapporteur in
March 2000 highlighted the case of Sarathambal Saravanbavananthakurukal, a
29-year-old Tamil woman who had been reportedly gang raped and then killed by
navy soldiers on 28 December 1999 in Pungudutivu, near Jaffna. She observed
that despite an order by the President of Sri Lanka to immediately investigate
the events, it was reported that "very little [was] being done to pursue
the matter". Sarathambal Saravanbavananthakurukal had been abducted from
her home, situated at about 500m from a navy camp. Her father and brother were
tied up by four security officers dressed in black. Her dead body was found on
barren land about 100m away from their home the next day. After public protest,
her body was sent to Colombo for post-mortem by a senior JMO who indicated that
the cause of death was "asphyxia due to gagging"; that her underpants
had been stuffed inside her mouth; and that "forcible sexual
intercourse" had taken place. The father and brother were allegedly
threatened not to reveal the identity of the four men who came to the house.
According to the Director of the Criminal Investigation Department, who had
been instructed by the President of Sri Lanka to investigate the rape and
murder, the brother had "not been able to identify any of the four persons
who came to the house". The criminal investigations into the rape and murder
of both Ida Carmelita and Sarathambal Saravanbavananthakurukal have not
proceeded beyond the initial inquiry stage. No charges have been filed against
the alleged perpetrators and it is unlikely that those responsible for the rape
and murder of the two women will ever be brought to justice.[144]
Reported cases of rape in Northern Srilanka
are as follows:
1996 - 17
|
1998 - 05
|
2000 - 01
|
1997 - 16
|
1999 -03
|
2002 - 06
|
(Source: Sexual violence against Tamil women in
Srilanka by D.B.S Jeyaraj- Sunday Times Jan 2002)
Plight
of the school going girls:
For most
female students in the uncleared areas the schools were a fertile breeding
ground for militant indoctrination. Many
join the militant movement as they see the discrimination of the state towards
the minority Tamils and become victims of male chauvinism. These girls do not even have the privilege of
getting education aids like books, maps etc as they are banned items. Exams are not conducted on schedule and they
cannot move to the South for higher education as a result of the dreaded pass
system. In the cleared areas school
going girls have to bear the burden of standing in queue to get the movement
pass and also pass through a series of checkpoints. Each of these check points are a threat to
the modesty of these girls as it here that it is feared, disappearances take
place resulting in the rape and killing of innocent girls by armed forces. The famous Krishanthi Kumaraswamy case was a
great eye opener to the entire world about the practice of kidnapping and
raping of school going girls by the soldiers being perfected at these
checkpoints. As their families are poor
as a result of the economic blockade, parents see the girl child as a burden in
a society where dowry is prevalent, hence the option for survival is very
limited, either to suffer or join militancy.
Though the girls in the uncleared areas are
economically privileged they suffer the same plight of their sisters in the
uncleared areas as too many restrictions on them prevent them from seeking
higher education in the south in the absence of any university in the North
except for the Jaffna University in the Jaffna peninsula. Apart from all these problems girls have to
bear the mental agony of frequent displacements and at times continued loss of
studies by which they are forced to remain at home and slowly tune to the sense
of non-worthiness of education.
Women
and Medical Aid:
In the Uncleared area there is only one big hospital
at Akkarayan. Frequently there have been complaints from the medical staff
about lack of infrastructure and severe shortage of essential medicine. The plight of the pregnant women is the most
miserable. They do not get adequate
forced to take care of themselves. This
results in severe pains, bleeding during delivery of the child. More than 75% of children born in the
uncleared areas suffer from under weight and malnutrition. Lactating mothers do not get enough to eat to
feed their young ones. Baby food is
unheard in the uncleared areas. Malaria,
Diarrhoea, Cholera, typhoid are very common, women and children are the most
vulnerable. As movement of people from
the uncleared to cleared areas is restricted to a single day in a week and
further restricted to a fixed number, the plight of the sick is un-seeable as
they are stranded in a place where there is no medicine and death awaits them
joyfully.
In the cleared areas, there are two hospitals, one
in Mannar town where there was no gynecologist for a very long time. The other hospital is in Vavuniya, which has
to cater to a very larger number of people from both the cleared and uncleared
areas, but has only 60 beds with no proper X-ray facility and soldiers most
often occupy the available beds. Further
they cannot even travel to the south for medical help.
Corruption is rampant in these hospitals
and these poor displaced women are forced to sell their jewels to save their
dear ones or themselves. Here one gets a
feeling that unless permanent peace dawns the commerce in tears would continue
unabated.
Psychological
status of displaced women:
The psychological pressure women undergo have
resulted in the following: -
q Boredom
q Immunization
of sufferings leading to lack of reactions
q Losing
emotions
q Mental
illness
q Losing
interest is self and family finally leading attempts to suicide and suicide
itself,
q Tendencies
of irresponsibility / careless attitude towards life,
q Vulnerability
to anti-social activities to release mental stress,
q The
guilt feeling of not being able to earn and look after the family,
q Constant
fear of getting killed/harassed,
q Children
developing imaginary visions of being attacked and harmed by armed group
leading to loss of sleep and a buzzing noise in the ears.
q Difficulty
in delivery,
q Expectant
mothers/young mothers undergo stress because they cannot give a good living
condition/environment to the children,
q Children
are curbed from their natural growth (e.g. playing, good food and health),
which makes them indifferent.
No psychological help exists in the uncleared
areas. In the cleared as the entire community
has undergone lots of stress they do not have adequate stress releasing
techniques. In the uncleared areas there
is no availability of medicine. In the
cleared areas it is very expensive, out of reach of the common people.[145]
Plight
of the widows:
The young widows are very
vulnerable to immoral activities; a good number of them take another husband, a
few try to go abroad to earn a living and end up as maid slaves in the middle
east, a few land up in the brothels of Bangkok, a few serve as concubines to
the travel agents or other middle men who promise them to send abroad. The armed groups at times use them as
informers.
The middle-aged widows try
to work, but getting employment is very difficult, they have to struggle to
make both the ends meet. If there is
some support from the family members who work abroad, they survive or they are
entirely dependent on charity.
The plight of the old widows
in the worst especially if they have lost their earning sons, also they don’t
see any point in living. They lead a
life a remembering the past (the good times) and weep over that has happened.[146] Death is their destiny.
Women in
Prison:
A large number of displaced Tamil women are confined
to the Anuradhapura prison and the Welikade prison, which are in the Southern
Srilanka where it is impossible for the Tamils from north to visit. Most of them are only suspects; they are made
to live in common dormitories along with women who are held on charges of
prostitution, robbery cheating, other immoral, anti-social activities etc. As these prisons are located in the south, it
is practically impossible for their relatives to visit them. These women face a danger to their lives, as
prison riots are common and harassment by jail authorities in the order of the
day. Women in jails suffer from
psychological disorder, malnutrition, unhygienic sanitary conditions, and
alienation from society. Though more
than 95% of them are acquitted by the courts they are branded as “jail
returnees” and face ostracization from their society. They do not have a compensation mechanism
where the innocents can get their justful right of getting monetary help from
the state for confining them unjustfully in the jail.
Displaced
Religious women:
The church has had a massive role to play in the
civil war. The most important of their
several activities is that of accompanying the displaced and rehabilitating
them. As a majority of the displaced are
women, the nuns from different congregations working among the displaced
portray the compassionate side of women.
They have dedicated their lives for the protection of women and
children. They have withstood various
kinds of pressures on them with the sole aim of helping the needy without any
discrimination. In situations where men
find it difficult to work these religious women have contributed immensely in
the education programme, giving medical aid, counseling, providing emergency
needs and most importantly accompanying them in their daily struggle as part of
their religious obligations, yet in spite of all their hardship these
courageous women, who’s own families are displaced posses a smile to brighten
the life of others.
Women Fighters
in the LTTE:
In violent civil war conditions men dictate terms,
women hardly have any role to play. Srilanka is an exception. Women have
identified violence as a means of retaliation. Half the LTTE cadre are women.
Freedom struggle is not the struggle of men alone. As an assertion of equality to the male
fighters in the LTTE, women have played an important role in carrying on their
ideology of war into the enemy territory. Women cadre came to the limelight
after the Indo-Srilanka pact in 1987. In
order to seek revenge for the atrocities committed by the Indian Peace Keeping
(IPKF)[147]
against the Tamil women. Dhanu, a human
bomb blew herself killing the former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Since then it is common to see women Tigers
carrying pictures of Dhanu for strength and protection. “The self-sacrifice of
the female bomber is almost an extension of the idea of motherhood in Tamil
Culture,” says Mangalika Silva, Coordinator of women for Peace in Colombo,
Srilanka. [148]
Women in the LTTE form half the estimated membership and fight shoulder to
shoulder along side their male counterparts as part of the frontline troops
against the Srilankan army in a conventional war. Women tigers are more
efficient than their counterparts, that is one of the reason they constitute
the majority in the Black tiger, suicide squads. Once they are given the target
they camouflage themselves till they finish the target even if it takes a few
years.
Why do these women take a risk of losing
their life and face such hardship in the battlefield? How can they transform from being
traditionally confined to the kitchen to taking up arms? How can they wear battle attire from their
traditional saree? How can they bare the
harsh training which include climbing, living in jungles, trenches, starvation
and living along with men? How can they
suppress their femininity and sexuality as they are disallowed to marry till
they turn 25 years of age? These are
some pertinent questions asked by any observer of the women tigers.
Violence in the form of different Survival mechanisms
As a mechanism against the state
structure
The atrocities committed by the Srilankan State
forces act as a natural stimulant to the young girls to join the ranks of
LTTE. The frequent rapes and killing of
women, disappearances of young girls, molestation, and eve-teasing at security
check points, frequent house raids instill a sense of fear in the minds of the
young girls who also see their siblings being taken away, tortured or
killed. This happens even to their
parents. The state sponsored economic embargo and restriction of movement helps
them in making a decision to fight against the unjust state structure.
As a curative mechanism
The insecure
feeling of being targeted by the state
drives them to join the “freedom struggle” wearing an uniform and
cyanide capsule gives them and gives them a sense of pride, protection,
invincibility and a cause to live or die. One of the healing processes
identified by these women is to target the enemies as they have experienced
violence on themselves, their families and community. Targeting their enemies
gives them a sense of satisfaction and cures their deep wounds. It brings a
healing and soothing effect when they are successful in accomplishing their
mission.
As a defensive mechanism
The LTTE discourse usually depicts Tamil women as
either victims of oppression by the Sinhala state, or they are fighting against
it, wearing a uniform, with a gun in hand and a cyanide capsule around the
neck.[149]Female
fighters of the LTTE are cast as a symbol of the emancipated Tamil woman, who
has taken her place in the trenches alongside men as an equal in the war for
the liberation of the Tamil state. In doing so, it is symbolic of breaking free
from oppressive social customs against women in Tamil society, [150]
which to this day practices the custom of superiority of men over women,
assigning the women a place in the kitchen. They see the better treatment and opportunities
provided to their brothers by the parents, dowry harassment is common it is
here they feel that one of the methods of asserting equality with the men is by
joining the LTTE. By doing this she is able to give a befitting answer to the
State sponsored violence as well as the unjust society.
To conclude, in the words of a displaced female
student from Jaffna, “The BBC carried the stories of women from Kosovo as they
were Europeans, the Church and UN played a vital role in projecting the
problems of East Timorese women, the Americans shed tears on the Afghan women,
this is not to undermine their struggle but Srilankan women are yet to see any
saintly soul projecting our stories”. The glaring omission of these brave
struggle by the women here has gone unnoticed in the fourth estate. It is time
they too start noting the struggle of these women and give them a voice.
A glimmer of hope has dawned the island in the form of a structured
ceasefire and the most happy people here are the women who possess a never say
die spirit in facing the new realities.
Yet peace alone in the island nation is not enough unless the rights and
aspirations of the women are catered to, it is sad to note that when different
groups are represented to air their views in the on going peace process one
notable group omitted here are the women.
War was created by man to further his interests and later he
incorporated women into it, it is time for man to act in a sane manner and
sponsor peace. Only everlasting peace in
Srilanka can end the woes of the spirited and inspired women of Srilanka Though
they know violence is evil, it is another technique mastered by these women for
their survival. It is they who have experienced violence on themselves and they
know it is time for peace.
Paul Newman
JRS South Asia,24, Benson
Road, Bangalore – 560046. India
BHUTANESE REFUGEE
REPRESENTATIVE REPATRIATION COMMITTEE -
A presentation on Refugees and Right to communication
By: S.B.Subba
Chairman
On behalf of the Bhutanese refugees and on my own
would like to take opportunity to thank World Association for Christian
Communication (WACC) for availing me to participate in the seminar on “Refugee
and Right to communication”. I am very pleased to be among the selected
participants here. It’s a new exposure to me and first of its kind. I have no
doubt that the seminar is going to enhance the participants particularly me
with insight knowledge of different
mechanism of establishing communication especially in difficult situation like
Bhutanese refugee state and dissemination of information to concern places. I
hope all the participants will be further enriched with more knowledge of
communication to apply effectively in day to day work. I have profound hope
that at the end we go out equipped with maximum information on right to
communication not only from the deliberation but also sharing of experiences,
interactions, exchange of views and ideas. I am sure the participants here are
not refugee like myself but are only dealing with the refugee issue.
Nevertheless, I know how difficult it is to work for the refugee cause for any
body especially for the refugees’ rights when I look through the prism of
myself. It is not quite easy to get access to media especially when the issue
is sensitive as some of the participants might have experienced or media
persons are biased and take side by influence and impression. On the other hand
media plays important role particularly in a case like Bhutanese refugee where
we have no abundant resources to physically approach to apprise the problem or
reach to the mass. Neither we have free access to communication facilities
without risk inside Bhutan. However, despite of many hindrances in getting
day-to-day information especially from inside which is very necessary to keep
update to all our concerned agencies, we have not felt securing it though may
not instantly.
Communication
system in Bhutan
News paper: There is no multi-media like in other countries and there is absence of
freedom of press in Bhutan. There is only one government controlled weekly
paper called “Kuensel” which is published in three languages- English, Nepali
and Dzongkha the national language of Bhutan and come to the market on every
Saturday. Before publishing all the news are scrutinized and censored by the
king himself.
No one can write in oppose of the government
policies and refugee news are never carried. There is no chance to directly
reach the refugee voice to general public to able to understand and sympathize.
Instead the government has distorted the facts and figure about the southern
Bhutanese (Nepali speaking) and misinformed the other two ethnics- Ngalong and
Sarchop to create misunderstanding and attribute culprits for creating problem
in the country. People have least chance to learn about the refugee problem in
Bhutan.
Telephone: The Royal Government of
Bhutan (RGOB) is now trying to connect 201 blocks at the village levels in
total of 20 districts for convenience of public. However, most of the STD and
ISD telephones holders whose relatives are in exile are bugged and monitor the
communication. Not only that all the correspondence and mail letters are
censored by the Police of those people whom they doubt of having
correspondences with the people now living in the refugee camps. Therefore,
there is not at all any privacy of individuals in Bhutan. In special cases the
government even plan secret watch on the activities and movement of the
individuals. Therefore, there is great risk for the relatives living inside
Bhutan to communicate with the relatives in the refugee camps and punish if any
relatives from the camps contact them.
It is very difficult to get direct instant information because of
government strict vigilance.
No
reporters are allowed to go inside Bhutan freely: RGOB does not allow any
reporter from outside to go inside Bhutan to write news report. It is strictly
guarded and reporters are allowed only on invitation and one who writes in
favor of government. Therefore, it is not easy for the refugees and others to
exactly know the current situation in Bhutan and other development therein. The
government mouth piece “Kuensel” reports only the good sides of the government.
In absence of freedom of press and everything monitor by the government, it is
difficult for anybody to know the real prevailing situation in Bhutan.
Bhutan TV: After much criticism from
the people outside and the international community the King has announced the
lifting of ban on TV on 17th December 1999 on the 91st
National Day of Bhutan. Till then the use of TV was banned on fear of being
influenced to the people politically and socially not considering that the TV
is one of the most effective means of communication and fast way of spreading
information and education to the rural people. However, still the use of Nepali
channels from Nepal are not allowed. It is because it carries sometimes the
news of refugees in Nepal and interview of leaders.
Bhutan
Broadcasting Service (BBS): There is a
Bhutan Broadcasting Service which airs in four languages for half an hour each
in English, Dzongkha, Sarchops and Nepali every morning and evening. It covers
domestic and international news but never on the refugees’ problem. It mostly
broadcast the government version. Therefore the people inside Bhutan except the
elites do not know much about the problem in the southern Bhutan and Bhutanese
refugees in Nepal.
How we get
the information from inside Bhutan: Despite the government strict vigilance, the
Bhutanese Refugee Representative Repatriation Committee (BRRRC) has established
its own sources of information from inside Bhutan covering all 20 districts. We
have clandestinely employed our people inside Bhutan with contact points on the
border areas in India and also sometime direct telephonic talks from India with
code words. Occasionally we do send secret mission from the camps in the
accessible areas to collect information and meet our contact people. We also
provide cameras to take photographs of anything interesting wherever possible
and also collect other documentary evidences of government circulars and orders
issued to the relatives or on change of government policies, rules and
regulation. Also collect information from the relatives of the refugees
visiting the camps. In some instances we quietly smuggle reporters inside
Bhutan especially in the bordering areas of India and who reports the fact in
the international arena of RGOB's deeds and treatment towards the southern
Bhutanese. Any reports we get and needs international attention are immediately
disseminated as “Update of BRRRC” for information and action.
Prison and
prison condition: BRRRC not only collects the information and follow up of the
government activities but also closely keeps track of the prisoners and prison
conditions in Bhutan. On the basis of our reports the Amnesty International,
United Kingdom and International Committee for Red Cross (ICRC), Delhi visited
some prisons in Bhutan and urged the RGOB to improve the conditions and treat
the prisoners as human beings. As a consequences the government has improved
the condition of some prisons and better facilities are being provided although
there are many prisons in every district remains to be improved. We also keep records
of the death and circumstances of death in prison. On the insistence of Amnesty
International, ICRC and other international community the Bhutan government has
allowed relatives of some prisoners from the camps to visit them in Bhutan
especially in Chemgang Central jail in Thimphu where the political prisoners
are kept. On the pressure from the Amnesty International, ICRC and
International community the government has released more than 2500 prisoners.
Resettlement: The
RGOB has started the resettlement program on the lands belonging to the people
now living in the camps since 1990. The people from north and east are settled
on the land and complicating the resolution of the problem and repatriation of
the refugees. About 8000 families have been resettled in the 6 districts of
southern Bhutan. Many of them forcefully resettled as they denied once they
came to know that the land belonged to the people living in the camps. However,
they were compelled to come as the government threatened to evict them or made
them to sign agreement that they would no more request land from the
government. So people in the camps are kept informed of the situation of their
land in Bhutan and wherever possible even give name of the occupant.
Maintenance
of record and data: In order to avoid any
complication on the event of repatriation and also to refute the government
allegation of presence of non-Bhutanese in the camps, the BRRRC keeps the data
of the refugee families properly recorded in the register with detail information
of family members including the address in Bhutan and in the camps. It also
helps to keep records of the exact population in the 7 camps and provide the
data whoever requires it.
Information
on discrimination: As far as possible BRRRC is trying to keep all the records of
discrimination meted out not only to the southern Bhutanese but other ethnics
too. The RGOB has not only persecuted and discriminated the people on the
ground of political belief but also on the religious practice. On the religious
ground, the hard hit people are the Christians. The government has banned the
practice and proselytizing of Christianity in Bhutan. However, despite the ban,
many northern, eastern and southern Bhutanese have embraced Christianity but
are being threatened by the government of severe punishment and deprived of
government facilities. All these people practice Christianity in the guise of
being Hindu or Buddhist. Children of Christians and the southern Bhutanese
whose relatives are in the camps are deprived from education and other
government opportunities. They have to produce No Objection Certificate (NOC)
from the Home Ministry and the Police to get admission in the schools which is
not issued on ground of being Christian and relatives of anti-national.
Role of
media in India: In
early 1990s when the refugees influx to Nepal were at the peak, most of the
leading Newspaper in India had widely carried out the issue and flagrant human
rights violation in Bhutan though some individual who received favor of the RGOB
reported negatively. It helped a great deal in disseminating information to the
diplomatic mission and other agencies in Delhi who also represent their
respective country to Bhutan as non-resident representative. The following were
the main papers which carried the news of Bhutanese refugees and helped in
disseminating.
1. In
Delhi:
- The Statesman(English)
- Hindustan times(English)
- Indian Express(English)
- The Pioneer(English)
- The Times of India(English)
- The Observer(English)
- Navabharat(Hindi)
2. In West
Bengal: The State of West Bengal
share common border with Bhutan and the people are link socially, culturally
and religion. The refugees first entered the immediate State for shelter,
safety and security. During this period the media in West Bengal played a vital
role in spreading the news of plight of Bhutanese refugees and human rights
violation in Bhutan. The following are the main newspaper:
- The Telegraph(English)
- Aja Bholi(Nepali)
- Sunachari(Nepali)
- Bharat Darpan(Hindi)
- Jan Satta(Hindi)
- Amrita Bazaar Patrika(Bengali)
3. In
Assam: The State of Assam share major portion of the geographical
border with Bhutan stretching from Dhansari, the eastern most part with Assam
up to Sunkosh bordering West Bengal covering almost 500 km. In the time of
influx of Bhutanese refugees due to forceful eviction from Bhutan, a large
number of Bhutanese refugees entered Assam for safety, security and shelter.
However, on expression of Assam State government unable to provide safety,
security and shelter, the refugees were forced to come to Nepal. In one
instance the Assam Police hounded about 894 Bhutanese refugees at Nalbari
district and forced to crossed the Assam border within 24 hours. Anyway, the
various following newspaper reported about the human rights violation in Bhutan
and the plight and sorry state of the Bhutanese refugees in the region. It
still keeps on reporting about the presence of insurgents like United
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
inside Bhutan through which we refugees are also aware.
- The Sentinel(English)
- Probanchal( Hindi)
- Abhiyan( Nepali quarterly magazine)
4. In
Nepal: Since the arrival of the Bhutanese refugees in Nepal in the
beginning of 1991 the leading newspaper of Nepal including the Radio Nepal, Nepal
TV and Channel Nepal have been constantly carrying out the news of refugees and
helping in disseminating the information in the region as well as in the
international arena. Unlike the break in the Indian newspaper, the newspaper in
Nepal continuously reports on the situation of the refugees and any development
on the process of resolution of the problem and repatriation. Refugees are kept
up-to-date with the day-to-day happenings on the issue.
The BRRRC in order to keep the refugees well
informed of any developments or problem pertaining Bhutanese refugees sends
photocopy of the news cutting to all the
7 camp committees, schools and women focal point besides other social
organizations working in the camps. The following are the newspaper of Nepal:
- The Kathmandu Post(English)
- The Rising Nepal(English)
- Himal Magazine(English)
- Gorkha Patra(Nepali)
- Kantipur(Nepali)
- Rajdhani(English)
- Samacharpatra(Nepali)
- Space Times(Nepali)
- Blast(Nepali)
- Purbanchal(Nepali)
- The Himalayan Times(English)
- Nepal Television(English and Nepali)
- Channel Nepal(English and Nepali)
- FM-Kantipur(Nepali) and Kanchanjunga FM
- Radio Nepal(English, Nepali and Hindi)
In view of the need of creating awareness among the
refugees with up-to-date information particularly from inside Bhutan and
day-to-day activities in 7 camps, the following news letter/paper from the
refugee community are also published mostly on monthly basis. These papers are
mostly circulated in the camps and few copies inside Bhutan clandestinely.
- The Bhutan Review( now stopped)
- Bhutan Focus( now stopped)
- Amar Bhutan ( now stopped)
- Bhutan Today(English)
- Sangrila Sandesh(English)
- Bhutan Jagaran(Nepali)
- Naulo Awaj(Nepali)
In addition to these, the BRRRC prepares Update,
leaflets and pamphlets and circulates in the camps and to international
community and concern individuals. Therefore the refugees in the camps besides
themselves following the news through Radio and TV, they are kept well informed
through various media and also holding meetings and sharing the information.
COMMUNICATION,
DISINTEGRATION AND THE TAMIL REFUGEES IN LONDON
Rev.Dr. Albert
W. Jebanesan
Theological
College of Lanka, Pilimatalawa, Sri Lanka
My personal experience of working for six years
among internally displaced people in Sri Lanka, had led me to study the human
experience of refugees. I lived in the
northern part of Sri Lanka from childhood. Later I lived in the same area as a
Methodist minister from 1988 to 1994. I
lived there throughout almost the whole period since the armed struggle broke
out between the government troops and the Tamil militants. Men and women, young and old, started leaving
the traditional inhabited areas to different parts of Sri Lanka and to other
parts of the world as ‘refugees’.
Furthermore, I lived as a refugee in refugee camps along with my family.
In the meantime, I went to the UK for my
postgraduate programme. There, I
observed the Tamil refugees caught up in a state of helplessness and without
appropriate support systems. Resources
that they would have relied upon in their homeland are not found in the UK, and
the existing resources available to them here appeared alien to them. I have realised that for many Tamil refugees
the adaptation process had become painful.
They were forced to move from the ‘extended family’ mode of existence to
the nuclear family: from group existence to individual existence. The differences of language and life style
had complicated the process of adjustment.
Although refugee families experience difficulties that are common to
many ordinary British families, they face unique psychological, environmental
and economic stresses such as tough immigration laws, and media and public
opinion, all of which portrayed refugees as a ‘problem’ in Britain for the
British population. They were forced to
move through the accommodative path carrying emotional distress, and symptoms
of tension.
It is estimated that over 35,000 Sri Lankan Tamils
have settled in London[151]
since 1983 as a consequence of the prolonged armed conflict between the government
military forces and the LTTE in the North and East Provinces of Sri Lanka. Tamil speaking Sri Lankans have entered the
UK as asylum seekers and the live in Greater London in small groups.
I felt that Tamil refugees had tried to replicate,
as far as possible, the pattern of life in their original villages, being far
from home. I felt at home, but not quite
at home. An old man complained to me:
“Back in Sri Lanka I was a village leader, people respected me and my relatives
even venerated me in my own house: but here they find me a nuisance.” A middle-aged man complained that children
and women here enjoy more freedom than in their homeland. University students stated that they have
abandoned their Hindu religious practices as soon as they arrived in London,
and that “Hinduism has lots its impact here.”
Soon I realised that Tamils were adopting new sets of values and mores,
and that even the most sacrosanct “blood solidarity” had lost its compelling
force.
All in all, with their exodus to London, Tamil
culture had collapsed in the minds of the refugees and had given place to
British culture, which the Tamil refugees did not understand. Many Tamil refugees saw themselves as
respected and civilised members in Sri Lanka, but not so in London. For example, Ganesh was a teacher, people saw
him a leader in the Sri Lanka society, but found himself confused in
London. He is working like so many
others, in a grocery store. Ganesh said
that he was ‘lost’ in London.
According to my understanding of the Tamil refugees,
they did not feel that they were ignorant.
Yet they expressed their inability to cope with the demands of a
different life style and culture that was forced upon them. The entire concept of life style has changed
for them very quickly, even before they realised that they needed to change
themselves. The contrast between the
‘out here’ and the ‘back there’ is dramatised by the case of Ratnam the
practising solicitor in London. “Peace
of mind is not here.” “Peace of mind” or
“Inner Peace” summarises the feeling of happiness resulting from a good
relationship with house, temple and community of family, relatives and
acquaintances who “mingled with us like one family.” The opposite of this kind of peace is not
war, but restlessness and insecurity.
Most of the interviewees said that the fact of
leaving their homeland did not solve their problems, but created new unexpected
problems in their daily lives. All of
them were explicit and concordant when they spoke of their integrated life in
Sri Lanka. However, their explanations and viewpoints grew in drama till they
reached peaks of intensity in their words and gestures and silences, when they
referred to ‘problems’ that forced them to leave Sri Lanka. They were willing to give lengthy explanations
about their past life and the present life in London, but they said very few
things about their transition from Sri Lanka to London. The explanation about their Diaspora occurred
when the interviewees discussed specific news from Sri Lanka in their get-togethers,
not so much in our individual interviews.
Tamil refugees bring with them the memories of
horror, and they know that it is precisely because of the horrors of war that
they were accepted in this new society and given temporary shelter, protection
and acceptance. However, is London a
shelter for them? The British
government’s continually changing of asylum policies, introducing tighter
measures against accepting any more refugees and deporting a good number of
them are frequent discussions in newspapers and television channels. For the British population, the refugees pose
a problem and are a problem to them, not just people who have come with
problems. If they accept the mass media
alarmist programmes uncritically, British people will come to the conclusion
that their government tried to solve the problems of the refugees and, by doing
so, introduced a new problem to the white British population. After the horror and trauma of disintegration
of their houses and families and villages and their corresponding exile, now
they need permission from the authorities to live, and to exist, and to
be. If they do not have that permanent
or temporary permission, they are no longer refugees but have become transients
and even fugitives from the law of the country that offered them ‘refuge’. Wandering from place to place, from country
to country, and from one detention centre to another detention centre; the mere
survival has become their main goal in life.
To achieve this goal, all means are legitimate in their view, but even
so they live a “dog’s life” (Hanna) without any meaning or purpose.
I met Hanna at a Tamil Church. I introduced myself and asked a question:
“How’s life in London?” Her abrupt reply
opened for me a new avenue of exploration of the life of the Sri Lankan
refugees in the Western countries:
Me: How is your life in London?
Hanna: What is this life? This life is a dog’s life!
Her reply seemed abrupt and even slightly
improper. This is not the answer to
expect for a greeting, that she was living like a dog in London. I could detect bitterness, anger and
frustration in her words and in her eyes.
Her reply made me feel that she had some grievances about her life in
London; later I realised that she had only a small circle to move around. So I persisted:
Me: Why do you say that your
life here is a dog’s life?
Hanna: There is no peace in my mind here (...) No
peace, happiness, culture, climate or language available for me in this country
(...) As a Hindu I spent time in temples,
and wanted to do the same here; but that is denied to me. (...) I was busy in Sri Lanka, and had
friends and relatives; even that has been refused to me here.
In this verbal outburst which I have shortened, we
immediately identify several ‘generative words’[152]
often repeated with equal emotion by other interviewees: peace, happiness,
culture, climate, language, family, friends, relatives etc. Her life in Sri Lanka was filled with life;
in London her life seems filled with the void, an empty life, the life of a
dog.[153] It is true that, comparatively speaking, her
standard of living in London was higher than in Sri Lanka, yet the quality of
life, if we give credit to her words, was the lowest ebb. According to her, the standard of living has
nothing to do with material things, but the quality of her life has to do with
things spiritual; they may not be in opposition all the time, but they must not
be confused either.
For some time I wondered whether I could find a
single term or expression that could encompass the many terms Tamil refugees
used to express the disillusion and misery they found very soon had subsided in
London, after their dreams and initial sense of relief and joy at reaching
their intended destination. Finally, I
thought that the striking Tamil expression “a dog’s life”, repeated quite often
in conversations as a passing reflection, and with the utmost intensity by two
women, Hanna and Saro, was a very graphic and accurate expression. In my search for an equally appropriate and
more respectable term for translating dog’s life I came across the word anomie. [154] They live a life of dogs’ life, a life in a
prolonged state of anomie.
In a flash thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils have made
the transition from a pre-industrial society to a post-industrial mass culture,
from a pre-modern environment of rural landscapes to a post-modern environment
of skyscrapers. This has shattered their
ancestral family life. They fee suffocated
and dizzy in the modern Western city.
The word anomie was introduced
into the vocabulary of the social sciences by the Franch sociologist Emile
Durkheim in his study on Suicide,[155]
and his previous book on Division of
Labour in Society[156]
precisely to explain what happened to the peasant masses that had to abandon
their ancestral rural villages and settle in the newly grown industrial cities
during the industrial revolution in Europe.
We could safely say that the general state of civil strife of a society
is equivalent to a general state of anomie
in that society. In a general context,
the American sociologist Levin expressed this very clearly:
Suddenly the rules that
regulated daily life are thrown into turmoil, and the resulting confusion about
how to act is called anomie, or the
state of normlessness.[157]
The values and norms by which people had ruled their
lives are no longer viable for life, and people have to devise schemes to cope
with the new unexpected reality. One
instance of this dramatic and sudden transition from a normal state (state with
norms) to an abnormal state (state without norms) was the industrial revolution
in the West, which is the background of Durkheim’s study. Another instance of destruction of the
familiar ordered universe and the fall into a state of no-norms is the present
prolonged ethnic war in Sri Lanka.[158]
The destruction of the cosmos and descent into chaos
in societies has some effects on individuals and groups, they fall into a state
of shock, numbness and utter confusion, which Durkheim calls “anomie”. According to him, one of the possible
consequences of the state of anomie
is the suicide of many, a refusal to cope with the new reality in
desperation. This fact, discovered by
Emile Durkheim in the 19th Century, is now widely recognised as one
acute problem of planetary dimensions.
The total transformation and even destruction of traditional cultural
patterns may be the result of the sudden introduction of modern technology,
with the corresponding destructive results of a state of anomie in entire cultures.[159] Levin gave a most comprehensive definition of
anomie in these terms.
A condition of social
ambiguity in which an individual does not know how to act because the rules of
behaviour (norms) are either unclear, entirely absent, or in some way
unsatisfactory.[160]
In this definition the ambiguity of not knowing the
morms for relating with others is not only a transitory state of anomie, but also a prolonged state, or
even a permanent condition. Levin
applies his definition to ‘individuals’, in this study we extend it also to
groups. This prolonged state of
confusion that is so prevalent among Sri Lankan refugees is understandable only
when we let the refugees express their own living conditions in exile. However, due to the lengthy restrictions, let
me give you one example.
“THE WANDERING
TAMIL”
The case of Sathiveli, though not typical of all, is
symptomatic of the restlessness and insecurity of life in exile, a life not
worth living, “a dog’s life,” at the
mercy of decisions made by ohters for no apparent reasons. We offer here an abridged narrative in
Sathiveli’s own words:
From Sri Lanka to Sweden:
Soon after the Elephant Pass
battle in 1992, I left Sri Lanka and went to Sweden. The Swedish authorities rejected my asylum
application in June 1993. There were
several cases of Sri Lankans rejected along with mine. They kept us in a detention camp till the
deportation orders were completed. We
were terribly frightened and sad about the decision. We knew that once we got back, we would end
up in one of the Colombo prisons. The
Sri Lankan government was arresting all the Tamils deported from other
countries, for interrogation. I had
heard that many of them have ended up in indefinite imprisonment. (...) So all the inmates in the detention camp got
together and made a big protest to the Swedish authorities. One held in custody poured petrol on his body
and set fire to himself (...) That did
not solve the problem (...)
From Sweden to Norway:
I managed to escape to
Norway in April 1994. I changed my name
because I was afraid that the Norwegian authorities would discover my
identity. If they found out that I had
lived in Sweden for some time, they would immediately send me back to Sweden.
(...) My new life in Norway did not last
long. The Norwegian authorities too
rejected my case.
The stigma of Criminality:
I was arrested and taken to
the police station. I was told that they
were going to deport me to Sri Lanka.
They also informed me that changing one’s name is a criminal offence. Also I was informed that they had found out my
previous stay in Sweden as a refugee (...) They also said that I would be
locked in the remand prison until a decision was made on my case. They took photographs of me and ordered me to
wear the prisoner’s uniform.
I was wearing a small cross
in my neck chain. I had to remove that
as well. I was not a Christian, but I
had the feeling that the cross was a protective symbol, and I had been wearing
it for a long time (...) Just before
removing the chain, I held the cross and said, Jesus! If you are a living God, save me from this
trouble. I do not want to get back to
Sri Lanka! Is just prayed without
knowing any implications about Christian prayer.
Utter Degradation:
I was kept in a prison cell
without light. Every hour someone would
come and, with the help of torchlight, looked at what I was doing. The prison cell looked like an animal cage in
the zoo. I started crying and prayed
throughout the night. At about 3 ‘o’
clock in the morning a policeman came, opened the prison cell, and told me: “We
have decided not to deport you to Sri Lanka.
We have received a message from the Swedish authorities saying that they
are willing to accept you. “It was a
shock to me! Several others who had been
arrested along with me had been deported or were still in prison; but I was
taken out of the prison cell. I could
not believe my eyes! (...) the Norwegian
police took me and handed me to the Swedish police. The Swedish police asked me why I had left
the country. I told them that I did not
want to go back to Sri Lanka. They said
that they could not make decisions about me now, and that I had to wait until a
decision was made. Just imagine my
situation! I thought that I was going to
be accepted by the Swedish government [as I had been told in Norway] but now
they were telling me that I had to wait for a decision. Later I was sent to the refugee camp where I
had stayed earlier. (...) I lived in
Sweden for six months, but in Sweden refugees are not allowed to work.
Escape to Denmark and Deportation back to Sweden:
Again I left Sweden and this
time went to Denmark to find employment.
I was arrested by the Danish police and handed over to the Swedish
authorities. (...)
Dislodged to Sri Lanka
In the meantime in Sri Lanka
there was a peace accord between the government and the LTTE in the later part
of 1994. At this point the Swedish
government deported many of us to Sri Lanka.
I reached Sri Lanka in June 1995. (...)
From Sri Lanka to London:
I started again on my
carpentry work in Jaffna. (...) At that time
the security forces killed my sister-in-law’s husband. (...) My brother-in-law, who was living in the
United Kingdom, was willing to pay money to a travel agent and sponsor my
sister-in-law’s eldest son to travel to the UK.
They wrote to me asking for my assistance to bring him to Colombo,
because of the security risks involved for a young person to travel alone. So the two of us travelled to Colombo and,
while we were there, my brother-in-law told me over the phone that he was
willing to give me a loan to pay the travel agent. (...) Although I had no plans to go abroad again, I
decided to give another try. I agreed to
the proposal, paid the money and landed in the UK on the 22nd of
November 1996. (...)
His life started once again in a new country, the
UK. Sathivel testified: “I felt that I
was chased down like an animal.” The
condition of being a fugitive rather than a refugee forced him to a separation
from the whole of reality; the supreme value of his life was just to keep
alive, a refugee from Sri Lanka and a fugitive from three Scandinavian
countries. The experience of
restlessness, fear and rejection developed in him an acute anomic
condition. Yet he is trying to break
this situation by taking the new emerging reality courageously upon himself and
enter the new social order to save what was left of his human dignity. His Tamil culture and religion did not
provide any meaning or purpose to Sathivel’s life; and the present British
culture in which he found himself immersed could not give any meaningful
content to his life. He was tossed by
invisible and incomprehensible political powers from one country to another,
from one location to another, with nothing to look forward to, except the
preservation of his life; and even this preservation was in the hands of
others. Sathivel is one of many who were
forced to exist with new ideas and values, but his social points of reference
were elsewhere. Once you have been uprooted
from the soil, any location is good enough if it provides a shelter for
survival in the storm. Yet the traumatic
fact is that many refugees experience a mere bilogical existence, not a social
or culturally meaningful existence. They
do not know where they are heading until they reach a specific Western country
and precariously settle in it. The
researcher finds many stories of Tamil refugees stranded in remote countries,
in Moscow as well as other countries in Eastern Europe and even in Africa,
without even knowing the name of the country of their arrival, in their attempt
to devise circuitous ways to reach the Western European countries. Sathi told the following story with jovial
humour:
About five years ago, one
day I received a telephone call from a shop owner in my village. Someone from Heathrow Airport telephoned, asked
me to come to identify this man and release him from the immigration
authorities. I went there immediately
and helped him. As soon as we came out
of the airport he said, “brother! Your father told me that you were living in
London; how come that you are in Germany?
I said, “This is London”. Then
the fellow said, “My agent told me that they were taking me to Germany. I do not know what happened; it looks like
they have put me on a London flight”.
This experience of living an unstable existence impels
them to provise norms and rules that are valid “for the time being”. This experience reveals and reinforces an
acute anomic condition that, among
other ill effects, separates the refugee from the whole surrounding
reality. Durkheim very appropriately said:
All man’s pleasure in
acting, moving and exerting himself implies the sense that his efforts are not
in vain and that by walking he has advanced.
However, one does not advance when one walks toward no goal, or which is
the same thing – when his goal is infinity.[161]
In Sri Lanka Tamils lived in community and had
communion and communication with each other.
They find that all this is lost in London. Their Exodus and Diaspora are so recent and
have come so suddenly! In order to live
in a community, the refugees have to create it; and to create their own
community they have to devise certain methods of socialisation[162]
in London. They seek and find shelter
and security, and the possibility of intimacy with friends and acquaintances,
in the creation of their own ghettos to replace the social atmosphere of the
village as far as it is possible, with necessary adaptations. There is no question of ‘Why?’ It is just a fact; they need a community and
they create their own community, and from the bosom of their newly created (not
newly found) community they look at their surroundings with a sense of
self-affirmation. The transition to a
metropolitan environment has shattered the ancestral family life. They wanted to experience an extended family
system, but that was not available to them.
The need to belong[163]is,
no doubt, a universal biological, social and spiritual requirement for us if we
are going to be fully human; without belonging somewhere we are spiritually,
socially and even biologically dead.
Erich Fromm stressed that humans have a compelling
need to belong to a community, , “to avoid aloneness.”[164] The emotional feelings Tamil refugees feel
about their lonely life in London corresponds very closely to Fromm’s analysis
on solitude and belonging. Erich Fromm
concludes his analysis:
To feel completely alone and
isolated leads to mental disintegration just as physical starvation leads to
death. This relatedness to others is not
identical with physical contact. An
individual can be physically alone for many years and yet he may be related to
ideas, values, or at least social patterns that give him a feeling of communion
and “belonging”. On the other hand, he
may live among people and yet be overcome by an utter feeling of isolation, the
outcome of which, if it transcends a certain limit, is the state of insanity,
which schizophrenic disturbances represent.
This lack of relatedness to values, symbols, patterns, we may call moral
aloneness and state that moral aloneness is as intolerable as the physical aloneness,
or rather that physical aloneness becomes unbearable only if it implies also
moral aloneness.[165]
We do not need to expand on the disintegrating
effect of suddenly being thrown out into the unfamiliar and unknown and the
consequent feeling of solitude and void; one of the most recurrent
expressions. It is no wonder, then, to
hear the expression “I feel lonely” even from the lips of people who have
managed to bring their families or have formed a family here.[166]
When the conventional inherited symbols are no
longer bearers of meaning, as Levin points out, when there are no clear
guidelines in the social system to control people and give their lives meaning
and purpose, people will fall into confusion (anomic confusion), will tend to
rduce their world, and escape from the larger world they do no longer
understand or accept. Social interaction
and inter-personal communication require a commonly accepted system of signs
and symbols with their respective meanings given to the signs employed. When the old familiar signs have lost their
significance and no new signs have developed to explain the new reality, we
have the phenomenon of anomie; one of
its most common expressions is meaning-less-ness.[167] In my interviews the expression “meaning of
life” (or lack thereof, “meaning-less-ness” [dog’s life]) often comes
accompanied with the expression “purpose for living”.
Meaninglessness produces an acute sense of anxiety
or anguish that Paul Tillich understands as “due to the loss of a spiritual
centre.”[168] Durkheim’s sociological concept of anomie and Tillich’s
theological/philosophical concept of anxiety are closely related to each
other. The frequent mention of “lack of
meaning” that goes accompanied with “no peace of mind” and less frequently with
“no-purpose” is so overwhelming that Tillich’s “anxiety of emptiness and
meaninglessness” resembles our concept of self-alienation so characteristic of
Tamil refugees in London. Tillich
writes:
The anxidty of emptiness is
aroused by the threat of non-being to the special contents of the spiritual
life. A belief breaks down through
external events or inner processes: one is cut off from creative participation
in a sphere of culture, one feels frustrated and about something which one had
passionately affirmed, or is driven from devotion to one object of devotion to
another and again to another, because the meaning of each of them vanishes and
the creative Eros is transformed into indifference or aversion. Everything is tried and nothing
satisfies. The contents of tradition,
however excellent, however loved once, lost their power to give content
today. And present culture is even less
able to provide the content.[169]
I can find no more accurate description of the human
predicament of Tamil refugees in London, especially among teachers, students
and professionals, who constitute the majority.
Tillich continues with relentless clarity and accuracy
Anxiously one turns away
from all concrete contents and looks for an ultimate meaning, only to discover
that it was precisely the loss of a spiritual centre, which took away the
meaning from the special contents of the spiritual life. But a spiritual centre cannot be produced
intentionally, and the attempt to produce it only produces deeper anxiety. The anxiety of emptiness drives us to the
abyss of meaninglessness.[170]
Tamil refugees in London feel acutely that they have
lost that centre to which they can turn to orient their lives at all moments,
and which irradiates meaning to life in all situations. The family is lost, the village is lost, the
temple is lost; can they recreate these three pillars in London? That would be a goal to achieve that could
give direction, purpose and meaning to their lives. At least many of them have attempted the
task.
With the data at hand, we may safely conclude that
Sri Lanakan Tamil refugees are not only the children of the war, we could say
also that they carry a war within themselves in their lives in exile; they find
no inner peace, only turmoil and conflict between opposing cultures, interests,
values and codes of conduct, also a conflict between their expectations of the
new reality on the one hand, and the expectations of the new social reality
around them on the other; a conflict between promise and fulfilment, between
expectations and achievements. The
painful question we need to ask in this situation is that, is communication
possible in a disintegrating community?
In a situation of war, all norms, patterns of
understood communication methods are denied or temporarily suspended. After overcoming the shock of disintegration
of their families and villages, in London they have found themselves in a state
of ‘communication shock’; when prolonged without a satisfactory solution, this
state has led to their anomic
state. The centre of their lives and
norms of communication have been shifted or totally removed[171]
because in London they cannot find normal or traditional methods of
communication. In the new social and
cultural environment they feel lonely, confused, living aimless lives, under the
spell of ‘anomic terror’.
Rev.Dr.
Albert W. Jebanesan
News Barriers: Reporting on forced migration in times of globalisation
Max Martin
1.
introduction
On August 14, 2002, the eve of the Indian
Independence Day, Bangalore made an appearance on The New York Times (NYT) as a hub of globalisation. The paper’s celebrity foreign affairs
columnist Thomas L Friedman wrote: “Consider Bangalore, where the traffic is
now congested by all the young Indian techies, many from the lower-middle
classes, who have gotten jobs, apartments -- and motor scooters -- by providing
the brainpower for the world's biggest corporations” (Friedman, 2002a).
Earlier, on August 11 he wrote: “…India has been able to connect its millions
of educated, English-speaking, low-wage, tech-savvy young people to the world's
largest corporations…” (Friedman, 2002b). Friedman’s point was that democracy,
liberal education and economic liberalisation offered excellent economic
opportunities for a lot of people, participants in globalisation. He remained a bit starry-eyed even after
going home: “Bangalore, India's SiliconValley, where hundreds of thousands of
young Indians, most from lower-middle-class families, suddenly have social
mobility… -- thanks to globalization” (Friedman 2002c).
My argument is that the process of globalisation
that liberates a lot of people excludes many people, who actually need to be
liberated. While it gives freedom to a set of people and its promoters
celebrate the virtues of freedom, the same rhetoric of freedom works against
another set. But it remains largely unnoticed. While singing Hallelujah to
globalisation, the media ignores this set, as if they lived in the netherworld.
When Friedman spent time in Bangalore, reportedly
getting curious about young people listening to Led Zeppelin at coffee shops,
there were certain other happenings in and around the city. Northern Karnataka
farmers, hit by a continuing drought, were streaming into Bangalore slums. A
set of urban refugees were stranded in Bangalore in the aftermath of 9/11, when
several countries declined refuge to exiles from Afghanistan, Palestine and
several war-torn African countries[172].
And a few kilometres away from Bangalore, there were Sri Lankan Tamil refugees
in a camp and some refugee children were studying within the city – keenly
awaiting the outcome of the peace process in Sri Lanka, incidentally,
Friedman’s next destination. But these bits of “news” largely escaped the
attention of the NYT and local
newspapers, some of which reported on Friedman’s trip and stories.
Media reportage is determined by a set of filters
through which news pass through, including business and advertisement concerns,
political mood of the country, ownership, and source selection and sort of
internal censorship within media organisations (Chomsky and Herman, 1988). It
is difficult for forced migrants, the majority of whom are poor and neither
readers nor advertisers of newspapers, to get their side of the story passed
through these filters, unless when they make a dramatic entry or exit. Once a
city local reporter commented about a colleague’s intention to report on the
crammed refugee camp conditions near Bangalore: “What is new? They have been
living there for many years.”[173]
Friedman has argued in his book, Lexus and the Olive Tree, globalisation
has meant different things to different people (Friedman, 1999). As the title
suggests, some people get a chance to make Lexus cars for the global market,
but some others end up fighting to save their olive trees. The market economy
and local clashes, which are sometimes connected, leave a set of people who
find no place in a globalised world. When barriers are broken for capital,
images, values and news, new barrier are erected to stop the ‘flow’ of people
escaping from violence. Their place in the media is also increasingly getting
restricted as a result of invisible “news barriers”.
The first part of this essay describes the process
of globalisation and the changing migration scenario. Secondly, it probes how
forced migrants are becoming increasingly unwelcome world-wide, even on news
pages, as the third part of this essay notes. The concluding section probes the
possibility of a more positive coverage of refugee issues.
2.
Breaking barriers
The current phase of globalisation, as Friedman
argues, had its most defining moment in breaking of the Berlin Wall in 1989
(Friedman, 1999). It symbolised the end
of the Cold War and spread of the market to erstwhile closed economies. It also
marked the replacement of the Cold War-based system by another international
system, based on market competition. Globalisation denotes integration of
capital, technology, and information across national borders, in a way that is
creating a single global market and, to some degree, a global village (ibid.).
As part of it, all parts of the globe were linked into a single network
of rapid and cheap transport and nearly instant communications. Spread of
literacy and cheap mass reproduction and transmission of world’s images and
sounds led to a worldwide “common” culture (Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayao, 1989).
Friedman further elaborates in
his book: “The globalization system, unlike the Cold War system, is not static,
but a dynamic ongoing process: globalization involves the inexorable
integration of markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree never
witnessed before -- in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations, and
nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper
than ever before, and in a way that is also producing a powerful backlash from
those brutalized or left behind by this new system” (1999). The driving idea
behind globalisation is free-market capitalism, he argues.
The often-unreported flipside of
globalisation involve rapidly changing politics, policies and lifestyles.
Globalisation, in fact, happened in a world in turmoil. The period since the
1980s has been a turbulent one. The post-Cold War years, as in the period after
the first and the second world wars, witnessed the demise of the old ideologies,
the collapse of existing empires and the formation of new states (UNHCR, 1997).
Inevitably, these political changes led to huge population displacements.
In and around the former Soviet
Union, conflicts arose over national boundaries and ethnic communities in the
Caucasus, Baltic States and Central Asia. By 1999, there were about a million
refugees and internally displaced persons in the former Soviet Union (Suhrke
1997). Meanwhile African Asian and Latin
American countries witnessed problems of state formation and a development in
new and more severe forms during the 1990s (ibid).
By the end of 1997, there were 13 million refugees – those fleeing persecution,
armed conflict or violence. Of an estimated total of 50 million people of
forced displacement, including internally displaced people, 22 million were
people of concern to the UNHCR (UNHCR, 1997). Meanwhile an increasing number of
refuges and asylum seekers were stepping into Europe.
The refugee phenomenon was shaped by a set of
contradictory developments in the last decades of the 20th century.
The end of the cold war left a unipolar world and a new world order, where
market played an important global role.
Globalisation, an essentially economic phenomenon, linked commodity and
capital markets across the globe as a composite entity. Technological
innovations made it possible to transmit vast amounts of money almost
instantaneously across the world.
The changes brought about were for the good of a
large part of the world, but they also involved sharp inequalities. “This
global entity is characterized by an enormous gap between a few capital-rich,
technologically advanced, and strategically powerful countries and the rest,
whose internal conditions are largely shaped by the external policies of the
leading countries and the activities of their firms and export agencies”
Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayao, 1989). The global market influenced even the life of
a village peasant in a developing country. Studies by the Institute of Social
and Economic Change (ISEC), Bangalore, have traced linkages between farm
commodity crisis in Karnataka, a key reason for exodus from the region, with
changing trade policies and recommended government action including better
safety nets for farmers. On a larger plane, there has been a widening gap
between the rich and the poor. Globally, the 20 per cent of the world’s people
in the highest-income countries account for 86 per cent of total private
consumption expenditures – the poorest 20 per cent a minuscule 1.3 per cent
(UNDP, 1998).
Increasingly, there is evidence that links refugee
flows with skewed income distribution. Of the eight major concentration of
refugees in the early 1990s, five originated states that fall within the World
Bank’s lowest category of low income countries, with an average gross national
product (GNP) per capita (1985) of US $ 270. And most of the world’s refugee
camps are located within these countries, and a large proportion of the
refugees is resettled in these countries. A major consequence has been a massive
south-north migration. “The violent
conflicts that produce refugee flows are in themselves subject to influences
and pressure on resources and the environment ” (Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayao,
1989).
Besides, there is migration for
better economic opportunities. “Globalization also has its own demographic
pattern--a rapid acceleration of the movement of people from rural areas and
agricultural lifestyles to urban areas and urban lifestyles more intimately
linked with global fashion, food, markets, and entertainment trends” (Friedman,
1999). But the movement is not necessarily in search of better lifestyle, but
it is often a desperate run, seeking some form of livelihood as in the case of
north Karnataka farmers.
3. New
barriers
When barriers are removed for everything else, there
are new barriers put in place before people trying to cross borders in a
globalised world. Within nation states, cities welcome skilled worked force,
but tend to push unskilled labourers and the poor to slum and shanties. Internationally,
in the context of increasing migration, several nation states adopted a
multi-pronged strategy that included control over illegal migration, guest
worker policies and tighter refugee policies. Refugee polices clearly differed
from immigration policy, as international law obligates them to the principle
of non-refoulement.
The response of the Western Countries can be divided
into three broad categories – stricter immigration and asylum norms and
regional co-operation in checking the flow of migrants and asylum seekers and a
greater stress on humanitarian intervention. To reduce the intake of refugees
and to prevent the misuse of asylum, Western states tried to modify the asylum
process, to limit the access to asylum and to seek regional co-operation to
restrict the movement of asylum seekers. One of the most direct and
controversial of these methods is interdiction in a neutral territory. For
instances, the United States interdicted Haitian refugee boats on high seas.
Often, parts of international airports are considered to be outside the
national territory, so that illegal aliens can be removed, without offending
international law. Interestingly, there have been reported instances of
interdiction of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees on the straits, but without any
criticism from the media.
More indirect forms of the limiting strategy are
visa restrictions on refugee-producing counties and sanctions on carriers that
bring undocumented passengers. Western states refused to entertain the asylum
application of those coming form “safe” countries. Apart from resorting to
border controls, Western states resorted to a collective peacekeeping role,
accompanied by liberal relief supplies but restrictive asylum (Suhrke, 1997).
There are several reasons for the cold response to
refugees in the post- Cold War era. Once the cold war ended, the refugees no
longer possessed the ideological or geopolitical value they once had (Chimni,
1998). They are no longer voting with their feet against repressive Communist
regimes so that liberal democracies can gain political mileage out of hosting
them. Now, increasingly, the trend is to close the doors on refugees and to
send humanitarian aid packages for people trapped in wars.
Chimni further argues that the ideology of humanitarianism
mobilises a range of meanings and practices to establish and sustain global
relations of domination. In particular, it manipulates the language of human
rights to legitimise a range of dubious practices, including its selective
defence. It has a dual essence: the justification of the use of force, in
particular interventions and wars, and the amelioration of painful local
conditions engendered by globalisation through a neo-liberal political and
economic package (Chimni, 1999). He further argues that the ideology of
humanitarianism uses the vocabulary of human rights to legitimise the language
of security in refugee discourse, blur legal categories and institutional
roles, pushing repatriation as the only solution. And it promotes a neo-liberal
agenda in post-conflict societies leading the systematic erosion of the
principles of protection and the rights of refugees (ibid).
The situation has turned even worse post 9/11, when
the security discourse found increasing acceptance worldwide, when international
terrorism became a clear and present danger in some parts of the world. The
attack on Afghanistan by the US was justified as the US alleged the Taliban
government posed a security threat, it did not respect human rights, and it
protected Osama bin Laden, the prime accused in the attack over the Twin Towers
in New York. But, when bin Laden remains at large, evidence suggests that human
rights abuses continue in Afghanistan and refugee flow is still continuing,
including to India. Worse, the threat perception brought about by the 9/11
attacks has brought about new barriers for refugees, including from
Afghanistan.
4. News
barriers
The media attitudes to refugees in the 1990s also
witnessed a change, in tune with the lukewarm or cold welcome they received in
host countries. Significantly, the media used terms such as “flood”, “surge”
and “tide” to describe the “flow” of refugees, hinting it is something that has
to be dammed. There have also been instances of racist attacks on refugees and
asylum seekers (Berthiaume, 1995). Even when they do appear in the media, they
often remain in the background, as a “wallpaper”, without voice (Wright, T,
2002). While covering globalisation, journalists tend to faithfully echo the
established political vocabularies and the prevailing politico-economic
orthodoxy (Parenti, 1986).
Pilger argues that in media’s “global village” other
nations do not exist unless they are useful to “us” (Pilger, 1998). People who
live outside or on the peripheries of the market economy seldom make news. The
project of economic liberalisation hugely subsidises the rich and exploits and
the poor, but such dynamics of globalised economy are hidden under the garb of
modernisation (ibid). And the human face of war, including war casualties and
refugees, hardly make any significant appearance on the mainstream media. The
Gulf War in 1991, one of the most widely reported wars in history, few
journalists reported the truth, largely unknown, that a quarter of a million
Iraqis were slaughtered or died unnecessary deaths (ibid).
Scraton writes about the war on Afghanistan: “On the
ground, the war was conducted by the notoriously fractured Northern Alliance,
whose own history of human rights violations made it an uneasy bedfellow for
Western democratic Governments espousing the rhetoric peppered with the
vocabulary of ‘freedom’, ‘justice’, ‘community’ and ‘rights’.” (Scraton 2002).
Concluding a firsthand account of himself having been attacked and injured by a
mob of Afghan refugees, Fisk writes: “I feared other versions would produce a
different narrative, of how a British journalist was ‘beaten up by a mob of
Afghan refugees.’ And of course, that’s the point. The people who were
assaulted were the Afghans, the scars inflicted by us – by B-52s, not by them”
(Fisk 2002).
Locally, anti-refugee, anti-migrant propaganda is
often accepted by the media. Bangladeshi economic migrants, who have been
living in city slums, including in Bangalore, are of late often described in
the media as “infiltrators”. First the media reference was to a few people with
militant connections who sneaked in from across Bangladesh border, but soon it
became a tag for migrant population from Bangladesh in general. When there is prominent media coverage of
political statements regarding security concerns raised by refugees and
migrants, there is little coverage of the genuine concerns of these people,
leave alone a critique of the “security” discourse, founded on shaky grounds.
As for migrants who do not pose a security threat, they remain far away from
the media glare.
5. Conclusion
Globalisation is not a smooth process that liberates
people and gives them opportunities, but it is a rather schizophrenic
phenomenon that brings about new divides and new barriers. It generates a clear
set of losers, including forced migrants. The losers are increasingly finding
doors closed against them. And the media tend to celebrate globalisation and
its winners without much bothering to check about what happens to its losers,
who are unwelcome even on news pages. At the same time a new discourse based on
“security concerns” wrongly and cruelly tag refugees and many migrant
populations as dangerous.
Can the media play a more positive role in
highlighting issues of forced migration and putting it in the larger context of
global political and economic changes? In many instances, local reporting is
skewed by slanted news offered by readily available news sources. International
newspapers pick up and enhance locally available news. There is need to develop
reliable alternative news sources for media. Often refugee and migrant
settlements are out of bounds for media practitioners due to a variety of
reasons. They may be unknown fringes of the city or closed camps. More
importantly they are outside the mindscape of urban media practitioners and
consumers. Humanitarian workers who do get to see these people living on the
margins could try to tell the media about the reality of forced migration and
encourage a true depiction of ground reality. Reporters and editors should also
get better opportunities to see the big picture, often hidden by the glitter of
globalisation and hear voices of migrants, often deafened by shrill propaganda
against them. Otherwise the truth will remain hidden.
(It is a revised
version of a paper presented at the seminar on Refugees and Media. The author
is a Bangalore-based freelance
journalist, who writes on environment, development and forced migration.)
References:
Zolberg, AR,
Suhrke, A, Aguayao, S 1989, Escape from Violence, Oxford: Oxford University Press (OUP).
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of Refugee Studies, Vol 11, no. 4, Oxford: Oxford University Press (OUP).
Chimni, B. S. (1999): Globalisation, Humanitarianism
and the Erosion of Refugee Protection, RSC Working Paper no.3, Refugee Studies
Centre, University of Oxford, UK
Chomsky, N and by Herman, E S (1988) Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, Pantheon Books,
Friedman, T (1998), The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc
Friedman, T (2002a) Where Freedom Reigns, The New York Times, August 14, 2002, New York
Friedman, T (2002b), India, Pakistan And G.E., The New York Times, August 11, 2002, New York
Friedman, T (2002b), Where it matters most, globalization thrives, The New York Times, September 23, 2002, New York
Parenti, M (1986): Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media, cited by Pilger, J (1998)
Pilger, J (1998): Hidden Agendas, London: Vintage
Wright, T (2001), Collateral Coverage: Media Images of Afghan Refugees during the 2001 Emergency, working paper no, 62, Geneva: UNHCR
Suhrke, A (1997), Refugee movements in the second half of the twentieth century, in Gungwu, W (ed), Uncertain Globalisation, Oxford: Westview
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Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford: OUP
WACC South
Asia Consultation
“Refugees and their Right to Communicate – South
Asia Perspective”
UTC Bangalore, 25-27 October, 2002
Report on the
Consultation
A three-day consultation was held at the
United Theological College (UTC), Bangalore from 25th to 27th
October 2002. The program was sponsored by WACC. The main theme of the
consultation was “Refugees and their Right to Communicate”. It was timely and
appropriate, particularly in the context of South Asia. Many participants from
Srilanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and India arrived on 24th in order
to engage in the discussions on the theme. The participants were given a grant
welcome by the Principal of UTC and by the Secretary, Asia Region WACC. The
whole programme was inaugurated by the UNHCR, Chief of Mission at New Delhi, Mr
Lennart Kotsalainen. His excellent talk highlighted the issues related to
refugees in South Asia and their rights. He provided a lot of information about
refugees and also highlighted the UNHCR’s Model National Law on Refugees. It
was followed by Professor Fr Dr Michael Traber’s speech on the “Right to
Communicate”. His scholarship in the field of communication and his experience
in Africa enlightened the participants in the main areas of right to
communication in relation to refugees. Other speakers referred to his examples
as well. Dr Pradeep Thomas, Director of Research Programs at WACC, introduced
the topic “Refugees and Their Right to Communicate - A South Asian Perspective”
to the participants. He told the participants that many such seminars are
conducted in other parts of the world and highlighted the importance of
emphasising on the right to communicate particularly in relation to
refugees.
The
inaugural session was followed by Fr Amalraj’s main talk on Refugees in South
Asia – a sub regional overview. He put his experience in the field of working
with the refugees to good effect. The participants were challenged to think
about the scenario. Using common terminologies and real life examples he
engaged everyone in a critical awakening. Prof. Ranabir Samaddar brought to the
notice of the audience a new concept of the “ethics of care”. The afternoon was
taken up by a programme arranged by the students of the United Theological
College in Hosur. The visit to the Srilankan refugee camp gave a first hand
experience to the participants. The interaction with the Srilankan Tamil
refugees was helpful in knowing what they felt. The students of UTC performed
street theatre and involved all the people from the camp.
On
the 26th Prof. Dr. N.Subramania of the National Law College gave a
presentation on “ Communication and right of expression of refugees”. The
presentation gave an idea of the legalities involved. What were the procedures
that could be followed to fight for the rights of the refugees? Paul Newman
discussed the various ways in which the refugees were portrayed in the media.
His talk was interspersed with live examples of how the situation in Chennai
is. Chennai also has a camp for the refugees from Srilanka and the conditions
there are appalling. Dr. Paula Banerjee dwelled on the representation of
refugee women in South Asia. The presentation generated a lot of discussion
especially with regard to the identity of women. The post lunch session was
taken up by Dr. Albert Jebanesan who deliberated on “ Refugee issues in
Srilanka” and Dr.Jagat Mani Acharya who followed it up with “ Communication
rights and media representations of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal”. S.B. Subha
gave a pointer towards the problem in Nepal.
Max Martin, a reporter of the New Indian Express gave a lively
representation of what the media chooses to publish and how creative writing
can go a long way in highlighting issues. Dr. Bhumitra Chakma followed it up
with a presentation on the refugee issues in Bangladesh. After the presentations
group discussions were held and proposals and recommendations were submitted
from the groups. A special committee was set up in order to bring out a
resolution which was accepted by the participants of the consultation.
W ACC South
Asia Consultation "Refugees and their Right to Communicate -South Asian
Perspectives". UTC Bangalore, 25 -27 October, 2002
Resolution
1. The three-day Consultation convened by W ACC at
United Theological College in Bangalore from 25 -27 October 2002 deliberated on
the theme of "Refugees and their Right to Communicate -South Asian
Perspectives". The consultation discussed various experiences of
protection of refugees in the region, their powerlessness, and absence of their
right to communicate, and the torture, brutalities and indignities suffered by
women refugees in particular, who form the majority of the refugee population.
The consultation also took note of the bias in reporting of news related to
refugees in the mainstream media, or the absence of any coverage there, the
prison-like condition of many refugee camps, and the general social, political
and administrative tendencies to view the refugees either as a breeding ground
for terrorism or as objects of pity, charity and welfare, who have to be taken
care of and who are not supposed to have any voice in determining the framework
intended to protect their human rights. A visit to the (Hosur) Sri Lankan
refugee camp exposed participants to some of the constraints faced by refugees.
2. The consultation took
note of the following major issues in the course of the discussion.
a) Refugee protection is
both a humanitarian and human rights issue. b) The ethics of care and the
ethics of rights go together.
c) The right to communicate is a significant right
of the refugee towards ensuring justice for them, and measures have to be taken
by human rights and humanitarian communities so that refugees gain the capacity
to exercise their right to communicate.
d) The refugees have the right to inform and to be
informed. This will also go a long way towards showing the society that
refugees are not reconciled to remaining victims but people demanding justice
and becoming active to that end.
e) In the issue of right to communicate, the theme
of access is important- such as access by the refugees to the judiciary, to the
media and information resources.
1) A consistent programme of bringing to the notice
of the media issues relating to the refugees is necessary.
g) The human rights community, media practitioners,
faith communities and other concerned communities have to deliberate on
alternate media and communication practices, given the fact that news relating
to human rights violations reach the audience of the mainstream media only
through several stages of filters. Such alternative practices call for programs
of training and awareness relating to issues of justice to the refugees, in
particular women and other vulnerable categories of people.
h) An alert mechanism that includes early warning,
reporting systems is necessary to strengthen the field of communication
relating to the rights of the refugees.
i) A periodic media audit on refugees in South Asia
will be a significant step.
3) On the basis of these
discussions, the consultation proposes the following initiatives:
a) A short duration
intensive research program on media coverage of select cases of massive
displacements in acute conflict situations. Such a program will help the spread
of media literacy.
b) A media workshop for refugee activists, human
rights activists working with refugees and media practitioners. Such a workshop
will also familiarise them with similar communication practices by refugees
elsewhere.
c) A legal literacy and
assistance centre for refugees is needed. Such a centre can build a compendium
of judicial decisions and case laws in South Asia, particularly India, where
such decisions have been most in number.
4. The consultation urges
upon the participants to find ways of realising these initiatives. It also
urges WACC to send this resolution to all international and national
humanitarian and human rights institutions including the UNHCR, and circulate
it among members of the Human Rights and faith communities.
5. In the text of this
resolution, "refugees" also means the victims of internal displacement.
Follow up measures.
A workshop for writers
(Refugees) was mooted along with a content analysis of the selected media. The
expenses towards the same will be born from the same account.
WACC
South Asia Consultation
“Refugees and
their Right to Communicate – South Asia Perspective”
UTC Bangalore,
25th to 27th October, 2002-10-22
Names,
addresses and e-mails of resource persons and the participants
Pradip Thomas
WACC
357 Kennington Lane
London SE 11
5Qy, UK
Rev Cyril S. Cornelius
CARVAS, 15 civil lines
Jabalpur
Rev.Dr. Joshva Raja
United Theological College
P.O. Box No.4613
63, Miller’s Road
Benson Town
BANGALORE – 560 046.
Dr.Michael Traber July
To December
January to June 1,
Ranelagh Mansion
United Theological College New Kings road, Fulham
P.O. Box 4613 London
SW6 4RH.
UK
63, Miller’s Road michaeltraber@yahoo.com
Benson Town
BANGALORE – 560 046.
Mr. Lennart Kotsalainen
Chief of Mission
UNHCR New Delhi
Jagat Mani Charya
3/23 Shree Durbar Tole Lalitpur
G.P.O. Box 12855
Kathmundu, Nepal.
C.Amalraj
24, Benson Road
Bangalore – 560 046.
S.B. Subba
BRRRC
Setumari Road, Damak –13
Jhapa, Nepal
Dr. N.Subramanya
Research @ UNHCR Chairon Refugee Law
National Law School of India University
Nagarbhavi,
Bangalore – 560 072.
Narayan Sharma
National Law School of India University
Nagarbhavi, Bangalore – 560 072
Ranabir Samadda
Calcutta Research Group
Fr. S. Jayanathan
A.C.C.
P. Box 4650
Bangalore – 560 046
Fatima N.
Asian Age
Asian age@hotmail.com
Venkatesh Babu
Staff Reporter,
Deccan Herald
M.R. Road
BANGALORE – 560 001.
Dr.Paula Banerjee
G.D. 272, Sector 111
Salt Lake – Kolkata – 700 091
West Bengal
Amitha A.V.
221, 11 Cross, 11 Main, KEB Layout
Aswath Nagar, Bangalore
Albert W. Jebanesan
Theological College of Lanka
Pilimatawa, Sri Lanka
Rev.Ruban M. Ariyanagam
Jeevodhayam, Muruakan (MB)
Sri Lanka
Paul Newman
24, Benson Road
Benson Town
Bangalore – 560 046
Dr.Bhumitra Chakma
Dept. of International Relations
University of Dhaka
Bangladesh
Rev.Julias Khristy
CNI Church, Dipal Circle,
Maninagar East
Ahmedabad, Gujarat – 380 008
B. Amenla Cunningham M.Th II (Comm.)
A-3 UTC Quarter
97, Nandidurga Road
Benson Town
Bangalore – 560 046.
Hangpi M.Th II (Comm.)
United Theological College
Post Box No.4613
63, Miller’s Road
Benson Town
[1]
The term ‘refugee’ is an evolutionary as well as a contested concept. There is considerable confusion and a lack of
clarity in its meaning, nature, scope and usage. The terminologies that are used relating to
the term – political refugees, economic refugees, environmental refugees,
resource refugees, developmental refugees, eco-migrants, internal refugees,
external refugees etc. – indicate its multi-context usages and a certain degree
of confusion over its definition. On the
changing contour of refugee definition, see Pirkko Kourula, Broadening the Edges: Refugee Definition and
International Protection Revisited (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997).
[2]
Lok Raj Baral and S.D. Muni, “Introduction: Refugees, South Asia and Security,”
in Refugees and Regional Seurity in South
Asia, eds., S.D. Muni and Lok Raj Baral (Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt.
Ltd., 1996), p.1.
[3]
Minority Rights Group, The Biharis in
Bangladesh, Report 11, 4th edition, January 1982, p.7.
[4] E.
Haque Chowdhury, “Non-Bengali Refugees in Bangladesh: Patterns, Policies and
Consequences,” in Refugees: A Third World
Dilemma, ed. John Rogge (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefied, 1987), p.220.
[5]
For an overview on political persecution and its implications from
international legal point of view, see Sumit Sen, “Stateless Refugees and the
Right to Return: The Bihari Refugees of South Asia,” – Part I, International Journal of Refugee Law,
Vol.11, No.4 (1999), pp.625-645.
[6]
Sumit Sen, “Stateless Refugees and the Right to Return,” p.635, based on the
figure calculated in Minority Rights Group, The
Biharis of Bangladesh.
[7] Ministry
of Relief and Rehabilitation, Government of the People’s Republic of
Bangladesh, Stranded Pakistanis in
Bangladesh (Dhaka: Government of Bangladesh, 1982), p.3.
[8] New York Times, 13 February 1972; cited
in Dilara Chowdhury, Bangladesh and the
South Asian International System (Dhaka: Academic Publishers, 1992), p.297.
[9] The Economist, 13 May 1972.
[10]
Chowdhury, Bangladesh and the South Asian
International System, p.297.
[11]
Minority Rights Group, The Biharis of
Bangladesh, p.16.
[12] Robbar (Dhaka), 11 September 1983, p.17.
[13] Ittefaq, 2 January 1985.
[14] The New Nation, 3 January 1985.
[15] Ittefaq, 10 December 1985.
[16]
Cited in Abu Taher Salauddin Ahmed, “Bangladesh-Pakistan Relations: An
Evaluation,” in Bangladesh and SAARC:
Issues, Perspectives and Outlook, eds.
Ifthekaruzzaman and Imtiaz Ahmed (Dhaka: Academic Publiishers, 1992),
p.189.
[17]
Ibid.
[18] Far Easter Economic Review, 19 October
1989.
[19] Daily Star, 11 July 1992.
[20] The Morning Sun, 31 December 1992.
[21]
The Daily Star, 9 May 1993.
[22]
Dawn, 20 December 1994.
[23]
On the development of lethnic resistance movement in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts, see Amena Mohsin, The Politics of
Nationalism: The Case of Chittagong Hill Tracts (Dhaka: University Press
Limited, 1997); Syed Aziz-al-Ahsan and Bhumitra Chakma, “Problems of National
Integration in Bangladesh: The Chittagong Hill Tracts,’ Asian Survey, Vol.XXIX, No.10 (October 1989), pp.959-970.
[24]
Amena Mohsin and Bhumitra Chakma, “The Muth of Nation-Building and Security of
Bangladesh: The Case of Chittagong Hill Tracts,” in Bangladesh and SAARC: Issues, Perspectives and Outlook, eds.,
Ifthekaruzzaman and Imtiaz Ahmed (Dhaka: Academic Publishers, 1992),
pp.283-315.
[25]
on this point, see S.S.Chakma, “Can Chittagong Hill Tracts Accommodate More
People?” in On the Margin: Refugees,
Migrants and Minorities, ed., Chowdhury R. Abrar (Dhaka: Refugee and
Migratory Movement Research Unit, June 2000), pp.185-189.
[26]
For example, the Bengali settlers were involved with the army in the Panchari
massacre in the mid-1980s. For this, see
Amnesty International Report, Unlawful
Killing and Torture in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (London: Amnesty
International, September 1986). Field
reports also indicate forcible eviction of the Paharis by the ‘armed bengali
settlers.’ See, Ina Hume, “The Internally
Displaced Persons of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, Case I: Sajek
Union; Case II;Farua Union,” paper presented at a conference on The Internally Displaced Persons in
Bangladesh: Towards Developing Research and Policy Agenda, at BIISS auditorium,
Dhaka on 15-16 January 2000.
[27]
For an account of Bangladesh military’s repressive measure, see The Report of
the Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, ‘Life
is Not Ours,’ Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh
(Copenhagen: IWGIA, May 1991): Report of the Anti-Slavery Society, The Chittagong Hill Tracts: Militarisation,
Oppression and the Hill Tribes (London: Anti-Slavery Society Publication,
1984); Amnesty International Report, Unlawful
Killing and Torture in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (London: Amnesty
International September 1986); Wolfgong Mey ed. Genocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, IWHIA Document
51 (Copenhagen: IWGIA, December, 1984).
[28]
Father R.W. Timm The Adivasis of
Bangladesh (London: Minority Rights Group International, December 1993),
p.13.
[29]
M.Q.Zaman, “Tribal Issues and National Integration: The Chittagong Hill Tracts
Case,” in Tribal Cultures in Bangladesh,
ed. M.S. Quraishi (Rajshahi University Press, 1984).
[30]
The Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, ‘Life
is not Ours’: Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh,
Update 2 (Amsterdam: Organising Committee Chittagong Hill Tracts Campaign,
April 1994), p.11.
[31]
Satyabrata Chakravarty, “Political Solution Eludes Chakma,” The Statesman (Calcutta), 12 May 1994.
[32]
The Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, ‘Life
is not Ours’: Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, Update
2 (Amsterdam: Organising Committee Chittagong Hill Tracts Campaign, April
1994), p.11
[33] The Daily Star, 28 February 1998.
[34] The Bangladesh Observer, 2 January 1989.
[35] ‘Life is not Ours’ Update 2, pp.12-13.
[36]
On this point, see, B.G. Verghese, India’s
Northeast Resurgent: Ethnicity, Insurgency, Governance, Development (Delhi:
Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1996).
[37]
On the dynamics of nation-building and the political process in Myanmar, see
Shwe Lu Maung, Burma: Nationalism and
Ideology (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1989).
[38]
Human Rights Watch/Asia, September 1996, Vol.8, No.3.
[39]
Imtiaz Ahmed, “Refugees and Security: The Experience of Bangladesh,” in Refugees and Regional Security in South
Asia, eds., S.D. Muni and Lok Raj Baral (Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt.
Ltd., 1996), 137.
[40]
Printed in Bangaldesh in International
Affairs Vol.1, No.4 (April 1978), pp.13-14.
[41]
Muhammad Shamsul Huq, Bangladesh in
International Politics: The Dilemmas of the Weak States (Dhaka: University
Press Limited, 1993), p.139.
[42] Keesing’s Contemporary Archives
Vol.XXIV, 1979, p.29238.
[43] The Bangladesh Times, 10 July 1978.
[44]
Based on UNHCR figure, Morning Sun, 1
May 1993.
[45]
Pakistani national daily Dawn
reported such border skirmishes citing Bangladesh military officials. See Dawn
(Karachi), 3 January 1992.
[46] The Daily Ittefaq, 25 July 1997.
[47]
Abdur Razzaq and Mahfuzul Haque, A Tale of
Refugees: Rohingyas in Bangladesh (Dhaka: The Centre for Human Rights,
1995).
[48]
Cited in Shahdeen Malik, “Refugees
and Migrants of Bangladesh: Looking Through a Historical Prism,” in On the Margin: Refugees, Migrants and
Minorities, ed., Chowdhury R. Abrar (Dhaka: Refugee and Migratory Movement
Research Unit, June 2000), note 26, p.34.
[49]
Ain O Salish Kendro, Human Rights in
Bangladesh, 1998 (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1999), p.215.
[50]
Mahindra P. Lama, Managing Refugees in
South Asia: Protection, Aid, State behaviour and Regional Approach, Refugee
and Migratory Movements Research Unit Occasional Paper No.4 (Dhaka: Refugee and
Migratory Movements Research Unit, April 2000), p.22.
[51]
On this point, see Imtiaz Ahmed, “Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and the Stateless
Rohingyas,” The Daily Star, 15 June
2001.
[52] The Ittefaq, 29 July 1997.
[53] Which was done at Geneva on
28th July 1951 and date of entry into force being 22nd
April 1954. The preamble made a reference to the Charter of the UN and the UDHR
(approved on 10th December 1948) and which “endeavoured to assure
refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights [meaning the
principle that ‘human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms
without discrimination]. It also sought to ‘revise and consolidate previous
international agreements relating to the status of refugees and to extend the
scope of and protection accorded by such instruments by means of a new
agreement”.
[54] Which entered into force on
4th October 1967.The Protocol was signed by the President of the
General Assembly and by the Secretary General on 31st January 1967.
[55] Organization of African
Unity signed at Addis Ababa on 10th September 1969 which entered
into force on 20th June 1974.
[56] Adopted by the colloquium
on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and
Panama. held in Cartagena on 19-22 November 1984.
[57] The other salient features
of the OAU convention are that the ‘member states shall use their best
endeavours consistent with their respective legislations to receive refugees
and to secure the settlement of those refugees who for well founded reasons are
unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin or nationality”. It
contains provisions AGAINST the practices of NON ENTRÉE and UPHOLIND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON REFOULEMENT
[Article 2 Para3] which reads “ No person shall be subjected by a Member state
to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion which would
compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical
integrity or liberty would be threatened for the reasons set out in Article 1
Paragraphs 1 and 2 [ definitions ].
[58] It reiterates “ the
importance of the principle of Non Refoulement (including prohibition of
rejection at the frontier) as a corner stone of the international protection of
refugees”. It also mentions about the
setting up of refugee camps and settlements in frontier areas inland at a
reasonable distance from the frontier with a view to improving the protection
afforded to refugees, safeguarding their human rights and implementing projects
aimed at their self sufficiency and integration into the host society.
[59] Adopted and proclaimed by
the United Nations General Assembly vide Resolution 217 A (III) of 10th
December 1948.
[61] For
complete texts and other details see INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS ON REFUGEE
PROTECTION AND RELATED ISSUES, Volumes
I, II and III compiled by N.Subramanya for the Chair on Refugee Law at the
National Law School of India University, Bangalore, 2002
[62] Some of
them are regional instruments and as such their applicability is to the
respective regions but the principles contained in them are similar and are
worth a study.
[63] Adopted and opened for
signature, ratification and accession by the United Nations General Assembly
Resolution of 16th December 1966. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.
The main provisions of this convention which
was created to “… promote universal respect for and observance of human rights
and freedoms”, relate that everyone has the right to Life [Part III Article 6
Para 1] , liberty and security of person, freedom of thought, conscience and
religion, equal treatment in the courts among many other rights . This has
provided for Self-determination [ Part I Article 1] by virtue of which all
peoples freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development. No one shall be subjected to torture
[ Article 7], slavery [ Article 8],forced labour [Article 8] and arbitrary
interference in his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence. However “
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and
existence of which is officially proclaimed the States parties to the present
covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present
covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations
under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground
of race, color, sex, language , religion or social origin. [ Part II Article 4
Paragraph 1].
[64] Adopted for signature,
ratification and accession by the United Nations General Assembly resolution
dated 16th December 1966. The main provisions of this covenant are
that Everyone has the right to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions
at work, social security, an adequate standard of living, the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, education and to
take part in the cultural life and enjoy the benefits of scientific progress –
among other rights. International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
G.A. res.2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.
[65] Adopted and opened for
signature, ratification and accession by the United Nations General Assembly
resolution of 10th December 1984.
[66] Adopted and opened for
signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly on 20th
November 1989. RIGHTS
OF THE CHILD Declaration of the Rights of the Child,
G.A. res. 1386 (XIV), 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354
(1959).
Convention on the Rights of the Child,
G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989),
entered into force Sept. 2, 1990.
[67]
Adopted for signature, ratification and accession by the United Nations General
Assembly and entered into force on 3rd September 1981
[68]
The other international instruments for safe guarding human rights of women,
with relevance to the refugee issue are as follows.
Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, G.A. res. 54/4, annex, 54 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (Vol. I) (2000).
Convention on the Political Rights of
Women, 193 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force July 7, 1954.
Declaration on the Protection of Women
and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, G.A. res. 3318 (XXIX), 29 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 146, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women, G.A. res. 48/104, 48 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 217,
U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993).
Beijing Declaration and Platform of
Action, A/CONF.177/20 (1995) and A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995).
The Human Rights of Women: A Reference
Guide to official United Nations Documents
Draft Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Commission on the Status of Women U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/1999/10 (1999).
[69] Quoted in “Need for
national refugee law “ by V.Suryanarayan
[70] Full list of such
activities at pages 41-43 in the report on the Fifth Informal regional
consultations on refugee and migratory movements 1998.
[71] “Fifth Informal Regional
Consultation on Refugee and Migratory Movements” report , Kathmandu, Nepal 9-10
November 1998.
[72] I meeting at Geneva in
November 1994, II meeting at Colombo in
September 1995,III meeting at New Delhi in November ,1996, IV meeting
at Dhaka, November 1997, V meeting at Kathmandu November 1998.
[73] ibid
[74] Full text of paper at
pp29-35 of the report. In his paper Professor Dr V.Vijaya Kumar, Chair on
Refugee Law at National Law School of India University presented a paper titled
The need for a national legislation on refugees which critically evaluated the
current approach of the Government of
India towards refugees in light of constitutional provisions designed to
protect aliens. He argued that India’s membership in the Executive Committee of
the High Commission’s Programme (EXCOM) , the highest policy making body of
UNHCR obligated India both politically and morally to adopt national
legislation on refugees. Drawing on a number of decisions of the Supreme court
rulings in India, he pointed to an emerging legal framework. He argued that
national legislation should not be viewed as violations of state sovereignty ad
integrity but as formalizing India’s commitment to human rights. The paper stressed that having a national
law on refugees would ensure the protection of refugees, uphold the
constitutional provisions provided to ‘persons’, prevent discrimination from
policy makers with respect to particular groups of refugees, formalize
previously ad hoc policy and enable the Indian courts to better prevent
violations by administrative authorities
[75] p 45-51 of the report
[76] Ananthachari.T in “Refugees
in India : legal framework, law enforcement and security” 2000
[77] Most notably the Guwahati
High Court in Mr.Boggi v Union of India. “ The petitioner who is an under-trial
prisoner has approached us for allowing
him to go to Delhi to seek political asylum from UNHCR….the petitioner apprehended
that on expiry of his detention if he is deported to Burma his life would be in
danger. Therefore the petitioner prays
for granting an opportunity to enable him to make attempt to obtain political
asylum…We therefore direct the respondents [Union of India] to release the
prisioner..for a period of two months…” Civil Rule No 1847/89 Guwahati HC. A
similar case was in Ms.Zothansangbuii v State of Manipur
and others & in the case of an Iranian national in Seyed Mohammadi v Union of India
where in the petitioner was granted refugee status by the UNHCR and the court
ruled that “..there is no question of deporting the accused under the
circumstances”.( Criminal Writ Appeal No 1450 of 1994).
[78] Cr W.P 583/193 Supreme Court
of India
[79] Justice Shah relied on Article
73(1) of the Constitution which states “subject to the provisions of this
Constitution the executive power of the Union shall extend
[a] to the matters with respect to which
parliament has power to make laws and
[b] to the extent of such rights, authority
and jurisdiction as are exercisable by the Government of India by virtue of any
treaty or agreement”. He also relied on Article 253 “ Notwithstanding anything
in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter Parliament has power to make any
law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any
treaty, agreement to convention with any other country or countries or any
decision made at any international conference, association or other body”.
While the
Article conferred upon Parliament certain power it did not seek to circumscribe the extent of the power conferred by Article 73 “ Our Constitution makes no provision for making legislation as a condition of entering into an international treaty either in time of war or peace. The Executive is qua the State competent to represent the state in all matters international and may be an agreement, convention or treaties incur obligations which in international law are binding upon the state”.
Article conferred upon Parliament certain power it did not seek to circumscribe the extent of the power conferred by Article 73 “ Our Constitution makes no provision for making legislation as a condition of entering into an international treaty either in time of war or peace. The Executive is qua the State competent to represent the state in all matters international and may be an agreement, convention or treaties incur obligations which in international law are binding upon the state”.
[80] Colin Gonsalves in the article “ the somewhat
automatic integration of International refugee conventions in Indian law”,
Bulletin on IHL& Refugee law, Vol. 3 No 21 p 247
[81] 2000(2(SCC 465
[82] The purpose of this part is
to safeguard the basic human rights from the vicissitudes of political
controversies and to place them beyond the reach of political parties who by
virtue of their majority may come to form the government at the centre or in
the state.”.
[83] Article 20 provides
protection against conviction for offences and Article 22 Providing safeguard against
arbitrary arrest and detention.
[84]
The author carried out part of this research in her capacity as the WISCOMP
Scholar of Peace fellow for 2000-2001.
[85]
Syed Siskander Mehidi, “Chronicles of Sufferings.” Refugee
Watch. Nos. 10 & 11 (July, 2000) pp.33-34.
[86]
Etienne Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas:
Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and After Marx. Translated by James Swenson (New York: 1994)
pp.57-58.
[87]
Valentine M. Moghadam, “Gender,
National Identity and Citizenship.” Hagar: International Social Science Review,
Vol.I, No.1 (2000) p.42.
[88] I
have not included women who cross border motivated by economic concerns. I recognise the arbitrary nature and the
inherent difficulties of doing such an exercise because in South Asia
political, social and economic reasons for flight are often intertwined.
[89]
For a scholarly account of gender in the politics of partition refer to Ritu
Menon and Kamla Bhasin. Border and Boundaries: Women in India’s
Partition (Delhi: 1998) and Urvashi Bhutalia, Thes Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India
(Delhi: 1998).
[90] Paula
Banerjee, “Refugee Repatriation: A Politics of Gender.” Refugee Watch No. 1 (January, 1998) pp.8-9.
[92] Ritu
Menon and Kamla Bhasin, “Abducted women, the State and questions of Honour,” Gender Relations Project Paper 1 (Canberra:
1993) p.13.
[93]
Jan Jindy Pettman, “Boundary Politics: Women, Nationalism and Danger,” in New Frontiers in Women’s Studies: Knowledge,
Identity and Nationalism. Mary Maynard and June Purvis. eds. (London: 1996)
p.194.
[94]
Statistics on Bangladesh refugees is not easily. Sukumari Chowdhury suggested the percentage
to the author in September, 1996, in Calcutta.
[95]
Bolasn Gangopadhyay, “Reintegrating the Displaced Refracturing the Domestic: A
Report on the Experiences at Uday Villa,” Refugees
in West Bengal: Institutional Practices and Contested Identities. Pradip
Bose, ed. (Kolkatta: 2000) p.100.
[96]
Institutions such as Shesh Kiron in Varanasi and Amar Bari in Brindaban house
women refugees from Bangladesh.
[97]
Interviews taken by Subhoronjon Dasgupta.
Excerpts of the interview published in “Widows of Brindaban: Memories of
Partition,” Refugee Watch, Nos. 10 &
11 (July, 2000) pp.44-45.
[98] ibid.
[99] Derek
Summerfield, “The Social, Cultural and Political Dimensions of Contemporary
War,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival,
Vol. 13 (1997) p.7.
[100]
Irene Khan, “The Refugee Problem: A South Asian Perspective,” Peace Studies Reader, I (Forthcoming:
Sage 2001). The paper was presented in
Maulana Azad Institute of Asian Studies in 1997.
[101]
D. Kandiyoti, ed. Women, Islam and the
State (London: 1991) p.8.
[102]
Nirmala Chandrahasan, “A Precarious Refugee: A Study of the Reception of Tamil
Asylum Seekers in Europe, North America and India.” Harvard
Human Rights Yearbook, Vol. 2 (1989) pp.55-96.
[103]
B.S. Chimni. “The Legal Condition of Refugees in India,” Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol.7, No.4. (1994), p.385.
[104]
Asha Hans, “Sri Lanksn Tamil Refugees in India,” “Refuge, Vol. 13, No.3 (1993) p.30.
[105]
C. Amalraj, “Sri Lanka: The One-eyed Hope,” The
New Leader (1-15 June, 1995) p.19.
[106]
About 23 female suicide bombers died by March 1998. Source: Yerimalai Report.
[107]
Joke Schirjvers, “Constructing Womanhood, Tamilness and The Refugee,” in Selvy
Thiruchandran ed., Woman, Narration and
Nation: Collective Images and Multiples Identities (New Delhi: 1999) p.179.
[108]
“The Maid Running Madness,” South Asia
Refugee Information, Vol.3 (September, 1996) p.1. Also see “A Journey Without End: Sri Lankan
Tamil Refugees in India”, Refugee Watch,
No.2 (April, 1998) p.9-11.
[109]
“Refugee – The Human Cargo,” South Asia Refugee Information, Vol.5
(December, 1997) pp.5-6.
[110]
Dharini Rajhasingham-Senanayake analyses why pottu is a mark of challenge when
widows wear it as tradionally it is a mark of married women in “Post
Victiminisation: Cultural Transformation and Women’s Empowerment in War and
Displacement,” Selvy Thiruchandran ed., Women,
Narration and Nation: Collective Images and Multiple Identities (New Delhi:
1999) pp.136-151.
[111]
The author visited Alles Garden Camp Trincomalee on 24th and 25th
January, 2001.
[112]
Paula Banerjee, :Agomies and Ironies of War,” Refugee Watch, No.2 (April 1998) p.21.
[114]
“Hundreds of destitute Burmese asylum-seekers marooned on Guam” South China Morning Post, 6 February
2001, Source: Europe Intelligence Wire.
[115]
H.V. Stanley”Chin Refugees in India,” Refugee
Watch, No.13 (March 2001, Forthcoming).
[116]
Interview with the author on 20 September, 1998, in Dhaka.
[117]
“Trafficked from Hell to Hadis,” Report by Images
Asia (November 1999).
[118]
Soma Ghosal, :Stateless and Oppressed from Burma: Rohingya Women,” Refugee Watch, Nos. 10 & 11 (July
2000) p.15.
[119]
J.N. Dixit, An Afghan Diary: Zahir Shah
to Taliban, (New Delhi: 2000) p.495.
[120]
“Pakistan gets tough with refugees,” Inter
Press Service via News Edge Corporation, 5 February 2001. www.pcpafg.org.
[121]
Quoted in Syed Sikander Mehdi, “Chronicles of Sufferings – Refugee Women of
South Asia,” Refugee Watch Nos. 10 &
11 (July, 2000) p.35.
[122]
Atta ur Rehman Sheikh, “Women Refugees of Kot Chandana,” Refugee Watch, No.12 (December, 2000) pp.39-40.
[123]
Syed Sikander Mehdi, “Chronicles of Sufferings – Refugee Women of South Asia,” Refugee Watch Nos. 10 & 11 (July,
2000) p.35.
[124]
Kckondjo Kaapande and Shere Fenn, “Dislocated Subjects: The Story of Refugee
Women,” Refugee Watch Nos. 10 & 11
(July, 2000) p.28.
[125]
See National Human Rights Commission vs. Union of India (1996: 1 SCC 295); Also
Khudiram Chakma vs. Union of India (1994: Supplementary 1 SCC 614).
[126]
Interview with Yashoda in Sithamparapuram camp, Vavuniya, 22 April 1996.
[127]
Samir Das, “Ethnic Assertion and Women’s Question in Northeastern India,”
A.K.Jana, ed., Indian Politics at the
Crossroads (New Delhi: 1998) p.177.
[128]
J.H. Hre Man, Report on the Chin Refugees
in Mizoram State in India (New Delhi: 2000) p.10.
[129]
Figures taken from UNHCR reports at the end of 1998.
[130]
UNHCR, “Guidelines for Protection of Refugee Women,” EC/SC/67, Geneva, July
1991, para 53/la.
[131]
Cassandra Balchin, “United Against the UN: The UN Gender Mission
AttitudeTowards Afghan Women Refugees Within its Own Rank is Glaringly
Hypocritical,” Newsline (April,
1998), p.95.
[132]
Bolan Gangopadhyay, “Reintegrating the Displaced, Refracturing the Domestic: A
Report on the Experiences at Uday Vila.” Refugees
in West Bengal: Institutional Practices and Contested Identities, Pradip
Bose, ed., (Kolkatta: 2000) pp.98-105.
[133]
Manju Chattopadhyay, “Refugee Women of Bengal,” Refugee Watch Nos. 10 & 11 (July, 2000), pp.45 and 47.
[134] War has changed our Life not
our Spirit- Pg. 5 JRS Publ. Rome
Feb-2001.
[135] Fr.S.Singarayan SJ of the
Jesuit Refugee Service has been welcoming and taking care of the Pastoral needs
of the Srilankan Tamil refugees in the Mandapam Transit camp for Srilankan
Tamil refugees in India since 1996.
[136] SARI- South Asian Refugee
Information Feb 1998, publ by JRS South Asia .Fr.Jeyakumar, a Catholic priest
belongs to the Jaffna Diocese and lived with the displaced people in 1996 when
more than 500,000 people were displaced within three days.
[137] Displacement in
Srilanka-USCR Report 1997
[138] Ibid as above
[139] Ibid as above
[141] Kate de Rivero, War and its Impact on women in
Srilanka – Refugee Watch, June 2000
[142] Human Rights in Srilanka, Human Right Watch
2000 annual report
[144] Srilanka- Rape in Custody,
Amnesty International online report ASA 37/001/2002
See
Amnesty International report, Sri Lanka: Torture in custody (AI Index:
ASA 37/10/99) of June 1999 for more details on key aspects of torture,
including rape and deaths in custody. The paper comments on the legal,
institutional and political factors which allow these human rights violations
to happen and impede victims and their relatives from obtaining redress. The
current report should be read in conjunction with the above-mentioned report.
[145] These observations are based
on the author’s field visits to Srilanka’s cleared, uncleared areas as well as
the government hospitals in Mannar town and Vavuniya. The uncleared areas refer to land controlled
by the LTTE. The cleared areas are controlled
by the government troops.
[146] Paul Newman, Human Rights
Violations in Srilanka, Preventing Internal Flight Options –JRS South Asia
Publ, Bangalore. 1999
[147] The Indian Peace Keeping
Force was sent to Srilanka as part of the Indo-Srilankan Peace Accord of 1987,
concluded between the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and the Srilankan
President Mr. J.R. Jeyawardane.
[148] Nirupama Subramaniam, Women Tiger: How enabled are they? The Hindu, March 10, 2002.
[149] Ibid, 3
[150] Ibid,3
[151]
See Background Paper on Sri Lankan Refugees and Asylum Seekers,” Geneva: UNHCR
Centre for Documentation on Refugees, November 1994, pp.4-5; also Grenier,
Matthew, Protection Denied: Sri Lankan
Tamils, the Home Office and the forgotten civil war. London: The Refugee
Council, February 1997.
[152]
I borrow this expression from Paulo Freire, The method of using ‘generative
words’ was introduced and developed by the Brazilian pedagogue Paulo Freire in
his ‘educational base communities’ for his literacy campaigns for the peasants
in the huge cities of Brazil. See
Freire, Paulo, Pedagogy of the Oppressed.
New York: Seabury Press, 1968, pp.75-118.
[153]
The quality of village dogs has not improved a hair in the past decades. Miserable, mangy refugees from the happy
hunting grounds, they skulk around, apparently enduring a joyless, painful,
half-starved existence, only showing signs of life when threatened by their own
kind with the possibility of ending it.
Only crows, cats and small rodents show them respect. Those that range the lanes and roads and
slink about wherever human gather, particularly at public functions where they
vie with crows for crumbs and crusts, have neither personal appearance nor
charm of personality to appeal to the viewer.
Holmes, W. Robert, Jaffna (Sri Lanka) 1980. The Christian Institute for the Study of
Religion and Society of Jaffna College, 1980, pp.67-8.
[154]
For the debated concept of anomie, its development and applications see Orru,
Marco, Anomie: History and Meanings. Boston & London: Allen & Unwin 1987
and Passas, Nikos, Morton’s Theory of
Anomie and Deviance: An Elaboration. (Ph.D. Thesis), University of
Edinburgh, 1989. A good summary of the
concept’s development and a classified bibliography can be fojnd in Clinard,
Marshall Barron (ed.,), Anomie and Deviant
Behaviour: a Discussion and critique. New York: Free Press of Gencoe,
1964. A recent assessment can be found
in Passas, Nikos & Agnew, Rogert (eds,), The Future of Anomie Theory. Boston: Northwestern University Press,
1997.
[155]
See Durkheim, Emile. [Spaulding J.A. (tr.)] Suicide:
A Study in Sociology. New York: Free Press, 1951, pp.241-76.
[156]
Durkheim, Emile. (translated by W.D.Halls).
The Division of Labour in Society.
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984.
[157]
Levin, William C., Sociological Ideas –
Concepts and Applications. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing
Company, [1984] 1988, p.300.
[158]
For the study of ethnic conflict in a global perspective, see Horowitz, Donald
L., Wthnic Groups in Conflict,
London: University of California Press, 1985.
[159]
The UNESCO prepared a manual under the title Cultural Patterns and Technical Change under the direction and
editorship of the cultural anthropologist Margaret Mead. The insight underlying the entire project was
that rapid technical development led to the rapid social change and that entire
populations could not cope with such a change and consequently would fall under
the condition that Durkheim and others would call “anomic state”. See Mead, Margaret (ed.), Cultural Patterns and Technical Change.
(A Manual prepared by the World Federation for Mental Health), NY: The New
American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1961 (6th printing).
[160]
Levin William C., Sociological Ideas 0
Concepts and Applications, op.cit., p.299.
Further assessment of anomie
can be found in Merton, Robert K., Social
Theory and Social Structure, 2nd ed., New York: Free Press
[1949] 1968.
[161]
Durkheim, Emile [Spaulding J.A. (tr.)] Suicide:
A Study in Sociology, op.cit., p.248.
[162]
By the term ‘socialisation’ Sri Lankans mean getting together for some meaningful
prupose, and usually the fact of being together is the purpose of
socialisation, an end in itself.
[163]
For additional information on the meaning of oneness and belonging in Tamil
life, consult “The Ideology of Love” in Trawick, Margaret. Notes
on Love in a Tamil Family.
California: University of California Press, 1999, pp.89-116.
[164]
Fromm, Erich, Escape from Freedom.
NY: Avon Books, 1969 [1949], p.34.
[165] Ibid., p.34.
[166]
Paul Tournier narrates numerous clinical cases of mental disturbances resulting
mainly from the pervading feeling of loneliness among his patients. See Tournier, Paul, Escape from Loneliness.
Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962.
Both Erich Fromm and Paul Tournier agree that the sense of loneliness is
universal and often leads to a personal disintegration. Perhaps the difference between the solitude
of Tamils living in London and in the solitude of others living in their own
culture is a question of degree and diffusion, not of kind. It would be safe to say that, in London,
refugees in general, and Tamils in particular, suffer the melancholy of
solitude in a higher degree and more thoroughly than the rest of the
population.
[167]
Blauner, Robert. Alienation and Freedom: the factory worker and his industry. Chicago: University of Chivago Press, 1964,
p.22.
[168]
Tillich, Paul. The Courage to be. New Haven & London: Yale University Press,
1952, p.48.
[169] Ibid., pp.47-48.
[170] Ibid., p.48.
[171]
See Durkheim, Emile. Suicide: A Study in
Sociology, op.cit., p.252.
[172]
Personal meetings with UNHCR personnel, and individual refugees
[173]
Personal experience
[i] While I raise this question in the context of the denial of refugee
status to the Naga rebel leader Mr. T. Muivah, it is significant to note that
the issue of grant of refugee status as a part of reconciliation strategy
occurs albeit in an indirect way in the report on the recommendations of the UNHCR
Regional Symposium on Maintaining the Civilian and Humanitarian Character of
Asylum, Refugee Status, Camps, and Other Locations, 26-27 February 2001,
Pretoria. Paragraph 14 speaks of the right of the "deserters and others
who do not wish to return to the country of origin "to seek refugee
status. Paragraph 16 speaks of the "right of persons with a military
background to seek asylum".
[ii] For a general argument, Wenona Giles, Helene Moussa, and Penny van
Esterik (eds.), Development and Diaspora – Gender and the Refugee Experience
(Toronto: Artemis Enterprises, 1996); see also N. Kelly, "Gender Related
Persecution – Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women", Cornell
International Law Journal, 26, 1993.
[iii] Again my observations are in the context of total absence of any
sense of responsibility-sharing in South Asia at state level in terms of
refugee care, and the ethical source or absence of any sense of ethical
imperatives relating to that, the current protection literature on
responsibility sharing is increasingly recognizing the imperatives. Thus UNHCR
EXCOM resolutions or the European Council decisions (such as on 28 September
2000 establishing a European Refugee Fund, Official Journal L/252, 6 October
2000, p. 12) reflect a growing awareness of the ethical issues involved besides
material and financial. See also the section on "Sharing Responsibilities
More Equitably" in the Report of
the Second Global Consultations on International Protection
specifically dealing with asylum processes, EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 2001.
[iv] On this see, Pia Oberoi, "South Asia and the Creation of the
International Refugee Regime", Refuge, 19 (5), May 2001, pp. 36-45.
[v] See in this context the Report of the Asia-Pacific Seminar of
Experts on Migrants and Trafficking in Persons with particular reference to
Women and Children, 5-7 September 2000, Bangkok, which in Paragraph 1 of
its Conclusions admitted that "migration concerned the movement of people
within across national borders and that people migrated inter alia because of poverty, perceived deprivation, racial
discrimination, internal conflicts, lack of opportunity, discrimination against
women, and to reunite separated families". The same report also spoke of
legislative and other institutional inadequacies in protecting migrants and
victims of trafficking in persons.
[vi] There is now a growing awareness of the inadequacy of existing
institutional system of protection in situation of mass influx for the overall
protection framework, prima facie determination on group basis, temporary
protection, civilian character of asylum and screening of armed elements as
well as status and treatment of ex-combatants, registration, mechanisms of
responsibility-sharing, preventive strategies, and humanitarian evacuation and
transfer. See for example, the Report of Global Consultations on
International Framework, EG/GC/01/8, 20 April 2001.
[vii] It is interesting to note that in his address to the Roundtable
Workshop on Refugees in the SAARC Region, the President of SAARCLAW (India
Chapter), A.M. Singhvi, while admitting that these questions of state
obligations need to be viewed in the context of human rights, did not feel
necessary to feature the refugee as a determining agent in the matter. The
debate on the need for a national refugee law in India and the work on a model
law has been conducted often from a courtroom angle, and not from the
perspective of massive and mixed flows – though it must be admitted that such
debate represents a clear advance from the earlier state of affairs in policy
matters. On the address, see, “Report on Roundtable Workshop on Refugees in the
SAARC Region – National Legislation on Refugees”, SAARCLAW and UNHCR, New
Delhi, 30 April 1999; pp. 13-18.
[viii] I refer here to the title of Gil Loescher and John Scanlan, Calculated
Kindness – Refugees and America’s Half-Open Door, 1945-Present (New York:
Free Press, 1986).
[ix] Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, trans.
Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 16.
[x] Steve Hindle, “Dearth, Fasting and Alms – the Campaign for General
Hospitality in Late Elizabethan England”, Past and Present, 172, August
2001, pp. 44-86.